Wrongful Procreation, Factory Farming, and the Afterlife

Dustin Crummett
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Sometimes, I can affect whether an individual is created, but not how their life goes if they’re created. If their life will be bad enough, I apparently wrong them by allowing their creation. But sometimes, popular religious views imply that the created individual is guaranteed to have an infinitely good existence on balance. Since, I argue, I don’t wrong someone by allowing their creation when it’s infinitely good for them on balance, these views apparently have unacceptable implications for procreation ethics. After surveying various responses, I tentatively suggest that the best solution may involve adopting an unusual metaphysics of procreation.

1. Introduction

In some religions, certain groups are such that (i) members of these groups are guaranteed eternal postmortem bliss, and (ii) sometimes, we might know before an individual is created that if they’re created, they’ll be a member of that group. Human universalism, the view that all humans live forever in Heaven, implies this. All humans experience eternal postmortem bliss, and we know in advance whether someone will be human. So does animal universalism, the view that all non-human animals (or all sentient animals, etc.) live forever in Heaven. Mormons and many Protestants endorse an “age of accountability” where moral responsibility begins. Children who die before this go to Heaven. Call this baby universalism. If we know someone will die young, we know they’ll go to Heaven. Catholicism teaches that baptized infants who die as infants are guaranteed Heaven. Call this baptized baby universalism. This is like baby universalism, if we know the child will be baptized. Some Muslims accept baby universalism, while others hold that (only) the children of

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2Smith, Teachings of the Presidents of the Church: Joseph Smith 176–178.

3E.g., Mohler and Akin, “The Salvation of the 'Little Ones': Do Infants who Die Go to Heaven?“

4Catechism, sec. 1261.
Muslims are guaranteed Heaven.\footnote{Al-Munajjid, “Will Children Who Die Young Go to Paradise or Hell?”} The motivations for thinking babies go to Heaven also apply to humans who never develop the capacities needed for moral responsibility, so there are analogous views about them.

Views like this are common; perhaps most Abrahamic theists hold at least one. Say a view is among the Common Views if it (a) asserts that those in a certain group whose membership is sometimes identifiable in advance are guaranteed to have infinitely\footnote{It’s fine if, to avoid technical worries about infinity, we substitute “arbitrarily” or “indefinitely.”} good existences on balance due to their being guaranteed Heaven, and (b) isn’t gerrymandered in a sense which I specify in section four. For each Common View, call the group the Relevant Group. For human universalism, the Relevant Group is humans; for baptized baby universalism, it’s baptized humans who die young; etc.

I aim to show a conflict between the Common Views and some compelling judgments about procreative ethics. Here’s the general form: sometimes we know that, if an individual is created, they’ll have a miserable earthly life. Sometimes, we can’t improve their earthly life if they’re created, but we can prevent their creation altogether. (As discussed below, this might be true of some factory-farmed animals.) We often wrong these individuals if we allow their creation and subsequent miserable life. (E.g., if we don’t take available steps to reduce demand for factory-farmed products, thereby increasing the size of future generations of factory-farmed animals, we wrong the animals who are subsequently created.) However, we apparently don’t wrong an individual by allowing their creation if we know existing will be infinitely good for them on balance, and we can’t give them an even better life. And if one of the Common Views is true, it seems that there could be situations like this but where we know that the individual in question will be in the Relevant Group, so that coming into existence will be infinitely good for them on balance, if we allow it to happen. So, the Common Views apparently have the false implication that we don’t wrong these individuals by allowing their creation, provided we know they’ll be members of the Relevant Group. For instance, animal universalism apparently implies that we’re doing factory-farmed animals an immense favor by allowing their creation, since they’ll experience eternal postmortem bliss.\footnote{What to do if we’re unsure whether a Common View itself is true raises difficult Pascalian questions about responding to uncertain prospects of infinite values. Defending my views about this would take another paper. One quick fix is framing the puzzle I raise specifically in terms of the objective rightness and wrongness of our actions.}
The problem can be expressed by noting that the following three propositions form an inconsistent triad, where (1) and (2) have independent motivations and where (3) is implied by any Common View:

1. If existence will be infinitely good for an individual on balance, and we can’t affect their condition if they are created, we don’t wrong them by allowing their creation.

2. For any Relevant Group, there are possible cases where we’d wrong individuals by allowing their creation, even though we know that, if the individual is created, they’ll be a member of that Relevant Group, and we can’t affect their condition if they are created.

3. For some Relevant Group, even members in cases like those mentioned in (2) really are such that existence would be infinitely good for them on balance.

Since rejecting (1) or (2) is (I argue) unattractive, and since any Common View implies (3), the inconsistency provides reason to reject all Common Views. This may have further implications. E.g., some Common Views might be very likely on theism. Maybe a good God would let everyone, or at least infants or non-human animals, into Heaven. In that case, reasons to reject the relevant forms of universalism are reasons to reject theism. However, I won’t defend any judgment about what the best response overall is for an adherent of one of the Common Views, and I’ll ultimately suggest a possible way out. (In fact, I’m a theist and both a human and animal universalist, so naturally I hope for some solution.)

In section two, I explain the puzzle faced by one particular Common View: animal universalism. I single it out because its connection to factory farming gives it particular real-world relevance. In section three, I argue that ethical responses, which reject (1), are unpromising. In section four, I show how the problem can be generalized to Common Views besides animal universalism. In section five, I discuss how my argument differs from some superficially similar arguments. In section six, I discuss metaphysical responses. These reject (2), but for an odd reason. They don’t dispute what we should do in those cases. They instead deny that taking the intuitively right action really prevents a being from coming into existence. E.g., maybe God’s already made the souls of all the created beings who will ever exist, and procreation merely allows a soul to incarnate. Some metaphysical responses solve the problem only by committing to other implausible ethical claims. However, I tentatively defend the one I think works best.

2. The Puzzle

I’ll start with animal universalism. Consider that many farmed animals can’t be helped through my consumption choices. The animal whose meat I purchase is already dead. Animals currently being farmed for meat won’t

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be spared slaughter, or given better conditions, because demand dips. If I affect anything, I affect the size of future generations of farmed animals. Fewer sales might mean fewer animals raised in the future.

If these future animals would have worthwhile lives, this raises a puzzle: if eating farmed animals doesn’t affect currently existing animals, and creates on balance happy animals, does that justify eating meat (cf. Podgorski forthcoming)? It’s controversial; some answers will be relevant in section 3.1. But note that most farmed animals have unhappy lives. They’re factory-farmed; their lives are bad, or at least not good enough, on balance. Basically everyone who accords animals moral status recognizes a pro tanto duty to not create them under conditions like this. That wrongs them; they have a complaint against us once they exist. This may not be the only reason why creating factory-farmed animals is wrong. Perhaps it harms currently existing animals by increasing how often they’re forcibly impregnated. Perhaps it harms the environment. Etc. But the effect on the animals created is part of the problem. It’s not as though creating factory-farmed animals would be okay if they were gestated from synthetic gametes in environmentally friendly artificial wombs.

Now consider:

Prevention: I can reduce demand for factory-farmed products by organizing an effective boycott, or passing a tax on these products, or ordering Catholics to avoid them (I’m the Pope). Further, I’m in the position described above: I can’t help these animals if they’re created, but I can prevent their creation. The question now isn’t about creating factory-farmed animals. It’s about preventing their creation. Still, I should act. Allowing their creation wrongs them: their bad lives give them a complaint against me.

But animal universalism threatens this judgment. If animal universalism is true, life is infinitely good for factory-farmed animals, however miserable their earthly lives. Their finite suffering is followed by eternal bliss. And often, I don’t wrong an individual by allowing them to come into a life with some suffering, if I know their existence will even just be extremely good for them on balance. Consider:

Roommate: My roommate is about to conceive a child. The child will suffer significantly due to wrongdoing by others, but their life will be extremely good overall. I can’t help the child once they exist. However, I can prevent their conception by knocking on the bedroom door at the right time.

Perhaps it depends on the details, but I think I generally don’t wrong the child by failing to knock. This has something to do with the fact that, while

10 Bob Fischer (The Ethics of Eating Animals: Usually Bad, Sometimes Wrong, Often Permissible) accords animals moral status, but has recently argued that eating factory-farmed animals products is usually permissible. But he recognizes this duty (ch. 2); he just denies that you affect how many animals are created (ch. 4).

I allow them to experience harm, my inaction allows them to experience much more flourishing, and I can’t get the one without the other. But similar reasoning suggests that my inaction in *Prevention* doesn’t wrong the animals if animal universalism is true. Really, my justification in *Prevention* seems stronger since they’ll experience infinitely more flourishing.

This is compatible with the farmers wronging the animals by keeping them in miserable conditions. I’m not saying eternal bliss excuses gratuitous harm. The factory farmers could treat the animals better after they exist, giving them eternal bliss *without* terrible suffering. But I can’t. I must choose between the animals experiencing suffering followed by eternal bliss and their experiencing nothing whatsoever. If the animals demanded that I justify allowing their creation, knowing they’d suffer on Earth, I could truthfully respond that allowing this was overwhelmingly better for them than the alternative. The factory farmer cannot say this when asked to justify keeping the animals in miserable conditions.

Neither does this commit us to saying that we have an obligation to create happy beings. Suppose we have obligations to individuals who exist, but no obligations to non-existent beings, and so no obligation to create happy lives. That’s fine. The claim is that I should prevent the creation of factory-farmed animals, since, if I don’t, there will exist beings who I wrong. But on animal universalism, I apparently won’t wrong those beings by allowing their creation, and that seems incorrect. That’s compatible with the claim that, given animal universalism, I *may* prevent their creation, and more generally that I’m not obligated to create beings, or allow their creation, even when I know they’ll experience eternal bliss.

Finally, this doesn’t commit us to consequentialism. Suppose we’re contractualists and think we must justify our actions to hypothetical trustees with the animals’ best interests at heart. We could presumably justify allowing their creation by reference to the enormous benefits they get. Suppose we’re Kantians of an animal friendly sort and think we must treat animals as ends in themselves. Plausibly, we treat them as ends by allowing them to have an infinitely good life rather than none whatsoever (cf. sections 3.1 and 3.2). Suppose we’re virtue ethicists or natural law theorists. If we allow the animals’ creation, intending their heavenly bliss and viewing their earthly suffering as a foreseen but unintended consequence, it’s not clear why this would be vicious or contrary to natural law (cf. sections 3.4 and 4). This might be too quick: next, I discuss arguments for the claim that we wrong these individuals even if animal universalism is true. The point is just to note how minimal the ethical assumptions needed to set up the puzzle are.

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12Some arguments for thinking otherwise depend on the assumption that creating you cannot benefit you. For instance, Rivka Weinberg’s (*The Risk of a Lifetime*) contractualist account of procreation won’t allow the justification I suggest, but it depends on the claim that creating you cannot benefit you. And I’m operating on the assumption that this claim is false.
3. Ethical Responses

You might reject (1), the claim that we don’t wrong an individual by allowing their creation when existence will be infinitely good for them on balance and we can’t affect their condition if they’re created. I call instances of this strategy *ethical responses*. I think they fail.

3.1 Humane Meat

As mentioned, someone could endorse consuming humanely-raised meat on the grounds that, even if it’s wrong for the farmers to kill the animals, all I affect is whether additional, mostly happy animals are created. But others reject this reasoning. Ethical respondents might draw on their arguments to explain why I should act in *Prevention*. I don’t object to these arguments in *their original contexts*. But I don’t think they address my puzzle. First, notice that they’re about consuming such products, not allowing their production. E.g., responding to the claim that buying factory-farmed products is okay because one person can’t change how much factory-farming happens, Korsgaard\(^\text{13}\) writes:

> The question is... about how you are related to that particular creature when you eat her, or use products that have been extracted from her in ways that are incompatible with her good. You are treating her as a mere means to your own ends, and that is wrong.

Korsgaard subsequently\(^\text{14}\) writes that killing animals for food after raising them humanely is “not consistent with the good of the animals,” so this argument also condemns buying humanely-raised meat. Other arguments claim that, by doing so, you’re complicit in the farmers’ wrongdoing, benefiting from the farmers’ wrongdoing, exploiting the farmed animals, etc.\(^\text{15}\) But *Prevention* was about reducing demand for animal products among other people, not about consuming them myself. In failing to act, I’m not using animals for my purposes, benefiting from wrongdoing, etc. I’m just allowing their creation, knowing their suffering is the price of their eternal bliss. So, these arguments don’t initially seem to apply.

We could expand these arguments and say I have, e.g., a duty to prevent animals being used as mere means when I can. Fair enough. But this can’t be an *exceptionless* duty. It must be a *pro tanto* or imperfect duty, on pain of (among other things) creating genuine moral dilemmas.\(^\text{16}\) So the question is whether I have sufficient reason for allowing the wrongdoing in this case. I think that, *mutatis mutandis*, the argument I give in section 3.2.3 shows I do, given animal universalism.

\(^{13}\)*Fellow Creatures*, 223.

\(^{14}\)*Fellow Creatures*, 225.


\(^{16}\)I.e., sometimes I must choose which of two acts of use as a mere means I must prevent. If there’s an exceptionless duty to prevent such acts, and I can’t prevent both, I act wrongly no matter what.
3.2 Non-Identity and Creation Ethics

Responses to the non-identity problem are another obvious resource. If I dump some waste, leakage in three hundred years will cause serious birth defects. This will hinder the welfare of those born, but their lives will still be worth living. Further, my dumping will cause completely different people to exist in three hundred years. Unrelatedly, I’m wondering whether to conceive a child even though I can’t provide for one. They’ll face hardships, but they’ll have a life (barely) worth living. Many people think I act wrongly if I dump the waste or have the child. But who do I wrong? The relevant people wouldn’t exist otherwise, and their lives are worth living. Clearly, there’s a parallel with Prevention, where failure to act apparently wrongs individuals who, if I did act, would (given animal universalism) be denied infinitely good lives. The ethical respondent might hope that understanding why my actions in ordinary non-identity cases are wrong will show why factory-farming is wrong even given animal universalism, and in turn show why inaction in Prevention is wrong even given animal universalism. Alternatively, if it turns out that my actions in ordinary non-identity cases aren’t wrong, perhaps saying inaction is permissible in Prevention is okay.

3.2.1 Biting the Bullet

As the above suggests, there are three main options in ordinary non-identity cases: (A) say I don’t act wrongly after all, (B) say I’ve committed an impersonal wrong, acting wrongly without wronging anyone, and (C) say I wrong those I create, even though they wouldn’t have come into existence otherwise and their lives are worth living (Roberts 2019). The analogue of (A) says inaction is permissible in Prevention. That’s unpromising. First, I certainly seem obligated to act in Prevention. Second, it seems unlikely that anyone who cares enough about animals to accept animal universalism will dispute this judgment about Prevention. Third, no one seems likely to dispute that I’m obligated to act in the analogues of Prevention discussed in the next section (which involve human beings), so anyone who holds any Common Views about human beings will need to say something else in those cases, anyway.

3.2.2 Impersonal Wronging

The analogue of (B) says inaction in Prevention is wrong, but doesn’t wrong anyone. There are two problems. First, I think I really do wrong the particular animals who wind up getting factory-farmed. Second, it isn’t clear exactly what this impersonal wrong would be. If I don’t dump the waste, perhaps different, happier people will be born, increasing aggregate utility. But unless the animals in Prevention will be replaced by other animals—and we can stipulate otherwise—my preventing their births

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subtracts net infinite utility from the world, given animal universalism. We might appeal to values besides just utility, such as fairness or desert. I think such appeals can be handled, *mutatis mutandis*, by the argument I present in section 3.2.3.

3.2.3 Personal Wronging

The analogue of (C) says inaction in *Prevention* wrongs the animals who are created, even though inaction is necessary for their existence, and existence is infinitely good for them overall. There are many proposed explanations for why (C) might hold in ordinary non-identity cases: e.g., maybe the individuals have a birthright to “be born into good enough circumstances,” or are harmed in some non-comparative sense without a sufficiently good reason, or are wrongfully exploited by their ancestors. I can’t address all these in depth, and I have no issue with them as explanations of the cases they’re intended to explain. I instead want to present a direct argument for the claim that I’m not obligated to prevent an individual’s creation *specifically* in cases like those at issue here, i.e., where the rights violations committed by others are on a par with those involved in factory farming, and infinite utility is at stake. There is a large literature on some of the issues involved in the argument, and I can’t discuss it all. I hope to convey why I find this line of argument persuasive, even though I can’t foreclose all possible objections here.

Here’s the argument. (As mentioned, it also works against the objections in sections 3.1 and 3.2.2, perhaps with some trivial alterations.) I have two options. I can refrain from reproducing (call this *S0*), or I can have a child with a happy life, free of any suffering until they die at 90 (*S1*). I think I’m at least permitted to choose *S1* over *S0*. Further, it’s not just that I’m permitted to choose it *for my own sake*, because of my strong interest in procreation; I can choose it apart from such an interest. Now there’s a new option (*S2*). At no cost to myself, I can subject my child to a certain medical procedure. My child will experience a day of intense suffering, having their *pro tanto* birthright against the infliction of suffering infringed, but they’ll receive 100,000 more years of happy, suffering-free life. (The bad day has no lasting ill-effects.) I think I should choose *S2* over *S1*. (It’s often good, and even obligatory, when parents subject their children to procedures which produce greater costs for lesser benefits.) Since I could choose *S1* over *S0*, and since I should choose *S2* over *S1*, it

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18 Roberts, “The Non-Identity Problem,” sec. 3.2.
19 Roberts, “The Non-Identity Problem,” sec. 3.3.
20 Velleman, “Persons in Prospect,” 275.
21 Harman, “Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?”
22 Liberto, “The Exploitation Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.”
also seems right that I could choose S2 over S0. (It’s fine if both S0 and S2 are permissible: perhaps there’s no duty to create happy lives. But if I have a kid, I should do the procedure.) S2 seems permissible both when my choice is between S0, S1, and S2, and when S1 is removed, so that I must choose between just S0 and S2. (Maybe my partner won’t procreate unless we do the procedure.)

Now I’m offered S3, with a different procedure that causes two days of intense suffering (with no lasting damage) in exchange for 1,000,000 more years of happy life. If one day of suffering was outweighed by 100,000 years of happy life, presumably a second day will be outweighed by 900,000 more years. So, I should pick S3 over S2. I’m then offered S4, which involves three days of suffering but grants 10,000,000 years of extra happy life, and so on, all the way up to S41, which causes forty days of suffering but grants 10^44 years of happy life. I think I should keep trading up, selecting S41 rather than S1, S2, . . . or S40. And again, given that I could choose S1 over S0, I think I could choose S41 over S0, either when forced to pick between just those two or when allowed to choose any options in the sequence. Note that the average broiler chicken lives forty days before being slaughtered. So S41 introduces into my child’s life about as much suffering as is experienced by a factory-farmed broiler chicken.

Here are two potential objections to all that. First, perhaps I should stop trading up before reaching S41. Perhaps there’s some threshold on how much suffering I can cause my child, whatever the benefits, and this is reached before S41. I see two problems. First, the idea of such a threshold seems problematic. I’ve traded, say, three days of suffering for ten million years of flourishing; why shouldn’t I trade an additional one for ninety million more years of flourishing (or some arbitrarily bigger amount)? Even if intervals of happiness experience diminishing marginal value, does their value really hit, or asymptotically approach, zero, so that no additional amount can outweigh a day of suffering (and if they do, isn’t eternal bliss overhyped)? Suppose we decreased the intervals to seconds and increased the rewards; isn’t it true of every second in the sequence that I should add it to the earlier seconds in the sequence in exchange for an additional unfathomable period of flourishing? (Saying the threshold is vague or indeterminate doesn’t help. The problem isn’t that we can’t identify the precise second where I should stop. It’s that, for every second, it’s

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24Puzzles manifest if the sequence continues indefinitely (Pollack, “How Do You Maximize Expectation Value?”). But it doesn’t.
25Huemer, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, 52.
26To clarify: I’m not saying that, since you should trade each interval for the correlate interval of flourishing in isolation, you should trade all the suffering for all the flourishing. That’s invalid, absent the additional assumption (which I don’t make) that the values of the intervals of suffering and flourishing depend only on their intrinsic features. Otherwise, e.g., an additional second, added to the earlier seconds of suffering, might have increasing marginal disvalue, or negatively affect one’s whole life in some non-additive way. But effects like this are already built into whether you should add the second to the earlier seconds, in exchange for adding the flourishing to the already-obtained periods of flourishing.
determinately true that I should keep going.) But second, even if there is a threshold, $S_{41}$ is likely below it anyway. Consider the length of an ordinary, pretty good human life (~80 years), and the many sources of human suffering (illness, bereavement, etc.). It wouldn’t be surprising if ordinary, pretty good human lives contain the equivalent of much more than forty days of intense suffering. But most people think creating ordinary, pretty good lives is okay. If they’re below the threshold, so too, presumably, is $S_{41}$.

Second, we might deny transitivity. Perhaps I should choose $S_2$ over $S_1$, $S_3$ over $S_2$, and $S_{41}$ over $S_{40}$, but shouldn’t choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$. Or perhaps I should choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$, and may choose $S_1$ over $S_0$, but shouldn’t choose $S_{41}$ over $S_0$. But this leads to well-known problems (cf. Norcross 2002). Suppose, e.g., that between just $S_1$ and $S_0$ (choice $X$), I may choose either, that between $S_1$ and $S_{41}$ ($Y$), I should choose $S_{41}$, and that between $S_{41}$ and $S_0$ ($Z$), I should choose $S_0$. What should I do in a choice between all three? Are all options permissible? Well, if I should choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$ in $Y$, how could adding the option of doing nothing justify choosing $S_1$? (Imagine: I’m having a child, and am convinced that, given this, I must give them the procedure. Then I remember I can avoid having the child, so I have the child but don’t give them the procedure.) Are all options impermissible? Genuine moral dilemmas seem problematic generally, but especially here: if I could choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$ in $Y$, how does adding the option of doing nothing make it that I act wrongly no matter what? Is $S_0$ obligatory? If I could choose $S_1$ in $X$, how does adding a different, better option obligate me to choose $S_0$? Is $S_1$ obligatory? If I should choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$ in $Y$, how does adding the option of doing nothing obligate me to choose $S_1$? Is $S_{41}$ obligatory? If I should choose $S_0$ in $Z$, how does adding $S_1$ obligate me to choose $S_{41}$? Are only $S_0$ and $S_1$ permissible? If I should choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$ in $Y$, how does adding the option of doing nothing justify choosing $S_1$? Are only $S_0$ and $S_{41}$ permissible? If I should choose $S_0$ in $Z$, how does adding $S_1$ justify choosing $S_{41}$? Are only $S_1$ and $S_{41}$ permissible? If I should choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$ in $Y$, how does adding the option of doing nothing justify choosing $S_1$? But that’s every possibility. So, intransitivity leads to problems, and the same argument can be run, mutatis mutandis, for other relevant claims about intransitivity (e.g., that I should choose $S_2$ over $S_1$, $S_3$ over $S_2$, etc., but shouldn’t choose $S_{41}$ over $S_1$).

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27Cf. Huemer, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, 52.

28Some philosophers (e.g., Velleman, “Well-Being and Time”) think the temporal distribution of well-being in a life—the “shape” of a life—affects its goodness. E.g., one that starts off well and ends poorly might be worse than one which starts off poorly and ends well. Maybe it matters that the chicken’s suffering is largely unbroken, while human suffering is usually spread out. But I think many worthwhile human lives contain more than forty days of largely unbroken intense suffering (e.g., several months of bereavement, severe illness, combat service, etc.) so that much largely unbroken suffering doesn’t exceed the threshold, either.
So: in a choice between (just) $S0$ and $S41$, I (at least) may choose $S41$. This isn’t quite analogous to Prevention yet. Let’s rectify that. Suppose the suffering’s caused by impurities in the life-extension serum. Further, these impurities kill the child after $10^{44}$ years: otherwise, they’d live even longer. The doctor could purify the serum but doesn’t because they want to gain some information about allergens which they’ll sell to a cosmetics company. The doctor acts wrongly in administering the impure serum rather than a pure one. But my choice is between the impure serum and no child at all. Surely, I can choose the former. Now suppose we’re not talking about my child. Someone else faces the choice I had and is giving their kid the impure serum; I can stop them by preventing their procreating altogether. Since I could bring about $S41$ in my own case, surely I can allow someone else to make the analogous choice in their case. Now we’re closer to the situation with animal universalism and Prevention (as it relates to broiler chickens, anyway): I’m choosing whether to allow an individual’s creation, knowing they’ll suffer intensely for forty days and be unjustly killed through wrongful exploitation by another, but also that they’ll experience an unfathomable amount of flourishing.

There are three more disanalogies. First, if animal universalism is true, animals get infinite utility, not just $10^{44}$ years worth. That works in my favor. Second, Prevention is about animals, not humans. Some people (e.g., those sympathetic to “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people”) might think that also works in my favor, but I won’t appeal to that. Third, the parent here is willingly procreating, whereas factory-farmed animals are bred in ways inconsistent with their good. The farmer commits a further wrong which the doctor doesn’t. But this won’t be a difference-maker: as mentioned, surely I should act even if the farmed animals are gestated from synthetic gametes in artificial wombs, and my having an interest in procreation was unnecessary for $S1$’s permissibility.

So, again: I’m not rejecting option (C) in the standard cases, but I have a direct argument that the analogue doesn’t work here. This argument also applies to the strategies discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2.2. E.g., suppose I shouldn’t dump the waste because doing so is unfair to future people, and unfairness makes the world impersonally worse. The above reasoning supports the claim that, even if this is right ordinarily, any unfairness involved in failing to act in Prevention doesn’t obligate me to act (since it supports the claim that I’m not obligated to act in Prevention). Perhaps the ethical respondent should look elsewhere, then: to the effects of inaction on others, or on our relationship to God. I consider such moves next.

3.3 Indirect Effects

Maybe we should act in Prevention because of how factory farming affects the people involved. Perhaps it brutalizes them. Perhaps it makes them go to Hell. I see two problems. First, it doesn’t easily account for the fact that the animals who are factory farmed, rather than the farmers and consumers,
are wronged by inaction. Second, we’d be obligated to act in *Prevention* absent these effects. Suppose factory farming was carried out by non-sentient robots, with no moral agents involved in production or consumption; we’d still be obligated to interfere with this. More realistically: suppose our option in *Prevention* is to impose a tax which slightly reduces demand. The same people raise and consume animals as would without the tax; they raise and consume slightly fewer than they otherwise would, but would happily raise or consume more if not for economic considerations. It’s unclear why this would be any less brutalizing than their behavior without the tax, but I should impose it.\(^{29}\)

### 3.4 Presumption

Here’s another possibility. Mark Murphy\(^ {30} \) thinks allowing abortion because it will guarantee the aborted fetuses eternal bliss (see sec. 5) would be “presumptuous with respect to God’s willingness to bestow abundant blessings upon us,”\(^ {31} \) because it relies on God to make up for our permitting wrongdoing. He provides\(^ {32} \) this case:

> I am a teacher. . .Bully. . .has an unfortunate tendency to beat up Victim. . .I know. . .that Victim’s uncle. . .takes pity on Victim and deposits $1000 into Victim’s trust fund whenever Victim takes a beating. . .Victim may well accumulate quite a nest egg, long after the beatings by the neighborhood thug are forgotten. . .does the harm that Victim suffers at the hands of Bully provide me with reason to prohibit Bully from beating Victim?

Murphy thinks allowing the beatings is “deeply presumptuous, relying on the Victim’s uncle to compensate for the harm suffered by Victim, harm that it was in my power to prevent or at least to ameliorate.”\(^ {33} \) Maybe inaction in *Prevention* is similarly presumptuous.

Obviously, the harm’s a reason to act in *Prevention*. The question is whether it’s strong enough to require action. I have two worries. First, it’s unclear how this explains why we wrong *the animals*; the presumptuousness is directed towards God, not them. Second, I doubt our judgment about the teacher carries over. Realistically, our sense that the

\(^{29}\)Jeff Sebo and Tyler John (“Consequentialism and Non-Human Animals”) give an indirect utilitarian argument against humane farming. First, participation in humane farming allegedly promotes speciesism and lack of concern for animals. Someone might argue analogously in *Prevention*. This would be analogous to the move in the main text and run into the problems expressed there. (I think it’s clearer that the animals created are *themselves* harmed when they have *terrible* earthly lives than when they have on-balance good ones. So, these objections have more force against this analogue of Sebo and John’s proposal than against their proposal in context.) Second, Sebo and John argue that, in practice, even supposedly conscientious omnivores aren’t likely to stick to eating only humanely-raised meat, and even supposedly conscientiously-omnivorous societies aren’t likely to stick to only producing it. There’s no analogue to this slippery slope in *Prevention*. They’re already being factory-farmed.

\(^{30}\)“Pro-Choice and Presumption.”

\(^{31}\)“Pro-Choice,” 242.

\(^{32}\)“Pro-Choice,” 241.

\(^{33}\)“Pro-Choice,” 242.
teacher should intervene is influenced by the fact that we can’t really be sure that the uncle will pay or the money will make up for the beatings, the fact that we’re imposing a burden on the uncle, the fact that teachers have role-given obligations which make some aspects of their students’ lives more salient than others, etc. Suppose the uncle would respond to the beatings by providing his nephew with an immortality serum, that the serum would only work on the nephew anyway so that this imposed no cost on anyone else, and that we were somehow absolutely sure the beatings (and nothing else) would get him the serum. Now it seems permissible—maybe obligatory!—to let the beatings happen, just like it would be permissible to subject a child to painful medical procedures to give them immortality. But this is more analogous, since God offers an infinite benefit, presumably at no cost to himself, and there’s no risk of his failing to follow through.

Someone might claim that, given the huge benefit to the nephew and the non-existent cost to the uncle, the uncle is obligated to hand over the serum whether or not the beating happens, and this affects whether we’re presumptuous. Maybe this is different from heavenly life, which is God’s gracious gift. (Set aside the question why God isn’t obligated to give animals eternal life.) But return to Roommate. It may often be that individuals have lives worth living only because others perform supererogatory acts for them. Maybe my roommate’s child wouldn’t overcome their suffering if not for gracious, supererogatory acts by others (which I know these people will perform). This doesn’t itself make it wrong to refrain from knocking on the door, much less make it that I wrong the child (rather than these people) through inaction.

3.5 Divine Command

Finally: maybe God commands us to act in cases like Prevention, and divine commands generate (or constitute, are, etc.) moral obligations. I doubt this suggestion helps. Contemporary divine command theorists generally think God has prior reasons for issuing commands, even though the command is necessary for the obligation’s existence. Further, these reasons should have something to do with the animals themselves (rather than, say, the farmers’ characters) to account for the intuition that we wrong the animals. But what are these reasons? Presumably, they’d be ones like those discussed in sections 3.1–3.4. But I argued that, on the assumption that divine command theory is false, these reasons don’t give us obligations to the animals to act in Prevention. I think the same arguments probably show that, on the assumption that divine command theory is true, God lacks adequate reason to issue the relevant kind of command.

Leaving ethical responses behind, one could instead reject (2), the claim that there are cases where we wrong individuals by allowing their creation,

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34E.g., Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods.
even though we know they’ll be in the Relevant Group. The obvious way
to reject (2) is to say I’m not obligated to act in Prevention, or its analogues
in section four. I explained why I rejected this in section 3.2.1. But there’s
another way to oppose (2), which I discuss in section six. Next, I show
how the puzzle generalizes to other Common Views.

4. Generalizing

Of course, some people accept a Common View, but reject animal uni-
versalism. Some lost souls even endorse factory farming, and so deny
that I must act in Prevention. But my puzzle generalizes to other Common
Views. Consider:

**Human Prevention**: This is like Prevention, except human beings are farmed.
If human universalism is true, this is analogous to Prevention.

Now consider:

**Baby Prevention**: This is like Human Prevention. Also, the farmed
individuals are slaughtered in infancy.
If baby universalism is true, this is also analogous. Consider:

**Baptized Baby Prevention**: This is like Baby Prevention. Also, the infants
are baptized before they are slaughtered.

If baptized baby universalism is true, this is also analogous. Etc. We can
also imagine more realistic cases. I know that, if my roommate conceives
a child, the child will have a genetic condition which guarantees them a
short earthly life full of suffering. Intuitively, I ought to knock on the door
and prevent the conception, and the child who’s born has a complaint
against me if I don’t. Yet these views imply that (at least if the child is bap-
tized, etc.) existence would be infinitely good for them on balance. These
cases show that neither rejecting animal universalism, nor rejecting my
judgment about Prevention, themselves resolve the problem. Many people
who reject animal universalism accept one of these other views, and even
those who endorse factory farming oppose baby factory farming.

Employing an ethical response in defense of these other Common
Views doesn’t seem easier than employing one in defense of animal uni-
versalism. My earlier criticisms didn’t rely on the relevant individuals
being non-human animals; indeed, some relied on analogies with cases
involving humans. Someone might claim that, if baby universalism or
baptized baby universalism, but not animal or human universalism, are
true, then inaction in Baby Prevention or Baptized Baby Prevention violates
the principle of double effect, whereas the same isn’t true of Prevention or
Human Prevention. For animal and human universalism, whether you’re
in the Relevant Group depends just on the kind of thing you are. But for
baby and baptized baby universalism, whether you’re in the Relevant
Group also depends on when you die. If the babies in Baby Prevention and
Baptized Baby Prevention are guaranteed Heaven because they die young,
their deaths might be means to the resulting good. And double effect
condemns doing evil to realize good, however great the good. But double effect prohibits doing evil, not allowing evil. E.g., double effect is commonly taken to condemn *euthanizing* patients, but not allowing patients to die by withdrawing medical treatment in order to end their suffering. Double effect condemns the farmers killing the babies, since the good they cause is achieved through evil means. But it doesn’t apply to my inaction.

So, we can extend the puzzle to different Common Views: for each view, plug its Relevant Group into an analogue of *Prevention*. Who avoids the puzzle? I’m defining Common Views as those which (a) assert that those in a certain group whose membership is sometimes identifiable in advance are guaranteed to have infinitely good existences on balance due to their being guaranteed Heaven, and (b) aren’t *gerrymandered* in a sense which I specify in the next paragraph. So, one avoids Common Views by avoiding either (a) or (b). One avoids (a) by believing that the afterlife is non-existent, bad, neutral, or only finitely good. One also avoids it by holding that it’s always unpredictable in advance whether an individual goes to Heaven: e.g., maybe salvation requires making the right free choices, and these are unpredictable in principle. (Perhaps those who die in infancy are reincarnated until they get a chance to make such choices, or make them post-mortem.)

One could also avoid (b) by holding what I’m calling a *gerrymandered* view. Such a view claims that, although it may sometimes be possible to know in advance that, if an individual is created, they’ll go to Heaven, this is never true of individuals whose creation it otherwise intuitively seems like we ought to prevent. That prevents us from constructing an analogue of *Prevention*. E.g., maybe only people with pleasant earthly lives go to Heaven. Here, if we know you’ll have a pleasant earthly life, we know you’ll go to Heaven. But this still avoids the puzzle, since any individual whose earthly existence prospectively seems bad enough to require our preventing it is excluded from the Relevant Group.

But gerrymandering is independently unattractive. If a gerrymandered view is true, presumably individuals whose existence intuitively ought to be prevented are excluded from the Relevant Group due to some explanatory connection between their earthly condition and their post-mortem fate. Maybe God decides in advance that he dislikes some individuals, inflicting both bad earthly lives and exclusion from Heaven on them. Or maybe God dislikes losers and punishes those with bad earthly lives by excluding them from Heaven. Both seem implausible for a good God. Further, it’s unclear that anyone’s ever actually accepted gerrymandering anyway. (Perhaps the closest anyone’s come is the belief among some Calvinists that worldly success is a sign of predestination to Heaven. But I doubt even they think the link is as tight as gerrymandering requires.)

So, it’s unclear why anyone would accept gerrymandering, except as an ad hoc and implausible way of avoiding my argument. That’s why I call it “gerrymandering” and don’t think it poses a serious threat.
5. Abortion

Others have also argued that certain views of the afterlife have odd ethical implications. Notable here (because they may seem particularly analogous to my argument) are arguments advanced by Kenneth Himma and Stephen Kershnar. Both grant fetal personhood, for argument’s sake. Himma thinks baby universalism, together with the claim that some adults go to Hell and a Millian harm principle, implies that abortion should be legal since, rather than doing the fetus harm overall, it guarantees their entrance to Heaven. Kershnar claims that baby universalism, when combined with the view that some adults go to Hell, entails abortion’s moral permissibility, since it eliminates the risk of Hell.

Neither Himma nor Kershnar suggest that the pro-choice conclusions of their arguments are absurd in the way that I suggested that any view which accepts the permissibility of failing to act in Prevention is absurd. Himma wants to show how a Christian could be legally pro-choice while granting fetal personhood. Kershnar wants to show an internal tension in the views of many pro-life religious people. But Himma’s argument would probably also show that the murder of infants—or, for that matter, anyone else who will go to Heaven if they die now, but might not if they live—should be legal. Kershnar’s argument would show the same about the morality of killing such people. Those are absurd implications, whatever one thinks about abortion. (Himma thinks infanticide could be prohibited because it would “have the effect of diminishing the respect that we have for human life in general and hence would be likely to increase rates of violent crime.” My criticisms from section 3.3 apply to this. Kershnar just accepts that his argument has this implication.)

But my argument is troubling in ways that their arguments aren’t, for three reasons. First, both assume that some adults go to Hell. This—or at least the claim that some adults are excluded from Heaven, perhaps being annihilated—is why abortion supposedly benefits the fetus: it’s guaranteed entrance to Heaven, but might be excluded otherwise. Otherwise, someone could claim, e.g., that abortion harms the fetus by denying it certain goods connected to earthly life, while it would have been guaranteed the heavenly benefits anyway. But some philosophers (including Kershnar) think God’s excluding people from Heaven forever is implausible on independent ethical grounds. Learning that this view has implausible results when conjoined with other views is unexciting if it was implausible anyway. But the problem in my puzzle is generated by God’s including individuals in Heaven. So, my argument applies even to

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35“No Harm, No Foul.”
36“Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense?”
37“No Harm,” 186–188.
38“No Harm,” 187.
39“Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense?”, ch. 1.
universalists who escape Himma’s and Kershner’s arguments. If anything, the problem is worse for human and animal universalists, since the members of the Relevant Groups associated with these views are more numerous and easier to identify.

Second, my argument focuses, not on killing, but on allowing the creation of someone who will suffer and be killed. Some people think abortion cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds because abortion intentionally kills the innocent, and this is categorically prohibited. Since Kershner argues (conditional on the relevant assumptions) for the moral permissibility of abortion due to expected future consequences, he must reject this. He instead endorses “threshold deontology,” according to which the side constraint against killing the innocent can be overridden by sufficiently weighty consequences. But my argument is compatible with a categorical prohibition against intentionally killing the innocent.

Third, if God exists and some people are damned to Hell (or excluded from Heaven), presumably there’s some reason why God gives us the ability to damn ourselves to Hell (or exclude, etc.), rather than putting us in Heaven without our exercising that ability. (If God does the latter with humans who die young, it must be possible.) The reason might involve the value of free will, of a virtuous earthly life, etc. If God’s perfectly good, this reason must be weighty enough to justify the risks. And if free will or earthly virtue (etc.) give God a reason weighty enough to let us make choices that might damn us, it might also give us a reason weighty enough for us to let others make such choices. Perhaps it would also give God a reason to prohibit infanticide, etc., so we don’t interfere with such goods.

The response from Kershner and, implicitly, Himma is that free will, etc., possess only finite value, whereas Heaven is infinitely valuable and damnation is infinitely disvaluable. So, there’s inadequate reason to increase the chance of an individual’s missing Heaven, and suffering Hell, in pursuit of these finite goods. But this is just one of the independent objections to Hell mentioned above: it implies that God has decisive reason not to create the relevant afterlife system at all. Then we don’t need the rest of the argument. The view which Kershner and Himma discuss is unworkable anyway.

But there’s no analogous objection to my argument. My decision isn’t between guaranteeing someone Heaven and pursuing the goods of freedom, etc., but between guaranteeing them Heaven (at the expense of earthly misery) or preventing their existence altogether. Non-existence doesn’t give them the goods of a good earthly life anyway, so whether

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41Cf. Kershner, Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense?, 59.
42Kershner reinterprets double effect in an unorthodox way which allows using evil as a means when the good is great enough (Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense?, 58). But he admits that the ordinary version of the principle is incompatible with his argument.
45“No Harm,” 180.
these goods are important enough to risk exclusion from Heaven is irrelevant.

6. Metaphysical Responses

Here’s a final response to my puzzle. I’ll tentatively defend a version of it. One could reject (2), not by denying that you should act in Prevention and its analogues, but by rejecting my characterization of what acting does. Maybe I wrong the relevant individuals through inaction in these cases, but action doesn’t prevent their existence. This is a metaphysical response. An example: suppose substance dualism is true of humans and animals and God has already made all the creaturely souls which will ever exist. Here, procreation doesn’t create anybody; it simply makes available a body in which somebody becomes incarnate. This isn’t totally ad hoc. The pre-existence of the soul has been defended by Platonist, Neo-Platonist, and other philosophers, by significant Jewish, Christian and especially Islamic traditions, and is widely accepted by Mormons. Maybe everyone’s eventually embodied, and acting in Prevention causes the individuals to incarnate at different times in different bodies. Call this Different Earthly Life. Or perhaps acting in Prevention keeps the individuals from incarnating at all. Maybe they just live in Heaven. Call this No Earthly Life. (There are other possibilities, but these are natural views.)

There are possible metaphysical objections to metaphysical responses. E.g., if origin essentialism is true and I began existing at conception, then I couldn’t exist if you prevented that conception. But notice that metaphysical responses may not require that I pre-exist my earthly life. If origin essentialism is false, perhaps I actually began at conception, but could have been conceived under different circumstances. Further, even if metaphysical responses require pre-existence, they may not require dualism. Many philosophers think I’m material but am capable of surviving physical death, thereby transitioning from earthly life to the afterlife. Perhaps theories of how this is possible will also allow me to transition from pre-life to earthly life, if I’m material.

Metaphysical responses eliminate the tradeoff between earthly suffering and eternal bliss. Since the individual exists no matter what I do, I may be able to get them the latter without the former, by either (given Different Earthly Life) causing them to incarnate under different, hopefully better, circumstances or (given No Earthly Life) sparing them earthly life altogether. To evaluate metaphysical responses, we need a further distinction about why I should act in these cases. Perhaps it’s because it’s (in

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46 Givens, When Souls Had Wings.
47 Givens, When Souls Had Wings.
48 Cook, “Pre-Mortality.”
49 Cook, “Pre-Mortality.”
50 An “earthly life,” as I mean it, wouldn’t necessarily take place on Earth. It could happen on some other planet, or in a different universe. The point is that it’s roughly the kind of life we have, rather than the eternal, blissful life of those in Heaven.
51 Baker, “Material Persons.”
expectation) better overall for the individual. Maybe a life of infinite bliss in Heaven preceded by earthly misery is worse than a life of such bliss on its own, or than one preceded by earthly flourishing, even if modeling this mathematically requires nonstandard elements such as surreal numbers. Call this Welfare Difference.

Or maybe our action makes no difference to the overall well-being of the individual in question, with our obligation to act instead grounded wholly in some other way. Call this Welfare Equality. Maybe we think, for mathematical reasons, that finite earthly suffering can’t affect the value of a life which includes infinite positive heavenly value. Or maybe we think that, as Marilyn McCord Adams argues, God ultimately defeats all evils by incorporating them into positively-valued organic unities, so that no one’s life will be worse for them overall because of the evils in it. Different Earthly Life/No Earthly Life and Welfare Difference/Welfare Equality represent a cross-cutting distinction: either member of either pair could be combined with either member of the other. The No Earthly Life/Welfare Difference combination is what I’m tentatively defending.

Welfare Equality should be rejected in light of its implausible implications. Both the infinitarian and the defeat-based justifications imply that nothing overall harmful ever happens to anyone, provided they make it to Heaven (as, according to Common Views, members of Relevant Groups do). I, responding partly to Adams, have argued elsewhere that this undermines ordinary ethics. Ordinary moral and prudential reasoning, along with ordinary judgments about which emotional reactions to events are appropriate, centrally presuppose that all-things-considered harmful events sometimes befall people. E.g., my decision about whether to subject my child to a painful surgery is affected by whether I think it’s least harmful to them on balance (even if I also think they’ll make it to Heaven).

Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference also has implausible implications. Here, everyone eventually gets an earthly life, and the idea is presumably that we should prevent unpromising lives in hopes that the relevant individuals will get better ones. But this makes whether we should act in cases like Prevention depend, not just on the absolute quality of a life, but also on how it compares to other lives within some class. It thus faces a classic objection to what Parfit calls “the Average Principle,” which states that the value of a world depends, not on the aggregate amount of well-being in it, but rather on the average amount of well-being. The objection in both cases is that the relevant view gives reasons to create bad lives, or not create good ones, because of how they compare to intuitively irrelevant lives. Suppose most future lives will be extremely bad because, in two hundred years, a malevolent AI will seize control and submit everyone to unceasing torture forever. Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference then

\begin{itemize}
  \item Chen and Rubio, “Surreal Decisions.”
  \item Adams, Horrendous Evils.
  \item Crummett, “Sufferer-Centered.”
  \item Parfit, Reasons and Persons, sec. 143.
\end{itemize}
gives us reason to procreate as much as possible now, even if the lives in question will be very bad, so as to spare those individuals incarnating under worse conditions in the future. On the other hand, suppose technological advances will make life for everyone vastly better. This would give us reason not to create even very happy lives now, since these individuals will get even better lives in the future. These results are absurd.

However, No Earthly Life/Welfare Difference avoids the problems mentioned above. By allowing for all-things-considered harms, it avoids the problem with Welfare Equality. It can also avoid the problem with Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference. Suppose some earthly lives are worth incarnating for, while others aren’t. It seems plausible that which is which will depend on the absolute, not the comparative, quality of one’s life. And it seems plausible to draw the line wherever we ordinarily think the line for permissible procreation should be drawn.

This view still faces at least two potential ethical objections. (The first is also faced by all metaphysical responses, and the second is at least also faced by Different Earthly Life/Welfare Difference.) First, we ordinarily think we should be grateful to our parents for our existence. But metaphysical responses imply that we at most owe them for our incarnation, or our incarnating when we did. But this might be acceptable. The view implies that we should be grateful to them for the value of our earthly lives. This is essentially what people who don’t believe in an afterlife think anyway, though they differ over whether that’s “all we have.” On the other hand, we usually don’t think we should be infinitely grateful to our parents. But if they’re responsible for our existence, which includes eternal bliss, perhaps we should be. This view accounts for this by saying that we would have gotten eternal bliss anyway, and they’re just responsible for the finite value of our earthly lives.

Second, this view might foreclose an attractive view in procreation ethics. Many think we’re not obligated to create new individuals with happy lives because we only have obligations to existing individuals, and individuals who aren’t created don’t exist. But here, the individual who would have been born does exist; they’re just denied a valuable earthly life. Failing to procreate would then be more like failing to benefit an existing person. This seems counterintuitive, but perhaps not unacceptably so. After all, some people do think we’re pro tanto obligated to procreate when doing so will produce a happy individual, and some people think we’re not obligated, but for some other reason.

So: from an ethical perspective, No Earthly Life/Welfare Difference might be best. It could still be unattractive for other (metaphysical, theological, etc.) reasons. If so, the puzzle stands. If not, that’s itself significant, since probably the vast majority of people who hold Common Views don’t hold this view. The strength of non-ethical objections to it, and of any other potential responses which I haven’t discussed, are matters for future research.
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