Mark C. Baker and Stewart Goetz, eds., THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

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open-ended, even apophatic, discussions in the collection. A concluding remark by Stump is fitting here. “The appropriate conclusion to any argument for a methodology ought to be the employment of it” (263). I look forward to the work of analytic theology that is sure to be produced in the future. Whatever may constitute analytic theology, and how successful it can be, will be discovered only as the discipline is pursued.


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*The Soul Hypothesis* contains a set of state-of-the-art papers in philosophy of mind defending substance dualism. Although the book is an edited collection, unlike many such collections, it is tightly focused, and very well organized. The essays complement each other very well, and later essays refer to and build on points in earlier essays. Thus, in many ways the book contains something approaching a sustained argument.

It is not quite a sustained argument for a single view, however. Although all the authors are substance dualists of some kind, there are interesting differences in the kinds of dualism they defend. Indeed, one of the major theses of the book is that there are a range of positions that can usefully be described as substance dualism. One can usefully categorize dualisms by the degree to which they see the non-material soul as independent of the body and the degree to which they see the soul as differing from the body or other material objects. At one extreme, one might see Plato and (somewhat less extreme) Descartes, while at the other extreme one might place two of the authors in this volume: William Hasker, with his well-known “emergent dualism,” which holds that the mind is causally generated by the brain but nevertheless is a distinct entity, and Robin Collins, who holds a “dual-aspect” view of the soul, which attributes to it both physical and non-physical properties.

Along the way, various authors present many standard, well-recognized arguments for dualism (and critiques of materialism, which are often closely linked), such as the “unity of consciousness” argument and arguments from the irreducibility of qualia. However, one of the interesting features of this book is that several of the authors believe that empirical and even scientific data are relevant to the arguments about dualism. They try to show that dualism, contrary to the dismissive charges of materialists, is not only fully compatible with recent scientific work, but actually may be given support by scientific considerations. Along the way suggestions are made as to how dualism could be tested, and how it could generate a scientific research program.
Charles Taliaferro’s “The Soul of the Matter” kicks things off with an exposition and critique of “eliminative materialists” such as Paul Churchland, Stephen Stich, and Daniel Dennett (interpreted as holding to a view similar to Churchland’s). Taliaferro argues that our first-person consciousness is not simply a primitive theory, “folk-psychology,” destined to be replaced by a third-person scientific theory. The truth is that without first-person consciousness, no scientific theories can be developed or defended. (Many of the essays in the volume focus more on “reductive” and “non-reductive” forms of materialism; more attention to the kind of view Taliaferro criticizes would have been a plus.)

Daniel Robinson’s “Minds, Brains, and Brains in Vats” continues this kind of philosophical argument. Robinson, who is an expert in brain science, tries to show that recent brain research does not undermine dualism. To the contrary, the correlations between the brain and our mental life have to be established by taking seriously the claims we make about the latter. On Robinson’s view, much of the supposed empirical evidence for materialism is not really evidence against dualism at all, but is the consequence of reading a materialist theory back into the evidence.

Mark Baker, whose own field is linguistics, looks at the issue of dualism in relation to language-learning and linguistic competence in “Brains and Souls; Grammar and Speaking.” Baker makes the argument that computers are not sensitive to meaning, but only to form—an argument similar to one that John Searle has made famous. Baker goes on to suggest that if the brain does function in ways similar to those of a computer, it may be subject to similar limitations. Thus, on his view a dualist view of the self may generate some interesting predictions as to what aspects of language involve only the brain, and what aspects involve the soul (or perhaps the soul and the brain).

Stewart Goetz’s “Making Things Happen: Souls in Action” tries to show that only a dualistic view makes sense of our status as rational agents with the power to make free choices. The main thrust of Goetz’s argument is directed against the view that a “principle of causal closure” makes causation by a non-physical soul impossible. Dualism is entirely consistent with neuroscience. However, Goetz, unlike some of the other authors (but perhaps like Taliaferro), does not seem to think that any particular empirical considerations can establish the truth of dualism either.

Robin Collins, in “The Energy of the Soul,” provides a response to another standard anti-dualist argument, rooted in the claim that dualism would violate a well-established scientific principle, the principle of the “conservation of energy.” Collins argues that this objection presupposes an out-of-date understanding of contemporary physics, since general relativity theory implies that the total energy in some systems cannot be defined. Also, if we look at contemporary quantum physics, it is not hard to see how there might be causal interaction that does not require any exchange of energy.

Hans Halverson, in “The Measure of All Things: Quantum Mechanics and the Soul,” continues this look at the status of dualism in light of
contemporary physical theory. In a difficult essay (hard because the science is hard), Halverson explores some of the well-known paradoxes raised by quantum theory, including the “entanglement” of distinct particles and the “measurement problem,” which threatens to make observations impossible! Halverson explores various interpretations of quantum physics that might resolve these problems, and argues that a dualistic view actually might provide the best solution. Non-physical mental states cannot enter a state of “superposition” with physical states, but this entails that there is no “entanglement” and thus the “measurement problem” does not arise.

Dean Zimmerman, in “From Experience to Experiencer,” again tries to show that scientific considerations, far from threatening dualism, actually support dualism. He begins with an argument for property dualism, and then tries to show that the materialist who recognizes mental properties is stuck with extremely complex and implausible laws connecting these properties with the body. The main reason this is so is that such physical objects as brains and central nervous systems are necessarily vague. A dualistic view does not face the same problems since a non-physical mind can have a precise identity. Non-reductive materialists who accept emergent mental properties may thus be scientifically in a weaker position than dualists.

William Hasker, in “Souls Beastly and Human” gives a very clear summary and defense of the “emergent dualism” he defends at greater length in his book *The Emergent Self.* Hasker begins with the discovery of a type of polyp in the eighteenth century that can regenerate itself when cut in half. Assuming the polyp has some kind of mental life (which is perhaps dubious), this means that cutting the polyp in half also produces a new soul. What Hasker really does is try to show that his kind of dualism does justice both to the way the mind depends on the brain and the uniqueness of the mind.

Robin Collins returns in “A Scientific Case for the Soul,” to develop and defend the view that the postulation of the soul could be justified through a scientific research program. Drawing on “superstring theory” Collins presents a “dual aspect” view of the soul as having both physical and non-physical properties. I found this essay intriguing, but I confess that much of it, like a great deal of this book, put great demands on my own understanding of contemporary physics.

In a revealing and illuminating “Afterword” the editors discuss the relation between dualism and theism. They argue that the two are logically distinct; it is possible to be a theist and a materialist about humans and also possible to be an atheist who is a dualist. They do acknowledge, however, that theism and dualism make congenial partners and illustrate how this might be so. The authors voice a suspicion that the contemporary aversion to dualism is rooted more in an aversion to religion than to good arguments or facts, and I share this suspicion. It is striking to compare the understanding and subtlety with which these authors explore both materialism and dualism with the caricatures of dualism and unsophisticated
arguments against dualism found in the writings of many materialists. Let's hope that these essays provoke some genuine dialogue and responses on the part of materialists.

I end with some mildly critical observations. The book is almost completely focused on contemporary issues and arguments. There is almost no attention paid to the history of thought about these issues. Even Descartes's views are described in textbook fashion without much regard for historical complexity. There is no attention given to medieval treatments of the soul. This is not really a fair criticism; no book can do everything. However, I suspect that attention to the historical Descartes might reveal that Descartes was not, or not always, a “Cartesian.” In one key place Descartes argues that soul and body are separable, even if they are actually not separate and can only be separated by omnipotence.

I also would like to have seen some attention paid to the fundamental issue of what is required to treat two things as distinct entities. Views about such issues are assumed but not really discussed. I think it is not as clear as many assume what it means to say that I and my body are distinct entities. Most of the authors in this book seem to think of the soul as a postulated entity “in” the self. However, perhaps the soul just is the self, understood as a whole and not reducible to any physical object. I believe that Christians in particular need to think more about what it means to say that the self is embodied or incarnated. Perhaps it is true that I am essentially a soul, and that a soul is not a physical object. However, I may be the kind of soul whose nature it is to exist in a bodily form. If something like this is right, then it is misleading to think of the soul as a separate entity existing alongside the body. Rather I am a soul existing in a bodily manner.


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This is an interesting and wide-ranging collection of new essays by psychologists, social and biological scientists, philosophers and theologians on the currently much-debated issue of whether religious belief has an evolutionary origin and, if so, whether that calls into question its truth or rationality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is not a complete meeting of minds to be found in the volume, but at least the issue is discussed without the heat and acerbity that characterizes the semi-popular works of some of the more prominent public figures with well-known views on the topic. Some of the scientific contributors to the collection do tend to write in terms that will strike the ears of many philosophers and theologians as being unduly simplistic and reductive. But then, no doubt, to the ears