After defining presentism, I consider four arguments that presentism and divine atemporality are incompatible. I identify an assumption common to the four, ask what reason there is to consider it true, and argue against it.

Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and hosts of lesser lights shared a pair of metaphysical views. They were presentists, holding that always, the present is all there is to time—that nothing ever has past or future parts. They also held that God exists atemporally. Some recent authors argue that presentism and divine atemporality (hereafter DA) are incompatible; many more seem to suspect it. I now briefly discuss presentism, then present four arguments for the incompatibility and identify an assumption they share: that the way things are for things in time is the way they are for God. I then ask why we should think this assumption true and argue against it.

Two Forms of Presentism

One sort of presentism—call it “universal presentism”—is a bit hard to formulate. Universal presentists want to assert something like the following: only present things ever exist. Many state their view as the following claim:

Always, everything that exists or occurs is temporally present.

But this statement won’t do if universal presentism is to be a substantive thesis. For “exists” and “occurs” are present-tensed. So this amounts to the claim that always, everything that presently exists or occurs is temporally present: it is a tautology. Presentists need their view to be

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1 Though of course many things have had parts which used to exist or occur and now do not, and will have parts they now do not.


3 Some argue that every way to state presentism is either clearly false or a tautology (see, e.g., Meyer, The Nature of Time). If the first, presentism poses no problem for DA. If the second, those who argue that DA and presentism are incompatible should recant, because they concede that God could have been atemporal (so, e.g., Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time; Craig, God, Time and Eternity), and a tautology is compatible with everything possibly true. So while I try below to state presentism in ways that are non—tautologous and
non-tautologous, for they claim that presentism is incompatible with present, past and future being equally real. But whatever presently exists is temporally present even if present, past, and future are equally real. Again, a tautology is compatible with everything possibly true, and it is at least possibly true that present, past, and future are equally real. For there could have been only something timeless. For instance, there could have been only a three-dimensional absolute space. It is just not a necessary truth that space coexists with time, or is melded with it in a space-time continuum. Again, here is a reasonable set of claims:

There was a Big Bang singularity. It was not part of time. It was instead the boundary time approaches pastward. It did not have to erupt; it could have just sat there.

There could have been a non-temporal singularity that did not explode. Had there been one, there would have been no time. In a world with no time, past, present, and future are equally (un)real and always, everything that presently exists or occurs is temporally present.4

Let “existence” name what something has just if it is in the domain of the unrestricted existential quantifier. Then a second try at stating universal presentism might be the following:

**ID.** Existence = absolute temporal presentness.5

Every time is, was or will be present at itself. Being absolutely present is being present not at a time, but *simpliciter:* being present, full stop. The problem with (ID) is that it is an identity-statement. As such, it is necessary if true. But in my timeless worlds, things exist without being present. To get around this, we might try the following:

**Role:** If anything is temporal, existence only plays the role of the property of absolute temporal presentness.

**Role** says the following: If anything is temporal, some predications of absolute temporal presentness are true. But what makes them all true is that something has existence. Existence never shows up without making such a predication true; whatever exists, thereby is temporally present. **Role** does not rule out timeless worlds.

However, **Role** won’t do either. Universal presentism should be incompatible with the claim that past, present, and future are equally real. But **Role** is compatible with it; in a timeless world, both it and **Role** are true. To get past this, I suggest taking universal presentism as this claim:

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4If there are no presently existing things, there are no presently existing things that fail to be temporally present.

5For this sort of definition see, e.g., Tallant, “Defining Existence Presentism,” 494 and Zimmerman, “Persistence and Presentism,” 117.
UP1. Something is temporal, and existence only plays the role of absolute temporal presentness.

If there can be a timeless world, UP1 is contingent. But perhaps that’s as it should be. Presentists, again, want to say roughly that only present things exist. That is just not true in a timeless world. So their basic thought is contingently true at best. UP1 is substantive, and incompatible with the equal reality of past, present and future. So perhaps UP1 is adequate. Another account of universal presentism is the following:

UP2. Something is temporal, each time has its own sole class of all real things, and no such class contains anything wholly past, wholly future or atemporal.\(^6\)

Again, this is contingent, incompatible with the equal reality of present, past and future, and substantive.

Another sort of presentism is more restricted. Temporal presentism asserts only this:

TP1. Something is temporal, and for temporal things, existence only plays the role of absolute temporal presentness,

or

TP2. Something is temporal, each time has its own sole class of all temporal things, and no such class contains anything wholly past or wholly future.

Universalism and temporalism agree that time is always only as thick as the present; universalism adds that time is all there is to reality. Most historical presentists were temporal presentists.\(^7\) For most believed in some atemporal reality, and temporalism allows this. Universal presentism is largely a late twentieth-century phenomenon.

Argument is hardly needed to show that DA is incompatible with universal presentism. Further, those who argue the incompatibility do so to argue against DA, and it would beg the question to assume universalism in arguing against DA. For to assume universalism is to assume that there is no atemporal God. So it is charitable to take them as trying to show that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible. I now examine four arguments for this.\(^8\)

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\(^6\)This tweaks a claim by Dean Zimmerman in his “The A-Theory of Time,” 791–809.

\(^7\)Perhaps “meant to be” would be better. They did not avoid tautology in stating their views, and temporal presentism is not supposed to be tautologous.

\(^8\)Strictly, the authors I now discuss argue not that DA is incompatible with presentism, but that it is incompatible with all theories of time with an absolute moving present, the genus of which presentism is a species. In effect, then, they argue about a disjunction of theories, one of which is presentism. So it is fair to treat them as claiming inter alia that presentism and DA are incompatible. I discuss presentism in particular because it is the most popular such view and the view furthest from the only theory of time the authors I discuss think is
Omniscience and Immutability

The best-known argument on this subject isn’t precisely for the conclusion that DA and presentism are incompatible. It’s for the conclusion that DA, continual divine omniscience, and presentism are.\(^9\) The basic thought is this: On presentism, some time is now, in an absolute sense. It is all there is to time; it exists and no other time does.\(^10\) What time is now changes as time passes. To stay omniscient, God must always know everything. So what time He knows to be now must change as time passes. But an atemporal being does not change; something changes only if it has a property at some time and lacks it at some other, and so only temporal things change. So, given presentism, God cannot both stay omniscient and be atemporal. I discuss this argument below. For now I only point to a hidden assumption: if some time is now in an absolute sense for things in time, it is now in an absolute sense for God. That is,

_Time’s Way:_ The way things are for things in time is the way things are for God.

The present case of _Time’s Way_ may seem obviously correct, for here it amounts to saying that if only one time exists in time, only that one time exists for God. All the same, I question this later.

For now, I point out that this case of _Time’s Way_ is not dialectically neutral. For a presentist, only the present time exists in time. Many of DA’s friends do not believe that only the present time exists for an atemporal God, even if they are temporal presentists. Boethius is a temporal presentist.\(^11\) But consider his classic simile: an atemporal God is as if on a mountain top, looking out on an entire future those lower down cannot see.\(^12\) It is part of the image that all the future is really there at once to be seen. Boethius’s solution to the freedom-foreknowledge problem hinges on the claim that God’s knowledge is of all time at once and observational.\(^13\) The simile sug-

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\(^10\)Those who push this argument always ignore relativistic complications. For present purposes, I’ll let them.

\(^11\)Boethius, _The Consolation of Philosophy_ V, prose 6, ll. 12–18.

\(^12\)Boethius, _The Consolation of Philosophy_ V, prose 6, ll. 70–72.

\(^13\)Boethius, _The Consolation of Philosophy_ V, prose 6, ll. 72–83. This is simply what Boethius says. However, the _Consolation_ ends by saying that future events do not cause God’s knowledge (Boethius, _The Consolation of Philosophy_ V, prose 6, ll. 155—163), which vitiates the claim that God’s knowledge is observational. This final move leaves it unclear that the _Consolation_ as a whole has a solution to the problem: Boethius may mean the _Consolation_ to end with an _aporia_, though perhaps his point is that the existence of the future _makes true_ what God believes even if it does not cause God’s belief state. Still, insofar as Boethius has a solution, it is in the part of the _Consolation_ which speaks of observation. Just why Boethius drops that bombshell at the end is an interpretive question whose answer depends on the overall point the _Consolation_ wants to make. But for present purposes I need not address it.
gests that observation sees what is there to be seen, and being unaware of the finite speed of light and its implications for vision, Boethius can hardly have thought otherwise. Boethius, then, denies *Time’s Way*.

**Craig’s Causal Relation Argument**

I now pass to another argument. William Craig argues the following:

Suppose . . . that God did not exist temporally prior to creation . . . once [He creates], God . . . becomes temporal in virtue of His real, causal relation to . . . the world . . . which is in that moment new to God and which He does not have . . . *sans* creation . . . Hence . . . creating the world . . . draws Him into time at that very moment in virtue of His (new) real relation to the . . . universe. In creating the world God . . . undergoes an extrinsic change . . . God comes into (a) relation . . . in which He did not stand before.

We could put the argument this way:

1. Whatever creates a temporal universe comes into a new relation.
2. Whatever comes into a new relation changes extrinsically.
3. Whatever changes extrinsically is or becomes temporal. Therefore,
4. If God creates a temporal universe, God is or becomes temporal.

For Craig, “the reality of tense” is what gives “oomph” to the thought that once God creates, something really new is on the scene, and so God must bear a new relation. Craig’s version of “the reality of tense” is presentism. Thus Craig thinks (1)–(4) show that presentism and atemporality are incompatible. I think a non-presentist could endorse (1)–(3). Suppose that past, present and future alike exist. Still we seem to have (1). Whatever creates a temporal universe has at that instant a relation it did not have earlier, and that is as much reason to call the relation new as we have on presentism. And it *comes into* that relation, i.e., it stands in it due to an event. (2) and (3) too are no worse off if past, present and future are equally real. So if past, present and future are equally real, we still have (1)–(3), as far as I can see, unless there just are no such things as events if this view is true. But standard accounts of events seem compatible with that. Still, if presentism implies (1), then (1)–(4), if sound, still shows a conflict between presentism and atemporality.

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14Craig, *God, Time and Eternity*, 60.
15Craig, *Time and Eternity*, 87.
17Craig, “In Defense of Presentism,” 391. Craig states presentism as “the only temporal items that exist are those that exist presently” (391). This is meant to state temporal presentism, I think. It is however a tautology.
18Craig might be happy with this: if I’m right, the argument, if sound, would show that DA is compatible with the existence of time no matter what parts of it are real.
19For instance, Kim defines an event as a thing having a property at a time. Thus no worries arise here. (See Kim, “Events as Property-Exemplifications,” 159—177.)
Let us ask why we are supposed to believe (1). Craig sees a timeless God's relation to creation as new because he thinks that He in some sense first exists "sans creation." No clear-eyed atemporalist would accept this. An atemporal God does not come to have new relations. (We see just why below.) He just timelessly has any relation He ever has. If so, none of God's life is sans creation. There is just the one atemporal point in His life. At that point, He creates, and so Creation is there. What is new for Creation is not new for Him. Craig, however, thinks that what is new for Creation must be new for Him: this is why he thinks that He must "first" have been sans creation. If it's new in time, it's new for God; lurking in the background is Time's Way.

Padgett's "ZTR" Argument

Let us now take up another argument. Alan Padgett begins from a definition: events are Zero Time Related (ZTRed) iff no duration occurs between them. He then add the following premises:

5. If God is timeless, any divine sustaining is ZTRed with its effect, and
6. If presentism is true, for all t, an act done ZTRed to t is real only ZTRed to t.

(5) is true. If God is timeless, God's sustaining is not located in time. There is duration between only things located in time. So if God is timeless, there is no duration between His acts and anything else.

Now suppose temporal presentism and that \( t_1 \neq t_2 \), \( e_1 \) occurs only at \( t_1 \), \( e_2 \) occurs only at \( t_2 \), and God sustains \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \). Then as an instance of (5),

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20Craig, God, Time and Eternity, 60.

21I think that if God “starts out” atemporal, He must remain so. For suppose that Craig is right, and consider God's initial atemporal willing that temporal things exist. If God becomes temporal, either this never ceases to be there atemporally, or it ceases to be so and comes to have been past, or it ceases to be so and comes to be present. If the first, then even if God is now temporal, there is still an atemporal state of affairs, God willing this. If so, it is now true both that God is temporal and that He is not. If the second or third, the atemporal part of God's life is over. But how could something be both atemporal and over? Being over seems a paradigmatically temporal state of affairs; anything that's over is not atemporal but in the past. If it's not over, the atemporal part of God's life is not over and yet He has a temporal life: He's living an atemporal and a temporal life “at once.” But if it is over, then if the second, the first instant of time (which is what God's willing causes) had a past. If the second or third, what is atemporally the case has altered; the atemporal realm has suffered a deletion. This seems impossible to me; I think that what is atemporally the case is immutably the case. Think of Plato's heaven of Forms: could a Form just vanish from there, to reappear on earth? Again, a number of theories of events (e.g., Kim's) make an event's date a constituent of it, essential to its identity—different time, different event. This is a plausible move. But on the second and third alternatives, the same event includes first one date (the null one) “and then” another, the first instant. God's willing that time exist both was and wasn't at the first instant, without enduring from one instant to another. There are just these three alternatives, and it seems to me that an impossibility crops up no matter which we pick.

22Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 21.
7. If God is timeless, God's sustaining e₁ is ZTRed to t₁ and God's sustaining e₂ is ZTRed to t₂.

Further, from (6),

8. If presentism is true, if God's sustaining e₁ is ZTRed to t₁, it is not real ZTRed to t₂, and if God's sustaining e₂ is ZTRed to t₂, it is not real ZTRed to t₁.

As Padgett puts it later,

Even a timeless God must await the present moment to act on really existing (present) things . . . God can be . . . timeless . . . and still have to wait for a temporal world to pass by.²³

He adds that if

God sustains E at . . . t₂ (then) if it is not t₂, then God is not . . . putting forth this specific power . . . For if he did . . . E would . . . exist . . . God, therefore, must wait until . . . t₁ to act . . . God's sustaining power must change between (earlier) and t₂. . . . E would not come into existence at t₂.²⁴

If God has a different effect at the two times, Padgett thinks, there must be different exertions of His power at those times. (7) and (8), Padgett thinks, imply that

9. If presentism is true, God really changes from t₁ to t₂ (from sustaining e₁ to sustaining e₂).

10. If God is timeless, God does not really change. So,

11. If presentism is true and God is timeless, God does and does not really change.²⁵ So,

12. Presentism and DA are incompatible.

Note the basic thought of Padgett’s argument: if we in time must wait, God must wait. If a temporal act ZTRed to t is real only ZTRed to t, the same must be true for an atemporal act ZTRed to t. If it is that way for things in time, it is that way for God. Again we meet Time’s Way. And again, Time’s Way is not dialectically neutral. If I wait for something and then it arrives, my life has an earlier part in which I wait and a later one in which I do not. If my life has temporal parts, I am temporal. Thus a timeless being cannot wait. To assume that God must wait is to assume that He is in time. Now universal presentism implies Time’s Way: on universal presentism, there are only things in time, and so there is no room for things to be any other way than the way they are for things in time. But temporal presentism leaves room for the atemporal. So on temporal presentism, 

²³Padgett, “Eternity as Relative Timelessness,” 97. The equation of “really existing” and “present” reveals Padgett’s presentism; see also 96.
²⁴Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 74–75.
²⁵Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 72–73.
there is at least room to ask why we should think that temporal things are for an atemporal God the way they are for things in time. First, though, a last argument for incompatibility.

_DeWeese’s “Function” Argument_

For Boethius, a timeless God somehow has all of time there to see “at once.” To Anselm, this implies the following:

Eternity has its own simultaneity, in which exist all things that occur at the same time . . . and . . . at different times.26

Plausibly, on Anselm’s account,

13. If God is timeless, the series of temporal events exists in eternity in an atemporal analogue A of the temporal order.

With this in mind, DeWeese argues as follows:

14. A function F pairs temporal events with positions in A.

One might expect this, since those very events make up A. Now plausibly

15. No function pairs nonexistent with existent items.

After all, one might think, something can be paired with something only if it is there to be paired. But then

16. If the future does not exist, F does not pair future events with A. So

17. If the future does not exist, A does not contain future events.27 So

18. If the future does not exist, either A grows or A is incomplete.

19. A cannot grow, as A is atemporal and what is atemporal cannot change. Further,

20. A cannot be incomplete.

For A is what God “sees”: if A is incomplete, God is not omniscient. So

21. All future events exist. So

22. If God is timeless, time is not presentist.28

DeWeese takes it that what constitutes A are times’ events themselves, existing in eternity. (For now, pretend that you understand this.) So what puzzles him can be put more simply: how can A be timelessly complete if there is now no future to complete it? The question insists that there is just one way things really are, the way they are now for things in time, and so

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26 Anselm, _de Concordia_ I, 5.

27 DeWeese moves from (18) to (19) because he treats the function as somehow generating points in A given events in T (DeWeese, _God and the Nature of Time_, 182).

28 DeWeese, _God and the Nature of Time_, 181, 183. DeWeese’s actual conclusion is that if God is timeless, no tensed theory of time is true.
eternity can’t contain more than what is currently in time. If it is that way for things in time, it is that way for God in eternity: again we meet *Time’s Way*.

**Why Time’s Way?**

These are all the arguments I know for the incompatibility of presentism and DA. I show elsewhere that all but the first are unsound regardless of what we make of *Time’s Way*, but here, what is relevant is that all involve *Time’s Way*, and in the first, only *Time’s Way* seems possibly contentious. So I suggest that *Time’s Way* is really the nerve of the case for the incompatibility. Those who give these arguments mean them to tell against DA. So again, we should take them to be discussing temporal presentism, and again, on temporalism, it’s at least worth asking why we should believe *Time’s Way*. There are seven obvious answers.

A. *Time’s Way* is the simplest assumption, and so is our default.

I grant this. But any number of things can be sufficient reason to abandon the simplest, default position on any philosophical issue. If this were all one could say for *Time’s Way*, then even one good argument for DA would be enough to justify abandoning it. I think there are more than one.

B. There is just one ultimate way things are. How could there be two? The way things are for things in time is at least a way things are. So if there is just one way things are, it is the only way things are.

I reply that perhaps the one ultimate way things are is that there are two ways things are, a way they are for things in time and a way they are for something atemporal. There has to be a single true story about how things are. But there could be more than one way to tell that story, or it might consist irreducibly in two partial stories. A novel told from two viewpoints, with no omniscient narrator tying them together, is all the same one novel, telling one story.

C. If we add an atemporal story to the temporal one, but do not assume *Time’s Way*—letting things be different for an atemporal God than for things in time—the result is inconsistent. For then if God is timeless, future things that are not there in time are there for Him to see. So if God is timeless, future entities both exist and do not exist.

I reply that contradiction seems to threaten only because we ignore tense. If God is atemporal, future entities do not both exist and not exist. “They do not exist” uses the ordinary present tense. “They exist” does not use this, because it states how things are in what Anselm calls the simultaneity of eternity and what Augustine, Boethius and Anselm call the eternal present. So “they exist” has either no tense or a tense that expresses the eternal present.

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29See Leftow, *Anselm’s God*.

D. Even if adding the atemporal story does not generate a contradiction, it generates obvious falsehoods. William Hasker, for instance, asks: if future events exist in eternity, as Anselm says, aren’t they atemporal, just like God?\textsuperscript{31} The answer is no. Future events will occur. Nothing atemporal will occur.

E. Hasker tries again with this: If temporal events are all eternally there for God to see, “The existence of my chalk-stub is as enduring as that of the Andromeda Galaxy. Boethius’s ‘moving and transitory moment’ (is) as eternal as . . . God Himself. The . . . contrast between temporal beings and the Eternal Being has been undercut.”\textsuperscript{32}

This is good rhetoric, but its underlying thought is questionable. Let us ask why temporal events are supposed to be there in the simultaneity of eternity and what that really means. If God is not in time, His life has no proper temporal parts. Nor is anything before it. What has something before it \textit{ipso facto} is in time. So nothing is ever over in His life. For if it was over in His life, either it would lie in a past part of His life, or it would be before His life. Again, if God is not in time, nothing is after any part of His life. So He never has a future. So nothing has not yet started in His life. If it had not yet started, it would lie in His future, and He has none. Now God sustains and “sees” all temporal events. That provides a rather thick sense in which they are all “in” His life. So for a timeless God, everything is in the same simple bit of His life: everything in His own life and everything in history. In His life, nothing is ever yet to come or over. This is how things are, objectively, in relation to Him. It is not a matter of how things appear to Him. We live through some events before we live through others. God does not live through any event before He lives through others. If He did, His life would have earlier and later parts.

For events to be in the simultaneity of eternity is for them to be “in” the same simple bit of God’s life. The order (or lack of order) in which God lives through them has no implication for these events’ ordering or duration in other lives. Rather, if God is atemporal, the order of episodes of His life comes apart from the ordering of events in temporal lives. Temporal events are in temporal lives ordered as earlier and later, but they are in His life too, and as events in His life they are not ordered as earlier and later, for He lives no part of His life before He lives any other. One can tell consistent time-travel stories that order temporal events differently in different lives.\textsuperscript{33} Suppose you hear me give a paper, realize you’ve missed something important, and so leave the room, time-travel back to its start,

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\textsuperscript{32}Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless God,” 197.

\textsuperscript{33}Some might say that time-travel is inconsistent with presentism, and so time-travel stories cannot show that anything is compatible with presentism. I cannot discuss this here, but see, e.g., Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel,” 333–345; Monton, “Presentists Can Believe,” 199–202; Rea, \textit{Metaphysics}, 78–87.
enter the room, and hear it again. Then two episodes of your life coincide with one episode of mine. I live through two episodes of your life at once, while you do not, along your own timeline. Episodes of your life are ordered differently in my life than they are along your own timeline—but this does not affect their order or length in your life. Nor does it affect how long my paper lasts. If you were immortal and spent the rest of your life in a series of hearings of my paper, always leaving the room just as I start my last paragraph, my paper would never be over for you. But that would not imply that in itself, my paper was never over. The way my paper was for you would be due strictly to how episodes of your life are arranged, and that would not alter my paper’s length.

If God is atemporal, all of time is “in” the single, temporally simple episode of His life. This is due to the way His life is—to its lack of parts to order, its being “outside” time, and to the events in Himself which place all temporal events “in” it. It has no more implication for the order or duration of events in other lives than facts about a time-traveler would. It is as if God time-traveled to every instant at the same instant in His life: nothing is ever over to Him, but that does not imply that nothing is ever over. What arrives later in time does not arrive later in God’s life than what arrives earlier in time; it is “in” the same part of God’s life. If God’s life is simple and outside time, it does not pass away or extend into later parts. So as the present arrives, it is “with” God’s whole life, and as the future later arrives, it too is “with” all of God’s life. So what is real differs depending on whose life is in question. In temporal lives, the future does not exist. In a simple life “there” with all of time, it does. This no more implies that events are not short than my time-travel story implies that my paper is not short. That nothing is ever over for a timeless God is due only to the way His life is. It does not imply that nothing is ever over simpliciter, let alone that my chalk-stub lasts as long as Andromeda. All it means to say that temporal events “exist in the simultaneity of eternity” is that (a) they occur in God’s life, (b) as that life is outside the ordinary temporal order, as a time-traveler’s would be, they are ordered differently in that life than in others, and (c) as that life is simple, they are not ordered as earlier and later in it.

F. Add an atemporal to a temporal story, and human freedom is in jeopardy. How can we have alternate possibilities of action, Hasker asks, when “in . . . eternity, nothing can be changed . . . There is no . . . possibility that I will act differently. . . . Divine timelessness can be reconciled with libertarian freedom only if . . . there are future actions of my own which timelessly exist in eternity (and) it is in my power, now, to bring it about that those actions do not exist in eternity. Does anyone seriously believe that?”

34Along the public timeline, you do: earlier you and later you are both listening at (say) 3 p.m.
I reply that my eating breakfast tomorrow is in God’s life because tomorrow, I freely choose to eat. It is there because I put it there; I determine to what He (as it were) time-travels. If when I do the action I can do otherwise, my freedom then also is in His life. (Anselm is explicit on this.)\(^{36}\) Being in God’s life entails not that I can’t do otherwise, but only that I won’t. Again, it was true yesterday that my eating tomorrow is timelessly “in” God’s life, but as long as the explanation runs from the action to the truth yesterday, there is no real issue here, unless logical fatalism is a much stronger position than we generally think.

G. The last somewhat-obvious answer is this: we believe *Time’s Way* because there is no coherent, plausible picture of how things could be otherwise.

Well, I think there may be one. I now sketch it.

*Discrete Times*

I start from a definition:

there are two discrete Times =df. there are two series of events S and S*, every event in S bears some temporal relation to some event in S, every event in S* bears some temporal relation to some event in S*, and no event in S bears any temporal relation to any event in S*.

S and S* are discrete times, no event in one is earlier than or at the same time as any event in the other. I suggest that possibly

DT: There are two discrete Times.

For there is no contradiction in this, and an abstract “diagram” of there being two series has the sheen of plausibility about it that provokes an intuition of possibility. Further, some inflationary cosmologies let baby universes “pinch off” from a parent spacetime, and so be (become?) temporally discrete from it.\(^{37}\) Such cosmologies are offered as physical explanations. So the evidence they explain confirms them. Evidence for them, then, is stronger evidence than conceivability or intuition that DT is possible. Finally, we could have still further reason to believe DT: for we could have reason to believe that God had revealed DT to us. This would not suppose thinking Him atemporal, either. If He were temporal and sited in our time, He might know DT by knowing about the “pinching off” and understanding its consequences.

\(^{36}\)Anselm, *De Concordia* I, 5.

\(^{37}\)My thanks here to Pedro Ferreira. These stories must involve more dimensions than our usual four, if in them bits of space-time change status. To make this clear, I now subscript certain words “5,” to indicate reference to events, processes, relations, etc. that involve a further dimension. Say, then, that spacetime 2 first is, part of spacetime 1 and then, pinches, off. Then first, the “first” time-slice of 2 was (say) after, the last of 1. But once, 2 pinches, off from 1, it is, not. 2 ceases, to have, a past., though it continues, to have, a past, in which it has, a past. If we call dimension 5 hypertime, we can say that 2 hyper-ceases to have a past, though it hyper-continues to hyper-have a hyper-past in which it has a past.
I think DT is compatible with both forms of presentism. First, universal. UP2 requires only that each time have a certain associated class. It says nothing about the ordering or grouping of those times. So UP2 is perfectly compatible with DT. UP1 says nothing about how many Times existence plays the presentness-role in: it does not require that there be only one. And having two Times is not having “two presents at once.” Presentness can be had at different times related as earlier and later, so why not equally at different times not related as earlier and later? There would not then be a single all-encompassing present-tensed quantifier, but it is not part of presentism as defined above that there be one. So to create a problem for DT, one will have to argue that this is needed or perhaps that there is no coherent alternative: neither is just slam-dunk obvious.

Still, it’s illicit to assume universal presentism in this context. For we’re debating DA, and in that debate, universalism just does beg the question. So again, our concern is temporal presentism. This seems compatible with DT much as universal did: TP2 too places no constraints on how times are ordered, and TP1 lets existence play that role in more than one Time. Further, on temporal presentism, an all-encompassing present-tensed quantifier would be a bit of a tough sell. For temporal presentism is intentionally silent on whether there might be things outside time, and such a quantifier would break the silence. As to a temporally all-encompassing present-tensed quantifier, it would take arguing to show that temporal presentism requires it. I submit, then, that temporal presentism and DT are compatible.

If DT were true and our Time were temporal-presentist, the other Time would be too. TP1 and TP2 straightforwardly entail this, and it is plausible independently. For temporal presentism articulates the nature of time, not just of our Time. If there could be non-presentist time despite the arguments for temporal presentism, it becomes an uncomfortable question just why the arguments would not look equally good in a world indiscernible from ours save for not being presentist. Thus given DT and temporal presentism, each Time has its own absolute present. If there were one absolute present spanning the Times, they would not be discrete.

Suppose then that there are two Times. Let us consider the status in Time 1 of what is present in Time 2. It is false that it exists, or existed, or will exist. But in Time 2, it exists. So in Time 1, it is now true that it exists, but now is not a time at which it exists, a time simultaneous with that—else the Times are not after all discrete. Let’s use EXISTS to abbreviate things like this: EXISTING in a time-series is existing, but not in that series. Looking at reality as a whole, then, there are two partial stories to tell, one in 1-tenses in which what is present in 2 EXISTS but never exists, and one in 2-tenses in which what is present in 1 EXISTS but never exists.

The stories fit together consistently and together leave nothing out.

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The truth of <it exists> is simultaneous with now, but I show below that this does not imply what it may seem to.
From Discrete Times to Eternity

Next step: add that 1 is not only one instant thick, but one instant long—
that all there ever was or will be to 1 is one instant. Then 1’s present can’t
pass away. For if it passed away, it would be past. But if it is past, there
must be a time at which it is past. For if it is never true—i.e., true at no
time—that it is past, it just never is past. The time cannot be 1’s single
instant. For if it passed away, it would not be there to be past, and with no
other instant in 1, there would be no 1-time at which it was past. And if it
did not pass away, it would be present, not past.

Nor can the time be some proper part of 2. For suppose that 1’s instant
is past at some proper part of 2. The proper part either does or does not
include all of 2 before some point. If it does not, then before that proper
part, 1’s present was not past. So there is a time in 2 when 1’s instant be-
comes past. So its becoming past is simultaneous with a 2-time, violating
the series’ discreteness. If the proper part does include all of 2 before
some point, then that part either does or does not have a first instant. If
1’s instant is past at 2’s first instant, 2 is after 1’s instant is present. If 2 has
no first instant, but still 1’s instant is past before all of its earlier part, 1’s
instant is past at all of 2, and so 2 as a whole is after 1. Being past at the
whole series violates the series’ discreteness: there is then a 2-time, namely
the sum of all 2-times, at which 1 is past. Nor can the time be 2 as a whole.
For one thing, this seems again to place 1 straightforwardly before 2. If this
somehow does not follow, then, if 1’s instant is past at 2 as a whole, it is
equally present at 2 as a whole—there is no more reason to say the former
than to say the latter. But nothing is past and present at the same time.39

Thus if 1 is just an instant long, that instant and what it contains cannot
pass away, because there is no later time for these to be past at. This gives
us Boethius’s and Anselm’s picture: two presents, 1’s “unmoving” and so
eternal, 2’s “flowing” and so temporal. If you don’t think there can be instants
without periods they bound, think of 1 as an extended temporal simple.40
So understood, the Boethius-Anselm picture is at least coherent: presentism
is coherent and there is no hidden contradiction in the theses that an inde-
pendent point or an extended simple exists. Further, the Boethius-Anselm
picture satisfies TP1 and TP2, because DT does, and shortening one series
has no effect on that. There is not even an appearance of incompatibility
with TP1. As to TP2, every time in 2 has its own class of what is temporally
real, and no such class includes the wholly past or wholly future. That all
2-times are “in” God’s life doesn’t seem to affect that, and if God’s life is not
a time, it need not satisfy TP2. Further, if we do require it to satisfy TP2, it
does, trivially, for in God’s life nothing is past or future.

39 In a nutshell, what is present passes away only if there is a later time at which it is past.
This implies that “flowing” time cannot have a last instant. I accept this; I don’t see it as a
cost.

40 For Boethius as an early friend of extended simples, see my Time and Eternity, 112–146.
Anselm may favor a point model: see his de Incarnatione Verbi, 15.
A Compatibility Claim

The case that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible rests on Time’s Way. I’ve argued that six obvious ways to justify Time’s Way fail. The last claims that there is no coherent, plausible picture of how things would be without Time’s Way. I submit that as modelled via DT, the Boethian picture is coherent. Further, it is at least somewhat plausible: there is decent support that possibly DT and both independent instants and extended simples are within the range of acceptable philosophical hypotheses. So I submit that we do not actually have reason to accept Time’s Way. If so, then on the claim that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible, we should return at best a Scots verdict: case not proven. But if the picture is at least coherent, that is some reason to think it is possible, as are the last paragraph’s compatibility arguments. If it is possible, temporal presentism and DA are compatible.

Back to Omniscience/Immutability

I now apply DT against Time’s Way and the argument from omniscience. Suppose, then, that there are two presentist Times, 1 and 2. Consider an object O present in 1. As we’ve seen, it is true in 2 that O EXISTS. But this cannot begin or cease to be the case in 2. For suppose that O ceased to EXIST in 2. This could only be because it had ceased to exist; if it did exist, it would still EXIST in 2. Next, ask why it would cease to EXIST in 2 when it did. There are just two options. On one, O ceases to EXIST in 2 because and so when it ceases to exist, in 1. If so, then a time in 2 is when in 2 O ceases to exist; this has a date in 2. What has a date occurs simultaneous with that date. And if a 1-event is simultaneous with a date in 2, 1 is not discrete from 2. So if 1 is discrete from 2, what I have described never happens. This drives us to the other option, namely, that when O ceases to exist, does not explain when O ceases to EXIST in 2. But then there is no reason it would cease to EXIST in 2 at one time rather than another. How could it just happen to happen when it does, rather than having this determined by what happens in 1?

One alternative is not compatible with DT. The other leaves a surd mystery. I submit, then, that if in 2 O EXISTS, in 2 O never begins or ceases to EXIST. Now if items in 1 did not EXIST in 2 when past, or future, they would begin or cease to EXIST in 2. So in 2, all items at all times in 1 always EXIST, no matter when in 1 they exist.\footnote{But in 1, past or future items never EXIST. For O EXISTS in 1 only if O exists, but not in 1. So 1 still never has past or future parts. Nor does 2 have past or future parts relative to 1: for while 2’s past and future EXIST relative to 1, they are not past, or future, relative to 1, and in neither 1 nor 2 do they exist.} Equally, all 1-times always EXIST in 2. So a 1-time at which O is present, and one at which O is future, always EXIST in 2. In 2, O cannot begin or cease to be past or present or future. 1-times at which it is all three equally EXIST from the standpoint of 2. So at all 2-times, O’s existence has either all 1-tenses or none.
Suppose that it has all 1-tenses. Then while in 1, that $O$ is, wholly future, entails that $O$ is not present, in 2, it does not entail this. Yet that $O$ is, wholly future, cannot both entail and not entail that $O$ is, not present. Now “$O$” refers to $O$ no matter in which Time the sentences are tokened. So on this alternative, one of the predicates must express different properties in the two Times. Being wholly future and being present are incompatible. So either “is, wholly future,” tokened in 2, does not express being future, or “is, present,” tokened in 2, does not express being present. But there is no reason for only one tense not to work in 2. If any don’t work, none do. So 1-tensed properties can’t be expressed in 2. In 2, 1-tensed language expresses only tenseless facts. Moreover, if in 2, being wholly future is compatible with being present, these two things are compatible, pure and simple: being wholly future just does not entail not being present. But of course, it does entail this. So they are not compatible in 2, and so $O$’s existence cannot have all 1-tenses in 2. But it cannot have only some, and it has no 2-tense either, because it is not located in 2. So if we start out assuming that $O$’s existence has all 1-tenses in 2, we end up concluding not just that 1-tensed facts can’t be expressed in 2, but that $O$’s existence is tenseless in 2.

This is what follows if we suppose that at all 2-times, $O$’s existence has all 1-tenses. Suppose on the other hand that at all 2-times, $O$’s existence has no 1-tense. Then in 2, $O$’s existence is tenseless, since it cannot have 2-tenses. So whether we say that in 2 $O$’s existence has all 1-tenses or that it has none, it turns out that in 2, $O$’s existence is tenseless. In 2, there just are no 1-tensed facts. And this is as it should be: if $O$’s being present were 1-tensed in 2, 2-events would be simultaneous with $O$’s being present, and so 1 and 2 would not be discrete.

Again, in 2, all 1-times have the same ontological status: they EXIST. But if a Time is metaphysically tensed, not all its times have the same ontological status. So in 2, 1 just is not metaphysically tensed. The metaphysical differences in 1 which 1’s tenses mark within 1 are not there in 2. Thus if there were two presentist Times, the metaphysically significant tense of each would be strictly internal to itself. It would be real within the Time, but not from without. Further, if there can be two Times, tense is in fact real only internally, even if there is no second Time. For adding
something outside a Time to one’s ontology does not change the nature of
time. It can only reveal the nature time had all along. Now *Time’s Way*
implies that a Time is metaphysically tensed externally as well as internally.
So if possibly DT, *Time’s Way* is false.

All this yields a response to the omniscience argument. That argument
supposes that it is (say) now noon both in time and for God, outside time.
But if possibly DT, such metaphysically-tensed facts are facts only within
Times. From an external standpoint, there are none: it is not now noon or
any other time. For it is now noon, for a presentist, only if only the noon
bit of time is real. From outside time, all of time EXISTS, that is the only
fact about its ontological status, and so from outside time, it is not noon.
So a timeless God can be omniscient even if it is now noon and He does
not know this. For at His standpoint, it is not now noon, and one cannot
expect God to know what is not true at His standpoint.

*A Thesis From Aquinas*

Aquinas famously or notoriously held that while creatures are “really
related” to God, God is not “really related” to creatures.\(^3\) For Aquinas,
God simply does not have real relational properties *ad extra*.\(^4\) I do not

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3: on presentism, a Time isn’t even many times. Only its present exists. So on presentism,
being Time-relative just is being relative to a time. Objection 4: in a one-instant Time, the
distinction disappears altogether.

I reply as follows. *Ad 1:* we needn’t take subscripting with “1” as a way of dating, of saying
“in Time 1.” “Is present,” might better express, e.g., being an event flow through which is
now generating Time 1. The present is not relative to the series; rather, the series is relative
to the present. To me, at least, this does not sound like a dated property, though “Time 1” is
a date-term. Mere inclusion of a date-term is not enough to make a phrase express a dated
property: consider “is thinking about Time 1.” *Ad 2:* on the approach just sketched, the present
is not relative to the times. Rather, the times are relative to the present, and so the present
is in the relevant sense absolute. *Ad 3:* from an external standpoint, even a presentist Time
contains many times. Its past and future are real from that standpoint. *Ad 4:* I have argued
that something one instant long wouldn’t be a Time. But suppose it would. Still, arguably
two properties (being present, being present, at t in 1) can be distinct even if necessarily co-
instantiated. Further, they *are* necessarily co-instantiated only if one-instant 1 could not have
lasted longer: only if Times essentially have just one length. That is at the least not obvious.

\(^4\) Though the Trinity involves relational properties in some other way. I note below that
relational properties are one thing, relations another. It is one thing for Isaac to have the
property of being Abraham’s son and Abraham to have the property of being Isaac’s father,
and another for there to be a father-son relation which links them, which (so to speak) has a
hook in both. Like all medieval Aristotelians, if Thomas *had* the idea of a relation as distinct
from sets of relational properties, he took it that all the facts could be accounted for strictly
in terms of relational properties—Aristotelian accidents of individual substances. So while
he denies real divine relational properties *ad extra*, he never expresses a view on whether
real relations can link God and creature. Relational properties would be accidents, and so
Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity rules them out (see, e.g., *Summa Theologiae* Ia 3, 6). But
since Aristotle spoke only of relational properties, not relations, there would be no strictly
textual case for classing relations as Aristotelian accidents. And our current conception of re-
lations as between rather than in their relata does not make them metaphysical constituents.
It supposes instead that the relata are complete in themselves, there to be related, logically
before the relations come to (as it were) externally link them. So it is not clear that a concern
for divine simplicity would preclude recognizing real relations between God and creature as
distinct from real relational properties in God.
wish to defend this claim. As far as my present argument goes, it is fine if God atemporally has a real relational property of being my Creator, for instance. It is also fine for present purposes that there be causal relations between God and creation, e.g., a relation which is God’s causing it to exist and a relation which is its existence causing God to know in some quasi-perceptual manner that it exists—though like any atemporalist, I must insist that if the causal relation has an analysis, it does not invoke temporal priority. In the same way, it is fine that there be relations between discrete Times, as long as they are neither temporal relations, nor relations whose analysis includes those, nor relations about which there are substantive metaphysical truths that place temporal relations between their relata. But I want to defend part of Aquinas’s claim, and explain why a strict Thomist might find the rest plausible. The defense I want to make is this: in light of what I’ve said, I submit, change in relations between God and Creation need not entail that God is temporal, for it need not entail that God changes. If God has real relations \textit{ad extra}, He does not begin or cease to have them.

Suppose that there are two Times. Yesterday I in 1 did not know about 2. Today I learn about it. So it becomes true that I know about 2. That I know about 2 entails that 2 is known about by me. Because this follows, the change in me is enough to make both things true. There need not also be a change in 2, in which 2 acquires a property, being known about by me. I think there is in fact no such change. If there were, it would occur at some 2-time. But if it occurred at any one 2-time, plausibly that time would be simultaneous with my learning about 2: it would be when in 2 it became true that the change in 1 occurred, and that seems sufficient for the two to be simultaneous. But if a 1-change and a 2-change are simultaneous, there are not after all two Times.

Further, if the Times are discrete, no candidate for the title “2-time when the 1-change occurred” is any better than any other. There would be no reason for one 2-time rather than another to be when the change occurred, because before I learned about 2, all 2-times had the same temporal relation to all 1-times: that is, no relation at all. So it seems more plausible that 2 at either all or no 2-times have the relational property of being known about by me. Whichever is true, 2 never acquires that property, even though I acquire the property of knowing about 2.

If it sounds bizarre to say that it was true before I was born that 2 IS known about by me, the right way to fill out the story is that 2 never has this relational property, though at a certain time in 1, it becomes true that 2 is known about by me. Aquinas held that even if I at birth acquire the relational property of being God’s creature, an atemporal God does not

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45My own view is that it has no analysis, but is just a primitive relation of production. If that is correct, then such theses as that necessarily, a cause occurs earlier than its effect cannot claim to be arrived at by analyzing the concept of causation. They are at best substantive metaphysical truths arrived at by substantive argument. I do not think there are good arguments for such claims, but I cannot pursue the matter here.
then or ever acquire or have the relational property of being my Creator.\textsuperscript{46} One can argue this just as in the case of 2's being known by me. Aquinas had broader systematic reasons to deny the real relational property, specifically a doctrine of divine simplicity which required this. Those without such commitments are free not to make that move.

Now relational properties are one thing, relations another. Suppose one can’t reduce facts about relations to facts about relational properties, and consider the \textit{relation} that obtains between 1 and 2 when I learn about 2. The relation obtains if and only if (so to speak) it has feet in both Times. So if there were a 2-time and a 1-time when it began to obtain, the 2-time would be when in 2 it began to obtain in 1. The 2- and 1-times would be simultaneous. So the relation cannot begin to obtain if the Times are discrete.\textsuperscript{47} One might reply here that the Times \textit{were} discrete, but my learning about 2 ended that. This is however massively implausible. Suppose that a baby universe pinches off from our spacetime and a physicist learns about that. The physicist’s thoughts cannot reconnect the spacetimes. My own thoughts are no more powerful. So if Times are ever discrete, learning about this can’t change it. And so again, the relation cannot begin to obtain. But before I was born, there cannot have been a relation between me and 2. If there was not, and there cannot come to be one, then in this sort of case, there cannot be relations, though there can be relational propositions made true by things’ relational properties. Again, this does not rule out atemporal causal relations between God and a Time. If a relation is atemporal, it cannot begin or cease to obtain; beginning or ceasing would imply that it is temporal.

\textit{Quantification}

On temporal presentism, 1’s most inclusive temporal domain of quantification always contains just items then present in 1. But if DT, in 1, everything in 2 EXISTS. So if DT, in 1, there are truths about items not in the most inclusive temporal domain. For temporal presentists, this is just business as usual. As noted earlier, most of them have allowed some atemporal reality. Further, temporal presentists know that Caesar is dead, this truth is about Caesar, and he is not in the presentist’s most inclusive temporal domain. Presentists need to make sense of this without letting Caesar creep back via the meta-language, and to provide adequate semantics and truthmakers for past truth generally. But I need not do so here. If presentists can’t allow that “Caesar is dead” is about Caesar, that is a large problem for presentism. It is surely less problem for presentism to have truths about items not in the most inclusive temporal domain than not to have truths about Caesar. If presentists let “Caesar is dead” be about Caesar, it is no problem that on DT, there are truths about items not in the most inclusive temporal domain.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Summa Theologiae} Ia 13, 7.

\textsuperscript{47}For like reasons, such relations can’t cease to obtain.
On temporal presentism, 1’s most inclusive domain *simpliciter* includes what EXISTS, not just what exists. If God is timeless, God EXISTS. So on temporal presentism, our *simpliciter* most inclusive domain includes a timeless God, if there is one. On temporal presentism, this is fine, or so I’ve argued. But while our most inclusive domain includes items that EXIST, if there be such, it does not include Caesar. For Caesar does not EXIST. This might seem *ad hoc*, or a trick of my definitions. If God is atemporal, it is now true that timelessly, God sees Caesar. If God is in the domain, why not things which are there for Him to see? Well, being seen does not entail existing: the finite speed of light provides counter-examples. If it does not entail existing, it does not entail existing for someone other than the one doing the seeing. Further, Putnam’s argument from special relativity to the equal reality of past, present and future teaches presentists that “existing for” is not transitive. If a rocket travelling very fast passes just over someone at rest relative to the earth, on STR, some things in one’s future are present for the other. So if we conjoin presentism with STR—there are ways to do so—January 1, 2302 (say) exists for someone in the rocket, and the rocket exists for the person at rest, but 2302 does not exist for the person at rest. The transitivity of “exists for” is the only reason to think things real for a timeless God have to be in 1’s most inclusive domain, and presentists can’t endorse that transitivity for reasons quite independent of DA and DT.

If temporal presentism and DA hold, what is in the most inclusive domain of quantification depends on location: for God it includes objects in our future, for us it does not, even as for those in 1, future 2 objects EXIST, but in 2 they do not EXIST. For presentism, this is nothing *outré*. Any presentist who believes that objects come or cease to be accepts that what is in the most inclusive domain depends on one’s temporal location. For standard presentisms, there are, were and will be as many equally ultimate ways things are as there are, were and will be present times. If we add DA, there are, were, will be and ARE (this last for God’s atemporal location) as many equally ultimate ways things are as there are, were, will be and ARE present times or atemporal locations. On neither standard presentisms nor presentism plus DA are there differing most inclusive domains or ultimate ways things are at once.

*Morals*

An atemporal God would relate to our Time as a second Time would. So if DT is compatible with temporal presentism, so is DA. For an atemporal God, then, our Time exists without tense, as it would for a second Time. Yet it is internally presentist. It’s just that its tense is not real externally, i.e., from God’s standpoint. One might wonder whether DT yields neither presentism nor eternalism, but a sort of *tertium quid*, in which presentism

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about 1 is right in 1 and eternalism about 1 is right in 2. I think not; if I’ve defined presentism properly, then if presentism is the truth about 2, those in 2 should think 1 is presentist too. It’s just that from 2, 1 has to look eternalist.

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50 A talk with Christopher Hughes suggested this question.

51 Earlier versions of this were read at Cambridge, the Ecole Normale Superieure, the University of Munich, Kings College London, and Oxford. My thanks to those audiences for their questions and comments, and particularly to Christopher Hughes.


https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230376519


