Book Reviews


"Engaging" describes Jack Sasson's treatment of the book of Jonah. This monumental work—one of the longest, if not the longest commentary on Jonah in print—is actually interesting, and will prove so, I think, to readers of divergent understandings of Jonah. Sasson, chair of the department of religious studies at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), has produced a work particularly strong at two points: it's penetrating textual notes and its appreciation for the book of Jonah as a powerful literary work.

Sasson's textual notes scrutinize every syllable of the Massoretic text and do so in sophisticated conversation with all significant versions and textual witnesses, ancient and modern. But he is not stuck on syllables. He proves a master of differentiating words and expressions and discerning their possible meanings. The grammatical, syntactical, lexical and philological studies which occupy the bulk of the work rarely disappoint. In spite of Mr. Sasson's hopes to the contrary (p. xi), I fear these excellent notes will be of limited value to persons without facility in the biblical languages. Fortunately, their results are translated into "readable prose" in the much more abbreviated "comments" on each passage. Sasson's carefully crafted, lively translation of the book distills this literary finesse. Printed as a whole at the opening of the work, it is repeated, unit by unit, as the commentary unfolds (following here, as at almost all other points, the standard format of *The Anchor Bible* series).

In the Comments, Sasson "engages the narrator on how characters are made to behave and how events are plotted" (p. xii), indicating the literary/narrative-critical vantage point from which this commentator approaches the story of Jonah. His careful work along these lines, including attention to the micro- and macro-rhetorical and narratological features of the text treated in the textual notes, is the second major strength of this study. This focus allows the interpreter to pursue whatever historical background he deems necessary for understanding the narrative world of the book of Jonah while avoiding entanglement in any specific historical reconstruction as critical to his interpretation. Thus, Sasson clears the way for concentration on what Jonah might really be about.

Unfortunately, it is precisely at this point that the commentary's chief flaws emerge. What does Sasson think the book of Jonah is really about anyway? And what difference would it make? In this reader's judgment, Sasson seems overly
eager to avoid the conclusion that Jonah may indeed be a "narrow little man." Concern about abuses of such a conclusion to "censure Judaism and Jewish attributes" seem to keep Sasson from tracking the narrator's own focus. The writer, unflattering as it may be, seems indeed to have pitched Jonah's argument with God precisely at the point of the Lord's compassion toward Nineveh (p. 274 and note 7, among several similar references). The link of 4:1-2 with 3:5-10 and the return to this very question in 4:10-11 are ill explained on other grounds. Crises of prophetic identity, individual human dignity and the like could just as readily have been clearly flagged by the narrator, but they were not.

Exclusion of this interpretive option early on entails other unfortunate results. In this student's judgment, Sasson overestimates the depth of Jonah's spiritual reversal on board ship and in the belly of the big fish, neglects the nonpenitential literary form of the 2:2-9 psalm, fails to pursue clues to the nature of Jonah's activity in Nineveh deftly identified on pp. 236-237, trivializes God's questions to Jonah in 4:4 and 9 to queries about the intensity of Jonah's emotional response, and inadequately explains God's redirection of Jonah's frustration and the point of God's final questions. Finally, in the concluding review of various interpretive approaches to the Jonah narrative (pp. 321-351), as in the abbreviated Introduction (pp. 7-29), Sasson treats positions, some of which one would think to be mutually exclusive, so evenhandedly that this reader at least wished for a clearer summary of Sasson's own views.

Even so, readers of Sasson's Jonah will find a wealth of information with which to pursue their own interpretation of the book. Weakness at several strategic points prevents the work from being as useful as a guide to understanding the work as a whole as it is for the examination of the details of most of its parts.

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As Bandy Professor of Preaching and New Testament at the Candler School of Theology, and as a preacher of remarkable skill and reputation, Craddock seems the ideal contributor to a commentary series which intends to serve those "who teach, preach, and study the Bible in the community of faith" (p. v). Throughout
the entire volume the reader feels the guiding touch both of a teacher wellversed in the issues of biblical criticism, and of a preacher well at home in the pulpit.

The preacher in Craddock appears early, as he reflects on Simeon’s warning to Mary (that a sword would pierce her soul, 2:25): “As much as we may wish to join the name of Jesus only to the positive, satisfying, and blessed in life, the inescapable fact is that anyone who turns on the light creates shadows...and it is this reality which causes many to take up the task of preaching with great hesitation..." (p. 39). In comments on the healing of the Geresene Demoniac, Craddock notes how painful it is for “young ministers to discover that the reign of God has its enemies...Being asked to leave by those you seek to help is a pain unlike any other” (pp. 117-118). But, as if turning to counsel ministers flushed with success, Craddock notes from Jesus’ warning to the Pharisees (11:37-12:1) how the “increasing crowds can turn the head and rob one of powers of discernment” (p. 159).

Useful tips on the craft of preaching are scattered throughout, with special care and pointed warnings reserved for the tricky task of preaching the parables. In a page-long excursus on the story of the Good Samaritan, one can imagine Craddock on his hands and knees pleading his case: “First, painting unnecessarily unattractive portraits of the priest and the Levite weakens the story...Second, great care should be given to the search in our culture for analogies to the Samaritan. Often poor analogies trivialize a text” (p. 151). More sound advice is offered with his treatment of the parables of lostness in Luke 15: “The teacher and the preacher would do well not to try to explain [parables]...Like an explained joke, an explained parable violates the listener” (p. 187).

But the value of Craddock’s explicit preaching, counsel and general insight on the biblical text is matched by the value of his writing as a model for preachers. Such is the care taken in his choice of words and their cadence that the commentatory text begs, at times, to be read aloud or even preached. The power of his writing depends not on cheap tricks or cute sayings, but on the freshness of language at the point of genuine theological reflection and personal insight. Craddock’s musings about the nature of Satan’s temptation of Jesus illustrate: “There is nothing here of debauchery; no self-respecting devil would approach a person with offers of personal, domestic, or social ruin. That is in the small print at the bottom of the temptation” (p. 56). Likewise, his comments about salt in 14:34-35: “Under pressures both open and subtle, pressures all of us know, salt does not decide to become pepper; it just gradually loses its savor. The process can be so gradual, in fact, that no one really notices. Well, almost no one” (p. 183). Craddock’s scholarly perspective comes to light most vividly in his frequent coaching on the nature of narrative and of Gospel genre. He never tires of admonishing the reader to refrain from a harmonistic reading of the Gospels and to hear each Gospel in its own right as a whole literary composition. Craddock follows his own advice, drawing the reader to notice and reflect upon the placement of a pericope within the Gospel, the themes in which it participates, the interplay of char-
acters, and similar matters often housed under the rubric of literary criticism.

Most of our disappointments with this volume can be traced to the friction between common expectations of what a commentary "should" provide and the particular thrust chosen by this commentary series. Readers will find introductory matters, historical questions and synoptic problems only lightly brushed. No index, and only the barest of bibliographies is made available. Reference to ancient, extra-biblical literature or to particular biblical scholars is rare. But if what one wants is an intelligent and reflective companion while reading Luke, Craddock is hard to beat.

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This is a slightly revised version of a doctoral dissertation accepted by the evangelical-theological faculty of the University of Tubingen in 1988. Citations of sources are in the original Greek, Hebrew, German and French languages. Extensive footnotes, bibliography, and index of scriptural reference are provided.

Volf, assistant professor of New Testament at Fuller Theological Seminary, presents an exegetical study of relevant Pauline passages to support her thesis. Although the situations which threaten Christians' faith lead Paul to face them with the real possibility of alienation from salvation, he believes that they will attain the final salvation, because they are elected by God. God will bring this about by overcoming the obstacles to their salvation posed by outward threats or their own ethical failure or even temporary alienation from the gospel through unbelief or wrong belief (p. 286-7).

In part one, Volf studies Pauline passages which affirm the final salvation of the Christian. Part two examines the passages dealing with judgment and punishment of "insiders." According to Volf, some of these judgments are merely temporal and do not affect the final salvation. Some of those judged are mere "insiders" of the Christian group but not Christians at all. Part three deals with passages which indicate that some of God's elect, including Israelites, are alienated from salvation. Volf considers this as only temporary. They will be saved ultimately. Part four treats the passages which express Paul's concern for the ulti-
mating effect of his mission and Christians' receiving the grace or believing in vain. These passages are not related to the final salvation of Christians, Volf claims.

In studying these passages, Volf traces the development of Paul's argument, and takes the contextual and philological data into account. She interacts extensively with exegetical literature. She has many valuable exegetical insights. The support for her thesis, however, is weak.

In the passages studied in part one, Paul emphasizes the certainty of Christians' final salvation. Paul, however, speaks about the Christians collectively, not every Christian individually. The final salvation of Christians collectively is certain. But this is not necessarily true for every Christian. The parallel passages of Eph. 5:25-27 and Col. 1:22-23 illustrate this. The former deals with the Church collectively and no condition is attached. The latter deals with Christians individually ("you") and is conditional, "provided that you continue in the faith, stable and steadfast, not shifting from the hope of the gospel."

In her study of Romans 9-11 Volf implicitly concedes that some of God's elect are not saved. The Israelites are God's people, foreknown and elected by God (p. 167, 170). Even though, at present, the majority of them are excluded from the supreme gift-participation in the salvation (p. 163), in the future "all Israel" will be saved (Rom. 11:26a). Volf claims that "all Israel" at Rom. 11:26a "does not necessarily include all individual Israelites" (p. 183-4). It connotes "nonnumerical type of completeness, or completeness as a collectivity" (p. 184). This means that some Israelites, whom God has elected to salvation (p. 190), ultimately do not participate in the salvation. When the Jews "living at the consummation of salvation history" are saved, God's faithfulness to his elect will be vindicated (p. 185). Volf concedes implicitly that God's faithfulness in accomplishing the goal of his election is to be understood collectively, not individually.

Many times Volf does not satisfactorily resolve tensions. She states that God disregards "Israel's national election through Abraham in presently omitting to call the majority of the Jews to salvation in Jesus Christ." Yet, citing Rom. 10:21, she writes that God is "graciously extending welcoming hands the whole day long to a disobedient and stiff-necked people" (p. 166). Based on Rom 10:11 she claims that the "gospel issues a welcome to Israel as to 'everyone who believes'" (p. 167). God does not call the Jews and welcomes them at the same time. How can this be possible? Paul explicitly states in Rom 11:20 that the Jews' present exclusion from the salvation is due to their own unbelief, not God's non-calling.

In treating 1 Cor. 10: 1-12, Volf intimates that while all the Israelites were called by God and participated in God's redemption, the majority of them were not chosen to enter the promised land (p. 126). Translated into Christian situation, this means that only some Christians are chosen to attain the final salvation. This contradicts Volf's own thesis. She insists that Paul's warning in 1 Cor. 10: 12 does not refer to losing salvation but to losing the appearance of salvation. If this is true, being the counterpart in the argument, the Israelites who died in the
wilderness only appeared to have participated, but in fact did not, in the redemption. Yet Volf writes “God’s redemptive purpose for God’s people benefited them all” (p. 126). Appearance of salvation and actual salvation are mutually exclusive. She cannot have both.

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One of the pressing issues which theologians and missiologists of the twentieth century have faced is the relationship between Christianity and other religions. Indeed, this is a matter of growing concern among many ordinary believers, owing to the fact that contact with persons of other faiths is increasingly common in our day.

Harold Netland comes to this question well prepared by his training and experience. His parents were missionaries in Japan for many years, and he himself presently teaches religious studies at Tokyo Christian University. Moreover, his doctoral mentor at Claremont was John Hick, a distinguished philosopher of religion who is one of the most prolific and influential authors in the current debate.

In this book, Netland aims to defend a position he calls exclusivism against various versions of religious pluralism. Exclusivism is defined as the view that “the central claims of Christianity are true, and that where the claims of Christianity conflict with those of other religions the latter are to be rejected as false” (p.9). Pluralism, by contrast, holds that there is nothing normative or superior about Christianity and that it is “merely one of many equally legitimate responses to the same divine reality” (p.10).

Netland’s fundamental thesis in this book is that pluralism cannot survive “the question of truth.” He lays the groundwork for demonstrating this in the early chapters by summarizing the basic beliefs of four different religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Shinto. His aim here is to show that the different religions seem clearly to be making mutually incompatible claims about the nature of the religious ultimate, the nature of the human predicament, and the nature of salvation.

Pluralists, of course, do not think the problem of conflicting truth claims is insurmountable. Various moves have been made in this regard. One of the most popular, which has been fashionable in theological circles for some time, is the rejection of propositional truth. Religious truth, on the view, does not reside in propositions
which state how things are, but in the transformed lives of those who appropriate it. Another influential move is to draw a (Kant-inspired) distinction between the religious ultimate as it is in itself, and the religious ultimate as experienced and perceived in various historically and culturally conditioned settings. Yet others insist that religious truth is ineffable, while others embrace relativism, and some even go so far as to suggest that the law of noncontradiction should be abandoned.

As Netland recognizes, these are epistemological claims which require philosophical skill to negotiate. In the heart of his book, chapters 4-7, Netland analyzes these, along with other views, as advanced by such spokesmen as W. Cantwell Smith, Paul Knitter and Raimundo Panikkar. He persuasively argues that propositional truth is basic to other notions of truth; that the ineffability thesis is self-refuting; and that those who deny the law of noncontradiction are reduced to incoherence or silence. His most thorough critique, however, is reserved for his mentor, John Hick, whose sophisticated version of pluralism relies heavily on the Kantian distinction noted above. Netland shows that those who follow Hick are finally left with religious agnosticism.

The final chapter of the book is a helpful discussion of “Evangelism, Dialogue, and Tolerance,” which commends dialogue, while dispelling some confused notions of tolerance. The only part of the book I found really disappointing was the author’s discussion of the fate of those who have never heard the gospel. Netland highlights the diversity of opinion among evangelicals on this question, but refrains from pressing the matter or taking a position on it.

But this did not dampen my enthusiasm for this book. Netland has taken on an important issue, and has probed the philosophical roots of it. He has faced the truth question squarely and has provided a clear and convincing defense of Christian exclusivism.

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Alasdair MacIntyre is a Roman Catholic moral philosopher and, after having
taught at several universities in Britain and the United States, is now the McMahon/Hank Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. Among the most important of his many previous books are After Virtue (1981, 1984) and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988).

In this monograph of his 1988 Gifford Lectures, MacIntyre argues both that rival moral theories cannot be evaluated except from some one particular standpoint and that there is no neutral standpoint, independent of all theories, from which such evaluation can take place. But he also argues that ethical relativism is false and that it is possible to evaluate rival theories without having to stand outside all of them. A given theory can be shown to be superior to others if it and it alone can explain the failures and incoherences of its rivals in their own terms and by their own standards. MacIntyre then focuses upon “three very different and mutually antagonistic conceptions of moral enquiry, each stemming from a seminal late nineteenth-century text” (p. 2). The consequent argument is complex, because each of these rivals is a theory of moral enquiry and a moral theory and a theory of rationality and a theory of theory rivalry: “In philosophical controversies of any depth what divides the contending parties is characteristically in part how to characterize the disagreement” (p. 44).

The first rival version is that of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Enlightenments’ encyclopaedias, culminating in the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1875-90). This rival’s distinguishing feature is belief in the unity of reason, independent of standpoint, and the continuous progress of science. “In ethics there is on the encyclopaedist’s view a set of conceptions of duty, obligation, the right, and the good which have emerged from and can be shown to be superior to...their primitive, ancient, and other preenlightenment predecessors”(p. 42).

The second rival is the genealogical mode of Nietzsche and such post-Nietzscheans as Foucault. Its foundational document is Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) and one of its aims is “to trace both socially and conceptually how rancor and resentment on the part of the inferior destroyed the aristocratic nobility of archaic heroes and substituted a priestly set of values in which a concern for purity and impurity provided a disguise for malice and hate” (pp. 39-40). For the genealogist there is no absolute truth, but only truth from some particular perspective: “Where the encyclopaedist aspired to displace the Bible as a canonical book, the genealogist intended to discredit the whole notion of a canon” (p. 25).

The third rival is “the Thomistic tradition-informed dialectical enterprise” (p. 229) and its charter document is Pope Leo XIII’s On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy (Aeterni Patris, 1879). This encyclical letter, MacIntyre writes, “summoned its readers to a renewal of an understanding of intellectual enquiry as the continuation of a specific type of tradition, that which achieved definitive expression in the writings of Aquinas, one the appropriation of which could not only provide the resources for radical criticism of the conception of rationality
dominant in nineteenth-century modernity and in the Ninth Edition, but also preserve and justify the canonical status of the Bible as distinct from, yet hegemonic over, all secular enquiry” (p. 25). And despite this tradition’s “recognition of the historical situatedness of all reason giving and reason-offering, it understands the truth to which it aspires as timeless” (p. 66).

MacIntyre identifies each of these rivals with a specific literary genre; there is a unity of content and form. The genre of encyclopaedia is the encyclopaedia article/ex cathedra university lecture; of genealogy, the aphorism; and of tradition, the lecture as commentary upon texts believed to be authoritative, and the disputation. MacIntyre points out that Adam Gifford belonged to the cultural milieu of the encyclopaedists, and that the form of the Gifford Lectures is, therefore, not neutral with regard to the three rivals.

At this point MacIntyre argues that the Thomistic tradition is rationally superior to its rivals by way of posing problems for them to solve, not in Thomistic terms, but in their own. The thesis of lecture eight is that “post-Sidgwickian moral philosophy, judged by the standards of the Ninth Edition and of Sidgwick [who wrote the “Ethics” article] himself, has turned out to be a dubious type of activity, self-discrediting in just the way that Sidgwick held that the theology of the late nineteenth century was self-discrediting” (p. 189). In lecture nine, MacIntyre goes on to argue that the problem posed for the genealogist by his or her own conception of personal identity is serious, though perhaps, unlike the encyclopaedist’s, not fatal.

In his tenth and final lecture, MacIntyre proposes an alternative kind of university—and it is here that there is most clearly a need for additional work. He contrasts the “preliberal modern university,” which was characterized by “enforced and constrained agreements,” with the encyclopaedic, “liberal university,” which “aspired to be a university of unconstrained agreements and hence [abolished] religious tests and exclusions” (p. 230), but rendered itself “culturally irrelevant” (p. 219). To these MacIntyre proposes a third alternative: “the university as a place of constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in conflict, in which a central responsibility of higher education would be to initiate students into conflict.” He adds that those engaged in teaching and enquiry within such a university would have to sustain it as “an arena of conflict in which the most fundamental type of moral and theological disagreement [is] accorded recognition” (pp. 230-231). The challenge for MacIntyre, though, is to explain how this “constrained,” but “fundamental,” moral and theological disagreement would be different from “unconstrained disagreement.”

It was one thing for the thirteenth-century University of Paris to be (as MacIntyre explains in lecture five) an arena with room for both the Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions, and within which Aquinas could merge the two. The discrepancies between Aristotelianism and orthodox Christianity can be excused at least somewhat by the fact that Aristotle wrote in the fourth century B.C. But
what about twentieth-century scholars who have heard the gospel of orthodox Christianity, have rejected it, but still insist that they are Christians?

At about the time of his Gifford Lectures, Maclntyre left a formerly-Christian Methodist university (Vanderbilt) to join the faculty of a university that calls itself “Catholic,” but at which a “Catholic” professor is defined as one who checked a particular box on an application form, and at which “Catholic” students are in no position to consider rival moral theories because they have been taught almost nothing about their own. I do not see how we could have a genuinely Christian, twentieth-century university without some type of religious test for its faculty, and, therefore, what Maclntyre calls “constrained agreement.”

In the end, though Maclntyre’s foes are legion, Protestant Christians should not be among them. His account of the Thomistic integration of the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions provides the historical background for understanding the Wesleyan holiness tradition, according to which ethical primacy resides, not in the performing of certain kinds of actions, but in our becoming a certain kind of person. And his account in lecture seven of Duns Scotus’ and Occam’s non-Thomistic distinction between what God commands and what is good for the person commanded provides the historical background for the divine-command ethics of many Lutherans and Calvinists. Everyone interested in the historical background of Protestant ethical theories or concerned about the future of Protestant colleges and universities should surely give Maclntyre a serious look.

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The development and influence of the Wesleyan/Holiness movements outside North America and England have been the subject of remarkably little research. Weyer has made a significant contribution to the study of the Wesleyan/Holiness tradition in Germany in this programmatic analysis of its interaction with the Methodist Church in German–speaking Europe, primarily Germany. The volume is not intended to be a definitive, exhaustive analysis of
the development of German Methodist thought about the Wesleyan/Holiness adaptation of Christian perfection or a complete description of German interaction with either the English or American Wesleyan/Holiness adherents. Instead it poses the historiographical and current theological imperative for coming to terms with this aspect of German Methodist history.

The volume takes as its point of departure Weyer’s reflections upon the content of the archives of the Theologische Seminar der Evangelisch-methodistischen Kirche in Reutlingen, Germany, where early correspondence from all three branches, which merged to form the present church (Wesleyan Methodist [English]), Methodist Episcopal Church and the Evangelical Association, reveal the frequent recurrence of Wesleyan/Holiness code language such as “Christian Perfection,” “entire sanctification,” and “perfect love.” Weyer goes on (chap. 2, pp. 12-22) to reflect on the early period, the Wesleyan roots, the state Lutheran Church and the transmission of Wesleyan/Holiness ideals and commitments within German Pentecostalism (especially the Mulheim Bewegung) before asserting its importance in the contemporary context.

Chapter 3 (pp. 23-42) provides a status quoestionis as to the treatment (or lack thereof) of relations between the Wesleyan/Holiness movements and German Methodism in Methodist historiography. The standard histories of German Methodism are reviewed, including J. L. Nuelsen (1920 and 1929), Ernst Grob (1931), P. Scharpf (1964) and the more recent work of C. E. Sommer and K. Steckel (1982). [A work not discussed is Johannes Jungst, Der Methodismus in Deutschland: Ein Beitrag zur neuesten Kirchengeschichte (3d. ed.; Gieszen: A. Topelmann, 1906)]. A general trend to minimize Wesleyan/Holiness influence and to distance German Methodism from the revivals of the 1870s stimulated by the preaching of Robert Pearsall Smith is demonstrated. Two examples which clearly demonstrate the need to reexamine this received historiography are discussed. The 1873 essay, Der Frühling im Winter, which advocated Wesleyan/Holiness concepts had wide readership. The case of Lorenz Eisenhardt (pp. 73-79), a pastor who had worked as a theoretician and evangelist of holiness before he and the fledgling movement were deeply influenced by R. P. Smith during 1875, is presented. Both the essay and Eisenhardt are manifestly deserving of individual analysis. Neither are discussed by P. Fleisch, Die moderne Gemeinschaftsbewegung in Deutschland (Leipzig: H. G. Wallmann, 1912) and both have significant implications for Fleisch’s historiography. Weyer clearly demonstrates that R. P. Smith and the other early Keswick figures were not speaking in a vacuum.

There follows a “chronicle” of the movement (pp. 82-139) which lists significant moments in the history of the Wesleyan/Holiness traditions, German Methodism and their contexts from 1835-1940. Weyer accepts the theories of Timothy Smith, inter alia, that there was a declension of holiness teaching in Methodism which resulted in the Palmer and Finney revivals. As A. Coppedge has convincingly argued [“Entire Sanctification in Early American Methodism:
1812-1835," Wesleyan Theological Journal 13 (1978): 34-50], this thesis needs to be reexamined. While helpful as an orientation to the traditions as well as indicative of research foci deserving of scholarly attention, one would have wished for more details of events, conferences and publications together with more bibliography. Arguably the most important events are mentioned.

The largest section of the volume (pp. 140-235) provides extracts from books, ecclesial documents, letters and liturgies, written between 1872 and 1911, relevant to the study of the Wesleyan/Holiness movements in Germany. These original sources eloquently attest to the presence of the tradition, its impact, the evolution of the "official" ecclesiastical perspective and the development of the theological concepts. Without doubt, the historiography of German Methodism (and of related traditions in German and Switzerland) needs to be revised to achieve a more accurate understanding of their cultural and religious structures. The anthology is a very useful feature of the volume.

Outside the Methodist Church and beyond the scope of this volume, an analysis is needed of the influence in Germany and on German Methodism of American Wesleyan/Holiness mission results [Church of God (Anderson); Church of God (Cleveland); Church of the Nazarene; American German Holiness publications], the Healing Movements and The Salvation Army, as well as indigenous German Pentecostalism which adheres to Wesleyan/Holiness understandings of Christian holiness. Relations between the Methodists and Wesleyan/Holiness adherents within the state Lutheran Church, the Gemeinschaftsbewegung, and the Evangelical Alliance will also be a fruitful area for additional investigation.

While one might wish for more information, documents and analysis, as well as an index to the vast number of names mentioned, Weyer's volume provides, for the first time, entrée into the larger world of German Methodism and the Wesleyan/Holiness movements. The classified bibliography is helpful, providing additional guidance to the historiographical agenda so clearly established in the work. Weyer's book is a truly significant scholarly contribution to the intercultural structures of American Wesleyan/Holiness history and thought. It will remain a standard reference tool for the study of the Wesleyan/Holiness traditions.

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John Kilner has written a book that is of enormous scholarly, as well as practical, import. This is a book documenting criteria actually used and deemed important by medical practitioners as they make decisions as to who will, and who will not, receive scarce lifesaving medical resources. This is also a book documenting the debates over these same criteria, and carefully analyzing the possibilities for consensus, and reasoning toward considered, ethical guidelines for the use of these criteria. The need for broadly acceptable criteria in the selection of recipients of limited lifesaving medical resources is, as Kilner himself rightly notes, “widely recognized as one of the crucial ethical issues of the day,” and the need for such criteria is “underscored in the fields of medicine, public policy, law, sociology, ethics, religion, industry, and journalism, to name a few.” (p. ix) Kilner’s book constitutes a substantial contribution to all of these fields and to lifesaving decision-making, as such.

To begin with, Kilner has carried out his own empirical research. In the United States, he sent questionnaires to all of the medical directors of kidney dialysis and kidney transplantation facilities. He had them rate sixteen patient-selection criteria as to their degree of importance and as to their willingness to use them. Only one of these, sex, was regarded as virtually unimportant and not to be considered to guide practice.

To provide a cross-cultural perspective, Kilner conducted his own research, studying the caregivers, modern and traditional, among the Akamba people in Kenya. This proved to be highly important. For example, some U.S. philosophers have claimed that it is “counterintuitive” to prefer an older person to someone younger in selecting who receives scarce resources; the Akamba tradition, however, has a preference for older persons when it comes to patient selection in situations of scarcity.

Kilner devotes a chapter to each of the fifteen selection criteria other than sex. These are, in order considered: social value, favored group, resources required, special responsibilities, age, psychological ability, supportive environment, medical benefit, imminent death, likelihood of benefit, length of benefit, quality of benefit, willingness, ability to pay, and random selection. In each of these chapters, Kilner makes use of his comprehensive survey of the literature to present the reader with all of the arguments both for and against the use of the selection criterion being discussed. Then, with great care, he sorts out these arguments to see what basis there is for what he calls “possible common ground.” This type of analysis proves to be very valuable. It leads, for example, to specifying certain conditions, not currently recognized, under which the criterion “imminent death” should be used. And, in one case, it leads to a strong case for rejecting any attempt to select patients on the basis of their alleged “social value.”
Each chapter concludes with a highly relevant case to which the criterion in question is applied, illustrating what has been learned from the analysis immediately preceding it.

Kilner concludes with two more chapters, one discussing decision-making when the scarce medical resources in question are used in experiments, and the other, the final chapter, discussing his own proposal for patient selection when medical resources are scarce.

As a prelude to presenting his own recommendations, Kilner begins his final chapter with an overview of what he has discovered in his quest for possible common ground. Everything considered, there appear to be seven different selection criteria which are widely acceptable: medical benefit, imminent death, likelihood of benefit, resources required, special responsibilities, willingness (to accept treatment), and random selection (most often in the form of first–come, first–served) (p. 226). After indicating the problems associated with a first–come, first–served approach to random selection, and also with likelihood of benefit, Kilner offers “the following basic approach to the selection of recipients of limited lifesaving medical resources:

1. Only patients who satisfy the medical benefit and willingness–to–accept–treatment criteria are to be considered eligible.

2. Available resources are to be given first to eligible patients who satisfy the imminent-death criterion and next to eligible patients who satisfy the special-responsibilities or resources-required criterion.

3. If resources are still available, recipients are to be randomly selected, generally by lottery, from among the remaining eligible patients (p. 230).

Kilner is aware that his rejection of the likelihood of benefit criterion and his preference for a lottery to achieve random selection will not readily gain wide acceptance. At the same time, he is equally aware that the specific views of those selecting patients which are challenged by his recommendations, have not been formed with the benefit of such an extensive sifting of the arguments and the values being sought. His proposal is close to what he has discovered to be an achievable consensus. Even so it conflicts, as he notes, with the computerized system now being developed in the U.S. for selecting organ transplant recipients. One reason for the conflict lies in the priority Kilner gives to arguments which are “person–oriented” as opposed to “productivity–oriented.” Person–oriented arguments respect people as such, regardless of the goods they produce; productivity–oriented arguments promote the achievement of some good, such as efficiency or happiness (p. 227). In the United States the two types of arguments tend to be given virtually equal weight. In Kenya, person–oriented arguments are greatly predominant. This means that Kilner’s proposal seeks to save as
many lives as possible and to do so in a way that preserves the equal right of each individual to have access to lifesaving treatment as much as possible.

Kilner’s book is a major accomplishment and a very welcome one at that. To begin with, he has generated highly significant data where there was none. Not only do we know now what patient selection criteria loom large in importance and use in some of the areas in which scarce resource decisions are made in the U.S., we also have some data about a very different cultural tradition with respect to such decisions. Furthermore, healers from this tradition are influenced by how much education they have; those who attend medical school view scarce resource decisions much more like their U.S. counterparts. This uncovers an implicit moral direction within contemporary, scientifically oriented medical education—away from the Akamba emphasis on respect for persons toward an emphasis on productivity or good consequences.

Not only has Kilner made some highly original contributions to the literature on patient selection criteria, but he has also given this area of research and reflection the most comprehensive survey and analysis of the existing literature. This book has 238 pages of text, 57 pages of notes, and 58 pages of references which have been cited. It is in itself the best place to begin any further research on scarce medical resources and the criteria for their use. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the content and methods Kilner has employed, the research of a wide variety of scholars will need to consult his work both to avoid duplication and to be brought up to date.

But Kilner has also offered a set of guidelines which are distinctive and innovative. These guidelines are, in my view, better than anything currently in use. What they accomplish above all is to assure, to a higher degree than any of the previous approaches, that individuals will not die for lack of a scarce resource. Scholars, policy makers and health care professionals should study Kilner’s proposal carefully. Frankly, I hope it is widely adopted with any refinements and adaptations that may prove necessary or desirable as it is applied. Kilner himself suggests some alterations which others might prefer which would not alter the basic structure of his approach and its priorities on egalitarianism and saving lives.

There may be those who would question Kilner’s use of the “special responsibilities” criterion. Some who are consistently person-oriented or deontologists may see the criterion of special responsibilities as an intolerable deviation from this way of reasoning. Some who are more productivity-oriented may see this criterion as allowing for a wider use of productivity-oriented guidelines than Kilner has allowed for in his proposed set of guidelines. It would not be correct, however, to view Kilner as utilitarian. For utilitarians, what is morally right is determined by the good or value being produced by the action or policy in question. Kilner is choosing between two actions which are both morally right by reason of saving lives, and claiming that it is sometimes the most right act to choose to save the life of someone whose life is directly tied to the saving of other lives.
In short, he is weighing relative moral harms should either of two individuals die based on all the morally significant relations in which these individuals stand. It is for reasons such as these that virtually everyone would treat a physician first in a situation in which doing so would avert a number of other deaths, by averting the death of the physician. In any event, Kilner’s otherwise strict egalitarianism is on the line here, and he discusses special safeguards to help assure that the invocation of special responsibilities as a selection criterion will remain a rare exception and not the rule.

Making scarce resource decisions does strain our ingenuity as we seek, as human communities, to retain those moral values on which our common life depends. Kilner recognizes, in the last segment of his concluding chapter, that he needs to undergird the priority given to person-oriented criteria, especially the use of random selection which some regard as humane and others as inhumane. What is the “normatively human” to which “humaneness” refers? Kilner speaks here of the Akamba use of stories by means of which moral ideas are connected to their total life context. With the rise of secularization in the West, the “Judeo-Christian story” has been increasingly neglected. Kilner suggests that this formative story for Western medicine be brought back into the picture. Although I share Kilner’s concern to attend to what our Jewish and Christian heritages can teach us, the necessity to give priority to life-affirming and egalitarian guidelines in patient selection arises within a story human beings share: that human beings are of equal worth, and that their lives are ultimately inviolable, are functional requisites of communities as such, of cooperative action within them, and of morality itself. Everyone who has been born, nurtured, and protected in their dependence, shares in that story, however unique their own story may otherwise be. I would invite Kilner not to overlook these common aspects of our human heritage in any future contributions he makes to our understanding of the ethical criteria in patient selection. Given the very high quality of his first, very impressive study, I look forward to Kilner’s continued reflection on these exceedingly difficult kinds of decisions.

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At the time he wrote this volume, the author was associate professor of social and medical ethics at Asbury Theological Seminary and adjunct professor of medical ethics at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Kilner is formally trained in ethics, but also has conducted studies of ethical decision-making, regarding allocation of medical resources by medical directors of United States kidney dialysis centers and by health care workers of the Akamba people of Kenya, Africa.

The title of the book derives from the author's conviction that recent and costly life-saving breakthroughs in medicine can genuinely prolong life expectancy, but may be unavailable to all whose illnesses require them. While not attempting to welcome or encourage such patient-selection decision-making, the author predicts that it will be necessary and contends that thoughtful analysis of such decisions in advance of their implementation provides the most rational approach. In countries where health care resources are dramatically limited, decisions as to whom will receive certain costly (or even not so costly) medical technology is a daily event. Even in the prosperous United States, soaring health care costs, a growing under-insured or uninsured population, and limited amounts of certain technology (e.g., organs for transplantation), are forcing decision-makers to choose one patient over another. Rather than avoid thinking about selection criteria for scarce medical resources, the author contends that one ought to assess all possible selection criteria and assemble all those found acceptable into an overall approach to patient selection. Such an approach comprises the majority of the book.

Dr. Kilner then proceeds to analyze sixteen criteria which might be used for patient selection. These criteria include: *social criteria*—the impact that selection decisions will have on society at large and the amount of resources used for one person versus many persons; *social medical criteria*—decision based upon age and/or psychological ability; *medical criteria*—the benefit of such treatment, the likelihood of death if no treatment is given (imminence of death) and the likelihood, length, or quality of any benefit of the treatment; and *personal* criteria—willingness of the patient to have the treatment and their ability to pay. Each of these criteria are thoroughly analyzed by reviewing their historical use either in the United States or in Kenya, the justifications for such a criterion, the weaknesses of the criterion, and finally by attempting to find common ground that might appeal to both proponents and opponents of that particular criterion.

After a detailed analysis of each of the sixteen criteria, the author concludes that there are seven different criteria which appear to be widely acceptable in the current American ethical and medical culture. These are the medical benefit, imminence of death, likelihood of benefit, resources required, patients with special responsibilities, willingness of patients to accept treatment, and a random selection process (usually in the form of first-come, first-served).
As a nephrologist (kidney specialist) working in the field of dialysis and transplantation for the past twenty-five years, I've had considerable experience with the reality of limited resources and the need for some type of decision-making process for the allocation of those resources. This book provides a comprehensive review of all reasonable criteria for making such decisions. The thoroughness with which each criterion is reviewed is both noteworthy and at times repetitive and laborious. Nevertheless, the physician, health care worker, or lay person who wishes to study these issues and become better informed about this important ethical area will find in this book a rich set of resources. Each chapter is thoroughly documented with an extensive bibliography. There is a rather detailed index. The author also makes extensive use of examples from the organ transplant, kidney dialysis arena to substantiate and illustrate how decision making criteria either have been used in the past or might need to be viewed in the future. Further, at the conclusion of each chapter, a case is used to illustrate how the criterion under discussion might be applied in a "real life" situation.

Dr. Kilner, whose personal Christian faith is known to me and is reflected in his other writings, does not substantiate any of his arguments by reference to the Christian faith or to biblical authority. In a pluralistic culture such as ours, this may allow his book a wider readership. Importantly, the biblical basis for his ethical thinking is latent throughout the book. In the final chapter, Dr. Kilner reminds his readers that ethics based solely on a materialistic view of the world lack coherence and credibility. He suggests that this very exercise may require some to examine the basis for ethical decisions as well as the decisions themselves.

I believe this book is a fine contribution to the thinking which must accompany the allocation of health care resources and to deciding "who lives and who dies."

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