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PURGATORY AND THE DILEMMA OF SANCTIFICATION

Justin D. Barnard

Christian Protestants typically affirm both the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith. Yet these two commitments generate an apparently self-destructive dilemma—one I call the *dilemma of sanctification*. The *prima facie* puzzle can be resolved in at least three ways. In this paper, I articulate the *dilemma of sanctification* in some detail and offer an argument against a widely-held Protestant solution I call provisionism. This constitutes indirect support for the solution I find most promising, namely, a doctrine of purgatory. I close by sketching a model of purgatory consistent with Protestant soteriology.

§1. Introduction

Philosophical arguments in defense of a doctrine of purgatory are scant.¹ Among Protestant Christians, this fact is easily explained by its nearly universal rejection. For Protestant Christians within the Reformation tradition, for whom the mantra *sola Scriptura* is a virtual Shibboleth, the doctrine of purgatory is typically included among a litany of Roman Catholic teachings for which there is insufficient Biblical warrant.² According to article XXII (Of Purgatory) of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, the “Romish Doctrine” of purgatory “is a fond thing, vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God.” Somewhat more colorfully, Protestant reformer John Calvin called the doctrine of purgatory a “deadly device of Satan” and a “horrid blasphemy against Christ.” On the other hand, in his *Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer*, C. S. Lewis suggests:

Our souls *demand* Purgatory, don't they? Would it not break the heart if God said to us, “It is true, my son, that your breath smells and your rags drip with mud and slime, but we are charitable here and no one will upbraid you with these things, nor draw away from you. Enter into the joy”? Should we not reply, “With submission, sir, and if there is no objection, I'd *rather* be cleaned first.” “It may hurt, you know” — “Even so, sir.”³

More recently, Jerry Walls has argued that the doctrine of purgatory is “plausible . . . for Protestants. For those who take freedom seriously and

believe that transformation is the heart of what salvation is all about, it seems to be a fully natural doctrinal development."⁴

In this paper, I hope to show that the conviction shared by Christian philosophers, such as Lewis and Walls, regarding the appeal of purgatory is worth further exploration. In the spirit of Walls's proposal, I will argue that a doctrine of purgatory is useful for Protestant Christians who take seriously sanctification as a process. However, my own project diverges from Walls's treatment in a few important respects. First, I will neither argue nor assume that "salvation is essentially a matter of transformation"⁵ *per se*. Rather, my project aims to speak not only to those for whom salvation is fundamentally transformative, but also to those for whom salvation is principally a matter of forensic or legal justification.⁶ Second, whereas Walls's comments on the nature of purgatory within a uniquely Protestant theology are merely suggestive,⁷ I aim to be more precise in suggesting two competing models of purgatory, only one of which Protestants should accept. Finally, since my project aims to speak to those Protestants for whom salvation is principally a matter of justification, the crux of my case turns on apparent difficulties generated by a standard view associated with this understanding of salvation to the effect that God makes unilateral provision for our remaining sanctification at death. Though Walls's discussion reflects an awareness of the difficulties that are generated by this view, he neither makes it explicit nor employs it argumentatively, as I intend to do here. Thus, my own project, if successful, serves to reinforce intuitions shared by Lewis and Walls that a doctrine of purgatory is a reasonable feature of a philosophically coherent and comprehensive Protestant theology.

§2. The Essential Moral Perfection of Heaven

According to traditional Christian belief, heaven is the dwelling place of God⁸—a place where nothing unholy abides. It is a state of existence that represents the *telos* of created human persons, the enjoyment of eternal union and fellowship with the triune God. Undoubtedly, such thinking is shaped in part by the poetry of John's apocalyptic vision.

And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away."⁹

At one level, such imagery suggests that heaven, in contrast to one's present existence on earth, represents a state of existence in which there is neither pain nor suffering resulting from evil or sin. However, this suggestion does not seem fully to capture standard Christian intuitions about the nature of heaven. For what distinguishes heaven from earth is not the *mere* absence of evil or sin; rather, in contrast to an earthly existence, a heavenly one will be one in which sin is no longer possible. Thus, perhaps it is more accurate to suggest that heaven is essentially morally perfect.

The suggestion that heaven is essentially morally perfect does not, by itself, resolve the sense in which it is. Taken as a claim about bare logical or broadly metaphysical possibility, the assertion that evil or sin is not possible in heaven is subject to a familiar counterexample from traditional Christian belief. For according to some Christians, evil and sin actually arose in heaven when Satan and his cohorts rebelled against God. Thus, since the actual, albeit temporary, presence of evil or sin in heaven entails the logical possibility of evil or sin in heaven, heaven is not morally perfect in every possible world.

Whether the story of Satan's fall is credible is not important for present purposes.¹⁰ For even if it were true that evil and sin existed at one time in the presence of God, this would not entail the falsity of my claim about heaven's essential moral perfection. Two related reasons make this clear. First, one might accept the story of a Satanic fall while denying that Satan's fall constitutes the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such. In order to maintain such a position one need only think of heaven as an eschatological fulfillment, a future hope. It is an unactualized state of being that God intends to bring about.¹¹ Since Satan's fall preceded the fulfillment of this eschatological hope, it does not constitute the presence of evil or sin in heaven as such. Thus, one might accept the story of a Satanic fall, while maintaining the view that heaven as such is essentially morally perfect. One difficulty with such a response is that it appears to sever the connection between heaven and the immediate presence of God. Given standard Christian beliefs about heaven, it is plausible to think that to be fully in God's immediate presence is to be in heaven. Thus, to the extent that a Satanic fall occurred in the immediate presence of God, it occurred in heaven. To concede this point would entail that heaven is not essentially morally perfect in the logical or broadly metaphysical sense for reasons already described. However, it would not entail that subsequent to the expulsion of Satan and his followers, heaven is not (or will not be) essentially morally perfect in some other sense.

The sense in which heaven is essentially morally perfect is grounded in the natures of its occupants. God, the principal occupant of heaven, is holy. His nature is such that he cannot sin. Thus, heaven is morally perfect not because God merely happens not to sin, but because, given his nature, he is incapable of doing so. Similarly, I want to suggest that other denizens of heaven (e.g., angelic beings and human persons) contribute to its essential moral perfection by virtue of their possession of natures that render them incapable of sin as well. To be sure, the sense in which the human persons here imagined would be incapable of sin is not the same sense in which God is incapable of sin. Thus, I am not suggesting that by virtue of being incapable of sin, such human persons would, in effect, be God. On the contrary, the kind of moral perfection that such a human person would possess would be one befitting her nature *as* a human person (about which more below). At the same time, just as the essential moral perfection of heaven is grounded in the moral perfection that God possesses (in keeping with his being God), so also the essential moral perfection of heaven is grounded in the moral perfection that its human occupants possess (in keeping with their being human).

If the essential moral perfection of heaven is grounded in the natures of its occupants, then the sense in which it is not possible that there be evil or

sin in heaven is perhaps best construed as a kind of causal or nomological necessity. To claim that heaven is necessarily morally perfect is not to claim that heaven is perfect in every possible world. Rather, it is to claim that there is a law-like connection between the absence of sin and evil and the natures of heaven's inhabitants such that this connection would be maintained in a cluster of relevantly similar worlds. Thus, given standard Christian beliefs about heaven, even if it is logically possible that there be evil or sin in heaven, it remains plausible to think that heaven is (or will be) morally perfect as a matter of this sort of nomological necessity.

§3. Protestant Soteriology and the Dilemma of Sanctification

When this account of the essential moral perfection of heaven is placed in juxtaposition with standard Protestant beliefs about the nature of salvation, it ultimately gives rise to a philosophical puzzle, one I call the *dilemma of sanctification*. According to traditional Protestant theology, the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. Of course, the precise nature of saving faith itself and the manner in which it is effected are matters of intense dispute among Protestant theologians. Nevertheless, for present purposes, such disputes are largely, though not entirely, irrelevant.

For purposes of this particular argument, I do not make any specific assumptions about the manner in which saving faith is effected. Nonetheless, I do assume that to whatever extent the imputation of saving faith is a work of God, such divine agency cannot work so as to exclude any and all free human response whatsoever. Thus, I reject what might be thought of as a thoroughgoing determinism with respect to salvation. At the same time, I do not assume that the receipt of saving faith must be conceived of as such. In other words, it is possible for a person to obtain saving faith, despite the fact that she does not explicitly or consciously view herself as doing so. Thus, my assumption that the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven accommodates Protestants with inclusivist, and perhaps even universalist, inclinations.

In keeping with standard Protestant beliefs, my argument does assume that the possession of saving faith is not strictly identical with the possession of a morally sanctified nature. Thus, while the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven, the possession of saving faith does not, by itself, entail that one, in fact, possesses a morally sanctified nature. Among those who possess saving faith, some might possess the morally sanctified nature in question, while others might not. For ease of reference, I'll refer to persons in the former category as *the Sanctified*, and those in the latter as *the Lapsable*.

While familiar within Protestantism, the distinction between *the Sanctified* and *the Lapsable* as I intend to employ it here requires further philosophical clarification. As suggested above, what distinguishes *the Sanctified* from *the Lapsable* is that the former possess a certain kind of nature, character, or disposition that the latter do not. According to standard Protestant accounts, sanctification is the "process by which one's

moral condition is brought into conformity with one's legal status before God."¹² It is the process by which those who possess saving faith are made holy. Minimally, it would seem that the completion of this process produces a person free from sin, one who no longer commits sinful or evil acts. However, the fact that one no longer commits sinful or evil acts should not be accidental. Rather, it should be a consequence of the further fact that one who is sanctified has a different nature (i.e., a sanctified nature). It is this sanctified nature that distinguishes those who no longer commit sinful acts *because they are sanctified* from those who no longer commit sinful acts merely because they are lucky. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that *the Sanctified* possess a certain kind of settled virtuous disposition that *the Lapsable* lack. And it is the possession or lack of this settled virtuous disposition that properly distinguishes between *the Sanctified* and *the Lapsable*.

An initial gloss on the kind of settled virtuous disposition that I have in mind is rooted in possible relations between the will of a human person and the Divine will. Those who are sanctified are such that their own wills are fully and properly aligned with the Divine will. As a result, they are not capable of falling into sin. By contrast, those who are not sanctified are such that their own wills fail to be fully or properly aligned with the Divine will. Moreover, it is this fact about their wills that explains their being lapsable (i.e., capable of falling into sin). At the same time, to suggest, as I have, that *the Sanctified* are incapable of sin is not to suggest that it is logically or broadly metaphysically impossible for them to sin. Rather, it is to suggest that it is nomologically impossible for *the Sanctified* to sin. That is, there is a law-like connection between their failure to sin and their possession of the settled virtuous disposition that would be maintained in relevantly similar circumstances. Moreover, the possession of the settled virtuous disposition would support the following counterfactual. For any person *x*, if *x* were in circumstances *C*, *x* would not sin. In other words, it is the possession of the settled virtuous disposition in question that would make the foregoing counterfactual true. Here, it is important to note that *C* does not include all logically or broadly metaphysically possible circumstances. Thus, we might imagine certain bizarre possible circumstances in which *x* would sin without this counting against *x*'s possession of the settled virtuous disposition in question. This is because such bizarre possible circumstances are simply not relevant to whether *x* possesses the settled virtuous disposition in question. For example, we can easily imagine that *x* would sin under such counterfactual circumstances as those in which she found herself being tormented in hell or lacking the presence of the Holy Spirit. Yet *x*'s sinning in such counterfactual circumstances would not count against her possession of the settled virtuous disposition in question since they would not be relevant. What is relevant to whether *x* possesses the settled virtuous disposition in question are those circumstances that are appropriate to the nature of *x*. So, in the case of human persons, circumstances *C* will be restricted to those conditions under which human persons ought properly to be expected not to sin. Those who are sanctified then, are not merely those who don't sin. Rather, they are those who could not sin in the sense that they would not sin under circumstances in which they ought properly to be expected not to sin.

In contrast, *the Lapsable* lack this settled virtuous disposition. Consequently, if a person is lapsable, it is not true of her that if she were in circumstances in which she ought properly to be expected not to sin that she would not. To be sure, the falsity of the counterfactual in question does not entail that if she were in such circumstances, she *would* sin. What it does entail however, is that her failure to sin in such circumstances would not be nomologically grounded in the settled virtuous disposition I have described. And it is in this sense that, if she were to avoid sinning, her avoidance of sin might be as reasonably ascribed to luck or chance as to her character. Moreover, because she lacks the relevant settled virtuous character, it is true of her that it is nomologically possible for her to commit sinful or evil acts.

As I have already suggested, when we situate my account of the essential moral perfection of heaven in the context of standard Protestant beliefs about the nature of salvation, we encounter a conundrum I call the *dilemma of sanctification*. My efforts to clarify the distinction between *the Sanctified* and *the Lapsable* serve to elucidate the dilemma. On the one hand, the essential moral perfection of heaven is such that it is not nomologically possible for sin or evil to be there. Since *the Lapsable* are persons for whom sinful or evil actions are a nomological possibility, no one in heaven is lapsable. On the other hand, standard Protestant theology is committed to the idea that while the possession of saving faith is a sufficient condition for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven, it is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for the possession of the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. So, given the reality that the vast majority of those who possess saving faith die as lapsable persons (i.e., who lack the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*), it would seem that standard Protestant theology is committed to the presence of lapsable persons in heaven. Therefore, it would seem that either heaven is not essentially morally perfect or saving faith is not a sufficient condition for eternal union and fellowship with God.

§4. Solving the Dilemma of Sanctification: The Problem(s) with Provisionism

Despite its initial plausibility, the apparent tension created by the dilemma of sanctification is merely apparent. For while the essential moral perfection of heaven does entail that no one in heaven is lapsable, this does not entail that saving faith is not sufficient for eternal union and fellowship with God. Interestingly, the essential moral perfection of heaven does entail that no one possessing saving faith attains or occupies heaven *as* someone who is lapsable. Thus, if heaven is essentially morally perfect in the sense that I have described, then everyone with saving faith must obtain the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified* prior to attaining or occupying heaven. In short, being sanctified is a necessary condition for eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven.

By itself, the fact that one must be sanctified in order to enjoy eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven does not undermine the sufficiency of saving faith. This is because one might be inclined to think (as is perhaps commonly assumed in Protestant theology) that the possession of saving faith at time *t* is sufficient for the possession of a morally

sanctified nature at some later time t_{+n} , where t_{+n} is prior to one's entrance into heaven. Thus, the possession of saving faith remains a sufficient condition for eventually enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. However, when coupled with what might seem to many an obvious datum of the Christian life, Protestant theology seems committed to a troublesome position about how the sanctification of those who possess saving faith is accomplished.

Recall that according to traditional Protestant theology, the possession of saving faith is not strictly identical with the possession of a morally sanctified nature. That is, the possession of saving faith, while perhaps ultimately sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified nature, is not initially (or by itself) sufficient for the possession of a morally sanctified nature. What is underscored by this claim is the nature of sanctification as a process, the completion of which results in the possession of the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. Yet many would readily concede that for the overwhelming majority of those who possess saving faith, it is not a process that comes to completion during one's earthly life (i.e., before death). In light of this, many Protestants either explicitly or tacitly assume that for those who possess saving faith but die as lapsable persons, God will immediately and unilaterally supply the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. For example, Jerry Walls attributes such a view to Jonathan Edwards. Edwards writes:

At death the believer not only gains a perfect and eternal deliverance from sin and temptation, but is adorned with a perfect and glorious holiness. The work of sanctification is then completed, and the beautiful image of God has then its finishing strokes by the pencil of God, and begins to shine forth with a heavenly beauty like a seraphim.¹³

As Edwards's imagery suggests, God effectively fills in the gap between the lapsable nature with which the person possessing saving faith dies and the sanctified nature necessary to attain or occupy heaven. Moreover, God does this immediately and unilaterally for all persons who die possessing saving faith regardless of their relative level of lapsability. For ease of reference, I will call this view "provisionism" since God makes unilateral provisions for *the Lapsable* to become *the Sanctified* immediately upon their deaths.¹⁴

Although provisionism affords Protestant belief a way of maintaining the essential moral perfection of heaven and the sufficiency of saving faith (in light of the reality that more often than not the process of sanctification is not completed during this life), it does so in a way that strains credibility. As a way of motivating my case for purgatory, I will indicate in what follows why I find provisionism difficult to accept. Generally, my case against provisionism can be summarized as follows. First, there are reasons related to continuity of personal identity for thinking that God could not unilaterally bring about the kind of transmutation to which provisionism is committed. Second, even if we assume that God could unilaterally bring about such a transmutation at death, there seems to be no reason why God could not do it now. Thus, the fact that God does not do it now makes God appear morally culpable for the evil that is the result of those who possess saving faith but are lapsable.

That God could not bring about the kind of unilateral transmutation suggested by provisionism is grounded in reasons having to do with continuity of personal identity. According to traditional Christian theism, a person who passes from this life into the next maintains at least some level of personal continuity. This is true even for views of human personhood that reject the existence of disembodiable souls in favor of some materialist account of personal eschatology. For regardless of one's theory of personal eschatology, the assumption of traditional Christian theism is that the person who persists beyond death is, in some sense or other, continuous with the person who died. Minimally, such continuity seems to require the persistence of consciousness—an awareness of the self as a continuing, even if interrupted, subject of existence. But, it is precisely this minimum for continuity of personal identity that provisionism seems unable to accommodate.

A simple analogy is helpful here. There are cases in which medical patients with ordinarily curable conditions cannot be cured. This occurs most frequently in situations where the cure requires an operation, but the patient's general health is such that she could not survive the operation. Thus, while the condition itself is ordinarily curable by means of the operation in question, such a cure is not available to a patient who could not endure the operation. Quite simply, it would kill her. And her death in such circumstances would not constitute a cure; it would be her destruction. Similarly, it seems reasonable to imagine that God's instantaneous and unilateral transmutation of a lapsable individual into a sanctified one is an operation that simply could not be endured. It would result in the annihilation of the person in question. To be sure, God's power is such that he could bring *some-one* back into being after having annihilated *some-one*. However, it is unclear whether the one brought back into being would bear any continuity of consciousness with the one annihilated. After all, to suggest that one could not endure such a divine operation is to suggest that one's very "soul" or center of consciousness would be destroyed. Thus, whatever soul or center of consciousness God brought back into existence could not bear the relevant level of personal continuity with the one destroyed.

Of course, the analogy here proposed is not, in itself, an argument. It is merely suggestive of one. And while I believe that such an argument is not only available but also (once clearly articulated) compelling, I will not take the time to pursue it here.¹⁵ Rather, I will assume, for the sake of argument, that it is possible for continuity of personal identity to be preserved through the kind of divine operation presupposed by provisionism. Moreover, I will assume, as it seems provisionism does, that God can bring about the imagined unilateral transmutation without thereby sacrificing any significant good. Once such assumptions are made, it appears that provisionism faces a new difficulty, one that can be summarized as follows. If God can make immediate and unilateral provisions for *the Lapsable* to become sanctified at death on the basis of their possession of saving faith without thereby sacrificing any significant good, then there seems to be no reason why God could not do this now. Thus, the fact that God does not do this now makes God appear morally culpable for the evil in the world that is the result of the actions

of the *Lapsable*. In short, provisionism entails a new species of the evidential problem of evil.

One useful way of characterizing this difficulty employs a concept borrowed from Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga, a perfectly good being eliminates as much evil as it can *properly eliminate*.¹⁶ To properly eliminate evil is to eliminate evil provided that doing so does not bring about a greater evil or eliminate an outweighing good. With this concept in hand, one might argue that God is not morally culpable for certain kinds of evil, a certain amount of evil, or for evil generally because such evil is not *properly eliminable*. For example, according to the now familiar "free will defense," it is logically impossible for God to create a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simultaneously guaranteeing the absence of evil. If the good of morally significant libertarian freedom outweighs the evil that results from it, God cannot properly eliminate such evil. Thus, God would not be morally culpable for the evil that results from such morally significant libertarian freedom.

In the case of provisionism, however, such reasoning seems unavailable. Since by hypothesis God can properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the *Lapsable* at death (i.e., God can do so without thereby sacrificing any outweighing good), there seems to be no reason why God cannot properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the *Lapsable* now. And if there is no reason why God cannot properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the *Lapsable* now, God's failure to do so impugns his perfect goodness. Thus, provisionism places God's perfect goodness in question by generating a type of evil that is properly eliminable, which God fails to eliminate.

One immediate, but ultimately unsuccessful, response to this difficulty appeals directly to the free will defense. According to the proposed response, God cannot now properly eliminate the remaining capacity for evil in the *Lapsable* since doing so would result in the loss of the outweighing good of morally significant libertarian freedom. Such a response however simply multiplies the difficulties for provisionism. If the good of morally significant libertarian freedom were such that its possession now (i.e., during one's earthly life) is more valuable than the guarantee of no evil, then the same would be true at some later time (e.g., during one's life in heaven). Thus, by appealing to free will as a way of avoiding the implication of the difficulty I have proposed, provisionism self-destructs. This is because the preservation of morally significant libertarian freedom in heaven would require God to refrain from providing for the sanctification of the *Lapsable* (i.e., making provisions for them to become beings who are no longer capable of sin). Moreover, such a move threatens the essential moral perfection of heaven, by raising what James Sennett has labeled the "*dilemma of heavenly freedom*."¹⁷

According to the standard free will defense, the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God is logically compatible with the existence of evil. This is because it is logically impossible for God to create a world containing morally significant libertarian freedom while simultaneously guaranteeing the absence of evil. Thus, the possibility of a world containing evil would be justified in light of the fact that such a possibility would be required to procure the significant good of morally significant

libertarian freedom. However, as we have seen, the essential moral perfection of heaven requires the nomological impossibility of evil (or sin) in heaven. Thus, either human beings possess morally significant libertarian freedom in heaven, in which case heaven is not essentially morally perfect or human beings do not possess morally significant libertarian freedom in heaven, in which case the free will defense is in jeopardy.¹⁸

To solve this dilemma, Sennett proposes a sort of "*compatibilist*" conception of freedom he calls the *Proximate Conception*. A rough way of characterizing the proximate conception of freedom is as follows:

For any morally significant action *A*, *A* is free only if either

- (1) *A* itself is a *libertarian* free action, or
- (2) *A* is determined by a causal history that includes some other *libertarian* free action(s).¹⁹

Essentially, the proximate conception of freedom makes morally significant *libertarian* freedom a metaphysically necessary condition for freedom generally. Thus, in order to procure the significant good of freedom in general, God had to create a world in which evil was possible at some time (i.e., a world containing morally significant *libertarian* freedom). Thus, the free will defense is preserved. However, in order to procure the significant good of freedom in general, God need not create a world in which evil is possible *at all times* (i.e., a world containing *only* morally significant *libertarian* freedom). For according to the proximate conception of freedom, an action can be free even if it is determined, provided that it is determined by a past that includes at least some morally significant *libertarian* free actions. Thus, while human beings in heaven can enjoy the significant good of freedom, for which morally significant *libertarian* freedom is a necessary condition, the freedom that human beings in heaven can enjoy poses no threat to its essential moral perfection since their actions can be determined by sanctified natures.

The details of Sennett's proposal need not detain us here. And although I lack the space to defend this assumption, I will presume for the sake of argument that Sennett's picture is largely correct.²⁰ If it is, then at least one crucial point seems to emerge. What justifies the absence of morally significant libertarian freedom in heaven is the fact that (a) the creatures who lack it in heaven possessed it at one time (i.e., on earth) and (b) the "*compatibilist*" freedom possessed by these creatures in heaven is the result of a process (i.e., a causal history) that included morally significant libertarian freedom. It is the necessity of this process that simultaneously makes Sennett's account plausible and ultimately renders provisionism unable to respond to the argument I have offered against it.

While Sennett himself is aware of this potential difficulty, he responds to it with what amounts to a promissory note. Sennett writes:

I have been asked repeatedly if my position entails a rather stringent doctrine of salvation; *viz.*, that only those who have lived long enough and worked hard enough to develop a character that fully determines actions for the good will be allowed into heaven. I do not believe that it does. There is room for some kind of doctrine of sanctification, whereby God supplies upon our deaths whatever is lacking

in our character formations to bring us to the state of compatibilist free perfection. I believe this can be worked out consistently by insisting that it is the pattern we establish throughout a life of persistent intentional character building that is critical—not our actually attaining the desired character itself in our lifetimes. By establishing such a pattern we are, in effect, giving God permission to fill in the gap. This is a highly complex matter, and one that must await a fully developed theological encounter with the Proximate Conception for complete explication. For the time being, however, I will claim only that it is not apparent to me that it cannot be made consistent with standard Christian views of salvation and sanctification.²¹

Although, as Sennett's remarks suggest, provisionism may succeed in avoiding a doctrine of salvation by works, it does not succeed in avoiding the difficulty posed at the outset of this section. Specifically, if, immediately upon our deaths, God can unilaterally supply what is lacking to bring us into a state of compatibilist-free perfection on the basis of a pattern of character building that includes some morally significant libertarian free actions and decisions, and he can do so without thereby sacrificing any significant good, then there seems to be no reason why God cannot do so now. That is, there seems to be no reason why God cannot *now* unilaterally supply what is lacking to transform at least some of the *Lapsable* into persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the *Sanctified*. And, if there is no reason why God cannot do this now, then his failure to do so renders him morally culpable for the evil that is due to the actions of the *Lapsable*.

One might argue that the reason why God cannot *now* unilaterally supply what is lacking to transform at least some of the *Lapsable* into persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the *Sanctified* is because the *Lapsable* in question have not yet established the crucial pattern of "intentional character building." However, this response is not to the point. Either those that have not yet established the relevant pattern will do so during their earthly lives or they will not. If they will, then there is nothing that should prevent God from providing them with a sanctified nature once they have, in fact, established the relevant pattern—even if this entails providing a sanctified nature on earth. And as before, God's failure to avail himself of this option would make him morally culpable for the evil that is a result of actions on the part of those who had, in fact, established the relevant pattern, but had not been provided with a sanctified nature. Alternatively, if those who have not yet established the relevant pattern will not, in fact, ever do so in this life, then provisionism renders the pattern inessential. In other words, it entails a view of salvation and sanctification according to which establishing the relevant pattern of intentional character building is not ultimately a necessary condition for God to supply what is lacking in our sanctification at death. In effect, regardless of how one lives, one will ultimately possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the *Sanctified* on the basis of God's unilateral provision, provided that one possesses saving faith.

The upshot of the foregoing argument is this. Provisionism seems to make God morally culpable for the evil that is due to the actions of the

Lapsable. Moreover, this culpability cannot be overcome by claiming that it is possible that there is some significant good that would be sacrificed were God to unilaterally transmute members of *the Lapsable* into persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. For according to the provisionist model, this is precisely what God will do upon the deaths of *the Lapsable*. Since provisionism entails that God's so doing apparently does not sacrifice any significant good, God's failure to exercise this option now seems to make him morally culpable for the evil that is due to the actions of *the Lapsable*. In short, God fails to eliminate evil that is properly eliminable.

Of course, the straightforward strategy in response to this difficulty is to propose some significant good that would be sacrificed if God were now to unilaterally transmute all of *the Lapsable* into persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. One possible suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral provisions for all of *the Lapsable* to become such persons or to do so immediately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would result in the loss of divine hiddenness.²² The basic idea behind this proposal is as follows. God desires that human persons enter into fellowship with him. However, he desires that such a relationship be entered into on the basis of the free choices of human persons. Such choices must not be coerced. This requires that, at least to some extent, God remain hidden beyond the complete cognitive grasp human persons. For the full disclosure of God's goodness and love (i.e., of the Divine Self) would compel human response. Human persons would no longer be free to choose to love or to reject God because the full disclosure of the Divine Self would have a coercive effect on human response. In this scenario, God's unilateral transmutation of *the Lapsable* into *the Sanctified* immediately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith is purportedly tantamount to the loss of divine hiddenness. Simply put, the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith would make it epistemically obvious to those without it that God exists. Thus, the relevant level of divine hiddenness would be lost.

Despite its attractiveness, the appeal to the preservation of divine hiddenness as a reason why God cannot now bring about the sanctification of *the Lapsable* is not entirely adequate as a defense of provisionism. First, one might make a *prima facie* case on biblical grounds that it is simply false that God's unilateral transmutation of *the Lapsable* into *the Sanctified* now would result in the loss of divine hiddenness. In a familiar parable from Luke's gospel, a rich man in Hades pleads with Abraham to send the beggar Lazarus from Hades to his five living brothers to warn them of the torment he is experiencing there. The rich man intercedes, "if someone goes to them from the dead, they will repent." Abraham responds, "If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the dead."²³ As Abraham's reply to the rich man suggests, it is possible and perhaps even likely that the spiritual blindness of some persons is such that not even verification of spiritual realities by the resurrected dead would make such realities epistemically obvious enough to compel belief. If this is true, then analogously, it is possible and perhaps even likely that the spiritual blindness of some persons is such that not

even the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith would make it epistemically obvious to them that God exists.

But even if the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith did make it epistemically obvious to those without it that God exists, it does not follow that the relevant set of goods purportedly preserved by divine hiddenness would be lost. After all, the purpose of divine hiddenness is not to avoid coercing human persons into *mere* belief in God's existence. Rather, it is to avoid coercion into the kind of full and loving relationship that God desires to have with human persons. And since mere belief in God's existence does not constitute the kind of full and loving relationship that God desires, even if the instantaneous moral perfection of those who acquire saving faith made mere belief in God's existence rationally compulsory, this would not, by itself, entail the loss of the goods that divine hiddenness purportedly guarantees. In order to make the proposal based on divine hiddenness more plausible, one would need to show that if God were now to make unilateral provisions for all of *the Lapsable* to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, then this would not merely make belief in God's existence rationally compulsory, but also that it would coerce human persons into the kind of loving relationship that God desires. Since it is far from clear that the latter can be shown, the appeal to divine hiddenness as a reason why God cannot now unilaterally bring about the sanctification of *the Lapsable* does not seem plausible as a way of defending provisionism.

An alternative suggestion is that if God were now to make unilateral provisions for all of *the Lapsable* to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would result in the loss of the good constituted by the process of sanctification itself. According to this proposal, the process of sanctification, while involving God's cooperation, is itself a good significant enough to require that its termination or completion occur only as a result of its own internal momentum.²⁴ If God were now to make unilateral provisions for all of *the Lapsable* to become sanctified or to do so immediately upon their individual, respective acquisition of saving faith, this would, in effect, cut the process of sanctification short or perhaps even prevent it from ever being initiated. Thus, God must let the process of sanctification run its course, so to speak.

This suggestion represents a crucial juncture in the argumentative dialectic against provisionism. For the proposal that the process of sanctification is a good significant enough to require that its termination or completion occur only as a result of its own internal momentum together with provisionism, presupposes that death is the proper terminus for the process of sanctification. Apart from such an assumption, this proposal would be subject to a fairly obvious criticism. Specifically, if the process of sanctification itself is such that its termination or completion should occur only as a result of its own internal momentum, then this should remain true of the process of sanctification in someone who is lapsable whether it is with respect to this life or the next. In other words, if God's unilateral transmutation of *the Lapsable* into *the Sanctified* would sacrifice the significant good of the process of sanctification now (i.e., in this life),

it seems equally plausible to think that the same good would be sacrificed were God to perform the same action at one's death. Note however, that such a criticism fails on the assumption that death is the proper terminus of the process of sanctification. That is, death is the point at which the process of sanctification comes to completion as a result of its own internal momentum.

Thus far, my argument against provisionism has presupposed that this is false. By contrast, my assumption has been that rather than representing a significant point in the process of sanctification at which God might be justified in penciling in the finishing strokes, death represents a point in the process of sanctification that is arbitrary. It is important to note that my assumption about the arbitrariness of death does not, by itself, beg the question against provisionism. This is because I allow that there is a reason that might justify God's unilateral action at some point in order to complete the process of sanctification.²⁵ Nevertheless, my assumptions have been that the point in question cannot be an arbitrary one and that death is an arbitrary point in the process. To the extent that one is committed to the good of the process of sanctification itself, one seems committed to its internal integrity. Thus, I will not argue for the assumption that the point at which the process of sanctification comes to completion must not be arbitrary. However, in order to make my case against provisionism, more must be said about why death represents an arbitrary point in the process of sanctification.

The claim that death represents an arbitrary point in the process of sanctification is initially grounded in phenomenological or existential considerations. When we consider our experience of death as a whole, it is an aspect of our experience from which no pattern seems to emerge. We speak of lives "cut short." And we struggle to make sense of timing which often seems so untimely. To be sure, none of these considerations entail that there *is* no pattern behind what we experience as the chaotic disorder of death. Yet, our experience of death in this way is suggestive of my contention that death is not the proper terminus of *any* process that possesses an internal momentum like the one that sanctification does. Death cuts such processes off at points during which they otherwise would not have come to completion on the basis of their own internal momentum. Death cuts against the nature of such processes; it interrupts them.

That death interrupts such processes becomes clearer in light of a relevant disanalogy between biological life and the process of sanctification. The disanalogy explains why death might not always seem arbitrary when we are thinking about the former, whereas death does seem arbitrary when considering the latter. In the case of biological life, there is a sense in which death is its proper terminus. Living things die. The internal momentum of their biological processes are such that, if uninterrupted, they will terminate in death. Thus, with respect to biological life, death does not always seem arbitrary. Note that the same is not true of the process of sanctification. The internal momentum of the process of sanctification is not such that, if uninterrupted, it will terminate in death. To the contrary, if uninterrupted, the internal momentum of the process of sanctification is such that it will terminate in the possession of the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. With respect to such a process, death

seems an interruption. Thus, it does not seem to be a point in the process of sanctification at which God would be justified in making provisions for *the Lapsable* to become *the Sanctified*.

Let us take stock. To the extent that death does represent an arbitrary point in the process of sanctification, any reason that would justify God in making unilateral provisions for *the Lapsable* to become *the Sanctified* at death ought to justify God in making such provisions now. Moreover, any significant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, would seemingly be sacrificed by God's provision at one's death. If there is no significant good that would be sacrificed by God's provision now, then God's failure to avail himself of the option of perfecting *the Lapsable* seemingly makes him morally culpable for the evil that results from their actions. Thus, provisionism succeeds as a solution to the dilemma of sanctification only at the expense of generating a species of the evidential problem of evil for which there seems no adequate response.

§5. Purgatory: Two Models

The discussion to this point discloses some important tensions in Protestant theology, as well as a significant philosophical worry about the view I have called provisionism. Obviously, my argument does not show that provisionism is false. Rather, I have suggested that provisionism, as a solution to the dilemma of sanctification, carries with it a significant philosophical difficulty to which there does not appear to be an easy answer. The extent to which the problem that I have raised counts against provisionism generally is not a matter about which I will speculate at this point. Instead, I will simply suppose that while possibly true, provisionism does not enjoy a degree of epistemic obviousness that compels rational assent. That this is so should be clear from the considerations that I have raised against it. Consequently, I wish to consider the extent to which purgatory represents a viable alternative to the dilemma of sanctification.

The model of purgatory that I propose as a solution to the dilemma of sanctification aims not only to avoid the difficulties encountered in relation to provisionism but also to alleviate Protestant worries about the prospect of rendering Christ's salvific work pointless. The model that I propose to defend stands in contrast to a traditional Roman Catholic model, one I call the *Satisfaction Model* of purgatory. According to the *Satisfaction Model*, purgatory is a temporal state of existence after death the purpose of which is to make satisfaction (i.e., payment) for sins committed on earth for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered by the time of death. It is this model that appears to have been affirmed at the Council of Florence in 1439.²⁶ The council declared as follows:

Also, if truly penitent people die in the love of God before they have made satisfaction for acts and omissions by worthy fruits of repentance, their souls are cleansed after death by cleansing pains; and the suffrages of the living faithful avail them in giving relief from such pains, that is, sacrifices of masses, prayers, almsgiving and other acts of devotion which have been customarily performed by some of the faithful for others of the faithful in accordance with the church's ordinances.²⁷

It was this model of purgatory that incurred John Calvin's fury when he wrote in his *Institutes of Christian Religion*:

[W]hen the expiation of sins is sought elsewhere than in the blood of Christ, and satisfaction is transferred to others. . . . We are bound, therefore, to raise our voice to its highest pitch, and cry aloud that purgatory is a deadly device of Satan; that it makes void the cross of Christ; that it offers intolerable insult to the divine mercy; that it undermines and overthrows our faith. For what is this purgatory but the satisfaction for sin paid after death by the souls of the dead? Hence when this idea of satisfaction is refuted, purgatory itself is forthwith completely overturned. But if it is perfectly clear, from what was lately said, that the blood of Christ is the only satisfaction, expiation, and cleansing for the sins of believers, what remains but to hold that purgatory is mere blasphemy, horrid blasphemy against Christ?²⁸

With regard to the *Satisfaction Model*, Calvin's invective seems fitting from the perspective of Protestant theology. At the very least, the suggestion that additional satisfaction for sin must be made by sinners themselves in purgatory undermines the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. However, merely because the *Satisfaction Model* of purgatory renders Christ's work superfluous, it does not follow that no model of purgatory is compatible with the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin.

The model of purgatory I propose to defend I call the *Sanctification Model*. According to this model, purgatory is a temporary state of existence after death for *the Lapsable*, the purpose of which is to complete the process of sanctification in order to become persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of *the Sanctified*. The fundamental difference between the *Sanctification Model* and the *Satisfaction Model* hinges on purpose. Whereas the latter pertains to payment for earthly sins, the former does not. Rather, the *Sanctification Model* assumes the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Thus, a person who is lapsable does not go to purgatory because she must make satisfaction for sins (for which sufficient satisfaction was not rendered during her earthly life); rather, she goes to purgatory in order for the process of sanctification to come to completion on the basis of its own internal momentum. In effect, the coming-to-completion of the process of sanctification after one's natural death is purgatory.

Alternatively, the difference between the *Satisfaction* and *Sanctification* models might be characterized in terms of what is being purged.²⁹ On the *Satisfaction Model*, what gets purged through the purgatorial process is the penalty for sin or sin itself. By contrast, what gets purged in the *Sanctification Model* is the disposition to sin. For Protestants, the possession of saving faith is sufficient for having sin or the penalty for sin "purged" by virtue of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. Yet, the disposition to sin remains until the process of sanctification is complete. In essence, the *Sanctification Model* of purgatory anticipates the completion of this process. It is forward looking in that its purpose is to provide an occasion for the fulfillment of a future aim. By contrast, the *Satisfaction Model* is backward-looking as its purpose is to provide an occasion for the remission of past failures.

The *Sanctification Model* of purgatory has several important virtues. First, the *Sanctification Model* of purgatory solves the dilemma of sanctification. This is because purgatory makes it possible for the *Lapsable* to become persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the *Sanctified* before enjoying eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. Thus, heaven preserves its essential moral perfection, while the possession of saving faith is maintained as a sufficient condition for eventual eternal union and fellowship with God in heaven. Second, in contrast to provisionism, the mechanism whereby the *Lapsable* become persons who possess the settled virtuous disposition characteristic of the *Sanctified* is not God's unilateral provision at death. Instead, it is a process that comes to completion as a result of its own internal momentum. So, the integrity of the process of sanctification itself is preserved. Moreover, the process of sanctification itself is arguably a good so significant that its internal integrity should not be compromised at an arbitrary point in the process. Thus, God is arguably not morally culpable for the evil that results from the actions of the *Lapsable* since his unilateral action at an arbitrary point in the process of sanctification would compromise the overriding value of the internal integrity of the process itself. Finally, the *Sanctification Model* of purgatory does not undermine the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin. This alleviates at least one standard objection that Protestants might have against purgatory.

§6. Conclusion

I have argued that a certain understanding of the essential moral perfection of heaven coupled with a standard Protestant understanding of the nature of salvation and sanctification gives rise to an apparent philosophical dilemma, the dilemma of sanctification. I have further suggested that the tension created by the dilemma of sanctification can be alleviated by adopting either a provisionist or purgatorial understanding of the manner in which those who possess saving faith are ultimately perfected. At the same time, I have pointed out that provisionism has a price. Provisionism appears to place God in the position of being morally culpable for a certain set of evils. Of course, appearances can be deceiving. Thus, the stalwart Protestant remains within her rational rights to believe that there is a reason that justifies God's unilateral provisions for sanctification at death that does not justify such provisions now. It is simply beyond our ken, a mystery. Still, given that the notion of purgatory would relieve the epistemic pressures borne by provisionism, a doctrine of purgatory might prove useful to Protestant theology.

It perhaps goes without saying that my unadorned, abstract description of the *Sanctification Model* of purgatory raises many questions. For example, those whose conception of purgatory has been shaped by the medieval imagination of Dante might demand further detail about the nature of a purgatorial existence. No doubt, some of the questions raised by the view that I have proposed will prove vital in assessing not only the theological viability of a doctrine of purgatory but also its relative epistemic credibility. These questions must await further exploration. Yet, other questions raised by the view I have proposed will pass beyond the

purview of philosophic investigation into realms best left to poetic imagination. And, in response to questions such as these, I close with the words of the philosopher-poet, C. S. Lewis:

My favourite image on this matter comes from the dentist's chair. I hope that when the tooth of life is drawn and I am "coming round," a voice will say, "Rinse your mouth out with this." *This* will be Purgatory. The rinsing may take longer than I can now imagine. The taste of *this* may be more fiery and astringent than my present sensibility could endure. But More and Fisher shall not persuade me that it will be disgusting and unhallowed.³⁰

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NOTES

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1. However, see David Brown, "No Heaven Without Purgatory," *Religious Studies* 21 (1985): pp. 447–56 and Jerry Walls, *Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy* (New York: Oxford UP, 2002): pp. 51–62. For an abbreviated version of Walls's defense of the doctrine of Purgatory, see Jerry Walls, "Purgatory for Everyone," *First Things* (April 2002): pp. 26–30. For an extensive treatment of the history and development of the doctrine of Purgatory, see Jacques LeGross, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For a recent defense from a Roman Catholic perspective, see Zachary Hayes, "The Purgatorial View," in *Four Views on Hell*, ed. William Crockett (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992).

2. See for example, Wayne Grudem, *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994): pp. 817–19.

3. C. S. Lewis, *Letters to Malcolm: Chiefly on Prayer* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1964): pp. 108–09.

4. Walls, *Heaven*, p. 62.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

6. Although he may have independent reasons for rejecting the forensic view of salvation, Walls's effort to argue that salvation is principally a matter of transformation seems (partly) motivated by a need to employ the notion of transformation as a key premise in his argument for purgatory and ultimately, his view of heaven. My own strategy is to show that even if salvation itself is not essentially transformative in Walls's sense, there are other claims to which Protestants are committed that suggest the necessity of transformation and consequently, support the plausibility of purgatory.

7. In several places Walls writes that for Protestants there are considerations in favor of "something like the traditional doctrine of purgatory" or

"some version of the doctrine of purgatory" [emphasis mine]. Although the whole tenor of Walls's project is such that he would likely reject a traditional Roman Catholic model of purgatory, such remarks as these do not answer the question of whether the traditional Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory is largely correct or fundamentally incompatible with Protestantism. In my view, this constitutes a minor weakness in Walls's defense. For if it turns out that every version of the doctrine of purgatory is incompatible with some other cornerstone of Protestant theology, then there would be good reason to reject the doctrine of purgatory even if it seemed consistent with some aspects of Protestantism. My paper offers a corrective to this shortcoming.

8. Nothing in my argument hinges upon whether heaven is actually a place as such, as opposed to a state of existence or being. I refer to heaven as "a place" as a matter of linguistic convenience.

9. Rev. 21.3–4 ESV.

10. Against the suggestion that evil did exist in heaven at one point (when Satan and his cohorts rebelled against God), see James Sennett, "Is There Freedom in Heaven?," *Faith and Philosophy* 16 (1999): pp. 69–82. In response to this suggestion, Sennett offers this observation. "[T]raditional theism in no way entails the story of a Satanic fall, and there are serious questions about whether or not it even represents good biblical exegesis. (A seminary professor of mine once remarked that we owe our conception of Satan much more to John Milton than to any biblical sources.)" p. 80n4.

11. It is worth noting that such a response has at least some biblical support. The reference in Revelation 21:1 to a "new heaven" might be taken as suggestive of a "heaven" that is entirely discontinuous with the one in which a Satanic fall might have occurred.

12. Erickson, p. 968.

13. *Heaven*, p. 53.

14. In an earlier draft of this paper, I considered another view common among Protestants in the Wesleyan tradition. I called this view "perfectionism." According to perfectionism, it is possible for those who truly possess saving faith to experience complete sanctification before death. Thus, the essential moral perfection of heaven is preserved since there are no lapsable persons in heaven. Philosophically, perfectionism constitutes a viable solution to the dilemma of sanctification. However, given the evident reality that many, if not most, who possess saving faith arguably die without having experienced complete sanctification, perfectionism seems to entail that the "narrow gate" is suffocatingly narrow. Whether this consequence constitutes a virtue or a vice of perfectionism is a matter best left to Protestant theologians. Hence, I'll here set perfectionism aside in order to focus on the philosophical difficulties with provisionism—a view more common in the Reformed tradition.

15. Part of the reason that I do not pursue this argument here is because similar arguments have been explored in Brown. However, I should add that while I agree with the substance of Brown's arguments, the details warrant further exploration and clarification. See also John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966): p. 383.

16. Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977): pp. 20–21.

17. Sennett, p. 70.

18. This is because if it is possible for God to create a world containing a maximal amount of goods (i.e., heaven) that lacks both evil and morally significant libertarian freedom, then God is morally culpable for failing to make the actual world such a world.

19. For a fuller explication of the proximate conception of freedom, see Sennett, pp. 73–75.

20. In making this assumption, I follow Walls, *Heaven*, p. 205n77.
21. Sennett, pp. 77–78.
22. I thank Robin Collins for this suggestion.
23. Luke 16.30–31 ESV.
24. Some might find it odd to suggest that the process of sanctification has its “own internal momentum.” After all, it is a process that is influenced (perhaps even governed) by a complex interplay of largely external factors: e.g., the circumstances in which one finds oneself, the action(s) of the Holy Spirit, the admonition of fellow believers, etc. However, despite the influence of external factors, it is plausible to think of processes as having their own internal momentum. Consider almost any example from biology: the process by which an acorn becomes an oak, the process of photosynthesis, the process by which a caterpillar becomes a butterfly.
25. What would beg the question against provisionism is the assumption that there is no point at which God’s unilateral action would be justified.
26. This model was reaffirmed at the Council of Trent in 1563.
27. Quoted from <http://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/FLORENCE.HTM#3>
28. Bk. III, chap. v., sect. 6. Quoted from <http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/institutes/bookiii/bkiii09.htm>
29. I owe this suggestion to James Sennett.
30. Lewis, p. 109.