Recovering the Vision of Holiness: Wesley’s Epistemic Basis

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Students of Wesley’s doctrine of sanctification have characteristically approached the subject by considering its nature and purpose in his thought. However, little attention has been given to the distinctive mode of understanding reality that lay at the heart of his vision of holiness. Our concern here will be to explore the vital relationship between epistemology and holiness with a view toward illuminating the meaning of that mode of knowing that became increasingly prominent in his mature thought.1 It is our contention that a failure to identify that way of perceiving reality seriously compromises any effort to understand and appropriate the doctrine of Christ’s sanctifying grace as taught by John Wesley. Also, his view of the integral linkage between our mode of understanding inherent within saving faith and our being in Christ helps to illuminate Wesley’s distinctiveness with reference to the heritage of the Protestant Reformation as well as other seminal representatives of the Anglo-American evangelical awakenings of the eighteenth century.

FAITH AND KNOWING IN THE WESLEYAN MODE

There has been disagreement in recent studies as to which philosophers were most influential in the formation of Wesley’s religious epistemology. Brantley and Dreyer have emphasized the role of John Locke and Peter Browne, both empiricists.2 Shimizu has pointed to the linkage between Wesley and Malebranche, a Cartesian rationalist.3 English chooses to stress Wesley’s agreement with the Cambridge Platonists, and Outler, in his notes on Wesley’s sermons, highlights the influence from Christian Platonism, as mediated by “the Alexandrines, Bonaventura, the Cambridge Platonists, Malebranche, and specially John Norris.”4 In a critique of this literature in a

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recent unpublished paper,⁵ Rex Matthews has argued quite persuasively for the primacy of traditional, Aristotelian reasoning, with its empirical tendencies, as mediated to Wesley by his Oxford tradition.⁶

It is understandable that there should be such diverse proposals in view of Wesley’s wide-ranging reading and eclectic reflection, particularly in those subjects outside his core of essential doctrines, that were original sin, justification, and sanctification.⁷ Laurence Wood contextualized the issue in the light of Wesley’s day when he noted, “Whereas the great metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century—Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz—saw reason to be the realm of eternal truths held in common by the human and the divine mind, the eighteenth-century thinkers looked upon reason as an intellectual activity.”⁸

Given the diversity of Wesley’s sources, what form did his reflections on the relation between faith and knowing take, especially in those mature years, when he was seeking to guide the later course of the Evangelical Revival? These reflections are both apologetic and homiletic. In his An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1743), Wesley presented his most detailed exposition of epistemology within an apologia for the presence of Methodism as an evangelical order within the Anglican state church. In his later sermons on knowing God,⁹ he presented this perspective with homiletical force as biblical and doctrinal exposition.

Let us first consider the structure of his argument in An Earnest Appeal. Here Wesley was addressing a national church that was hampered by deism and by religious formalism that was frequently anti-Methodist in bias. In A Farther Appeal (1745), he also compared Methodism with the beliefs of those sects that had proliferated as Dissenters in Stuart and Hanoverian England.¹⁰ The Appeals have ordinarily been read as a defense of the legitimacy of Methodism, with its roots in Anglicanism and its record of service to that tradition. More important for our purpose is its record of Wesley’s epistemological reflections.

Addressing an unsympathetic, non-Methodist audience, Wesley demonstrated his capacity to contextualize his message amid skeptics, preserving his soteriological intentions without introducing the doctrinal terminology that was indispensable for the Methodist. His purpose was to convince “either men of no religion at all or men of a lifeless, formal religion” that “there is a better religion to be attained.”¹¹ He never minimized the importance of correct doctrine, but here his concern was, in Cragg’s words, to describe “a life inwardly encircled by every spiritual grace and outwardly set free from the oppression of evil.”¹²

Further, the definition of faith that Wesley offered in the Appeal is intimately joined to a transcendent and yet sensible (e.g., empirical) discernment of
divine Presence. "Faith," he wrote, "is that divine evidence whereby the
spiritual man discerneth God and the things of God. It is with regard to the
spiritual world what sense is to the natural."13 He was describing a disposition
that is basic to all that might be said about the Christian faith. Here is "the
spiritual sensation of every soul that is born of God."14 It is "the eye of the
newborn soul," whereby every true believer sees "the light of the glory of God
in the face of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. 4:6).15 It is the "ear of the soul, whereby a
sinner 'hears the voice of the Son of God and lives'" (John 5:25). It is the
"palate of the soul," whereby a believer "tastes the good word, and the
powers of the world to come" (Hebrews 6:5). It is also the "feeling of the soul,
"whereby a believer perceives "the love of God shed abroad in his heart"
(Romans 5:5).16

Wesley upheld the doctrine of prevenient, resistible grace,17 that places the
initiative in salvation with God, in contradistinction to Pelagian humanism.
This doctrine also requires an appropriate (i.e., repentant) human response,
in contradistinction to the capriciousness of the Calvinistic Deity. Saving
faith, grounded in Christ's pardoning and sanctifying grace, is the gift of God.
It effects a new creation for the ungodly who plead God's mercy in Christ.18
At the heart of this divine-human synergism lies a God-given "spiritual
sense," a supernaturally-bestowed faculty that is not to be confused with the
"moral sense," a natural human faculty for the ethical life that was posited by
Wesley's contemporary, Frances Hutcheson.19 As Matthews has observed,20
the truth available through the spiritual senses represents a higher criterion
for truth than the "moral certitude" lauded by the moralists of Wesley's day.
It also takes into consideration the reality of the fall. This spiritual sense is
presented in the Appeal according to the logic of empirical thinking, with
supernatural sense experience yielding clear ideas, that in turn lead to true
judgments and proper reasoning.21

In his Farther Appeal22 Wesley took pains to distinguish this spiritual sense
from the Quaker doctrine of the inspiration of the Spirit.23 In his day Quakers
were rightly fearful of "formality in public worship," but he implied that they
had failed to apply with consistency this principle in the affairs of daily life as
well.24 Formality "can have no place in anything we say or do but so far as we
forget God!"25 Of interest to us here is his comment that the Methodist is one
who consistently acknowledges this inward principle as "the obedient love of
God by the supernatural knowledge of God."26 This gracious knowledge
cannot "begin, or subsist one moment, without immediate [supernatural]
inspiration," and all that does not spring from this faith is sin.27

Wesley suggested in one line of thought that this spiritual sense is awakened
by removing the veil of sin from our damaged physical senses. In this regard,
grace functions as a liberating power. In this sermon, "On Living Without
God," Wesley related a story of a toad that was encased alive in a giant oak
tree.28 When the oak was cut down at an age of more than one hundred years,
the toad crept away. Speculating that this toad may have lived its entire life in this tree, Wesley wondered what sort of existence would have been possible that was devoid of all sensation. The senses had been dormant, and now they had been awakened to their rightful use. Likewise, all who are born of the Spirit find that the veil is removed and their senses now function to discern the eternal world of God, for which they had been intended. Similarly, in “The Privilege of Those that are Born of God,” Wesley argued from the analogy of the newborn child who, with “senses shut up” in his prenatal life in the womb, had “scarce any intercourse with this world.”

There is a further dimension than liberation, for in other places Wesley thought of grace as transformation. In his Appeals, he does not envision the mere liberation of the natural senses by grace. Instead, the new birth supplies

>a new class of senses opened in your soul, not depending on organs of flesh and blood to be the evidence of things not seen as your bodily senses are of visible things, to be the avenues to the invisible world, to discern spiritual objects and to furnish you with ideas of what the outward eye hath not seen, neither the ear heard (I Cor. 2:9).

Until the “eyes of the understanding” are opened by these “internal senses,” there can be for Wesley no apprehension of divine truth, “no idea of them at all.”

Interpreters of the so-called Wesleyan quadrilateral have frequently interpreted reason in a wholly natural sense, to mean either common sense or the “critical analysis” to which doctrines must be submitted “so that they may commend themselves to thoughtful persons as valid.” However, it is clear from his argument in the Appeals he was speaking here of “eternal reason,” or that faculty of discourse that relates to supernatural reality.

He agreed with the “men of reason” that seekers of true religion should “use all the reason which God hath given them in searching out the things of God.” Nevertheless, the qualification that may not be disregarded is that proper reasoning always presupposes “true judgments already formed whereon to ground your argumentation.” He cited the traditional Oxford, Aristotelian logic for support: “ex falso non sequitur verum,” or “it is impossible, if your premises are false, to infer from them true conclusions.” Wesley’s line of argument is masterful. He related to his antagonists by appealing to the canon of rationality that was so much in vogue in his day: “Now, if you are a reasonable man, . . . .” At that point he shifted the locus of his argument to that reason supplied supernaturally in the gift of “internal senses,” whereby the believer discerns “objects of a spiritual kind.” These are not innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense, for Wesley held that our ideas, whether they be natural or spiritual, “are not innate, but must originally come from the senses.” What remained for Wesley is a kind of epistemological
dualism that operates within the believer. He is equipped with his natural senses for bodily perception and with a new complement of spiritual senses to discern the spiritual world. Cell has referred to this epistemology rooted in the spiritual senses as a "transcendental empiricism."  

Wesley clearly grounded his presentation of spiritual reality in his biblicism, unlike such spiritualists as Jakob Boehme.  

Virtually every point in his argument in the *Appeals* contains a citation from Scripture. Hence, to speak of reasoning from the basis of the "spiritual senses" is to portray "scriptural Christianity." Wesley insisted, "We appeal to this, to the written Word [of Scripture], if any man's temper, or words, or actions, are contradictory to right reason, it is evident to a demonstration they are contradictory to this."  

The close correlation between a "reasonable Christianity," grounded in the spiritual senses, and the truly moral life, that the preceding citation suggests, brings us to the heart of our concern. For Wesley, there was no possibility of a believer operating at the level of spiritual discernment who is not also manifesting the fruit of Christian holiness. This correlation is less evident in the *Appeals*, where he was speaking "to those chiefly who do not receive the Christian system as of God."  

However, in his doctrinal sermons on the knowledge of God, the connection is unmistakable. This linkage appears where he described the contrast between the unregenerated and the regenerated person in terms of the lifting of "a thick impenetrable veil." It entails the unlocking of the spiritual senses (liberation), and the quickening of a continual breathing of God upon the soul and of the soul unto God as "a kind of spiritual respiration" (transformation). The foremost reason he offered for this account of the new birth is its necessity "in order to holiness." Holiness is not a "bare external religion." It is the inward renewal of the *imago Dei*, being "the whole mind which was in Christ Jesus," and consisting of "all heavenly affections and tempers mingled together in one."  

In these later sermons, Wesley underscored the relation between the "spiritual senses" of faith and his empiricist epistemology. Having laid the groundwork in the *Appeals*, he could explore the richness of the imagery of the "invisible world" through a host of homiletical images, as in the metaphor of the toad in the oak tree. Throughout this literature he was arguing that the spiritual senses provide the indispensable basis for all knowledge of God, although a degree of non-salvific knowledge about God is certainly attainable on other grounds, as by an appeal to historical tradition. However, to "walk by faith and not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7) requires the gift of new senses, "exercised to discern spiritual good and evil." Even the most excellent of our natural senses cannot attain the direct, saving knowledge of God, and not even "boasted reason," since "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu": Nothing is in the understanding which was not first perceived by some of the senses." Understanding is absent where it has "nothing to work upon."
It is apparent that God, by virtue of His prevenient grace in Christ, has permitted some "streaks of light" from the invisible world whereby mankind can infer the existence of his Creator, thereby preventing his "utter darkness." Nevertheless, apart from the biblical revelation, these small "glimmerings of light" remain "merely conjectural," being derived from an "uncertain tradition." Further, it is the reigning power of sin, tied to the non-Christian's insatiable desire for knowledge, that always exceeds the bounds of his actual knowledge. Accordingly, he chose to reserve the phrase "Divine Revelation" to the full biblical disclosure of the "Sun of Righteousness." Only by entering into His holiness, by the way of the cross, are our spiritual senses awakened, whereby we may see and walk according to "things invisible and eternal."

For Wesley, each aspect of God's saving grace in Christ, as disclosed in "The Scripture Way of Salvation," had its indispensable role in the fashioning of one who seeks "not only the form but the power of godliness." This applies to justification, the "relational" grace of pardon, and sanctification, the "real" grace that enables a regenerated life, even unto the attainment of perfection in Christ's love. Underlying the entire dynamic of our existence in and through the Holy One, Jesus Christ, is the new way of perceiving the reality of God that exists by virtue of that renewed faculty, the spiritual senses.

A lively, constant communion with God in Christ through these senses prevents the moral life from being hypocritical and self-defeating. By living for the eternal, the believer learns to judge temporal things as good or evil insofar as these promote or hinder his eternal welfare. This becomes the norm for regulating the physical tempers, thoughts, and actions, that is finally actualized in the grace of entire sanctification, toward which everyone who is being saved is either fervently pressing or vigilantly maintaining. In Wesley's judgment, the scandal of unholiness, particularly dissipation in any form, is that it is the act of "forgetting God." "It is a total studied inattention to the whole invisible and eternal world," and to death and its consequences in particular.

As a concluding note in one of his last sermons, "On Faith" (1791), Wesley reflected on those spiritual senses with which the redeemed will be supplied in the state of glory. In this context, the "objects of the spiritual world" refer not to the revealed truths of Scripture but to a realm of discernment for which we are not yet equipped. When the believer attains this state he will be able to "penetrate the inmost substance of things, whereof we now discern only the surface."

In these sermons from the older Wesley one can also glean some important delimitations that he came to place upon his concept of faith as a spiritual
discernment. In the sermon on "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge," he observed that the gift of holy discernment does not extend to an understanding of why some persons experience the knowledge of holiness before others do, nor why others do not retain the gift of sanctifying grace once it has been received. Wesley cautioned that "we do not herein know the mind of the Spirit." In "The Case of Reason Impartially Considered," he argued that divine revelation and the gift of faith may not be founded upon private imagination or dreams, since that could lead to a vilification of reason as well as the norm of Scripture. Also, in the sermon "On Living Without God," Wesley affirmed that, however important may be that discernment that is grounded in the spiritual senses, the final test of faith is praxis, not cognition. "I believe the merciful God regards the lives and tempers of men more than their ideas."

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF WESLEY'S DOCTRINE OF FAITH AS SPIRITUAL DISCERNMENT

Having examined several key features in Wesley's epistemology, what can be said concerning the distinctiveness of his approach with respect to the meaning of religious truth? Three observations will be offered.

First, Wesley's epistemological instructions contributed to an understanding of grace and faith that exceeds the positions held by the major representative of the Protestant Reformation. For the mature Luther, grace was conceived as God's unmerited good will (beneficium) to sinful humanity, in distinction from the Roman concept of sacramental grace. Also, faith was not a cognitive assent to doctrinal truth; rather, it was a personal trust (fiducia) in the saving merit of Jesus Christ. By such faith, as the gift of God, a sinner enters into the "wonderful exchange" (frohliche Wechsel) of his unrighteousness for Christ's righteousness. As a forgiven sinner, the believer may take no credit for this imputed righteousness. Further, since reason rests upon and only accepts what "she either sees or feels,... in matters of faith, one must simply cling to the bare Word, close one's eyes, blind one's reason, and simply open one's ears and take God at his word."

This understanding of grace and faith from the standpoint of imputed righteousness led Luther to relegate sanctification to a secondary and derivative status. Insofar as one's righteousness unto salvation is grounded in Christ and not in one's own degree of intrinsic righteousness, the believer is bound to remain a sinner even unto the day of his death. His existence in Christ is to remain a life outside his former autonomous, sinful self, that was under the judgement of the law. Similarly, to allow natural reason any constructive role in the exercise of Christian faith is to introduce an autonomous and corrupted element that is foreign to the kingdom of Christ. The wisdom of the cross, which he does recognize as being a theological kind
of reason, always defies and stands in juxtaposition to the wisdom of this world.

It is well known that, for Wesley, grace was more than forensic pardon; as he stated in his “instruction to children,” it is “the power from on high” to lead a new life. The focus is not only upon liberation and acceptance; it is transformation. As a corollary, faith involves more than the aspect of childlike trust (fiducia) in Christ’s merits for our pardon. To be sure, that is the foundation for saving faith, as distinct from a non-salvific cognitive assent to doctrinal truth (historica fides). But implicit in this act of trust is a spiritual discernment, based upon spiritual senses graciously given to the believer in the act of regeneration. This discernment enables the believer to recognize and receive the “things of God”—including Christ’s gifts of pardon and new life—that are founded upon the “oracles of God” (Scripture). It is this discernment that also enables him to perceive Christ in his neighbor. A common thread throughout his accounts of this spiritual discernment is that it is a holy discernment. It is life lived in acknowledgment of God’s holy Presence infusing all reality. Without this vision, admonitions to Christian holiness are bound to be perverted by a lifeless legalism. With this vision, the life that is disciplined by the moral law becomes the transparent vehicle of saving grace.

Outler is to be credited for helping us to see the contrast between Wesley and the Protestant Reformers with reference to the doctrine of faith. He asserted that Luther taught sola fide, whereas Wesley heralded “by faith primarily,” since “faith is in order to love.” However, if Wesley’s epistemology is brought to bear upon this issue, a deeper insight is brought to light. He did not so much describe a movement from a passive stance (faith as trust in Christ, resulting in pardon) to an active one (love as witness to Christ in word and deed), as he redefined the nature of saving faith in each moment of its operation. At each point it is a holy discernment, through the agency of the Holy Spirit, of all reality in and through Jesus Christ, from pardon to empowerment for transformed, Spirit-led living, to the perception of the “eternal world” that is possible only by the believer’s “spiritual senses.”

It would also follow that Wesley’s positive evaluation of reason exceeded the requirements of his apologetic intentions in the Appeals, and yet it does not represent a retrenchment from his commitment to be a homo unius libri. Luther had opposed natural reason as a component in saving faith. Hence, the majority of his references to “Frau Hulda” (reason) are negative, although he makes occasional references to reason enlightened by the Word to become the servant of faith. When Wesley spoke of reason within the context of faith, he too did not have in mind “bare” reason, unaided by the illumination of the Holy Spirit. The sort of reason that Wesley was advocating in his account of spiritual discernment was a mode of perception,
based in the revelation of Scripture and in new faculties of sensation, that are in some measure analogous to the operation of natural reason at the old, unregenerated level.

Second, attending to Wesley’s epistemology enables us to sharpen our awareness of his distinctiveness as a pastor-theologian with reference to his Reformed counterparts in the religious awakenings of the eighteenth century. In particular, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) among the New England Puritans also linked saving faith with the praxis of holiness. However, the manner of that linkage differed to some extent for each. The issue of epistemology provides a key to their differences.

Edwards’s epistemology, which I have developed in detail elsewhere, may be summarized by noting the central argument of his youthful Notes on the Mind and also his mature work, The Freedom of the Will. Like Wesley, he showed a conscious influence from Locke’s empiricism. Similarly, he also posited a doctrine of spiritual senses that relate to the transcendent realm of divine truth. Despite this similarity, he also turned his argument against the Arminian defenders of free will. However, the Arminian doctrine of free grace, as held by Wesley, should properly be distinguished from the proto-Unitarian humanism of Edwards’s antagonists, Chubb and Watts, who were also given the Arminian label.

Whereas Wesley suggested the operation of two parallel systems of sense faculties, one for the natural and the other for the supernatural “worlds,” Edwards sought to demonstrate the ontological unity between the two realms. Wesley frequently stated that he was not concerned with the manner in which metaphysical entities are related, but only with their operation. Metaphysical issues are more meticulously addressed by Edwards, although he too would agree that they are finally only resolved by faith. He criticized Locke’s assumption that the existence of physical entities is upheld by invisible substances that are not empirically knowable to the mind. Edwards concluded that Locke’s postulate was a metaphysical fiction. The existence of things in space, whose attributes are knowable empirically, is not dependent upon an invisible network of such substances. Neither is the present moment of time dependent upon the succession of past moments for its existence, since the past is also beyond our empirical grasp. Hence, concluded Edwards, all things which now exist in space and in time do so by the direct, unmediated agency of the presence and power of God.

This omnipresent and sovereign God is savingly known to the eyes of faith through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. With Wesley, Edwards would emphasize that the act of regeneration requires an intentionality of will on the part of the seeker. This is reflected in Edwards’s concern for holy affections and Wesley’s expression that Methodists are to “desire to flee the wrath to come.” Edwards’s ultimate norm in explaining the act of regeneration, as
was Wesley's, was not natural reason but Scripture, the locus of salvific truth. Wesley spoke in more synergistic terms of one freely receiving Christ's saving benefits with the assistance of prevenient grace. Edwards was a stricter monergist, arguing that God's sovereign Presence, filling all reality, temporal and eternal, and directing all things, influences and empowers one to receive Christ's saving grace when it is proclaimed. "The will is as the most apparent good is," wrote Edwards. Edwards's Word acts to determine, by which he means to influence decisively in a moral and not a natural sense, one's capacity to discern and to will life in Christ. Wesley would agree with Edwards that there is no freedom in a dormant, inactive will. Wills, that is persons, are only free as they are graciously motivated to act as God wills. For Wesley though, the focus is upon those new spiritual senses that transcend the natural. Here is the locus of the Spirit's regenerative work. Edwards, however, examined the nature of ordinary human activity and proceeded to describe the act of faith as an operation of these functions from a theonomous and not an autonomous (or sinful) standpoint.

Aside from Wesley's disavowal of Edwards's predestinarianism, both men affirmed the primacy of grace as divine pardon and power for holy living. Both men also presented faith as a holy, supernatural discernment of the saving "things of God," thereby extending its activity beyond the polarity of either a lifeless historical faith or a non-rational commitment to fiducia.

*Third,* Wesley's epistemological thought in his *Earnest Appeal* reflects a mode of Christian witness that entered into an eclipse in later generations of Methodism. It was noted that his argument here, being directed to a non-Methodist audience, explicitly avoided the use of "heavy" doctrinal terminology, such as discussions of justification or sanctification, that is so important in his doctrinal sermons and treatises. He was also communicating the message of scriptural holiness by contextualizing it, without neutralizing it, in the thought patterns of the eighteenth-century "men of reason and religion."

Robert Chiles has demonstrated how later American Methodism replaced distinctive emphases of Wesley's theology with concepts from latter-day liberal theology, including personalism (e.g., the transition from "revelation to reason," from "sinful man to moral man," and from "free grace to free will"). Could it not be that the failure of later Methodism to think theoretically about the meaning of faith in a convincingly Wesleyan mode helped render it susceptible to such heterodoxy? Such departures were forthcoming without Wesley's dynamic understanding of faith as a holy discernment of God, self, and the world. This loss of this outlook also made it possible for his more conservative spiritual heirs to lapse into a moralism in which ethics could at times be divorced from the witness of a vital, living Christian faith.
CONCLUSION

By extending Lockean empiricism to the sphere of the supernatural, Wesley concluded that all genuine knowledge of God was grounded in the "spiritual senses" by which saving faith operates, in accordance with Hebrews 11:1. Here was an epistemological base for his biblical theology of life in the Spirit, that would be a life of genuine holiness. It was to be far more than either a system of doctrinal belief (assensus) or a pardon for sin (fiducia). It was the discovery of a new world. It also reflected an outlook which resembles, although with important differences, that of his American Puritan counterpart in the Great Awakening, Jonathan Edwards.

It is noteworthy that Wesley concluded his sermon that defends the role of reason in theology with the recognition that natural reason should be used "as far as it will go." At the same time, real virtue, rooted in genuine faith, is to be sought as the gift of God. Only then does one ascend to the level of holy, spiritual discernment and living that the present world does not know.

"So shall you be living witnesses, that wisdom, holiness, and happiness are one; are inseparably united; and are, indeed, the beginning of that eternal life which God hath given in his Son."

Notes


6. For example, Matthews cites Wesley's testimony in "A Plain Account of the Kingswood School," (1781), Works, Volume 13, pp. 296-300.
7. These are found in the doctrinal summaries in the minutes of the Conferences of 1744-1747, *Works*, Volume 8, pp. 275-338.


9. See note 1 above.


11. *An Earnest Appeal* (1743), paragraph 2, in Gragg, op. cit., p. 45.

12. Ibid., p. 39; see also paragraphs 2 and 3.

13. Ibid., paragraph 6.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., paragraph 7.

16. Ibid.

17. Wesley found scriptural support for this doctrine in John 1:9; see “The Scripture Way of Salvation,” *Works*, Volume 6, p. 44.

18. *An Earnest Appeal*, paragraph 1, p. 45.


20. Matthews, p. 56.

21. *An Earnest Appeal*, paragraph 32, p. 56. Matthews (op. cit., p. 26) would argue that this merely resembles Locke, but in fact reflects Wesley’s reliance upon traditional Aristotelian empirical reasoning.

22. Part II, paragraphs 3-10, pp. 252-260.

23. Wesley bases these reflections upon Romans 8:14 and Galatians 5:18; Part II, paragraph 8, p. 257.

24. Ibid., paragraph 10, p. 259f.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., paragraph 8, p. 258. (underlining supplied)

27. Ibid., an allusion to Romans 14:23. (enclosure mine)


29. Ibid.


32. Ibid., paragraph 33.


35. Ibid., paragraph 31.
36. Ibid., paragraph 21.
38. *Appeals*, paragraph 12.
39. Ibid., paragraph 32.
40. Ibid.
42. In his *Journal* entry for June 4, 1742, Wesley refers to Boehme's mysticism as follows: "It is the most sublime nonsense; inimitable bombast; fistian not to be paralleled!" *Works*, Volume 1, p. 375f.
43. *Appeals*, paragraph 27.
44. Ibid., paragraph 38.
46. Ibid., p. 71, paragraph 4.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. See above, p. 7.
51. Ibid., p. 258, paragraph 7.
52. Ibid.
53. Wesley again cites John 1:9 to buttress this point.
54. P. 258, paragraph 8-9, op. cit.
58. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Ibid.


66. Ibid., p. 351, paragraph 2.


68. Ibid., p. 354.

69. In the Roman view, grace as *sacramentum* was procured by the priest for the faithful in his office as Christ's vicar in the sacrifice of the mass. See the discussion in Bard Thompson, editor, *The Creeds of the Western Church*, (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961), p. 27ff.


75. Ibid.

76. This helps to account for the early Methodist and Pietist terminology of "breaking through" to salvation, that contrasted with the Lutheran and Moravian emphasis upon a more passive trust in the sovereign Presence of God's Word. See Wesley's controversy with the Moravians, as found in his *Journal* entries for November 1, 1739-September 3, 1741.


78. *An Earnest Appeal*, p. 56, paragraph 32.

79. Philip William Otterbein among the German Reformed and the United Brethren in Christ also reflected this linkage, although he rested his epistemology upon Ramistic basis. See my forthcoming article in *Methodist History* entitled "The Hermeneutic of the Otterbeins."


82. e.g., *Works*, Volume 6, p. 204.

86. Edwards distinguishes between determination based on physical coercion, as in the case of physical laws of nature, and determination based upon moral persuasion, as in the attraction of love that binds persons in human communities. He argues that God operates with humans according to the latter model of determination. See Edwards, pp. 156-162.
88. Chiles, op. cit.