

# A NEGLECTED QUA SOLUTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF CHRISTOLOGY

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We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.

## 1. *The Fundamental Problem of Christology*

The fundamental problem of Christology concerns the coherence of orthodox Christology (at least as given by the Council of Chalcedon). In particular, there is an apparent contradiction arising from Christ's having two apparently contrary natures—the divine and the human.<sup>1</sup> Richard Cross puts the problem crisply:

[T]he fundamental philosophical problem specific to the doctrine is this: how is it that one and the same thing could be both divine (and thus, on the face of it, necessary, and necessarily omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, immutable, impassible, and impeccable) and human (and thus, on the face of it, have the complements of all these properties).<sup>2</sup>

In the same vein C. J. F. Williams writes:

The two assertions 'Christ is a man' and 'Christ is God' are *prima facie* opposed to one another. It seems impossible that they should both be true; and this impossibility is apparently a logical impossibility. It is no use therefore in discussing the Incarnation to appeal, as St Augustine did, to the Divine Omnipotence; *tota ratio facti est potentia facientis*; for it is not part of the Christian faith that God can do the logically impossible.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For present purposes we say that two natures (or, generally, properties) are *contrary* just if a being's having both of them entails a contradiction.

<sup>2</sup>Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 453.

<sup>3</sup>Williams, "A Programme for Christology," 515.



An instance of the fundamental problem is the following argument towards contradiction, where the rationales for the premises point to orthodox Christianity (at least per Chalcedon):<sup>4</sup>

1. Christ is mutable.
2. Christ is immutable.
3. Therefore, Christ is mutable and not mutable.<sup>5</sup>

Many responses to this (and the other) arguments to contradiction are available. Perhaps the most popular response is in the family of QUA responses, which, as Timothy Pawl notes, “are all attempts to modify the statement so that the pairs are not apt [i.e., true] of the same thing at the same time in the same way.”<sup>6</sup>

### 2. Three Standard QUA Solutions

There are three basic (families of) QUA solutions to the fundamental problem, classified by the grammatical position of the (often hidden) QUA locution in a sentence *S is F*.

1-QUA: *S-QUA-N is F*, where *N* is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Subject position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the Subject (viz., Christ).

2-QUA: *S is-QUA-N F*, where *N* is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Copula position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the Exemplification relation.

3-QUA: *S is F-QUA-N*, where *N* is a nature. Here, the QUA device applies to the Predicate position, where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the Property in question.

These QUA views are very well known in analytic theology and philosophical theology generally. We have little to add to either the standard explanations of such views or standard objections against such views; we rely on recent discussion for review and criticisms.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Note that we treat “*x* is immutable” as entailing the (logical) negation of “mutable,” namely, “*x* is not mutable” (or, equivalently, where *it is false that* is logical negation, “it is false that *x* is mutable”). This, like so many elements of the problem, has been questioned, for instance in Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*; but that *being immutable* entails *not being mutable* remains a common view — one that neither we nor the main QUA views question.

<sup>5</sup>We put “Therefore” in (3) to mark the conclusion, but the content of (3) is simply “Christ is mutable and not mutable.” We follow this convention throughout. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.

<sup>6</sup>Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62.

<sup>7</sup>We assume familiarity with the three standard QUA solutions. For recent discussion that reflects our own understanding of (and positions on) the standard solutions see Adams, “Christ as God-Man”; Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, chapter 8; Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*; and Senor, “Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz’s Law Problems.” We note that Pawl labels 1-QUA through 3-QUA as *Subject*, *Copula* and *Predicate*, respectively, and even labels our target grammatical position (see §3) as *Assertion*; but Pawl’s view of the

### 3. A Fourth QUA Solution: 0-QUA

Our aim is to advance a novel QUA solution that, as far as we can tell, has been completely neglected in analytic theology and philosophical theology generally. We do not advance or defend the given solution as the true Christological theory. Rather, we put it forward as a solution that is just as viable as other QUA solutions.

#### 3.1 *The Missing Position*

The three standard QUA views concern *sub-sentential* parts of sentences: Subject position, Copula, and Predicate. In the abstract this leaves at least one more position that a QUA device might occupy: namely, applying to the whole sentence—a *sentential operator*. In keeping with the *i-QUA* labels above (see §2) we call this fourth view *0-QUA*:<sup>8</sup>

0-QUA: *QUA-N: S is F.* Here, the QUA device applies to the Sentence (position), where “QUA divine” and “QUA human” each modifies the Sentence—modifies the evaluation of the sentence.

But now the pressing question: how is “QUA divine” or “QUA human” to be understood in such a way that it makes sense as a sentential operator?

#### 3.2 *Natures and Stories: According To*

It is natural to think of Christ’s divine nature as delivering (i.e., entailing) a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature, where “story,” in this context, need not be fiction—and isn’t fiction in the case of the story of Christ. Similarly, it is natural to think of Christ’s human nature as entailing a true story of anything that exemplifies that nature. Indeed, *any* nature delivers some true story of whatever possesses it—at the very least, the essential truths tied to that nature.

We advance the 0-QUA view along just such lines: namely, the QUA device is an *according to Nature* operator. In particular, Christ’s exemplification of two natures is accompanied by two distinct QUA devices: *According to the Divine Nature* and *According to the Human Nature*. The more standard (and perhaps more natural-to-the-ear) terminology of “story” may equivalently be used provided that the core stories in question are entailed by Christ’s two natures. Accordingly, one may think of the 0-QUA account as involving two sentential operators: namely, *According to the Divine Story* and *According to the Human Story*.

#### 3.3 *The 0-QUA Solution*

The 0-QUA solution to the fundamental problem notably varies from Pawl’s characterization of QUA solutions in that it does not “[attempt]

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latter is not what we have in mind at all (except grammatical position), and so we use our own terminology.

<sup>8</sup>For those to whose minds the familiar “in virtue of” idea springs we note that, while that view can—and perhaps should—qualify as a 0-QUA view *with respect to grammatical position*, we hope it is clear from the discussion below that such “in virtue of” ideas are not part of the 0-QUA view as we advance it. (See §3.3 and especially §4.1 for further discussion.)

to modify the statement so that the pairs are not [true] of the same thing at the same time in the same way.”<sup>9</sup> Rather, the 0-QUA solution changes how we *evaluate* the embedded (viz., “QUA-unadorned”) statements: according to our proposal we evaluate the target QUA-unadorned claims relative to nature-tied stories. The 0-QUA view maintains that according to the divine story Christ is not mutable, and that according to the human story Christ is mutable. There are two natures and thereby two stories of Christ; but it’s the one and only Christ in each of the two apparently incompatible stories.

As with all QUA solutions the *explicit* statement of the relevant truths requires the QUA device—in the 0-QUA view, the *according to* device. Any truth in “Christ is mutable”—similarly, “Christ is immutable”—is elliptical for an essentially QUA-involving claim (on our view, an *according to* device):

4. According to the human story: Christ is mutable.
5. According to the divine story: Christ is immutable (not mutable).

The central question: what of the alleged consequence (3)?

3. Christ is mutable and not mutable.

On the 0-QUA view this step is fallacious since there is no one nature that delivers a true story according to which Christ is mutable and not mutable. And that is critical. The two target stories (viz., divine and human) are normally thought to be “unionizable” (for lack of a better term) into one larger true story. But that this fails is precisely the lesson of the fundamental problem: namely, the true story of Christ is given not by the union of all nature-tied stories of Christ but is rather a set of logically consistent stories tied to Christ’s two (otherwise inconsistent) natures.

The uniqueness of Christ having two apparently contrary natures without a logically contradictory theology is going to involve something strange, a point on which all theologians and philosophers agree. On the 0-QUA view the strangeness is reflected in the fact that while both (4) and (5) are true the union of the given nature-tied stories is untrue. Without the explicit QUA operator the relevant truths of Christ are not expressed; the *according to* operators are fundamental to telling the truth of Christ.

A dangerous analogy might be useful—dangerous if taken to be exactly the 0-QUA view in Christology. Related phenomena have a similar (not to say exactly the same) structure. Let “*w*” name a possible world in which cats are enormous, each weighing 4000 lbs. Take all the claims that are true of cats at *w*. That’s a true story in one clear sense: the claims in the story are all true, according to *w*, of something. But any target truth expressed by “all cats weigh 4000 lbs” is elliptical; it requires a 0-position operator, namely, that *according to the w story, cats are enormous*.

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<sup>9</sup>Pawl, “A Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology,” 62. We do not believe that Pawl would thereby withhold the 0-QUA view from the family of QUA views. What Pawl’s characterization does is truly characterize the *standard* three QUA views—and we agree with his characterization of those views.

We are not suggesting that the fundamental problem of Christology—Christ’s apparently contrary natures—is solved by thinking that the natures are divided up into island-like possible worlds. (That’s the danger in the dangerous analogy.) But the loose analogy can be useful (if the danger is avoided). Natures can be thought of as delivering—entailing—true stories of whatever exemplifies that nature. Normally—in fact, in all but the extraordinary case of Christ—we don’t bother invoking the explicit *According to* operator; normally there’s exactly one nature at issue, and nothing perplexing arises. But Christ’s particular two-natured being cries out for explicitly using the *According to* operator. That’s what the fundamental problem of Christology teaches us according to the 0-QUA account. The truth of Christ is QUA-adorned at a fundamental level.

#### 4. Measured against Objections

The 0-QUA view is simple and, by our lights, at least as plausible as the other three QUA views. We now clarify the view by defending it against some objections.

##### 4.1 A Non-starter?

*Objection:* The proposed 0-QUA view is neither new nor viable. There is a 0-QUA view that is well known and rightfully widely dismissed, namely, where the 0-position device is an *in-virtue-of-Nature* operator. Timothy Pawl calls such a view a *non-starter* because it “doesn’t provide a way to avoid predicating ‘passible’ and ‘impassible’ to the same thing.”<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, voicing the widespread *non-starter* view, Senor writes:<sup>11</sup>

The first and most straightforward reading is “In virtue of being *N*, *S* is *F*.” Thus, understood this way, if one says “*Qua* God, Jesus Christ was omnipotent”, one is saying that it is in virtue of his deity (or his divine nature) that Christ was omnipotent. . . . The difficulty with this interpretation of *qua*-sentences . . . is that it does not solve [the fundamental problem].<sup>12</sup>

What Pawl and Senor (and others) are highlighting is that *in virtue of* devices satisfy the following (extra-logical) entailment, “release”:<sup>13</sup>

6. In virtue of *N*: *S* is *F*.
7. Therefore, *S* is *F*.

And if this is the case the fundamental problem reappears.

<sup>10</sup>Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predications,” 97.

<sup>11</sup>See also Pawl’s further argument along these lines in Pawl, “Conciliar Christology and the Problem of Incompatible Predicates,” 93–94, along with discussions in Adams, “Christ as God-Man,” 254–255 and Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, 194.

<sup>12</sup>Senor, “Incarnation, Timeless, and Leibniz’s Law Problems,” 229.

<sup>13</sup>This is not a *logical* entailment because logic only speaks of logical vocabulary, and “in virtue of” is not part of logical vocabulary; however, the entailment would be one of an extra-logical consequence relation for theories (perhaps including theology) that involve the target *in virtue of* language.

*Reply:* We agree with Pawl and Senor (as well as Adams and Cross) about the given entailments of relevant *in virtue of* devices. But our 0-QUA proposal is not an in-virtue-of proposal at all. We have offered a different account of (0-position) QUA clauses, where they are *according to* operators. *According to* operators do not support the problematic release entailment:

8. According to *N*: *S* is *F*.
9. Therefore, *S* is *F*.

This step is dubious right from the start. Our proposed 0-QUA position blocks this entailment, an entailment without which the target logical contradiction—the fundamental-problem contradiction—fails to arise. (See §4.3 for more on inferential behavior of *according to*.) Accordingly, the 0-QUA solution, unlike the in-virtue-of-*N* accounts, offers a solution to the fundamental problem of Christology.

Not only do we agree with Pawl's claim, and similar claims made by others, that the in-virtue-of approach to a (0-position) QUA view is a non-starter; we think that it can be strengthened. On our view the in-virtue-of approach offers not a solution to the target contradiction; it offers would-be *explanations* for the independent contradictory claims. Why is Christ mutable? What explains Christ's mutability? Answer: Christ's mutability is explained by his human nature; it's in virtue of Christ's human nature that Christ is mutable. Why is Christ immutable? What explains the immutability? Answer: Christ's immutability is explained by his divine nature; it's in virtue of the divine nature that Christ is immutable. What "in virtue of" is doing is offering an explanation of how we get to the apparent contradiction, not a resolution of the contradiction—which is why Pawl and many others are exactly right that it is a non-starter as a solution to the fundamental problem. It's a non-starter to that problem because it stops at the starting line of the problem. In many ways the in-virtue-of 0-position "QUA view" is not really a QUA view at all; it doesn't—as far as we can see—purport to *modify* or *operate on* the embedded statement so much as *explain* it.

Like the other standard three QUA views our proposed 0-QUA view involves a rejection of the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable (similarly, immutable); the truth is expressed only in QUA-modified form, where, on our view, the QUA device is one or another *according to* operator (namely, *According to the divine story* or *According to the human story*). Moreover, unlike the would-be in-virtue-of "QUA view," our proposed 0-QUA view, just like the other three standard QUA views, does not purport to *explain* either the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is mutable or the would-be stand-alone truth that Christ is immutable; it offers no explanation of those would-be stand-alone facts because they aren't (stand-alone) facts. The Christological truths are the QUA-adorned ones that explicitly advert to the nature-driven stories.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>An anonymous referee points out that a possible QUA view could hold that *some* nature-tied stories release: the divine story could release and so "Christ is immutable" (un-

#### 4.2 Unadorned Truths

*Objection:* The reply to the “non-starter” objection (see §4.1) suggests that *no* truths are true of Christ except ones that are QUA-adorned (i.e., 0-QUA-prefixed). Is that the position?

*Reply:* The whole point of QUA views is that the fundamental problem of Christology arises from ignoring QUA devices—ignoring, so to speak, “QUA-lifications” implicit in the target truths. The 0-QUA account is no different. Again, any truth expressed by the QUA-unadorned “Christ is immutable” is elliptical for the explicitly adorned “According to the Divine Story: Christ is immutable.” Moreover, as we have emphasized, there is no “unionizing” of the Divine and Human stories into a single, stand-alone QUA-free true story. But this is not to say that no QUA-free truths are consequences of the QUA-adorned truths. The following principle can be incorporated into the true Christology without problem:

Nature Release: If both *According to the Human Story: P* and *According to the Divine Story: P* are true, then *P* itself is true.

The idea is that the QUA-unadorned sentences that are included in our total true theory of Christ are just those that are delivered by each of Christ’s nature-tied stories.

Here again the extraordinary case of Christ is made apparent. Typically, each person has a single nature—and so has a single true story. The single-natured case always satisfies a generalized version of Nature Release.<sup>15</sup> Since *P* is true in every nature-tied story—in the usual case, the only nature-tied story—*P* is true even without a 0-QUA adornment. But Christ is fundamentally different from most persons; Christ has two very different natures and two very different nature-tied stories.

#### 4.3 Unadorned Un-truths

*Objection:* The proposed 0-QUA account rejects that “Christ is immutable” is true (likewise for “mutable,” and so on). But, then, the 0-QUA view must hold that “Christ is immutable” is false. But, then, the 0-QUA account is just heresy; it accepts the falsity of Christ’s immutability. And so the proposed 0-QUA view fails to achieve a key desideratum: namely, to provide an orthodox Christology—a solution to the fundamental problem which is compatible with orthodox Christology.

*Reply:* We think that orthodox Christology demands that according to the divine story Christ is immutable; and the proposed 0-QUA view fundamentally accepts that truth. On no QUA view does orthodoxy demand

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adorned) would be true while the human story would not release and so “Christ is mutable” would only be true when understood as QUA-adorned. This would avoid the inconsistency, but we see no principled reason why some stories should release while others do not.

<sup>15</sup>Here is the generalized version of the principle, which we also endorse.

*General Nature Release:* Let *N* be a nature and *x* an individual. Let *P* be any statement. Suppose that for *every* nature *N* that *x* has, it’s true that *according to N: P*. Then *P* itself is true.



the truth of the QUA-unadorned sentence “Christ is immutable,” and to demand as much would border on question begging against QUA views. The only solutions that maintain the truth of the target QUA-unadorned claims are either contradictory<sup>16</sup> or offer non-standard truth (falsity) conditions for the given claims.<sup>17</sup> Our concern in this paper is squarely on QUA views—and the neglected 0-QUA view in particular—and not on alternative approaches.

The current objection does raise a very important question: Is the QUA-unadorned claim “Christ is immutable” false since untrue? The question demands a more explicit statement of what “truth” (similarly, “falsity”) amounts to in the 0-QUA account. Much of the answer is implicit in what we have said so far but the current objection invites an explicit statement.

4.3.1 *0-QUA and truth-in-N*. The fundamental problem of Christology arises from ignoring (implicit) 0-QUA devices. On the 0-QUA view the key devices are *according to* operators, each tied to a particular nature (*viz.*, according to human nature, according to divine nature). Like *according to* operators in general, the key Christological devices do not release—that is, *P* is not entailed by the truth that (for example) According to the divine story: *P*. The key unadorned claims in the fundamental problem (e.g., “Christ is immutable,” etc.) are true in some but not all relevant stories; and the idea of being true-in-*N* (for nature-tied story *N*) is a key notion in the 0-QUA account.<sup>18</sup>

4.3.2 *Stories as (modeled by) closed sets of sentences*. For simplicity we shall think of stories as (modeled by) sets of sentences, and in particular so-called closed sets of sentences. Here, the “closure relation” is whatever entailment relation is required by the true Christology. For present purposes we shall greatly simplify by thinking of the given relation as all-possible-worlds entailment. Accordingly, a story is a set of sentences closed under all-possible-worlds entailment: if *P* is in the story and *P* all-possible-worlds entails *Q*, then *Q* too is in the story. (This is all that is meant by “closed under” for present purposes.)

4.3.3 *Truth-in-N and falsity-in-N*. Just as in logical studies, where the notion of truth-in-a-model (similarly, falsity-in-a-model) is the key notion of “truth” (similarly, of “falsity”), so too the idea of *truth (falsity) in a story* is key to the 0-QUA account in Christology. And here the definition is completely standard:

*Definition 1 (Truth-In-Story-N)*: Let *N* be a story. We say that *P* is true-in-*N* (or “true in the story *N*”) iff *P* is in *N*.

Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is true-in-the-human-story is to say (something modeled by the claim) that “Christ is mutable” is in the target

<sup>16</sup>Beall, “Christ—A Contradiction.”

<sup>17</sup>Pawl, *In Defense of Conciliar Christology*.

<sup>18</sup>For simplicity we sometimes use “*N*” ambiguously over natures and the corresponding nature-tied stories, leaving context to clarify.



story (where, again, stories are modeled by sets of sentences closed under a given entailment relation). Likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for other claims involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.

Similarly, we invoke a standard definition of *falsity in a story*, where *it is false that* is logical negation:

*Definition 2 (Falsity-In-Story-N):* Let  $N$  be a story. We say that  $P$  is false-in- $N$  (or “false in the story  $N$ ”) iff the (logical) negation of  $P$  is in  $N$ .

Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is false-in-the-divine-story is to say (something modeled by the claim) that “It is false that Christ is mutable” is in the target story (or where “not” is logical negation, “Christ is not mutable” is in the target story). Likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for other claims involved in the fundamental problem of Christology.

4.3.4 *Truth as truth-in-all and Falsity as falsity-in-all.* §4.3.3 makes explicit the fundamental notions of truth-in- $N$  and falsity-in- $N$ . What of the target notions of Truth (simpliciter) and Falsity (simpliciter)? Here, we also follow a standard idea due to Bas van Fraassen.<sup>19</sup>

*Definition 3 (Truth (Simpliciter)):* Let  $P$  be any statement. Then  $P$  is True (simpliciter) iff  $P$  is true-in- $N$  for *all* relevant stories  $N$ .

Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is True is to say that “Christ is mutable” is true-in- $N$  for *all* relevant stories  $N$ , including the divine story. On the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is True should be rejected, as “Christ is mutable” is not true in the divine story.

Similarly, we invoke the corresponding *false-in-all* account of Falsity:

*Definition 4 (Falsity (Simpliciter)):* Let  $P$  be any statement. Then  $P$  is False (simpliciter) iff  $P$  is false-in- $N$  for *all* relevant stories  $N$ .

Hence, to say that “Christ is mutable” is False is to say that “Christ is mutable” is false-in- $N$  for *all* relevant stories  $N$ , including the human story. On the 0-QUA view, that “Christ is mutable” is False should be rejected, as it is not false-in-the-human-story.

4.3.5 *Unadorned sentences: recap.* Note that we now have a sample QUA-unadorned sentence that, according to the 0-QUA account, is neither True nor False, namely, “Christ is mutable.” Yes, “Christ is mutable” is true according to the human story, but it is not True. And, yes, “Christ is mutable” is false according to the divine story, but it is not False. In this sense (and in this sense only) one should accept neither “Christ is mutable” nor its logical negation expressed via “Christ is immutable” (i.e., not mutable).

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<sup>19</sup>van Fraassen, “Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.” We use uppercase “T” in “Truth” (similarly, “Falsity”) to flag the technical usage. We note that this usage, important for the true Christology (according to the proposed 0-QUA view), is compatible with some very general notion of truth which is completely independent from truth-in- $N$  relations, etc. (Analogy: the many important notions of truth-in-a-model that are used in many important theories do not in any way threaten a general notion of truth which is independent from such notions.)

We say that all QUA views should unite in a rejection of both “Christ is mutable” and “Christ is immutable” (QUA-unadorned just so), but in no way is such a rejection—as we see it—a rejection of orthodox Christology. Christology—the true Christology—is one whose nature-tied claims are explicitly or implicitly adorned; and it is with such adornment that the truths about Christ’s uniqueness may be expressed.<sup>20</sup>

#### 4.4 Law of Excluded Middle

*Objection:* The 0-QUA view should be rejected since it needs to reject an important metaphysical principle for properties. Given the definitions of Truth and Falsity in §4.3.4 the 0-QUA view is incompatible with the following excluded-middle principle:

*Law of Excluded Middle for Properties (LEMP):* For any object  $a$ , and any property  $F$ , either it is true that  $a$  is  $F$  or it is true that  $a$  is not  $F$ .

The 0-QUA view rejects such a principle inasmuch as it requires that for some QUA-unadorned sentence neither the sentence nor its negation is True. (Example: “Christ is mutable,” “Christ is not mutable.”) And this violates LEMP, which is both an important metaphysical (and, in turn, theological) principle and also an independently plausible principle.<sup>21</sup>

*Reply:* The objection is important but is not as severe as it seems. According to 0-QUA, “Christ is mutable” is not True and “Christ is not mutable” is not True; however, according to 0-QUA “Either Christ is mutable or Christ is not mutable” is True. To see this, recall that target stories in the 0-QUA account are modeled by closed sets of sentences, with the target closure relation defined as all-possible-worlds-entailment. Accordingly, each story contains all necessary truths (and thereby all logical truths). We grant (for this discussion) that “ $A$  or not- $A$ ” is one such (schematic) necessary truth. Hence, since all necessary truths are in each target story, each target story contains each instance of the given (excluded-middle) schema; and so each story contains “Christ is mutable or Christ is not mutable,” and so—by definition of *Truth*—the given sentence (i.e., the given instance of the given excluded-middle principle) is True.

The objection, we say, does not point to a problem with the 0-QUA view. On the other hand, the objection is important in highlighting what might appear (to some) to be strange. One might think that if “Christ is mutable or Christ is not mutable” is True, then either “Christ is mutable” is True or “Christ is not mutable” is True. The 0-QUA account, for fairly straightforward reasons, rejects such a principle (viz., a principle according to which a disjunction is True only if at least one disjunct is True). As in §4.3.4, the 0-QUA account takes inspiration from supervaluationist treatments of various predicates, wherein Truth is defined as truth-in-all-valuations (or, in

<sup>20</sup>We note that the explicit model of Truth (etc.) just given sits naturally with the Nature Release principle(s) in §4.2.

<sup>21</sup>We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.

0-QUA terms, truth-in-all-stories).<sup>22</sup> On a supervaluationist treatment of a particular predicate *F*, a sentence “*a* is *F*” can fail to be True and fail to be False when “*a* is *F*” is *true according to one valuation* but is *untrue according to another*. Similarly, “*a* is not *F*” will fail to be True and fail to be False when “*a* is not *F*” is true in one valuation and untrue in another. But since valuations, like the stories in the 0-QUA account, are (usually) closed under all-possible-worlds-entailment (or, in the formal development, closed at least under classical logic), then “Either *a* is *F* or *a* is not *F*” is true in all such valuations and hence, by definition, True. Accordingly, on the issue of excluded-middle principles, the 0-QUA account is no more nor less strange than any usual supervaluationist treatment of (some class of) predicates.

#### 4.5 Humanity, Divinity

*Objection:* The 0-QUA account is just heresy. A desideratum is to maintain orthodoxy in a solution to the fundamental problem. The “solution” points out that the truth of orthodox Christology is not given in the QUA-unadorned claims

1. Christ is mutable.
2. Christ is immutable.

but rather in the explicitly adorned nature-tied claims:

4. According to the human story: Christ is mutable.
5. According to the divine story: Christ is immutable.

This is all in keeping with the standard core of QUA views: namely, resolve the apparent contradiction of Christ’s two (apparently contrary) natures by rejecting the QUA-unadorned claims while accepting the genuine QUA-adorned truths. But the 0-QUA view is downright heretical. In particular, the 0-QUA view must reject the very divinity and the very humanity of Christ. Specifically, the 0-QUA account must reject the orthodox truths:

10. Christ is human (i.e., exemplifies the human nature).
11. Christ is divine (i.e., exemplifies the divine nature).

That the 0-QUA account must reject both of these orthodox claims is clear. On the 0-QUA account natures entail true stories, at the very least true stories of anything that has the given nature. Moreover, on the 0-QUA account the divine nature entails immutability while the human nature entails mutability. Accordingly, if “Christ is divine” is true then “Christ is immutable” is true: (11) entails (2)—and likewise for other entailments. Hence, if (11) is in the true Christology then (2) is too. But on the 0-QUA account (2) is not in the true Christology.

The upshot: the 0-QUA account not only fails to be compatible with orthodoxy; it is clearly heretical in its rejection of both the divinity and humanity of Christ.

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<sup>22</sup>van Fraassen, “Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference.”

*Reply:* Contrary to the objection, what orthodoxy demands is that according to the divine story Christ is divine, and that according to the human story Christ is human. To demand more is to border on begging the question against all QUA views, not just 0-QUA. After all, no QUA view can accept that “Christ is divine,” QUA-unadorned just so, is true without rejecting the entailment from it to, for example, the QUA-unadorned “Christ is immutable.” And while, at least in principle, any QUA view can reject the given entailment from the divine nature to the given nature-tied properties involved in the fundamental problem, doing so would (in practice) diminish the importance of QUA adornments. Either way, QUA views generally should treat the orthodox claim about Christ’s divinity—likewise, humanity—exactly as they treat the other target orthodox claims (e.g., “Christ is immutable,” “Christ is mutable,” etc.): namely, such central truths are themselves QUA-adorned.<sup>23</sup>

#### 4.6 Multiplying Persons

*Objection:* An objection to 1-QUA is that it multiplies the persons of Christ. Any orthodox Christological theory rejects that Christ is two different persons—the divine Christ and the human Christ—and instead maintains that Christ is exactly one person who is both (“fully”) divine in nature and (“fully”) human in nature. Leo the Great writes that:

[One] and the same mediator between God and humanity, the man Christ Jesus, could both on the one hand die and on the other be incapable of death.<sup>24</sup>

The important point is that any orthodox Christology must say *of the same person* (viz., Christ) that he is both immutable and mutable. But the 0-QUA proposal looks to confront the same problem: it maintains that there are two different (and, indeed, apparently incompatible) stories of Christ, and thereby appears to multiply persons—the subjects of the apparently incompatible stories.

*Reply:* Our 0-QUA account does say of Christ that according to one story he is immutable and, according to the other, he is mutable; it says this of one person, not two. Christ—the one and only person at issue—is the subject of both target stories. That they cannot be consistently unionized is a mark of Christ’s strange (and unique) role and being.

Indeed, this may be the mark at which orthodoxy points to the ineffability of the hypostatic union of the two apparently contrary natures. It is a part of orthodox Christology that the hypostatic union is a mystery; thus, any good model of Christ’s exemplification of the natures can only be illuminating up to a point. (If a model is so illuminating that the hypostatic union

<sup>23</sup>An anonymous referee raises the point that some QUA views may not require that “Christ is divine” and “Christ is human” are QUA-adorned, provided that on such a view “Christ is divine” (unadorned) does not entail, e.g., “Christ immutable” (unadorned) but rather the related QUA-adorned claim. On these views, the relevant *entailments* are QUA-adorned, thus avoiding the fundamental problem. This would be one way to develop a QUA account, though we know of no one who explicitly puts forward such a solution.

<sup>24</sup>Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, 78.

ceases to be a mystery, it fails to be a good model.) Our 0-QUA account shows that the hypostatic union does not lead to contradiction; however, the account leaves mysterious just how the hypostatic union happens.

#### 4.7 Accidental Properties

*Objection:* What about accidental properties? On the 0-QUA view the *essential* properties of a given nature are in that nature-tied story. But are the accidental properties in any of the nature-tied stories?

*Reply:* The proposed view is silent on whether accidental properties are to be included in nature-tied stories. As in §3.2, the nature-tied stories, at a minimum, include the essential properties of their respective natures; but, for all that we've said, the nature-tied stories might include more.

Distinguish two versions of 0-QUA: namely, "permissive" and "strict." A *strict 0-QUA* view holds that only the essential, nature-tied properties are in the nature-tied story. A *permissive 0-QUA* view holds that every relevant story includes its nature-tied properties *as well as* all the relevant accidental properties.

For present purposes, we remain neutral between strict and permissive variants of 0-QUA, leaving debate over theological-cum-philosophical merits of the two views to future work.<sup>25</sup> What's important, for present purposes, is that such neutrality does not compromise the account's viability *as a solution to the fundamental problem*. The fundamental problem is a problem about Christ's *essential* properties: there is an apparent contradiction in Christ's having two (apparently contrary) natures, giving rise to apparently logically contradictory properties. But on either version of the 0-QUA account (*viz.*, strict, permissive) no single nature delivers a story wherein Christ has incompatible properties, regardless of whether Christ's accidental properties are included in the story.

#### 4.8 Non-adjunctive Consequence

*Objection:* The 0-QUA view, as advanced, involves the idea that Christ's nature-tied stories cannot be unionized to form a stand-alone true story free of QUA-adorned claims. This avoids the fundamental contradiction at the price of keeping the full story of Christ separated into nature-tied stories. A more natural approach would be to have a single (true) story where the fundamental contradiction—for example, the conjunction of "Christ is mutable" and its logical negation—does not arise even though each of the conjuncts is true in the story. This would involve a so-called non-adjunctive consequence relation for the true Christology, one where logical conjunction differs from the standard account by failing to be entailed by the given conjuncts. (In other words, if  $\wedge$  is logical conjunction, then the non-adjunctive approach to consequence rejects that  $P \wedge Q$  is logically entailed by a story/

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<sup>25</sup>An anonymous referee raises the point that if some of Christ's accidental properties are contrary to some of Christ's nature-specific essential properties, then this is a reason to adopt the strict 0-QUA view. We accept the conditional but remain neutral about which variant of the 0-QUA view to adopt.

theory that contains both  $P$  and  $Q$ .) This approach avoids the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the fundamental problem of Christology, and even does so without any need for QUA decorations.<sup>26</sup>

*Reply:* We agree that theology might demand a non-standard account of logical vocabulary (though on the proposed 0-QUA view logical vocabulary remains standard);<sup>27</sup> and it might well be that logical conjunction is the best candidate for a non-standard account. We also agree that non-adjunctive consequence (entailment) relations are widely available and well understood in logical studies.<sup>28</sup> What we reject is that the non-adjunctive route resolves the fundamental problem. Yes, the step from (1) and (2) to (3) in the target fundamental problem (see §1) is logically invalid according to the non-adjunctive account; but the spirit of the fundamental problem remains strong. In particular, the alleged virtue of having a single, stand-alone QUA-free (true) story of Christ is diminished by the fact that we have a logically contradictory story despite losing the fundamental contradiction. To be clear: define a *contradiction* to be the (logical) conjunction of a sentence and its (logical) negation. Define a *contradictory story* (or theory) to be a negation-inconsistent story (where negation is logical negation), that is, a story that contains both a sentence and its (logical) negation, regardless of whether it contains the corresponding contradiction (viz., the logical conjunction of the given sentence and its logical negation). Then the alleged virtue of the non-adjunctive approach is that we have a stand-alone QUA-unadorned story of Christ that contains no contradiction—a fortiori, no fundamental contradiction. But how is this a solution to the fundamental problem if the given stand-alone story is nonetheless contradictory? We see no clear answer, and so reject the non-adjunctive approach.<sup>29</sup>

#### 4.9 *Ad Hoc and Irrelevant*

*Objection:* Even if 0-QUA solves the fundamental problem of Christology, in that it avoids the apparent contradiction of orthodox Christology, it is suspiciously *ad hoc*, and it looks like 0-QUA will have few (if any) applications in other areas of Christology or theology.

*Reply:* Our focus is on the fundamental problem of Christology, and so we make no argument that 0-QUA solves other theological problems. But there is precedent for thinking that QUA adornments are needed in

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<sup>26</sup>We thank Susana Gómez for raising this point.

<sup>27</sup>Strictly speaking, issues arise if one generalizes logical entailment to so-called multiple conclusion entailment, at which point the peculiarity of a non-adjunctive account of conjunction is mirrored in some ways by the supervaluational (and so-called non-prime) features of True disjunctions (where Truth is defined per 0-QUA). But we flag this technicality only for those readers who balk at our claim that the 0-QUA account keeps to the standard account of logical entailment. (We say it does, provided that logical entailment is a single-conclusion relation, which we take it to be qua one of various closure relations.)

<sup>28</sup>Jaskowski, "Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems."

<sup>29</sup>We should emphasize that if one were to pursue a genuinely logically contradictory Christology then there is no obvious need for the proposed non-adjunctive approach, since



other areas of theology, or at least in other areas of Christology. Consider the relation of the Son to the Father in the Godhead. Aquinas writes that:

We are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in his human nature even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.<sup>30</sup>

And here we can understand Aquinas as endorsing a view like 0-QUA: it is true according to the human story that Christ is subject to the Father, but it is not true according to the divine story.<sup>31</sup> And understanding it to be true (unadorned) that Christ is subject to the Father will, according to Aquinas, lead to the problems of Arianism. So, Aquinas recommends that in our Christological theorizing we ought to understand “Christ is subject to the Father” as QUA-adorned *even if* this adornment is not made explicit.<sup>32</sup>

Figuring out which claims about Christ require adornment is not an easy task. But this is par for the course in theory building: building theories of *anything* is difficult, and building theories of Christ, who is extraordinary in having two (apparently contrary) natures, even more so. Beyond being difficult the task is important: as Aquinas notes, figuring out which claims require QUA adornment can prevent errors such as Arius’s.

### 5. Closing Remarks

Our aim has not been to establish that 0-QUA is the best of the QUA solutions; our aim has been to advance 0-QUA as a genuine option to the standard families. We have argued that the 0-QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology has many virtues: it provides a natural gloss of QUA clauses as *according to* clauses; it requires no sub-sentential modifications of sentences in our Christological theory; and it can overcome all of the objections leveled against other QUA accounts. We believe that the 0-QUA account is at least as plausible as the standard three QUA views, and may ultimately be the best QUA approach. Future debate will tell.<sup>33</sup>

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the point of a contradictory Christology is to accept that the fundamental “problem” of Christology is not in fact a logical problem at all. But in our current discussion we are setting aside the option of a logically contradictory Christology; our focus is on the QUA families that purport to resolve the fundamental problem in a logically non-contradictory fashion.

<sup>30</sup>Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, III, q.20, a.11.

<sup>31</sup>See also Crisp, *The Word Enfleshed*, 6, where the subordination of the Son is taken to be the doctrine that Christ is subordinate to the Father (i) in his human nature, and (ii) during his state of humiliation. We do not mean to endorse Crisp’s particular theory—on which we remain neutral here—but we see Crisp as proposing something in the spirit of a 0-QUA view in another area of Christology, namely, in the relationship of the Son to the Father in the Godhead.

<sup>32</sup>Aquinas also makes this point in *Summa Theologiae* III, q.16, a.8.

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