

Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 5

1-1-1989

Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?

Stephen Palmquist

Follow this and additional works at: <https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy>

Recommended Citation

Palmquist, Stephen (1989) "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?," *Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers*: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.

DOI: 10.5840/faithphil1989619

Available at: <https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol6/iss1/5>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

IMMANUEL KANT: A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER?

Stephen Palmquist

I begin with a few general suggestions about what it means to be a Christian. I then summarize the new interpretation of Kant as proposing a 'System of Perspectives,' which I have set out in greater detail elsewhere. After discussing the important notions of 'criticism,' 'perspective' and 'system' as they operate in Kant's thought, the bulk of the essay is devoted to an assessment of the theological implications of Kant's System. I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, particularly among some Christian theologians, Kant's intentions were theologically constructive, and moreover, that his System is thoroughly consistent with the Christian perspective.

One's answer to the question of the Christian character of Kant's Critical philosophy will determine the extent to which one believes his System can serve as an adequate philosophical foundation for a Christian world view. My strategy in working out an answer to this question will be first to suggest briefly a general meaning for "Christian," and then to examine in more detail the general character of Kant's philosophy.

I do not claim to be an authority on knowing what a "Christian" is—indeed, there are probably almost as many different definitions of Christianity as there are thinking Christians. But I will suggest three categories which, in my opinion, should be included in such a definition. A Christian is someone who: (1) has certain *beliefs* (e.g., about God and his creative power, about Christ and his redemptive power, and about the Spirit and its communicative power); who (2) seeks to *obey* God (e.g., by heeding the commands presented in the Bible along with those "written on his heart"); and who (3) has some sort of immediate *experience* of God (e.g., in the form of a "conversion," a prayer life, or participation in religious ceremonies). The precise *content* of a particular Christian's beliefs, actions and personal experiences will be determined to a large extent by the Christian community of which he is a member and its way of interpreting the standards set in the Bible.

Given this understanding of "Christian," we must now examine the general character of Kant's philosophy. In my experience "Kantian" tends to have nearly as many different connotations to different people as does "Christian." For most non-philosophers who know anything about Kant, the word conjures up a few general descriptions or caricatures. Those familiar with his theoretical philosophy—for



example, with his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds—might describe it as an absolute dualism which throws God out the front door, only to sneak him in again through the back. Those familiar with his moral philosophy might describe him as a rigid, “pharisaical formalist,”² and cite as evidence his tendency to follow such a strict schedule that the people of Königsberg used to set their clocks by his daily comings and goings.³ And those familiar with his religious scruples might describe him as one who could find room neither for historical religious beliefs and practices nor for any type of personal experience of God; here they might cite the story of how he followed the customary procession of professors to the cathedral, only to desert it at the doors of the church.⁴

One of the first descriptions of Kant I ever heard was one made by a college philosophy professor for whom I had much respect. After briefly explaining Kant’s philosophy and its theological implications, he came out with the following bombshell: “No single philosopher,” he proclaimed, “has done more damage to the Christian religion than Immanuel Kant.” This condemnation embedded itself in my memory like a steel beam being dropped from the clouds into a vat of wet cement. Fortunately, when I actually read Kant for myself several years later, the cement had not yet hardened.

The best way to avoid such a partial treatment of Kant is to attempt to view his work as a whole, rather than as a series of isolated theories. This, as we shall see, is how he intended us to view most of his philosophical books. Yet theologians in particular tend to limit their reading of Kant to his book on religion, together, perhaps, with the relevant sections from the three *Critiques*, which on the surface seem to be comprehensible without reading them in their overall context. However, by taking this context fully into consideration, we may be able to come up with a more positive estimate of Kant’s value to theology and religion; if so, we will be doing theologians in general and Christian philosophers in particular a favour. If it turns out that we can view Kant as a profoundly religious and profoundly *Christian* philosopher, then we will have established a much-needed point of contact between the Christian thinker and the non-Christian thinker; for the “modern scientific world view” held by the latter is also taken more or less directly from Kant.⁵ Before attempting to clarify the theological and religious implications of Kant’s philosophy, I shall make three points with regard to how we should interpret his general philosophical method. These points fall under the one-word headings: “criticism,” “perspective,” and “system.”⁶

Kant’s three most famous works are, of course, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*. In these and other systematic philosophical writings Kant employs a method which he calls “criticism.” Criticism is not, as might first appear, primarily a negative or destructive activity. On the contrary, it is at least as constructive, if not more constructive,

than it is destructive. The goal of Kant's philosophical criticism is to synthesize or *integrate* "dogmatism" and "scepticism"—i.e., to discern the true elements in each and dispose only of those elements which make each extreme distasteful to its opposite. The dogmatist's conclusions are generally regarded as positive: he believes he can demonstrate rationally the truth of numerous metaphysical propositions concerning the nature of reality. The sceptic's conclusions, on the other hand, are generally regarded as negative: he believes it is impossible to demonstrate any metaphysical truths about reality. The Critical philosopher, however, maintains that both views have a measure of truth, but are mistaken inasmuch as they are both based on the fallacious assumption that the objects of our ordinary knowledge and experience are ultimately real objects, or "things in themselves." In other words, they both assume that the subject of experience in no way influences the objects it perceives. Once it is recognized that we necessarily adapt all objects of perception to certain "*a priori* forms," such as space, time, and causality, it becomes clear that what we naturally tend to think of as "real objects" are actually best described philosophically as "appearances." In other words, in order to be an object of knowledge, a thing in itself must be an object *for us*: it must *appear* to us. Armed with this basic Critical assumption, Kant is able to admit that the sceptic is *right* in saying that we cannot know reality as it is in itself, and yet also to admit that the *dogmatist* is right in saying that reality as we know it (i.e., regarded in terms of appearances) is structured on a rationally knowable pattern. So much for Kant's special use of "criticism."

My second interpretive point is that the principle upon which all criticism is based is what I call the "Principle of Perspective." (Although Kant himself does not use the German equivalent of the word "perspective," he does make frequent use of a number of terms, such as "point of view," "aspect," and "standpoint," which are synonymous with the term "perspective" as I use it.⁷) A *perspective* is a way of looking at a certain question or set of questions: it acts as a context or a set of assumptions on the basis of which such questions can be answered. The primary Critical task is to discern the perspective assumed by a given question; for different answers can be given depending on what perspective is assumed. Thus, for example, both the dogmatist and the sceptic make the fundamental error of failing to distinguish between the empirical and the transcendental "perspectives."

My final interpretive point is that Kant sees the various perspectives he employs as being united together in a "System of Perspectives." As a result, the general goal which motivates all his Critical endeavours is to elucidate the difference between various human perspectives and to demonstrate how they can work together in a single, coherent, systematic explanation of human experience. Kant's three most general perspectives are the theoretical, as elaborated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the practical, as elaborated in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the empirical, as elaborated in the *Critique of Judgment*. To distin-

guish these from the four subordinate perspectives which operate within each (see note 10), I refer to the general perspectives as “standpoints.” Each standpoint generates its own system of perspectives—which is to say, each primary category of philosophical inquiry can itself be divided into secondary categories of inquiry. The logical relationship between perspective and standpoints within the context of the Critical System is the essence of Kant’s infamous “architectonic.”

Having touched briefly upon what I believe are the three most fundamental assumptions of Kant’s philosophy (see note 6), I shall now proceed to discuss in broad outline the theological and religious implications of his System of Perspectives. Kant is best known among theologians and philosophers of religion for his rejection of the validity of all traditional theoretical arguments for the existence of God. (Indeed, this is too often all he is known for!) Although the specific criticisms he advances against the proponents of the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological, or teleological, arguments differ significantly in their details, his *general* criticism of each focuses on essentially the same point: in each case the proponent of such arguments uncritically mixes two perspectives which should be kept distinct. The ontological argument, for instance, can be regarded as establishing certain knowledge of God’s existence only by someone who believes that a purely *logical* treatment of *concepts* (e.g., “God,” “perfection,” “necessity” and “existence”) can eventually establish a conclusion concerning the *real* world (*viz.* that God *really* exists).

But such an assumption could never be accepted by a Kantian, since theoretical knowledge concerning the real existence of things can be gained only by *combining* a concept with what Kant calls an “intuition.” He points out in the first *Critique* that, because God is not an object like other objects in the world, he cannot be intuited by man. He cannot appear to us in all His glory; or at least, if He did, we could never conceptualize what we were intuiting. Therefore, the *reality* of God’s existence cannot become an item of theoretical knowledge, no matter what type of proof is used. It is precisely because they attempt to establish such knowledge—*viz.* that *God exists* as a real object (albeit, the most real, or most perfect one)—that *all* theoretical arguments are bound to fail. There is no need to discuss here Kant’s specific (and well known) criticisms of each argument, as long as we recognize that they are all subject to this same general criticism.

For Kant, then, God’s existence is utterly unknowable from the theoretical standpoint. It is for this reason, no doubt, that most theologians, particularly those who favour the use of such arguments, label Kant as a “deist.” But Kant himself would have protested loudly, for he always regarded himself as a *theist*, i.e., as one who believes not just in “a God,” but “in a *living God*.”⁸ His reason for denying the possibility of theoretical knowledge of God’s existence is to insure that man stays in his proper place, as a *believer*, not as a *knower*. For “in order to believe in God,” he maintains, “it is not necessary to know for

certain that God exists.”⁹ And by this he does not mean to deny the importance of upholding a firm *conviction* of God’s existence, but only to point out that, however certain we are of God’s reality in our lives, our certainty will be of a different sort than our empirical certainty that this chair exists, or than our transcendental certainty that all objects of our perception appear to us in space and time, or than our logical certainty that $A \neq -A$.¹⁰ Our certainty is different because all questions about belief in God belong to the *practical* perspective. To fail to recognize this difference is to open oneself up to a number of dangerously misleading illusions about the extent to which man can establish conclusions about God’s existence. For any attempt to know God’s existence theoretically implicitly requires “attributing omniscience to yourself.”¹¹

Such an obviously unChristian position can be avoided, while yet preserving a positive role for theoretical theology, once the proper use for theoretical arguments is understood. For Kant’s criticisms are not intended so much to close the books on all theoretical arguments for the existence of God as to curb the pretensions of those who mistakenly believe such arguments can prove (what no argument can ever prove) that the transcendent is knowable as such, without ever having to become immanent. Kant readily admits that the arguments can be used to supplement a person’s faith by providing good reasons “to *postulate* the existence of an all-sufficient being”; but he warns that “in presuming so far as to say that such a being *necessarily* exists, we are no longer giving modest expression to an admissible hypothesis, but are confidently laying claim to apodeictic certainty.”¹² Kant believes such arguments “must be allowed to have a certain cogency,” but only when “the existence of some sort of necessary being is taken as granted.”¹³

What distresses some theologians about Kant’s criticism of traditional rational theology is that they believe it will, in the long run, have a detrimental effect on the ordinary religious believer. But this belief only reveals a pride on the part of such theologians that they are somehow protecting some indispensable element of religion which the ordinary religious believer on his own would be unable to protect, and would therefore eventually lose to the power of the Enemy. What is actually at stake, though, has little if anything to do with the religious man’s confidence in his God, but everything to do with the theologian’s self-image as “Protector of the Faith.” Indeed, Kant’s disapproval of such a “sophisticated” self-estimate is explicit and to the point:

In religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone
[So] it is not necessary for this belief [i.e., in God] to be susceptible
of logical proof [S]ophistication is the error of refusing to accept
any religion not based on a theology which can be apprehended by our
reason Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous thing;

our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for religion . . .¹⁴

Kant's position here is in such obvious agreement with so much of what the Bible says on this matter that it astounds me to think about how often his position is misunderstood and prematurely rejected. Nowhere does the Bible say that man knows God primarily through theoretical argument, even if such argument is based upon Holy Scripture itself. Rather the Bible points away from the standpoint of theoretical theology and tells us to "Cease striving and know that I am God."¹⁵ "Yes," says the Psalmist, "I am like a man who does not hear, and in whose mouth are no arguments. For I hope in Thee, O Lord . . ."¹⁶ Wickedness stems not from denying the possibility of *human* knowledge, but from denying the possibility of *divine* knowledge: for the wicked man says "How does God know? And is there knowledge in the Most High?"¹⁷ All our thoughts "are a mere breath" to God, who knows them all and who "teaches man knowledge."¹⁸ But God's knowledge "is too high, I cannot attain to it."¹⁹ Jesus himself tells his disciples that they must become like little children in order to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.²⁰ (Little children have faith in their parents even though they may be unable to understand the reasons why.) And Paul, of course, knew God through an *experience*, a personal revelation of Christ "in me."²¹ Indeed, he sums up the Christian position on the nature of our knowledge of God when he says that "to know God" really means nothing other than "to be known by God."²² For the condition of "being known by God" is to obey His commandments.²³ And on this also Paul agrees when he says: "If anyone supposes that he knows anything, he has not yet known as he ought to know; but if any one loves God, he is known by Him."²⁴ Thus our knowledge of God is not theoretical, but empirical (through our immediate relationship with God) or practical (through our obedience of the law which God places in our hearts²⁵).

If Kant follows the Biblical approach by refusing to place his trust in the traditional theoretical arguments for God's existence, then of what use, if any, is the theoretical standpoint in respect to one's theological beliefs? Kant's answer to this question is too complex to be treated adequately here, in the context of such a broad outline of his views. It will suffice merely to point out three ways in which he develops a radically positive theology, one which is intended to reap all the benefits of traditional rational theology, but without succumbing to unChristian pretensions.²⁶ First, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant proposes his theory of God as a regulative "idea of reason." Now this is in no way intended to imply that God is nothing but a fictional idea invented by man, much as the mathematician uses imaginary numbers even though he knows they are not real; rather it simply expresses the view that God's existence, when considered from

the theoretical standpoint, is bound to be “postulated problematically”²⁷ as what might nowadays be called an “explanatory hypothesis.” Once our *right* to use the concept of God is established theoretically by demonstrating that His existence cannot be *disproved*, we are free not only to fill out the concept of God by examining His attributes from the theoretical standpoint (as Kant does in his *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*), but also to use the concept from other, nontheoretical standpoints. Thus, the second aspect of Kant’s positive theology is an attempt to justify this postulate from a practical, or moral, standpoint in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. His argument, in a nutshell, is that if a moral agent is to think consistently about the implications of his attempt to act morally, he must admit either that there exists a God who will eventually reward the person who acts morally for the right motive, or else that morality itself is an irrational form of activity.²⁸ The third aspect of Kant’s positive theology is established in the *Critique of Judgment*, where he reintroduces the teleological argument in its proper context, as a postulate which arises not out of theoretical argumentation about the world, but directly out of our *experience* of beauty and purpose.

Perhaps I have said enough about the essentially positive thrust of Kant’s theology. His theological views seem to me to be thoroughly consistent with Christianity; but what about his views on religion? Here surely to be a Kantian must involve some claims which the Christian cannot accept. For in his book, *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, Kant gives the impression of being quite unorthodox in much of what he says. One of the reasons for this general impression of Kant’s philosophy of religion is that it has too often been taken up into the theologies of those who interpret Kant too simplistically. A good example is Ritschl, who, as one commentator puts it,

was compelled to grapple with secular philosophy to a sufficient degree to show that Kantian epistemology was entirely consistent with Lutheran Christianity.

But . . . the normal man in Kant’s critique of pure reason has little taste for the element of mystery in religion and seduced Ritschl to deny that mystery which slumbers in every human breast . . .²⁹

Such seduction can result only from a partial acquaintance with, or an inadequate understanding of, what Kant was trying to accomplish. For his overall System of Perspectives is intended not to deny such mystery to the thinking man, but to secure it against the illusions of dogmatic approaches which try to remove such mystery, and of sceptical approaches which regard *everything* as mysterious. As a result, when he comes to apply his Critical System to religion his conclusions are bound to seem to the sceptic to be too dogmatic and to the dogmatist to be too sceptical. But it turns out that many of the views expressed in his book on religion, which admittedly seem less than Christian at first sight, turn out upon

closer investigation to be profound explanations of the rational meaning lying behind basic Christian doctrines. Kant wrote this book, after all, not only as a defence of the Christian religion, but as a philosophical explanation of what religion generally is. When this is taken into account, it becomes more clear just how consistent his approach is with traditional Christian doctrine.

Throughout his works Kant's comments on religion are usually purposefully limited to the practical standpoint, so that he often ends up explaining (theoretical) theological doctrines or (empirical) religious experiences in practical (i.e., moral) terms. However, he never claims that the practical standpoint is the *only* legitimate context for interpreting such doctrines or experiences. When, for instance, he analyses the practical value of prayer as an inner stimulus, intended "to induce in us a moral disposition,"³⁰ he is not precluding the legitimacy of also regarding the immediate *experience* of prayer as a form of communion with God. Indeed, Kant himself reveals his awareness of this other perspective on prayer when he makes comments such as that God's "all-seeing eye penetrates into our innermost souls and reads our thoughts,"³¹ or that prayer "should fan into flames the cinders of morality in the inner recesses of our heart."³² Kant was admittedly highly suspicious of extremes such as religious "fanaticism" and "clericalism." But this should not blind us to the fact that he always kept an open mind with regard to the possibility of an irrational (or arational) experience of the supernatural, such as that in which he shows considerable interest in his much-neglected *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766). Kant's rejection of extremes does not entail a rejection of a balanced attitude towards the possibility of supernatural experiences.

In the last few years of his life Kant was working on a book which he believed would be the crowning work of his Critical System. Unfortunately, he never completed it; but the notes he left³³ make it clear that in this final work he was attempting to get to the very heart of man's religious experience. He consistently refers to God as a "Person," a practice which was by no means common in his day;³⁴ and he elaborates on the way God relates to man through practical reason, which, as he had already stated elsewhere, "may be considered as the immediate declaration and *voice of God*, by which he giveth a meaning to the letter of his creation."³⁵ Comments such as that God (the "knower of hearts"³⁶) is "closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands or feet"³⁷ suggest that, here at the end of his life, Immanuel Kant may have been trying to demonstrate that "God with us" belongs at the very centre of his System. Most interpreters regard such proposals as a subjectivist contradiction of the key principles of the Critical philosophy. However, when his philosophical task is understood in terms of a System of *Perspectives*, it becomes apparent that he is here grappling with the most difficult subject for philosophers (along with many theologians) to deal with—*viz.* immediate experience—and that in adopting this new perspective he is in no way ruling out the legitimacy of the others.

So far, I have only scratched the surface of the theological and religious implications of Kant's System of Perspectives.³⁸ For example, I have said nothing about many of Kant's specific theories which tend to encourage Christian theologians to reject his philosophy, such as his theory that the law of causality always holds true in the phenomenal world (thus apparently denying the possibility of miracles), or his conception of historical matters such as Jesus' resurrection, or of theological matters such as Christ's redemptive activity. In my opinion these and other difficult questions can be answered without straying from Kant's own principles and yet without compromising anything essential with respect to our Christian faith. But in any case, the limited extent of my treatment here does not affect my answer to the question posed at the beginning. For in its most general sense, a "Kantian" is not someone who defends and uses Kant's own terminology, or who agrees with the most important conclusions of his multifarious (and often perplexing) arguments. Rather a Kantian is someone who philosophizes in the spirit of Kant: someone who sets for himself the task of always discerning the perspective he is assuming before reaching his conclusions, who sees the limitations of human knowledge implied by such Critical thinking, and who accepts his ability to understand what he can without striving to understand that which he cannot.

Now, as Kant himself puts it, all this requires the confession that "the inscrutable wisdom through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in [respect to] what it has granted."³⁹ My conclusion, therefore, is that, far from doing cataclysmic damage to the Christian religion, as it admittedly does on a traditional interpretation such as Ritschl's, we should regard Kant's philosophical System as he intended us to: that is, as putting forward a coherent, rational explanation of the world in which man has been placed—an explanation which requires us humbly to confess our ignorance of God's own perspective, freely to obey the transcendent law we find working within our breast, and silently to rest in the awesome grace of his redemptive power. If indeed the Christian is someone who seeks to believe in God, obey Him, and have a personal relationship with Him, then it seems not only legitimate, but compulsory, to view Kant as having developed a radically Christian philosophy.

Hong Kong Baptist College

NOTES

1. Cf. Jer. 31:33 and Heb. 8:10.
2. Lewis White Beck, "Translator's Introduction," *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1959), p. ix. See also H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*

(London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 74-76.

3. Cf. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), p. 731.

4. Theodore M. Greene, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's *Religion*," in I. Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, tr. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. xxix, note 1.

5. In a subsequent paper I hope to demonstrate how Kant's philosophy can provide a philosophical foundation not only for Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics, but also for non-Euclidean geometries and quantum physics. Gerd Buchdahl affirms the possibility of such a demonstration in "Kant's 'Special Metaphysics' and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*," in R. E. Butts (ed.), *Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science* (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986), pp. 146, 156-57. See also Gabriele Rabel, *Kant* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. viii-xii. On p. vii Rabel agrees that "Kant was a profoundly religious man."

"The following three paragraphs represent a drastically condensed summary of the interpretation of Kant which I have developed and defended in great detail in a series of articles: "Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection," *The Heythrop Journal* XXV (1984), pp. 442-55; "The Radical Unknowability of Kant's Thing in Itself," *Cogito* III (1985), pp. 101-15; "Knowledge and Experience—An Examination of the Four Reflective 'Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy," *Kant-Studien* 78.2 (1987), pp. 170-200; and "The Architectonic Form of Kant's Copernican Logic," *Metaphilosophy* 17 (1986), pp. 266-88. Naturally, the summary given in this paper of Kant's general philosophical method will exclude many terms and distinctions which are crucial for a clear understanding of the *details* of his theories. But such details are discussed in full in the above-mentioned articles.

7. I have defended this usage in Chapter Two ("The Principle of Perspective in Kant's Critical System") of my forthcoming book, *Kant's System of Perspectives*, in which I use Gottfried Martin's *Sachindex zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967) in conjunction with my *A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith's Translation of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (circulated privately) to demonstrate the occurrence of over 500 words or phrases which can be taken as equivalent to the term "perspective."

8. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929), p. B661 (marginal pagination).

9. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, tr. L. Infield (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1979), p. 81.

10. Each of these types of certainty is related to one of Kant's four fundamental perspectives, which I have discussed in detail in "Knowledge and Experience" (*op. cit.*), §3.

11. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, tr. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 480 (marginal pagination).

12. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (*op. cit.*), p. B640.

13. *Ibid.*, p. B615.

14. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics* (*op. cit.*), pp. 86-87; see also *Critique of Judgement* (*op. cit.*), pp. 480-81.

15. Ps. 46:10. (Biblical quotes are taken from the *New American Standard Bible* (Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, Inc., 1973).

16. Ps. 38:14-5.

17. Ps. 73:11-2.

18. Ps. 94:10-1.
19. Ps. 139:6.
20. Matt. 18:1-6; cf. 11:25.
21. Gal. 1:12, 16.
22. Gal. 4:8-9.
23. Matt. 7:15:23.
24. I Cor. 8:2-3.
25. Jer. 31:33; Heb. 8:10.
26. I give a detailed treatment of these points in Chapter Ten of my forthcoming book, *Kant's System of Perspectives* (op. cit.).
27. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (op. cit.), p. B709.
28. For a good summary of this argument, see Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (op. cit.), pp. 450-51.
29. C. G. Jung, *The Zofingia Lectures*, tr. J. Van Heurck, in *The Collected Works*, Supplementary Volume A (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 107.
30. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics* (op. cit.), p. 99.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 99. In Chapter Eleven of *Kant's System of Perspectives* (op. cit.) I present a detailed argument against the traditional reductionist interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion. According to this commonly held view, Kant is portrayed as attempting to "explain away" religion by *reducing* it to morality. Yet this totally misrepresents his expressed intention in writing *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, which was to perform a kind of philosophical "experiment" designed to provide a rational *justification of Christianity* by determining the extent to which it can be regarded as "the universal religion of mankind."
33. Compiled and published under the title *Opus Postumum* (ed. E. Adickes, 1920). The notes are also published in the Berlin Academy edition of Kant's works (hereafter *Academy*), vols. 21-22.
34. See especially Clement C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926), pp. 181-84, 197-201. At one point, for example, Kant says: 'God is a Personality, not external to man as a separate substance, but within man' (quoted in Keith Ward, *The Development of Kant's View of Ethics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), p. 166).
35. Kant, Immanuel, *On the Failure of All the Philosophical Essays in the Theodicee* (1791) tr. anonymously in *Essays and Treatises* (London: Richardson, 1799), vol. 2, p. 205. (*Academy* 8.269).
36. *Ibid.*, p. 212. (*Academy* 8.269).
37. Kant, *Opus Postumum*, as quoted in Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (op. cit.), p. 200.
38. I give a more in-depth treatment of these implications in Part Four of *Kant's System of Perspectives* (op. cit.).
39. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p. 148 (marginal pagination).