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IN DEFENSE OF A LATIN SOCIAL TRINITY: A RESPONSE TO WILLIAM HASKER

Scott M. Williams

In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I objected to William Hasker’s Social Model of the Trinity (among others) on the grounds that it does not secure the necessary agreement between the divine persons. Further, I developed a Latin Social model of the Trinity. Hasker has responded by defending his Social Model and by raising seven objections against my Latin Social Model. Here I raise a new objection against Hasker on the grounds that it is inconsistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism, and I respond to the seven objections and in so doing further develop the Latin Social Model.

1. Introduction

William Hasker has written an incisive response to my article “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity” that raises several objections. This is my response to Hasker. In my previous article I discussed William Hasker’s and Richard Swinburne’s social models, and Brian Leftow’s non-social model. Here I will restrict myself to discussing Hasker’s model. In the previous article I began by criticizing Hasker’s, Swinburne’s and Leftow’s models of the Trinity, and then I developed a Latin Social model of the Trinity that is based in part on my earlier article “Indexicals and the Trinity: Two Non-Social Models.” My response to Hasker follows the same structure.

In §2 I discuss Hasker’s reply to my criticism of his social model and raise further objections. One objection, or better, a request for clarification, is based on what the seven ecumenical councils have to say about the Trinity, especially the fifth and sixth ecumenical councils. In §3 I defend the Latin Social model against Hasker’s objections. I argue that my Latin Social model is internally coherent and is consistent with Conciliar Trinitarianism. If consistency with Conciliar Trinitarianism and with Jewish monotheism are non-negotiable theological criteria for a plausible model of the Trinity, then my model is preferable to Hasker’s. I conclude that the Latin Social model is all-things-considered preferable to Hasker’s Social model of the Trinity.
In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I focused on the divine persons’ unity of action. I did this for two reasons. First, it was a basis on which to criticize competing models of the Trinity to the one I proposed. Second, it was a way into formulating the Latin Social model of the Trinity. I gave three reasons why it matters to Christians to posit that the divine persons have necessary agreements with regard to their volitions about contingent matters, especially with regard to cases of “permissible alternatives.”¹ The first reason was that Christian theologians “have taken pains to distinguish Trinitarianism from Tri-theism, or polytheism.” Trinitarianism and Tri-theism differ in that the former secures the persons’ necessary agreements (≡ NA) but the latter does not. Second, “arguments for God’s existence typically aim for a conclusion that there is just one ultimate source for all created existing things, and not three separate or independent ultimate sources that just so happen to agree on creating this particular world.” Third, “for many orthodox Trinitarians, there is a desire to show how a doctrine of the Trinity is consistent with, or a completion of, Jewish monotheism. It is difficult to see how a model of the Trinity is consistent with Jewish monotheism if it were not also consistent with NA.”²

In Hasker’s response he accepts the criterion of NA for a good model of the Trinity, responds to my criticisms of his model of the Trinity, and raises objections against my Latin Social model. Hasker asserts that his social model satisfactorily meets the criterion of NA.

[In the event of differing preferences the persons, recognizing the undesirability of conflicting wills, would voluntarily come to a resolution that all would accept. [. . . ] Would divine persons, endowed with supreme wisdom and goodness, not recognize that it would be a very bad thing for them to oppose their wills to one another? And recognizing this, would they not find an acceptable way to resolve their preferences? The answers, it seems to me, are obvious - and if so, it is not the case that proposals such as Swinburne’s and mine leave NA insufficiently secured.³]

Hasker goes on to say that

I express considerable hesitation about the possibility [of any non-agreement between divine persons], though in the end I do accept it. It could be that, in view of the fact that the powers of all the persons are grounded in the

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¹Swinburne gave us the example of whether the divine persons would choose to have the Earth revolve around the sun in one direction or another direction. Assuming there is no moral difference which direction the Earth revolves around the sun, there is no overriding reason to have it go one direction or another. The divine persons’ choosing it to go the direction it goes is arbitrary. There are many such “permissible alternatives” in the created, contingent world.


³Hasker, “Can A Latin Trinity Be Social?,” 358.
one concrete divine nature they all share, in view also of the interpenetration and complete mutual awareness of the persons implied by the doctrine of perichoresis, that even this minimal form of non-agreement between the persons is impossible.4

While I remain unpersuaded by Hasker’s response, we can still make some progress in the discussion by evaluating our models using other criteria—criteria that we both would accept. Hasker agrees that NA makes sense as a way to evaluate models of the Trinity, but he points out that other criteria are important too. In fact, if we are going to compare models of the Trinity, we need all-things-considered criteria. As he says,

It could be that Williams is not claiming to have a conclusive objection, but is merely pointing out that his own view secures NA more economically, without further assumptions utilized by Swinburne and me. Questions about economy, however, need to be addressed to theories as a whole, not just to special features of each view.5

Hasker is indeed correct. We should evaluate models of the Trinity using different theological and philosophical criteria. There is one criterion that I have reason to think Hasker accepts, but his social model does not satisfy. The criterion is this: a good model of the Trinity will be consistent with whatever propositions about the Trinity are affirmed in the seven ecumenical councils. Another criterion is that a good model of the Trinity will not affirm a proposition that the seven ecumenical councils denied (anathematized), or vice versa. Of course, these are dialectical criteria. If one does not accept these councils as guides for one’s model of the Trinity, then consistency with them will not have any (or much) dialectical force. But if one accepts them, or at least aims for one’s model of the Trinity to be consistent with them, then there is significant dialectical force.

In the opening chapter of *Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God*, Hasker endorses the Nicene-Constantinople creed. And, he takes the Cappadocian theologians (St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, and St. Basil of Caesarea) of the fourth century to be normative guides for our understanding the Trinity. This shows that Hasker is aiming for an orthodox model of the Trinity. Although Hasker says nothing about other ecumenical councils it seems that he takes the ecumenical councils as good guides for our constructing and evaluating models of the Trinity. Moreover, if philosophical theologians are trying to assess which model of the Trinity makes the best sense, overall, then they would also benefit from knowing whether the model in question is consistent with the ecumenical councils. (For the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholics, many Anglicans, and others, this will be an especially important theological criterion for assessing models of the Trinity.) In what follows I examine some passages from the fifth and sixth ecumenical councils that have to do with the Trinity in

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5Hasker, “Can A Latin Trinity Be Social?,” 359n.9.
order to illuminate whether Hasker’s model of the Trinity is consistent with them. I argue that Hasker’s model as it is currently articulated seems inconsistent with them, and so further clarification is needed.

Recall that on Hasker’s social model, the one concrete divine nature constitutes three sets of divine mental powers, such that one set of divine mental powers corresponds to each divine person. Hasker labels his view the “multi-power” view. Henceforth, “the multi-power view” is the claim that the number of persons corresponds to the number of sets of divine powers. For example, if there is one divine person, then there is one set of mental powers; if there are three divine persons, then there are three sets of mental powers.

Now consider this statement from the fifth ecumenical council:

If anyone will not confess that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have one nature or substance, that they have one power and authority, that there is a consubstantial Trinity, one Deity to be adored in three subsistences or persons: let him be anathema.6

The first sentence refers to the divine essence and divine power, affirms that there is just one divine essence and “one power,” and affirms that there are three divine persons. The passage suggests that if there are three divine persons, then there is one divine power (which can be interpreted as one set of powers). This seems inconsistent with Hasker’s multi-power view. Moreover, if it is inconsistent with the multi-power view, then the passage can be interpreted as condemning the multi-power view. Still, one may not be certain how best to interpret “one power.” Hasker could contend that “one power” is either hermeneutically underdetermined, or that he has a way of interpreting it so that it is consistent with the multi-power view. Still, if we can get clarification on “one power,” then we can understand what view is being rejected (anathematized) by this ecumenical council.

Fortunately, the sixth ecumenical council disambiguates the question whether “one power” is equivalent to numerically one power (or numerically one set of powers). The sixth council affirms what Pope St. Agatho writes in his letter to the council. Below I give three passages from Pope St. Agatho.

[1] [A]nd so we confess God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; not three gods, but one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; not a subsistency of three names, but one substance of three subsistences; and of these persons one is the essence, or of substance or nature, that is to say one is the godhead, one the eternity, one the power, one the kingdom, one the glory, one the adoration, one the essential will and operation of the same Holy and inseparable Trinity, which ha[s] created all things, ha[s] made disposition of them, and still contains them.7

6 Second Council of Constantinople, “Anathemas against the ‘Three Chapters’,” 114. Note that “subsistences” translates the Greek “hypostasesin” and “persons” translates “prosopoi.”
[2] This then is the status of our evangelical and Apostolic faith, to wit, that as we confess the holy and inseparable Trinity, that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to be of one deity, of one nature and substance or essence, so we will profess also that it has one natural will, power, operation, domination, majesty, potency, and glory. And whatever is said of the same Holy Trinity essentially in singular number we understand to refer to the one nature of the three consubstantial persons, having been so taught by canonical logic.8

[3] Consequently, therefore, according to the rule of the holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Christ, she also confesses and preaches that there are in [Christ] two natural wills and two natural operations. For if anybody should mean a personal will, when in the holy Trinity there are said to be three persons, it would be necessary that there should be asserted three personal wills, and three personal operations (which is absurd and truly profane). Since, as the truth of the Christian faith holds, the will is natural, where the one nature of the holy and inseparable Trinity is spoken of, it must be consistently understood that there is one natural will, and one natural operation.9

[1] asserts that there is just one divine “power,” and one “essential will and operation.” I take it that “essential will” is (roughly) equivalent to a faculty of will and “[one] operation” to be (roughly) equivalent to one act of will (a volition). [2] and [3] make clear that the number of “natural wills” and “operations” is equivalent to the number of natures. (This claim about equivalence derives (at least in part) from Basil of Caesarea or Gregory of Nyssa.)10 [2] and [3] strongly suggest a bi-conditional: if there is one nature, then there is one natural will and one operation from that will, and if there is one natural will and one operation, then there is one nature. At most, the affirmation of this bi-conditional is consistent with there being one set of mental powers (one intellect, one will, etc.). But Hasker affirms that there are three sets of mental powers (three intellects, three wills, etc.). These claims are incompatible, or at least seem to be incompatible. It cannot be true that there is just one set of divine mental powers and that there are just three sets of divine mental powers, so long as there is no fallacy of equivocation occurring between the conjuncts. Hasker may contend that what the persons will is the same thing (such that there is NA), even though they have numerically distinct faculties of will. But [3] claims that it is “absurd and truly profane” to assert that the number of persons is equivalent to the number of natural wills (i.e. faculty of will) and operations (i.e. volitions). Hasker’s claim that the number of persons corresponds to the number of

10We can see this inference from one nature to one (faculty of) will and from one (faculty of) will to one nature, in the passage from Gregory of Nyssa that I quoted in Williams, “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” 323.
wills (i.e. faculty of will) and operations (i.e. volitions) is not (or does not seem) consistent with these passages.

If it had been the mind of orthodox Christian theologians that there are three divine powers (three faculties of intellect, will, etc.), they could easily have said so. The ecumenical councils never affirm three divine powers or natures, only affirm one divine power and nature, deny there is more than one divine nature or (sets of) divine power or natural will, affirm a correspondence between the number of natures and the number of e.g., wills (i.e. faculty of will), and deny a correspondence between the number of divine persons and the number of divine wills. These claims seem incompatible with Hasker’s “multi-power” view.

But if Hasker has a hermeneutical way out of the (apparent) incompatibility, this would be a welcome clarification of his Social model of the Trinity. If Hasker addresses the issue of consistency with claims about the Trinity from the ecumenical councils, it would help philosophical theologians in assessing his model of the Trinity. Philosophical theologians may have, or not have, a prior commitment to the ecumenical councils. In either case, it would be illuminating to learn how models of the Trinity, in general, and his model in particular, fits with the ecumenical councils.

So the situation as it stands is that a core feature of Hasker’s Social model appears incompatible with claims about the Trinity from the fifth and sixth ecumenical councils, and an ecumenical council seems to have anathematized the very thing that Hasker affirms. This should give Hasker and orthodox Christians pause about adopting, or using as a heuristic, his social model of the Trinity. I do not assume that this entails Hasker’s model is false, but it does give one who takes the ecumenical councils to be a guide for models of the Trinity a reason to worry that Hasker’s model needs clarification (if not revision). I take these councils to be a guide for models of the Trinity, so I have reason to worry about Hasker’s social Trinity. This is one reason that my Latin Social model of the Trinity is a “one-power” view and not a “multi-power” view. In the next section I defend and develop this model of the Trinity in response to Hasker’s objections.

3. In Defense of a Latin Social Model of the Trinity

In this section I restate seven objections or challenges that Hasker raised against my Latin Social model and reply to them.

Objection 1. One of the central points of disagreement between us has to do with personhood and its relation to consciousness. Hasker summarizes my account of personhood and its relation to consciousness as follows:

[On Williams’s view] each person is an “incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature,” and the intellectual nature guarantees that the persons can have conscious experiences and be the subjects of mental acts of cognition and volition. And yet, there is only one consciousness and one set of mental power and mental acts! The closest I am able to come to imagining this is to think of science-fiction scenarios in which an alien race [ . . . ]
exist in a “group mind,” in which all thoughts, beliefs and volitions are fully shared, and the individual organisms are important only as means for carrying out particular volitions. To be sure, many readers find these scenarios repellent rather than attractive. It is clear that on this view no person will be able, on his own, to originate any act of divine will."

On my view, one is constituted as a person on the basis of some ontologically essential and incommunicable attribute and having an intellectual nature. An intellectual nature entails a faculty of intellect and a faculty of will, or what we can call “mental powers.” The incommunicable attribute is explanatorily prior to any cognitive habits or acts, and any volitional habits or acts. One is a person independently of any such mental habits or acts. But for Hasker, personhood requires or implies not only some incommunicable mental powers but also some incommunicable mental habits or acts. When we consider a person’s consciousness, on Hasker’s analysis, any conscious act is ontologically incommunicable. (At least, that is how I understand Hasker’s view.) But on my view, it is an open question whether a person’s conscious acts are ontologically incommunicable or communicable. Hasker is suggesting or asking for further clarification. If my analysis of divine persons is not even conceivable, then one wonders whether it is even possible.

Reply to 1. I need to nuance the Latin Social model in order to address Hasker’s ascribing to the Latin Social model that there is “only one consciousness.” It is important to keep in mind that we can talk about consciousness from an ontological perspective and from a phenomenological (experiential) perspective. Once we identify the relevant phenomena, then we can offer an ontological account of the phenomena. The Latin Social model of the Trinity (and any model of the Trinity) should say something about the ontology and phenomenology. If one omits either perspective, then something is missing in one’s model of the Trinity. I believe that a fine-grained ontology of consciousness can help us to better understand the phenomena, and vice versa. First, we need to distinguish types of conscious phenomena. I’ll identify three types of phenomena: (i) experiential consciousness, (ii) access consciousness, and (iii) introspective consciousness. (i) is the what-it-is-like experience. What it is like to see red, what it is like to think $2 + 2 = 4$, and so on. We can have experiential consciousness of sensible things (e.g., the shade of red on a book) and of intelligible things (e.g., what it’s like to think $2 + 2 = 4$). (ii) is a basic awareness of something such that one can interact with that thing. When you drive your car you are aware of this road, this stop-sign, and the like. You successfully drive down a road in part because you are aware of the relevant surroundings. So, I can have experiential consciousness of a certain shade of red on a book, and I can be aware of this shade of red on a book. Lastly, (iii) is awareness of one’s own awareness of something. I can be aware of $2 + 2 = 4$, and I can be aware that I am aware of $2 + 2 = 4$. David Armstrong

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contrasts (ii) and (iii) by telling the story of a long-distance truck driver.\textsuperscript{12} The driver can be aware of the road he is driving on, and can be aware that he is driving down the road. When he becomes exhausted he can fail to be aware that he is driving down the road but can nonetheless successfully drive down the road. He has access consciousness of his surroundings but does not have introspective consciousness that he is interacting with those surroundings.

What I described in (i), (ii), and (iii) are types of phenomena. Having identified types of phenomena, we need to offer an ontological explanation of them. It would be imprudent to ignore the ontology. After all, lack of reflection on the ontology may lead one to assume that for each phenomenon there is a unique ontological item. For example, if God the Son is aware that God the Son is not identical to God the Father, and God the Father is aware that God the Father is not identical to God the Son, then one may simply assume that what explains these phenomena are two numerically distinct ontological items, say, two incommunicable mental acts, one had by the Son and the other had by the Father. One might then infer that each divine person must have their own set of mental powers (faculties) in order to explain these persons’ incommunicable mental acts. On this ontological assumption, one might (like Hasker) suppose that what the Latin Social model proposes is hardly conceivable. But it becomes conceivable once we take a more fine-grained ontological analysis of (i), (ii), and (iii) in relation to the Trinity. This will clarify why it is incorrect to ascribe to the Latin Social model “one consciousness.” In brief, the ontology of the one-power view can explain (i), (ii), and (iii) by positing fewer ontological items than Hasker’s multi-power view.

On the Latin Social model, the divine persons share all their divine mental tokens (where a mental token is analogous to a spoken or written sentence to the extent that it has semantic content and syntax). On my ontological analysis what it is for a divine person to think of something is the following: a divine person uses a mental token in a context and in so doing is aware of a proposition. For example, God the Father’s (ii) awareness of the proposition that “God the Father is wise” is to be analyzed as follows: God the Father uses a mental token of “God the Father is wise” and in so doing is aware of the proposition that God the Father is wise. Moreover, the Father can be (iii) introspectively aware that God the Father is wise. This is to be analyzed as follows: God the Father uses a mental token of “I am wise” and in so doing is introspectively aware of his being wise. Since this is a “one-power” view, it implies that the divine persons not only share all divine mental tokens, they also share all uses of these divine mental tokens.\textsuperscript{13} God the Father’s use of the divine mental token of “God the Father is wise,” is shared with the Son. So, God the Son’s using the divine mental token of “God the Father is wise” entails that God the

\textsuperscript{12}Armstrong, “What is Consciousness?” 607–616.
Son is aware that God the Father is wise. But in the case of the persons’ shared use of a divine mental token of “I am wise,” God the Father’s using it entails that the Father is introspectively aware of his (i.e. the Father’s) being wise, the Son’s using it entails that the Son is introspectively aware of his (i.e. the Son’s) being wise, and the Holy Spirit’s using it entails that the Holy Spirit is introspectively aware of his (i.e. the Holy Spirit’s) being wise. Introspective awareness supervenes on a certain agent’s using a mental token that includes essential indexicals like “I.” Likewise, experiential consciousness supervenes on an agent’s using a mental token. If the mental token includes an essential indexical “I” in e.g., “I am wise,” then each person’s using “I am wise” entails that each person is introspectively aware of being wise and each person is experientially conscious of being introspectively aware of being wise. So, God the Father knows what it is like to know he (i.e. the Father) is wise; likewise, God the Son knows what it is like to know he (i.e. the Son) is wise, and God the Holy Spirit knows what it is like to know he (i.e. the Holy Spirit) is wise.\footnote{The reader should recall that I am not addressing the issue of whether divine persons have a gender or several genders. Cf. Williams, “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” 327n23. For coverage on this, see Harrison, “The Trinity and Feminism,” 519–530.} The diverse phenomena do not require an ontological explanation according to which each phenomenon requires a unique ontological item. On my view, the ontology of these different phenomena requires distinct divine persons sharing numerically the same use of the same mental token in a context. There is no need to posit three mental tokens of “I am a divine person,” or three incommunicable uses of a mental token, one for each person. If a simpler ontological account of these phenomena works, then we should go with the simpler ontological account. The “multi-power” view goes (in my view) against what Pope St. Agatho calls “canonical logic.” What I propose is that the number of mental tokens for a given type and the number of uses of mental tokens corresponds to the number of natures; given just one divine nature, there is just one set of divine mental powers, one mental token for each type, and the persons share their use of a mental token. (If the Father uses a mental token, then the Son and Holy Spirit necessarily use this mental token because all divine persons share numerically the same (set of) mental power and numerically the same uses of numerically the same mental token.)

It should be noted that experiential consciousness of, e.g., what it is like that one is wise might be qualitatively exactly similar for each divine person. But this need not be so in every case. If the divine persons are using a divine mental token of “I will become incarnate,” or “I am incarnate,” there can be less qualitative similarity of what the persons are experientially conscious, because knowing what it’s like for oneself to be incarnate (as in the case of God the Son) is different than knowing what it’s like to be essentially numerically the same divine nature as one who is incarnate (as in the case of God the Father and God the Holy Spirit) without being
identical to that person who is incarnate. So, the divine persons’ act of using such a mental token is shared, but the Father and the Holy Spirit do not think (or believe) exactly the same proposition expressed in using this divine mental token as does the Son. Moreover, the divine persons’ experiential and introspective consciousnesses in such a case are different. What they share is numerically the same act of using a divine mental token. What is not de facto shared is exactly the same access consciousness (the proposition of which each is aware), experiential consciousness (what it’s like to be aware of the proposition of which one is aware), and introspective consciousness (one’s being aware of something about oneself). A consequence of this analysis is that the divine persons’ access consciousness and experiential consciousness in contingent cases like the one in which the divine mental token being used is “I will become incarnate” or “I am incarnate” (assuming only God the Son is contingently incarnate), are communicable but not factually communicated or shared. (Their conscious experiences in such cases are communicable but not communicated, even though their use of numerically the same mental tokens are shared.) Given that the Son’s becoming incarnate is contingent, and that it is metaphysically possible for any divine person to become incarnate, it follows that it is not a necessary truth that only the Son has access consciousness and experiential consciousness of being incarnate. It could have been the case that all three divine persons became incarnate. In such a possible scenario, the three persons’ access consciousness and experiential consciousness in using a divine mental like “I am incarnate,” would be exactly similar. So, in the contingent case of only God the Son’s being incarnate, I claim that God the Son’s access consciousness and experiential consciousness from his using a divine mental token of “I am incarnate,” is not factually shared with or communicated with the Father and the Holy Spirit, but it could have been so if they also had become incarnate.

There is another case worth considering. The Father’s incommunicable property is being unbegotten or begetting (or both). If the Father uses a divine mental token of “I eternally beget the Son,” then the proposition that the Father thinks is that the Father eternally begets the Son. Moreover, in using this divine mental token, the Father has experiential consciousness of what it’s like to beget the Son and is introspectively consciousness of his begetting the Son. This sort of case of experiential consciousness and introspective consciousness cannot be shared with the Son (or Holy Spirit) because it is an experiential consciousness of, and introspective consciousness of, the Father’s own incommunicable property, namely being unbegotten or begetting. So, a divine person has an incommunicable experiential consciousness or incommunicable introspective consciousness if and only if what the consciousness is directed at is a divine person’s own incommunicable property. The Son, of course, has experiential consciousness of the Father’s personal property, but it differs from the Father’s experiential consciousness of the Father’s own personal property because it is not the Son’s own personal property. The Son has an experiential consciousness
of another divine person’s incommunicable property—what it’s like to be essentially numerically the same divine essence as one who eternally begets without being identical to that person. The Son’s experiential consciousness of the Father’s incommunicable property supervenes on the Son’s using the divine mental token of “I eternally beget the Son.” The Son is aware of the proposition that the Son is essentially numerically the same divine nature as one who eternally begets the Son without being identical to that person; and so the Son has experiential consciousness of this proposition.

In summary, in cases of contingent propositions like the ones discussed above, the divine persons’ experiential consciousness and introspective consciousness are communicable but not necessarily communicated (shared). It’s contingent whether these are shared or not shared. (By contrast, Hasker holds the stronger view that these are incommunicable. The weaker claim is that these are communicable but not factually communicated.) In cases of a divine person’s own incommunicable property, that person’s experiential consciousness of and introspective consciousness of their own incommunicable property are both incommunicable. Nonetheless, in all cases, the divine persons share numerically the same mental powers and numerically the same uses of mental tokens. Moreover, all three types of consciousness supervene on the divine persons’ use of a mental token in a context.

So, when Hasker ascribes “one consciousness” to my Latin Social model, this is misleading. To be fair, I did not elaborate on “consciousness” in the previous article. So it is understandable that Hasker infers on the basis of the Latin Social model that it seems to imply “one consciousness.” But now it should be clear that this ascription falls short. On my view, each divine person has access consciousness, experiential consciousness, and introspective consciousness. The divine persons are conscious of exactly the same thing or are conscious of something different depending on the divine mental token being used and the proposition of which each person is aware. The ontological explanation (i.e. the one-power view) remains the same for these diverse phenomena.

In the last sentence of this objection quoted above, Hasker says that “no person will be able, on his own, to originate any act of divine will.” If we set aside the “notional acts,” then yes, all “essential acts” of will are originated by all the persons because they share numerically the same faculty of will. This is not a bug in the system, it is a virtue of it! The claim that the divine persons’ acts of will (including acts of love) are shared and not incommunicable, is a virtue if one wishes to develop a model of the Trinity that is compatible with what is taught in the ecumenical councils.

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15This is consistent with Augustine’s claim that each divine person understands and wills. Cf. Scott M. Williams, “Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus,” 39–43.

From this point of view, to posit all divine acts of will as incommunicable acts is a bug in the system!

(Consider Richard of St. Victor’s claim that the Father shares everything he can with the Son and the Holy Spirit, including his own act of gratuitous love. “What, I repeat, [can the Son and Holy Spirit demand], since they receive from [the Father] as a gift even [that] due love, with which they repay his gratuitous love? If this were not the case, they would possess something that they have not received from him; but our previous considerations demonstrate how this is impossible.”17 If Richard posits the Father’s own act of gratuitous love is shared with the Son and Holy Spirit and his being unbegotten and begetting are incommunicable, then we do not have reason to ascribe the “multi-power” view to Richard. For Richard perfect supreme love requires that the divine persons share their “acts of love”; the act of love is communicated and communicable.18)

**Objection 2.** Hasker gives what I take to be a reductio argument from the metaphysics of the Incarnation. On the Latin Social model, God the Son acquires a created will power. The Son can now, in virtue of his individual human nature, “originate volitions of his own, without the other two divine persons simultaneously (and in the same act) willing the same thing.”19 This implies that the Son’s incarnation “looks less like a kenosis or humiliation, and more like a metaphysical augmentation or enhancement of the Son.”20

**Reply to 2.** The terms “augmentation” and “enhancement” are value-laden terms. Hasker worries that the Latin Social model implies that the Son gets a metaphysical improvement and not “humiliation.” First, the value that makes this appear to be a metaphysical improvement is the value that every person, uncreated and created, ought to be able to originate all of one’s own volitions such that one’s will power and acts of will are all incommunicable. I do not share this value. That is, given a commitment to the ecumenical councils as good guides for developing and evaluating models of the Trinity, I do not think an uncreated person should be thought to be able to originate all of their own volitions such that each person has their own incommunicable will power and incommunicable acts of will. It is true that God the Son acquires new powers in the Incarnation.21 But absent detailed discussion of the metaphysics of

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18I discuss this more in my unpublished book, *Henry of Ghent on the Trinity*.
21See what St. Agatho writes (as part of the sixth ecumenical council) (“Letter of St. Agatho to the Emperor,” 330–331): “For when we confess two natures and two natural wills, and two natural operations in our one Lord Jesus Christ, we do not assert that they are contrary or opposed one to the other (as those who err from the path of truth and accuse the apostolic tradition of doing. Far be this impiety from the hearts of the faithful!), nor as though separated in two persons or subsistences, but we say that as the same our Lord Jesus Christ has two natures so also he has two natural wills and operations, to wit, the divine and the human; the divine will and operation he has in common with the coessential Father from all eternity; the human, he has received from us, taken with our nature in time.”
the Incarnation, my rejection of Hasker’s value of an incommunicable faculty of will in the case of uncreated persons should suffice. In a nutshell, Hasker seems to stipulate that an incommunicable faculty of will is what scholastics would call a pure perfection (what it is better to be (or have) than not to be (or have)). I deny this. Absent this value judgment, Hasker’s claim that my Latin Social model implies an ontological improvement for God the Son is unsubstantiated, and the reductio argument falls flat.

**Objection 3.** Hasker posits a thought experiment that tries to show that my analysis of mental tokens that include ambiguous terms (i.e. terms that can be used to express different concepts) is “troubling” because it implies God’s deceiving (e.g.) the Apostle Peter. But, God does not deceive us, or at least not the Apostle Peter. So, my analysis of the divine persons’ thoughts should be rejected. The thought experiment is this:

Suppose the Holy Spirit says to Peter, “I am God the Father, who sent the Son to be the Savior of the world.” Sometime later Peter learns that it was in fact the Holy Spirit who spoke to him. Peter is troubled by this; he complains that he has been misled, perhaps even lied to. The Holy Spirit, however, explains that there was no intentional deceit; the problem was rather one of translation. The message given to Peter was first formulated in the divine language of thought. Peter, of course, does not know this language, so the message was translated into Greek in order to be conveyed to him. The formulation given to Peter was the best available translation into Greek of the original message in the divine mental language. However, a problem arose with regard to the copula “am.” In divine mentalese, that copula is ambiguous between expressing identity and expressing the [numerical sameness without identity] interpretation. The copula in Greek (as in other human languages) lacks this ambiguity, so the ambiguity was not conveyed to Peter. As a result, he misunderstood the message and mistakenly identified the speaker of the message as God the Father.

**Reply to 3.** There are two things to consider. First, this example introduces creatures. But the examples that I considered were limited to divine or uncreated mental tokens. But Hasker’s example has us consider a created token. So, this thought-experiment is not a counterexample to my analysis of divine mental tokens. It is a red herring, strictly speaking.

As I understand the example, we should understand the Holy Spirit to have created in Peter a mental token of “I am God the Father, who sent the Son to be the Savior of the World,” which Peter uses and so thinks some proposition. Metaphysically speaking, this mental token is e.g., a quality that exists in Peter’s intellect. It is not, as such, an uncreated or divine mental token that exists in the divine essence or nature. So, technically speaking no divine person uses this created mental token. (The metaphysics of the Incarnation present a different kind of case, which I don’t discuss here.) Rather, Peter uses a mental token that is caused in him by a divine

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person. And by using it Peter is made aware of some proposition. So, what is Peter made aware of? If Peter knows nothing else, that is, has no other relevant background beliefs, then there is no reason for him to ascribe to the Holy Spirit any communication here. Instead, with only this token, Peter would presumably be aware of the proposition that God the Father sent the Son to be the Savior of the world. (I am assuming here that Peter does not interpret the “I” to refer to himself. It is reported speech, as it were, that he is thinking.) My analysis of divine mental tokens is not at play here as Hasker supposes. Instead, we need a different analysis having to do with created mental tokens that are directly caused by a divine person by which e.g., a human being becomes aware of some proposition and an analysis having to do with how one thinks reported speech. (Peter might say or think to himself, “God the Father said to me, “I am God the Father.”) But that is outside the scope of my proposed model of the Trinity. That has to do with divine revelation to human beings.

In any case, if the Apostle Peter (who is fallible and limited in what he knows about the Trinity) is going to learn about the Holy Spirit, he is going to need the name of the Holy Spirit communicated to him. Hasker’s thought-experiment omits this name. Would Peter be deceived if the Holy Spirit were to say to Peter “I am God the Father, who sent the Son to be the Savior of the world”? If we assume Peter knows nothing about the Holy Spirit and this is all he is told, then, yes, Peter would be deceived. But if Peter had more relevant information about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit when receiving this message, then he would not be deceived. As I see it, we need more information in the example to be able to figure out whether deception would have occurred. (I think that a supremely good and wise divine person would accommodate or capitulate to what Peter knows at the time and so communicate a message to him that he would understand and not be deceived by.) Still, Peter’s receiving the message “I am God the Father, who sent the Son to be the Savior of the world,” would likely cause him to learn something true—namely that God the Father sent the Son to be the Savior of the world.

The second thing to consider is the traditional doctrine of appropriation. Here’s the gist of it. Assume the “one-power” view. Assume further that if God the Father creates the world, then so too do God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. Even more, the Father’s act of creating the world is not only the Father’s act of creating the world but also the Son’s act of creating the world and the Holy Spirit’s act of creating the world. (This is a consequence of my interpretation of the one-power view.) Nevertheless, we can talk about God the Father’s creating the world without also talking about God the Son’s creating the world. We aren’t denying God the Son’s creating the world, but we are just focusing on what God the Father has done. This is called “appropriating” some action to a certain divine

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person. (Preachers do this all the time when they say “Jesus loves you.” It is also true that the Father and Holy Spirit love you, but for the time being the preacher is just focusing on Jesus, who is God the Son.) Consider again Hasker’s thought experiment. Perhaps the Apostle Peter is only made aware of God the Father, who sent God the Son to be the Savior of the world. Peter isn’t aware of, and so does not report what the Holy Spirit has done. So, Peter appropriates or ascribes the act of sending the Son to be the Savior of the world to God the Father. But later in his life Peter learns about the divine persons’ shared power, and becomes aware of the fact that he appropriated the act of sending the Son to be the Savior of the world to God the Father, but this doesn’t imply that the Holy Spirit also didn’t send the Son to be the Savior of the world.

Object 4. Hasker raises the worry that the Latin Social model introduces ambiguity in the copula in divine mental tokens. For example, on my model, the mental token of “I am God the Father,” is used by the divine persons and each divine person is made aware of different propositions. Given that the proposition of which one is aware is determined by the use of a mental token in a context, each divine person is made aware of different propositions by the same use of this mental token in conjunction with different contexts of this same use. God the Father’s using it entails that God the Father is aware of his being identical to God the Father, but God the Son’s using it entails that God the Son is aware of his being numerically the same divine nature as God the Father without being identical to God the Father; likewise, God the Holy Spirit’s using it entails that God the Holy Spirit is aware of his being numerically the same divine nature as God the Father without being identical to God the Father. The same mental token has an ambiguous copula (the copula can be used to express different relations, e.g., Identity, Numerical Sameness Without Identity) and this worries Hasker. He writes:

All human languages suffer from ambiguity and vagueness to different degrees. This is inevitable, because we acquire the ability to make precise discriminations, both in sensory perception and in thought, only over an extended period of time, and perfection is never attained or even closely approximated. There is also the fact of the limited processing capability of human brains. None of these limitations, however, apply to divine persons, and I think we would naturally expect a divine language of thought to be very precise indeed, perhaps maximally so. But in the [numerical sameness without identity] interpretation of the copula, we find a major ambiguity in the divine language of thought, one that affects matters of great intrinsic importance - and an ambiguity that human languages manage to avoid without much difficulty.25

Reply to 4. Hasker takes ambiguity to be an imperfection and claims that human languages can avoid ambiguity “without much difficulty.” I disagree. I suspect that Hasker has misunderstood my discussion of ambiguous

tokens. We need to distinguish a token that can be used to express different things, and when someone is confused about what is being expressed. For example, suppose I tell you a story in which I said that “I was hit by a bat last night. It really hurt!” The term “bat” can be used to express, and to refer to, different things. It can express and refer to an animal called a “bat.” It can express, and refer to, the object used in the game of baseball for hitting baseballs. Suppose my story was two sentences long. “I was hit by a bat last night. It really hurt!” And, suppose you don’t have any relevant background information about me. In this scenario, I’d be using an ambiguous token of “bat” and you would be confused by what I meant by “bat.” In this situation, it looks like I mislead you. I worry that Hasker interprets my use of ambiguous tokens in the Latin Social model in a way analogous to this. As Hasker interprets it, I am positing both ambiguous tokens and confusion. So, to be clear, I am not positing that any divine person is confused. I am only positing that divine persons use mental tokens that include terms that can be used to express different propositions.

Moreover, I believe Hasker is wrong that human languages “avoid ambiguity without much difficulty.” That is, human languages have lots of words that can be used to express different things. In English the list is very long—most English dictionary entries have more than one meaning. I can use any of these dictionary entries to express something different. To be fair, I do not think that Hasker is really worried about ambiguous terms; he is worried about confusion. Confusion can be used in fallacies like amphiboly and be a feature of ignorance. But I do not posit any confusion for the divine persons. The persons are omniscient, which I take to be incompatible with their being confused.

Objection 5. Hasker raises an objection based on how we should count mental acts. He raises an interesting example. Suppose the Son and Holy Spirit each become incarnate. On the Latin Social model, if the Son and Holy Spirit share numerically the same use of a divine mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” and it is true that each becomes incarnate, then each thinks a different proposition and what each thinks is logically contingent and what each thinks is logically independent of each other. Hasker then asks, “Does it not seem evident that we have here two different uses of one and the same token? Isn’t this the only plausible way to read the situation?”26 Hasker contends that it should seem evident to us that if divine persons think logically contingent and logically independent propositions, then it must be the case that the persons have numerically different incommunicable mental acts. If that is right, then the Son and Holy Spirit do not share numerically the same mental act in their thinking different contingent and independent propositions. Thus, for Hasker, “to be aware of a proposition is precisely to perform a mental act.”27 Moreover, Hasker contends that it is question-begging for me to appeal to the Latin Social model in order to rebut this objection.

Reply to 5. I need to say two things in response to this objection. First, I need to be able to explain how it is that e.g., the Son and Holy Spirit could think logically contingent propositions that are also logically independent propositions. Second, my giving a coherent explanation is not enough. I should give an independent reason to accept the claim that divine persons’ share numerically the same (“essential,” because grounded in numerically the same essence) acts of intellect and will.

In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” and in Reply to 1 (above) I gave an explanation of how it is that the divine persons share numerically the same act of using a divine mental token and think different propositions (i.e. have different access-consciousness), and have different experiential consciousness and introspective consciousness. In doing so, I have addressed the first thing mentioned above.

In the objection Hasker accepts (for the sake of the argument) the postulate that divine persons use a mental token in order to think a proposition, and asserts that it is the case that awareness of logically independent and contingent propositions must require numerically distinct acts of using the mental token and that these distinct acts cannot be shared (or are incommunicable). I am suspicious whether Hasker’s previous worry about divine confusion is in the background here if the Son and Holy Spirit’s shared act of using the mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” implies that the divine persons are confused. And so, is Hasker’s way to avoid this implication to posit numerically distinct incommunicable acts of using this mental token? In Reply to 4, I said that no such confusion obtains. Why is there no confusion? Among other reasons, the divine persons would know which divine person (or persons) wills (and so, has been chosen) to become incarnate. The divine persons’ using a mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” is not isolated from their other uses of other mental tokens. The divine persons know all their volitions (what is willed), including which person (or persons) is to become incarnate. Given this, the divine persons’ awareness of this explanatorily prior volition determines what each divine person believes in using this mental token of “I shall become incarnate.”

If the Son and Holy Spirit chose (and so are chosen) to become incarnate, then the Son and the Holy Spirit each know that each of them has been willed to become incarnate, and so the Son and Holy Spirit each believe a true proposition by their shared use of a mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” which I gloss as “I shall be one who becomes incarnate.” Given the copula “be” and my metaphysics of the Trinity, the Father is aware that he is essentially numerically the same divine nature as one who becomes incarnate without being identical to that person; the Son is aware that he is identical to one who becomes incarnate; and, the Holy Spirit is aware that he is identical to one who becomes incarnate. (There is no contradiction because the persons “already” know that each is not identical to the others.)
So, in the case of these logically contingent and independent propositions, we do not need to posit numerically distinct incommunicable uses of a mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” but rather we need to include in the analysis explanatorily prior divine volitions and knowledge of those volitions that determine what each divine person believes in using a mental token of “I shall become incarnate.”

If Hasker accepts that the proposition(s) expressed by a sentence-token is context sensitive, then the real worry is this: can one act of using a mental token (or for that matter, any sentence-token, written or spoken or mental) express more than one proposition? Can my one act of using a sentence-token make me aware of different propositions, propositions that are logically contingent and independent from each other? I have given the example of Bilbo Baggins’s dialogue with Gandalf to suggest this.\(^28\) Hasker comments on my use of this story as follows:

Williams, however, needs to have it that a single token can express multiple propositions on the same occasion. For this, he turns to J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit. In the opening scene of this classic, Bilbo is standing outside his front door smoking his pipe, when along comes Gandalf. “Good morning!” says Bilbo, to which Gandalf tartly replies, “What do you mean? Do you wish me a good morning, or mean that it is a good morning whether I wish it or not; or that you feel good this morning; or that is a morning to be good on?” Bilbo answers, “All of them at once.”

Now, I think one could reasonably doubt whether Bilbo really did express all of these propositions by his conventional greeting; some of them may simply be accepted after the fact as possible interpretations. But if we do accept the multiple meanings at face value, it is worth noticing that all of the different alternatives offered by Gandalf are possible only because Bilbo’s greeting was extremely vague in what it expressed.\(^29\)

Hasker doubts the possibility of Bilbo expressing “all of these propositions by his conventional greeting” because the greeting is “extremely vague in what it expressed.” Two things should be noted. First, my understanding is that Bilbo’s greeting is not a case of using a vague term, but rather of an ambiguous phrase. There are definite alternative propositions that can be (and are) expressed by it. (It’s more like the term “bank,” which has specific different meanings, than the term “bald,” which has an indefinite range of meanings.) Second, my claim is that Bilbo expresses different propositions by using this spoken sentence-token in a context and is aware of these different propositions. The second conjunct should be understood as a case of access consciousness. Bilbo is aware of these propositions in the sense that he endorses them all at once. He need not also have introspective consciousness of each of these propositions of which he has access.

\(^{28}\) Cf. Williams, “Indexicals and the Trinity,” 82.
It seems to me that Hasker’s stipulation that “to be aware of a proposition is precisely to perform a mental act,” is like requiring that every person is like Gandalf and no person is like Bilbo. But every person is not like Gandalf, especially divine persons who are omniscient, omnipotent, and (on the Latin Social model) share numerically the same divine nature and (set of) power(s). Moreover, Hasker should clarify what is meant by “to be aware of a proposition”: is this experiential (phenomenological) consciousness, access consciousness, introspective consciousness, or some combination of these? I take it that for creatures, these types of consciousness are separable and de facto separate on different occasions. But for divine persons it seems fitting to suppose that if a divine person uses a mental token in a context, then that divine person is aware, with all three types of consciousness, of what is expressed in that context. Furthermore, it seems unfitting to ascribe to omnipotent and omniscient divine persons more mental acts of using a divine mental token of “I shall become incarnate,” than one act of using this divine mental token. Why posit several mental acts here, when one mental act will do the same explanatory work? It is a simpler ontological explanation and even more it is consistent with what the ecumenical councils say about the Trinity. If simplicity and consistency with the ecumenical councils is preferable, then it is preferable to posit that the divine persons’ share one act of using a mental token of “I shall become incarnate” in a context, rather than that the persons have their own incommunicable act of using this mental token in a context and have their own incommunicable mental powers.

Objection 6. Hasker asks, “But why must we posit divine mental tokens in the first place? We humans do sometimes formulate mentally sentences of our language, in order to think our thoughts. But it is hardly evident that we must always do so.” And in a footnote adds, “Consider the case of Helen Keller, who lived for a number of years when she did not even have the concept of a language. It is, I think, wholly incredible that during those years she did not think any propositions.”30 In sum, it seems that mental tokens are sometimes used, but not always used. If they are not always used when someone thinks a proposition, then perhaps divine persons do not always use mental tokens to think some proposition. But the Latin

Social model has it that all divine “thoughts” require a use of a mental token. Consequently, the Latin Social model’s claim is too strong.

Reply to 6. I need to give an independent argument for mental tokens in my analysis of the divine persons’ awareness of propositions. Here is an argument. We need to explain why a divine person’s mental act is directed at (among all possible propositions) the proposition it is directed at. (Put otherwise, why is one aware of a certain proposition and not some other proposition?) We could say that there is something that directs a mental act to a proposition, namely a mental token of a sentence in a context. Or, we could say there is no explanation; it is a brute fact that a mental act is directed at a certain proposition. But we should avoid positing brute facts when we can give an illuminating explanation. We can avoid positing a brute fact by positing a person’s use of a mental token of a sentence in a context. This is an illuminating explanation. So, we should posit that each divine person uses a mental token of a sentence in a context in order to explain why a divine person’s mental act is directed at the proposition it is directed at.

The objection refers to Helen Keller as a potential counter-example, namely a case in which someone thinks propositions without having a spoken or written language. As a matter of historical fact, Helen Keller produced and used some spoken tokens of sentences before she became deaf and blind. So she is not a counterexample in which one is aware of propositions without having any spoken language. I worry that Hasker’s appealing to Helen Keller is misleading. Is he ascribing to me the view that divine persons could not think a proposition without having a spoken or written language? If so, I need to be clear that I deny that spoken tokens or written tokens of sentences are necessary for a divine person to have (and use) mental tokens. After all, divine persons do not have (or use) divine spoken tokens or divine written tokens of sentences. Rather, divine persons use divine mental tokens. (See Reply to 3 above for brief discussion of divine revelation to, e.g., Peter.)

Objection 7. Hasker raises another objection that is something of a standard question for “one-power” views of the Trinity. Hasker discusses Richard of St. Victor on the Father’s generation of the Son, saying, “Here the Father’s generation of the Son is seen as a motivated, volitional act, albeit one that is inevitable due to the superior excellence of a multi-person Godhead—not merely an automatic operation of the non-personal divine nature. Furthermore, this act must be an act only of the Father; it cannot be an act also of the Son and the Holy Spirit, since the act is presupposed by their very existence. So the Father does have the power to perform acts of his own, not shared by the other two persons.”

I set aside the question of the Father’s motivation and willingness to generate God the Son and focus on the question about the power to generate a Son. This objection can be expressed by way of a modus ponens. (1) If the Father alone generates the

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32Hasker, “Can a Latin Trinity Be Social?,” 360n.11.
Son, then the Father has a power (for generating a Son) that the Son does not have. (2) The Father alone generates the Son; therefore, (3) the Father has a power (for generating the Son) that the Son does not have.

Reply to 7. In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I reported the traditional view that some acts distinguish the divine persons and some acts are shared among the divine persons. The former are internal divine productions, and the latter are operations (doings), e.g., acts of understanding, acts of willing. Further, only the Father begets the Son. Hasker takes this as reason to infer that the Father must have a power (the power to generate a Son) that the other divine persons do not have. I adopt an Augustinian and Scotist response to this objection. The power for generating a divine Son is shared among divine persons because it is grounded in the shared divine essence, but only the Father exercises it. Why is this? Since this is a perfect productive power (rather than imperfect productive power), it necessarily has a perfect product. (That is, a perfect power is necessarily united with that for which it is; for an imperfect power, if it is united with that for which it is, then the union is contingent.) This perfect productive power is perfected with one perfect product. If it were exercised more than once, then it would either be exercised a finite or infinite number of times. But there cannot be an infinite number of divine produced persons. If there is a finite number of produced divine Sons that is more than one but less than infinitely many, then there must be something that limits it to a certain number. But there is nothing that limits its exercise to some finite number that is not the number one. So, either this perfect productive power is exercised once or not at all. But it is a perfect productive power, so it is exercised by whichever divine person has the opportunity to exercise it. The Father has the opportunity to exercise it but not the Son because the Son is the product of its being exercised. So the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit each have this productive power, but only the Father exercises it. Given this explanation, the first premise (1) in the objection is false (or at least, not obviously true).

4. Conclusion

If my replies to Hasker’s objections are successful or at least show the internal coherence of the Latin Social model, then a Latin Trinity can be social. I believe the antecedent. So, I conclude that a Latin Trinity can be social. Moreover, I take it that the Latin Social model is consistent with Jewish monotheism and the ecumenical councils and Hasker’s is not, or at least not yet clearly consistent with them, and on this basis suggest that the Latin Social model is preferable to Hasker’s Social model.

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34My solution derives from Duns Scotus. Cf. Duns Scotus, God and Creatures, 44–50. Also, cf. Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 145–152. There are other responses too, but this suffices.
35Thanks to Mark Murphy, Beau Branson, and Carl Mosser for comments on this article.
References


