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wrongly by willfully failing to learn Esperanto. And it's an intuition that springs up in response not to some bizarre thought experiment, but in response to a situation that I am in fact in; I have just navigated away from the webpage that would have given me access to the free classes and I don't intend to return to it. Given that we don't actually live in a world of saints, shouldn't we behave differently from the way that we should behave if we did? Aren't we at least permitted to behave differently? It seems to me that we should and that we are so permitted; it seems to me that according to the Triple Theory, we should not and are not. And thus the Triple Theory seems wrong to me.

On What Matters is a closely-argued and detailed investigation of some of the main metaethical issues (there are notable absences: discussion of God and free will is rather brisk) and of the commonalities between three great traditions of normative theory: Kantianism, Consequentialism, and Contractualism. I hazard that nobody will agree with it in its entirety, but anyone with interests in any of the topics on which it dwells will find much of value in it and that it amply rewards what it demands: careful reading and re-reading.

In Adam's Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, by Ian A. McFarland. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 256 pages. \$120 (hardcover).

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Few doctrines are as difficult and controversial as the doctrine of original sin. To the modern thinker, the doctrine of original sin is absurd. How can one person's sin eons and eons ago determine the status and nature of all humanity? But when we open the pages of Scripture, we quickly see that the doctrine of original sin is a biblical doctrine, taught by the apostle Paul himself. Therefore, it is safe to say that the doctrine of original sin is a Christian belief. Where controversy arises, however, is in exactly how we, as Christians, should define original sin.

Ian McFarland has sought to tackle this very issue, though from a more philosophical and historical perspective. His thesis is straightforward and ambitious:

In reaction to a wide range of criticisms leveled against the idea of original sin, a number of Christian theologians in the modern period have attempted to develop a doctrine of sin in which the idea of original sin is heavily qualified or even rejected. Against these perspectives, I will argue that it is not only theologically defensible, but inseparable from the confession of Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord. Indeed, I will defend the doctrine in what is arguably its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and later defended in the Reformed theological tradition under the designation of "total depravity"—the claim that no aspect of our humanity is untouched by sin. (x)

McFarland, no doubt, is swimming upstream since many (most?) modern theologians reject original sin outright. However, do not be fooled. McFarland does not simply restate earlier positions, but seeks to address modern questions that earlier generations did not have to answer.

In many ways, McFarland's goal is accomplished. Throughout the book he has several strong statements affirming "total depravity." Furthermore, McFarland challenges the popular assumption that free will must be defined as the power of self-determination. He does so utilizing not only Augustine (chapter 3) but also Maximus the Confessor (chapter 4), a figure who (unlike Augustine) has flown under the radar of much contemporary scholarship on the topic of whether God, rather than the will, "is the source of individual identity, since it is God whose call defines the good for a person" (xi). I applaud McFarland for resisting what seems to be the modern assumption, namely, that if the will is to be free, it must be self-determined, libertarian, and contra-causal in nature. McFarland believes a libertarian view to be so problematic that it is found to "betray the good news of Jesus Christ, which is that we have been chosen and not that we have done the choosing" (xii). He clarifies, "This is not to deny that we quite obviously do choose all manner of things, still less to suggest that our relationship to God in Christ is anything other than free; but it is to insist that while we love God—and thereby are most truly and properly human—freely, that love, like all love, is, in its joy and freedom, beyond our capacity to choose" (xii).

Despite these strengths (and many others unmentioned), there is reason to believe that McFarland is inconsistent in applying his thesis. As cited above, McFarland's intention is to defend the Christian doctrine of original sin by arguing that it is defensible theologically and inseparable from the confession of the gospel. So far so good. But then McFarland states that he will defend it in its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine and later defended in the "Reformed theological tradition under the designation of 'total depravity.'" Here is where the confusion begins.

In the Reformed tradition original sin not only includes original corruption (sometimes called *pollution*) from where we get the doctrine of total depravity, but original guilt as well. Furthermore, it is from original guilt that original corruption is birthed. Therefore, Adam's progeny inherit both a guilty *status* from Adam and a corrupt *nature*. However, not only does McFarland overlook both aspects (guilt and corruption) in his thesis, but the rest of his book demonstrates that he rejects the Reformed doctrine of original guilt entirely. For example, McFarland argues that if it is the case that "we sin *because* we are sinners"—the classic Reformed view—"the conclusion seems unavoidable that our sinful state is finally God's responsibility as the one who made us that way" (148). Later on, McFarland rejects both the realist and federalist views that affirm original guilt. Picking on the federal view he writes, "there is no reason why Adam's being the *first* in a series should justify his *representing* the rest of the series in God's sight." God is made arbitrary, says McFarland, if

Adam is made our representative by whom we are counted guilty in his sin. Therefore, in light of these statements, it appears that McFarland's thesis fails on two accounts: (1) Original sin in "its most extreme form" (as represented by Augustine and the Reformed) does not merely include total depravity but the imputation of guilt. McFarland fails to recognize this in his thesis. (2) McFarland does not actually defend original sin in "its most extreme form, as developed by Augustine" and the "Reformed tradition," but actually rejects the imputation of guilt.

But more to the point still, McFarland has missed crucial arguments the Reformed make out of texts like Romans 5. A full defense cannot be made here (e.g., see works by John Murray), but a few points deserve mention. (1) In Romans 5 there is a clear parallel and contrast between Adam and Christ, one that is so strong it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Adam and Christ act as representatives (also see 1 Cor. 15:45–49). (2) When Paul says in Rom. 5:12, "because all sinned," he is referring to Adam as our representative so that a reference to actual sins is precluded. Instead, Paul is arguing that it was through *Adam's* sin that "all sinned." (3) The reason death reins even when there was no law (before Moses; cf. 5:12–14) is because on the basis of Adam's sin all men who came thereafter were counted as guilty before God. (4) In Rom. 5:16–19 the imputation of guilt is inferred since Paul asserts that because of Adam's trespass, all men are condemned before God. Paul then compares condemnation in Adam with justification in Christ. Clearly, forensic categories are in view. (5) If it is unfair for Adam's guilt to be imputed to his progeny, then must we not also cry "unfair!" to Christ's righteousness being imputed to us for our justification? Yet, this is the parallel Paul makes.

In the end, McFarland's solution is difficult to make sense of. Original sin exists not because "we all somehow pre-exist *in* Adam (as in realism), or because God has predetermined that Adam will stand for the whole human race (as in federalism), but simply because we are all one *with* Adam, and thus that we share with him—and with each other—the same nature, marked by the damaged wills that turn us all invariably and catastrophically away from God" (160). But what does this mean? How is being one "with" Adam different from being one "in" Adam? And how can McFarland say we are one "with Adam" because "we share with him . . . the same nature"? It is hard to see how McFarland avoids borrowing realist language. Again, I applaud McFarland for his affirmation of our pervasive corruption, but his explanation for how corruption is actually passed on is ambiguous and his rejection of imputed guilt struggles to make sense of texts like Romans 5 where representation language seems obvious.

Finally, McFarland argues that Christ himself assumes a fallen human nature in the incarnation, also meaning that Christ possesses a fallen human will and mind. He argues that such was necessary for Christ to become like us in every way (Heb. 2:17–18). He also believes he is taking the fathers and creeds (e.g., Chalcedon) to their logical end, for what Christ

has not assumed he cannot redeem. However, there are serious concerns with such a novel proposal. First, It does not follow that Christ must assume a fallen human nature, but only a human nature to truly be human like us. Sin is accidental to man's nature, meaning Adam was not created sinful but became a sinner. Therefore, in order to be 100 percent human, Christ need only assume a human nature, not a fallen nature. Second, McFarland again ignores the representation language found throughout Scripture. The reason Jesus is able to atone for us is because he, as the God-man, acts as our representative before the Father (Rom. 5:15–21). His intercession, therefore, is not contingent on possessing a *fallen* human nature, an idea foreign to Scripture. Third, it is incomprehensible to see how Christ avoids being a sinner, condemned before the Father, if he assumes our fallen human nature. Before we do anything good or bad, we come into this world inheriting a corrupt nature from Adam. Therefore, we stand guilty before God as those who possess a *fallen* nature. We are truly sinful in God's sight and therefore culpable. So if we are condemned for our fallenness, is not Christ also? How then can Christ be said to be blameless not only in deed but in his person? It simply will not do to argue (as McFarland does) that Christ's sinlessness is a function of his hypostasis and not of his human nature, for the two cannot be divorced from one another as the latter impacts and, in part, defines the former. How can a fallen human nature not result in a fallen person? Does the divine compensate for the human, and if so have we not succumbed to Eutychianism? Fourth, McFarland wrongly argues that Christ can assume a fallen human nature since our sinful nature, though fallen, "remains good and not evil." "However badly damaged it may be, our nature never separates us from God" (129). Such a statement is not Reformed but Semi-Pelagian. To the contrary, it is precisely because we have a fallen nature that we are unacceptable before God (Ps. 51:5). And possessing a fallen nature does indeed create a massive relational breach between us and God (Eph. 2:1–5). Yes, God may continue to uphold the existence of our nature, but that in no way means he is in approval of our nature as fallen. The same, therefore, applies to Christ should he assume a fallen human nature.

To conclude, McFarland boldly takes on the challenges posed to the doctrine of original sin, and to his credit he seeks to answer questions previous generations of theologians did not have to. Nevertheless, his thesis is inconsistent and his solution to the puzzle of original sin remains unsatisfying. Going forward, theologians must address the questions McFarland seeks to answer, though in my opinion with a different solution.