Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran, eds., COMMON SENSE METAPHYSICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LYNNE RUDDER BAKER

Kris McDaniel
University of Notre Dame, kmcdani1@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
DOI: 10.37977/faithphil.2022.39.1.9
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol39/iss1/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

KRIS MCDANIEL, University of Notre Dame

This collection is a fine tribute to Lynne Rudder Baker, who sadly unexpectedly passed away in 2017. Baker’s philosophical vision was very broad, and this fact is reflected in the range of topics covered in the essays in this volume. Common Sense Metaphysics consists of four parts, which in turn each consist of four essays. Part one focuses on philosophy of mind; part two on the metaphysics of material constitution; part three on the status of persons and the first-person perspective; and part four on topics pertaining to naturalism and supernaturalism. The divisions here are somewhat arbitrary—many of the essays in part one could have easily appeared in part four, and vice versa—but this is of little importance. Unsurprisingly, many of the contributors vigorously argue against positions Baker defended. She would have welcomed the challenges. Other pieces seek to clarify, expand on, or defend positions she defended. In what follows, I offer an overview of the papers in this collection.

Christopher Hill’s “What Is a Concept?” defends “hardcore realism” about intentional states such as beliefs and explores the nature of concepts. According to Hill’s theory, propositions are built out of concepts and by articulating a criterion of identity for propositions, we can thereby determine a criterion of identity for concepts. Two propositions are identical if and only if any possible believer who believed one of them would believe the other. Two concepts are identical if and only if in all cases substituting one for the other would result in the same proposition.

Carolyn Dicey Jennings argues in her “Practical Realism about the Self” that we should be “practical realists” about the self, which Jennings identifies as the subject of attention, contrary to “the illusion view” that says that a self with its own causal powers is an illusion. Practical realism is the view that we should be realists about what is validated by our practices even in the absence of scientific validation (39). According to Jennings, the self corresponds to (and maybe is identical with, though I am not sure) a whole-brain pattern of wave-activity that “is responsible for the direction of attention” (46). Jennings also claims that the “self is a set of interests or tendencies to seek out and respond to stimuli in a particular sort of way” (47). Jennings contrasts her view of the self with Baker’s view of persons.

Angela Mendelovici argues in her “Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions” that the postulation of propositional attitudes is not justified
wholly by introspection, since what introspection presents is an intrinsi-
cally individuated state that is not as descriptively rich as propositional
attitudes that are individuated partially by things (e.g., the environment)
external to them. Since the postulation of propositional attitudes is not
justified wholly by introspection, Mendelovici worries that their existence
must be scientifically validated. But perhaps instead Baker’s practical
realism can vindicate their existence—but if it can, why can it? Mende-
lovici argues that practical realism can vindicate the existence of proposi-
tional attitudes because what it is to be a propositional attitude is to be a
self-ascription. If we ascribe content to something, that very fact is by itself
sufficient for that thing to have content, at least derivatively. And so, if a
propositional attitude is a self-ascription of content, we have a guarantee
that it has that content, at least derivatively.

Janet Levin, in “Saving Physicalism,” rebuts Baker’s argument against
“the standard view” that mental states can explain behavior only if men-
tal states are identical with or realized by brain states. Levin also argues
that Baker’s own “practical realism” about mental states faces problems
at least as serious.

Derk Pereboom, in “Constitution, Non-reductivism, and Emergence,”
argues contra Baker that Baker’s constitution view doesn’t imply genuine
emergence. Baker holds that an emergent property is a novel property
that doesn’t reduce to other properties (107); it is a property of a whole
that cannot be explained by the properties or relations of its parts. Emer-
gent properties are not necessitated by the “basal properties” that underlie
them (108). Pereboom argues that Baker’s account incorrectly classifies
properties like being a planet as emergent properties. Even though the
property of being a planet is not explained merely by properties of the
parts of planets, it is explained by the properties of the larger system of
which planets are parts, and because of this, a better notion of emergence
will imply that being a planet is not an emergent property. Moreover,
Pereboom argues that Baker has no reason to think that the other proper-
ties she takes be emergent are not properly so-classified as non-emergent.

Kathrin Koslicki’s “The Threat of Thinking Things into Existence” de-
fends Baker’s constitution view from the argument that it implausibly
implies that we can think things into existence. Baker is committed to the
view that there are all sorts of objects that exist only if, and partly because
of, our intentions, beliefs, social practices, and so on. Because of this, crit-
ics argue that Baker’s view implies that we can simply think new things
into existence. Koslicki stresses that, for Baker, it is not enough to simply
think that a new constituted object exists in order for that object to exist,
but rather there must be a primary kind for that object to fall under. The
question then turns to the conditions under which we can create a new
primary kind. In order for a new primary kind to be created, our current
practices must provide “needed background support.” Moreover, a new
primary kind confers on its instances a new range of causal powers that
are not simply derivative of the causal powers of the objects that constitute
Kevin Corcoran and Paul Manata argue in “Unkind Persons: A Critique of Baker’s Constitution View” that the primary kind of human persons is *human person*, contra Baker, who argues that it is *person*. An unkind person is a person who is not fundamentally or essentially a specific kind (human, Martian, robot) of person. However, Baker also claims that a human person is a human person non-derivatively and the authors claim that this view is inconsistent with the claim that human persons are only contingently human, that human persons do not have *human person* as their primary kind. They argue that if *person* is a primary kind, then all persons have the same persistence conditions, but it is not true that all persons have the same persistence conditions, and so person is not a primary kind. A second part of the authors’ argument is that human persons have their human bodies essentially, but Baker’s view is committed to denying this.

Marya Schechtman, in “Constitution and Personal Identity,” argues for a different theory of personhood than Baker’s, according to which a social organization and a robust first-person perspective are part of a single system that defines personhood (170). According to both Schechtman and Baker, a human being who never develops a robust first-person perspective can still be a person. However, Schechtman argues that Baker has insufficient grounds for asserting this because if it is the causal powers conferred by a robust first-person perspective that make *person* a primary kind, then, strictly speaking, it doesn’t seem that one who lacks these causal powers could truly be a person. But if instead it is the causal powers accrued by being in a social organization that makes *person* be a primary kind, then human beings who lack a robust first-person perspective are not persons merely by courtesy.

Joseph Levine, in “On Baker on the First Person,” responds to an argument of Baker’s against naturalism, which Baker understands as the theory that a complete ontology is exhausted by the entities and properties postulated by scientific theories. Her argument is that the first-person perspective is a property not postulated by scientific theories. But is nevertheless still real and so naturalism is false. Levine argues that a representational theory of mind can respond to Baker’s argument. A representational theory of mind postulates a language of thought that has both a syntax and a semantics. On Levine’s view, belief is a three-place relation between a subject, a mental representation made out of items from the language of thought, and a content that representation expresses. According to Levine, this view handles the Frege problem as well as the problem of the essential indexical. It handles the latter problem by postulating that thoughts about oneself contain a dedicated symbol for self-representation. What distinguishes this symbol from other mental representations is its causal/functional role, and there does seem to be a difference in causal/functional role because behavior tends to change when I think of myself as myself rather than third-personally.
John Perry, in “The Missing Self,” discusses the problem of the missing self and whether the problem motivates Baker’s metaphysics of the first-person perspective. The problem of the missing self is figuring out how selves fit in to an objective conception of the world. Baker appeals to haecceities. Perry argues that they are not needed or helpful and uses an interesting example derived from Héctor-Neri Castañeda to illustrate why this is the case. In Perry’s example, an amnesiac is showed an objective list of possible people he might be, but because the list incompletely describes the individuals and his memory is faulty, he cannot pick himself out. As he acquires more information about a candidate on the list, his confidence that he is that candidate grows. The information that he acquires is qualitative information rather than information about his haecceity. At the end of the paper, Perry seems to suggest that not only is his origin essential to him, but also that his origin is what makes him be him.

Sam Cowling, in his “Naturalism and Non-Qualitative Properties,” discusses a similar issue to the problem of the missing self, which Cowling calls “a placement problem.” The placement problem for naturalism is the problem of determining how to “locate” non-qualitative properties in a naturalistic world. The first-person perspective is tied to non-qualitative properties in a distinctive manner: a duplicate of me couldn’t have my first-person perspective, because my first-person perspective can be instantiated only by someone who is me. So a necessary condition of having a first-person perspective is having a haecceity. Cowling argues that because a naturalist should not reject entities that are quantified over in successful sciences, and many successful sciences quantify over individuals, there are individuals—but if there are individuals, then there are haecceities. So a naturalist should accept that there are haecceities.

Einar Duenger Bohn, in “Persons First Metaphysics,” develops a person-first metaphysics, according to which the concept of a person is primitive and corresponds to a fundamental collective property. On this view, many things collectively are a person. (An individual person strictly speaking is not an individual at all.) The collective property of being a person cannot be reductively analyzed—it is a basic property that some things have and others lack. Personhood is a feature that grounds rationality and the first-person perspective rather than vice versa.

Peter van Inwagen, in “Speaking about Things Independently of Whether They Exist,” evaluates Baker’s interpretation of Anselm’s ontological argument that she developed with Gary Matthews. Does this argument imply Meinongianism, the theory that there are things that do not exist? Baker says it does not. One crucial yet underdeveloped concept employed by Baker is the concept of speaking of something regardless of whether it exists. Van Inwagen provides a non-Meinongian account of what it is to speak of something regardless of whether it exists; very roughly, it is to speak of a set of a specific properties that would be uniquely had by something were there to be something that had those properties. Van Inwagen argues that given this account, Baker’s argument
is question-begging, and that two of the stated rationales for Baker’s version of the ontological argument do imply Meinongianism.

Thomas D. Senor, in “Constitution, Persons, and the Resurrection of the Dead,” discusses Baker’s account of the resurrection of the dead. The doctrine of the resurrection is part of Christianity, yet it is hard to make sense of unless dualism is true. Baker offers an account of persons in terms of constitution, but Senor argues that it doesn’t accommodate the resurrection any better than dualism does.

Mario de Caro, in “Putnam and Baker on Naturalism,” compares Putnam’s liberal naturalism with Baker’s quasi-naturalism. One difference between them is that the latter is officially neutral on whether there are supernatural phenomena as well as natural phenomena.

Finally, Louise Antony, in her “Naturalism and “Robust” Subjectivity: A Critique of Baker,” defends a version of naturalism against Baker’s arguments. The version she defends is continuity naturalism, which is the view that anything that can be known by human beings is confirmationally interconnected. Antony also argues that a certain version of functionalism, the computational-representational theory of the mind (CRTM), can explain all that needs explaining with respect to the first-person perspective. Antony argues that the CRTM can, contra Baker, provide a reductive account of the first-person perspective.

The editors have produced a high-quality volume. As the summaries above hopefully make clear, this is a rich and varied collection of essays that will be of wide interest to metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of religion. (I thank Leigh Vicens for helpful comments on this review.)


ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Baylor University

Love’s Forgiveness is a rich, fairly comprehensive resource for thinking through the various aspects and complications of the concept of forgiveness and an excellent guide to the literature on forgiveness, including some of the most recent. One of the many merits of Lippitt’s book is concreteness: the use of historical, biographical, and fictional narratives to test and refine our intuitions about forgiveness. The book is deeply informed by Lippitt’s sustained and close reading of Søren Kierkegaard, in