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Hugh J. McCann

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Anselmian Explorations, the difference being that—in comparison with Morris’s volume—the technical machinery utilized to assess various Anselmian claims is considerably enlarged and sophisticated. Almeida’s presentation is often couched in the symbolism of quantified modal logic, and interacts with an impressively large swath of published material on divine freedom, the problem of evil, divine command theory, and related topics. Although he follows in a long line of philosophers of religion who have devoted attention to the coherence of theism, the author’s unique contribution in this volume is to (i) assess the divine attributes in “unfamiliar contexts” generated by recent philosophical advances, (ii) argue that these contexts reveal surprising implications of the Anselmian “package” of divine attributes, and thereby (iii) make a sustained case that many recent dilemmas posed for Anselmianism lack cogency. His thesis about “metaphysically occluded facts” should be of great interest to practitioners of philosophical theology, who are often asked (or ask others) to take a fairly permissive stance on the ability of *a priori* intuition alone to reach reliable judgments about metaphysical matters.

Anselm on Freedom, by Katherin Rogers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 217.

HUGH J. MCCANN, Texas A&M University

The thesis of this book is that in his writings on free will, Anselm attempts the first systematic libertarian analysis of freedom. The author develops her thesis in significant part by contrasting Anselm’s position with that of Augustine, whose views on the subject lay at the center of Anselm’s own theological heritage. Her strongest focus is on what Anselm has to say in *De Casu Diaboli* about the fall of the angels, but ample attention is paid to his other writings as well, and frequent use is made of concepts developed by contemporary writers on free will.

The book’s Introduction characterizes libertarianism as involving two key principles: that a libertarian free choice cannot be determined, causally or otherwise, by anything outside the agent’s own choosing; and that such a choice must ultimately originate in, or be caused by, the agent himself (5). This leads directly to the problem that is the book’s central focus. Classical theism, which Rogers describes in chapter 1, held it as a non-negotiable principle that as creator, God is the cause of all that is not God. Anything having positive ontological status either is God or comes from God, who sustains all things in being throughout their existence (16). The problem is to reconcile this with libertarian freedom, which would appear to exclude such a role for God when it comes to human choices. We are told in chapter 2 that Augustine’s solution to this problem is to adopt compatibilism—a position, says Rogers, that he maintained throughout his career. To uphold

compatibilism is, however, insufficient. It yields a version of freedom that allows God complete sovereignty as primary cause; but it makes God the cause of all human choices, including sinful ones (42). And God cannot be the author of sin.

A defender of Augustine might at this point invoke his famous doctrine that evil consists not in anything that has positive being but in some deficiency, in the absence of something that ought to be present. Applied to the sinful will, this would mean that the evil of a wrong choice has to consist not in being but in nonbeing, in the absence of something that ought to be there. It is obvious that what does not exist has no cause, hence we ought to be able to say that although, in their positive aspects, God is the cause of acts that are sinful, neither he nor anything else is the cause of them *qua* sin, inasmuch as their sinfulness can have no cause. But while Rogers devotes a fair amount of attention to answers of this kind, she considers them insufficient (46–51). At bottom, her reason seems rooted in Augustine's determinism, which permits God to be considered the "deficient cause" of sin in that he does not provide the causal influence that, in the case of agents who maintain a just will, enables them to choose justly. The most important case in point is that of the good and bad angels. The good were able to persevere in their goodness and achieve eternal bliss because God's grace ensured that they would do so; the evil did not receive sufficient grace and fell as a result—which leaves Augustine's position open to the charge that responsibility for the original evil lies with God (50–51).

For Rogers the only solution to this problem is to adopt a libertarian view, which she sees Anselm as doing. For Anselm, it is logically impossible for God to cause a creature to sin, in essence because to do so would be for him to will that the creature disobey his will, which is a self-contradiction (19, 89). From this impossibility Rogers draws the conclusion that, "The choice to sin must arise from within the created agent himself" (19). This choice is to be understood in libertarian terms; indeed, for Rogers the capacity for free choice amounts to a kind of *aseity*, a sort of sharing in God's capacity for primary causation. The point is developed by way of a citation she gives from *Cur Deus Homo* (II, 10) concerning the praiseworthiness of the good angels: "Those angels are not to be praised for their justice due to the fact that they were able to sin, but rather due to the fact that, in a way, they have it *from themselves* [Rogers's italics] that they are [now] unable to sin; in this they are, to some extent, similar to God, who has whatever he has from himself (*a se*)."¹ Rogers then states that the crucial requirement for freedom and praiseworthiness is not open options but *aseity*. She goes on to say that contrary to Augustine, Anselm "embraces the view that the created agent imitates God in being a genuine cause, what I have called a primary agent. Though all that happens is permitted by God, there are some events in this universe not causally willed by God, but rather willed by, and originating from, the created agent" (59).

How this works out in practice is told in chapters 3 through 6, in which Rogers develops an account of Anselm's treatment of freedom, often with

the aid of concepts drawn from contemporary discussions. Among the main points are, first, that Anselm does not in fact define freedom as the ability to choose between good and evil. This is because neither God nor the good angels in their present state are able to choose evil, yet both are to be considered free. Rather, freedom of choice is to be understood as the power for preserving rightness of will for its own sake (63), where rightness of will consists essentially in an agent desiring what it ought to desire. But while freedom of choice does not, for Anselm, demand a context of alternative possibilities, it is necessary that it be exercised in such a context by the angels in their primordial state, and similarly for human agents in the prelapsarian setting. Sticking with the case of the angels, God provides their wills with two *affectiones* or desires. One is a desire for benefit, that is, for what leads to happiness; the other is a desire for justice, which Rogers takes as a second order desire on the Frankfurt model, a desire that one's desires for benefit be ordered as they ought to be (67). As long as this order is preserved, justice is maintained. In the primordial angels, however, a conflict arises between a desire for justice and an inordinate desire for benefit. It is in the resolution of this conflict that the fate of each angel is settled.

But just why does the case of the angels require alternative possibilities, and how exactly is the conflict between them resolved? The answer to the first question is that alternatives are necessary in order that the angel have or lack justice through a choice that is *from himself*—that is, according to Rogers, by a self-caused choice (73). Had the angel received only one *affectio* from God, even if it were the desire for justice, it would deserve no reward from God because it would have acted out of necessity, owing to its received nature. Having both *affectiones* makes it possible for the angel to act from itself or on its own (*sponte*), and thus to be deserving of its fate. As to how the conflict is resolved, one might expect there to be some positive act of decision or choice by which the angel either ratifies the just state in which it is created, or turns away from justice to pursue benefit. In fact, however, Rogers does not read Anselm this way—perhaps in part because she sees no clear distinction in his writings between choice and occurrent desire, but perhaps also because like Augustine, Anselm subscribes to the non-negotiable thesis that everything possessing positive being is caused by God. In any case, Rogers holds that for Anselm, neither in maintaining justice nor in sinning does the agent add anything to the sum of things:

In the struggle between the desires for justice and for inappropriate benefit, the ultimate choice is not some third element, a really existing “something” above and beyond the desires. It is either a just choice, which is a continuation of the harmony of . . . motives . . . with which the agent was created, or else an unjust choice, which is the “winning out” of the already existing desire for the wrong benefit. Nothing with any ontological status is brought into being by the created agent. However, it is up to the agent himself whether he will maintain the just status quo, or pursue the wrong benefit (118).

Chapter 7 is devoted to a similar account of original sin, and Anselm's view of the relation between grace and freedom in the postlapsarian will. Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to Anselm's views on foreknowledge and freedom. Anselm is seen to reject fatalism, on the ground that the relation between God's knowledge of our actions and the deeds themselves is one only of conditional or consequent necessity; and Anselm's view of divine eternity is argued to require a four-dimensionalist view of time rather than a presentist reading. An important point is that because of the freedom it provides to creatures, Anselm's view implies that God is unable to control what our choices will be. Furthermore, it entails that we are able to act upon God, in that he can learn what we choose only from the choices themselves. Thus our freedom requires a loss both of sovereignty and impassivity on God's part. The loss is, however, diminished by the fact that it is self-imposed (151). Chapter 10 is devoted to God's own freedom, including his options as to what worlds he might create.

There is a great deal in this book to discuss, but I cannot help but express a serious misgiving about its main thesis. God's *aseity* may fairly be expressed by saying that God and all his attributes have their existence from his own nature. It is understandable, therefore, that one might take Anselm's statements that the good and bad angels have their moral status "of themselves" as signifying a special sort of reflection of the divine nature, one in which each angel, and indeed any other agent acting with genuine moral freedom, confers existence on its own choices. There is, however, no place where Anselm says created agents ever exercise anything that can count as primary agency; and the conclusion Rogers rightly draws from the possibility—namely, that for creatures to exercise such agency would effectively be for them to operate causally upon God—flies directly in the face of Anselm's repeated claims in *Proslogion* and in *Cur Deus Homo* that God is impassible.¹ Worse, if one looks into Rogers's account of Anselm for a way in which this so-called primary causality is exercised, one gets no help. True, we are told in the passage cited above that it is up to the agent whether he will maintain the just status quo or pursue wrongful benefit. But far from being offered a means by which this option is exercised, we are instead told that the agent brings into being nothing that has ontological status. That is not the way choice works. Whatever my powers of agency amount to, if I am poised between two options I must *act* if I am to settle between them. That act, the act of choosing, can only be an event with positive ontological status, which by Anselm's lights requires that it owes its existence to God alone.

I think, then, that Anselm's claims about rational agents having their justice and injustice of themselves require a weaker reading. Very likely, he means something like this: that our moral choices manifest each of our individual personalities, and are intrinsically such as to be deserving of

¹Anselm, *Basic Writings*, ed. and trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 2007), 84, 85, 88, 253.

praise or blame. This is not to suggest that no trace of what contemporary writers think of as libertarianism is to be found in Anselm. There is, for example, very little in his writings of the distinctively compatibilist theme Rogers finds rife in Augustine, that our choices always follow our strongest desire. Perhaps, then, Anselm inclined to something like present day libertarianism when it comes to worldly causes. But it is difficult to believe he took creaturely freedom as in any way diminishing God's role as primary cause, or his complete sovereignty over all creation.

One could also express misgivings over Rogers's determination to read Anselm as much as possible in terms of contemporary concepts having to do with freedom. I am disposed to think, however, that therein lies the book's greatest contribution. It is difficult to retrofit contemporary ideas to those of the past, and I would not claim that Rogers's effort to do so always succeeds. In the long run, however, the enterprise of studying past thought against the backdrop of contemporary views can only increase our understanding of both, and Rogers's treatment of Anselm on freedom greatly advances that endeavor.

Living Forms of the Imagination, by Douglas Hedley. London and New York: T & T Clark, 2008. Pp. x + 308. ISBN 978056702959 (paper).

PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, Duke Divinity School

"Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch" —we live poetically. Heidegger wrote this, and Douglas Hedley quotes it with full approval as an aphoristic summary of the central position of this delightful and often beautiful book. That position is, to make a complicated matter too simple, that it is proper to human beings to make a constant imaginative contribution to the bounds and structure of the world we inhabit, thus forging the world's given elements into a whole that is neither fanciful or fictional, but instead (when things go well) profoundly realistic, resonant with, and responsive to the most fundamental order of things. Imagination, for Hedley, is cognitively indispensable as well as affectively essential: without it, it is not possible for us to learn to inhabit a world, not possible to come to know how that world most fundamentally is, and not possible to engage our emotions with the order of things. Hedley also thinks that the Christian life cannot properly be lived nor Christian truth known without the imagination: what the imagination shows us is a cosmos beautiful in its created nature, and ourselves as quivering in reverie, responsive to that cosmos and to its maker. Christians ought therefore to be imaginative defenders of the imagination, Hedley thinks: both liturgy and theology require it.

Hedley's book is devoted to explicating and defending many aspects of this central thesis against its most influential opponents, who include: reductive naturalists in philosophy, for whom the imagination is cognitively