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RITUAL KNOWLEDGE

Terence Cuneo

Most work in religious epistemology has concerned itself with propositional knowledge of God. In this essay, I explore the role of knowing how to engage God in the religious life. Specifically, I explore the role of knowing how to engage God in the context of ritualized liturgical activity, exploring the contribution that knowing how to perform liturgical rites of various sorts can make to knowing God. The thesis I defend is that the liturgy provides both activities of certain kinds and conceptions of God such that knowing how to perform those activities under those conceptions is a species of what I call ritual knowledge.

Christian belief has faced and continues to face no shortage of challenges. Some challenges are broadly internal, generated by the Christian tradition itself. An example of such a challenge would be the controversy that animated the fourth-century discussion regarding what to believe of the person of Jesus. Other challenges, by contrast, are broadly external, typically generated not by the Christian tradition itself, but by those who stand outside of it. An example of such a challenge would be the charge that death cannot be due to human sin, as the Christian scriptures teach, since long before there were human beings who could sin, other animals suffered and died, often at remarkable rates.

The contemporary discussion of the epistemology of religious belief is driven by not an internal but an external challenge. While the challenge takes a variety of forms, each of its versions accuses religious belief of being epistemically defective in some way: irrational, unjustified, unwarranted, or the like. Over the last twenty-five years, this challenge has met stiff resistance. According to the resisters, it is not religious belief that is defective but the challenge itself. For nearly always, the resisters maintain, the challenge incorporates a commitment to inflated or otherwise unacceptable accounts of what epistemically meritorious beliefs would be. Given a more nearly adequate account of what such beliefs would be—so the resisters continue—we can see that religious beliefs can and often do exhibit epistemic merits such as being entitled, justified, warranted, and the like.¹

¹The most prominent work of the resisters includes William P. Alston, *Perceiving God* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds.,



The project of responding to this external challenge strikes me as eminently worthwhile. We have learned a great deal about what it is for beliefs to exhibit epistemic merits from it. But the project also carries risks. One such risk is that, in focusing almost exclusively on this external challenge to religious belief, philosophers have paid insufficient attention to both the variety and the roles of the religious attitudes, neglecting to ask questions about their character and purpose in the religious life. The result is often a lopsided picture of religious life “on the ground.”

Let me illustrate what I mean. In his book *Warranted Christian Belief*, Alvin Plantinga develops an account of religious belief-formation that he calls the Aquinas/Calvin or “A/C” model. According to the A/C model, we human beings are endowed with an array of epistemic faculties, among which is the *sensus divinitatis* or “sense of the divine.” Like our other indigenous epistemic faculties, the *sensus divinitatis* operates according to a design plan, which is itself calibrated to form true beliefs in congenial circumstances. When the *sensus divinitatis* operates according to its design plan in such circumstances, it yields warranted religious beliefs and, indeed, religious knowledge.

How does the *sensus divinitatis* yield such beliefs? According to the A/C model, it does so when various types of experiences occasion beliefs with theistic content. For example, when you or I contemplate the starry skies above, we might find ourselves forming the belief *that God is the designer of the universe*. Or, to enrich the model somewhat, when you or I hear the Gospel proclaimed, we might find ourselves forming the belief *that Christ has atoned for the sins of humanity*. What distinguishes beliefs of this last kind from beliefs of the former kind is not simply their distinctively Christian content. If Plantinga is right, these specifically Christian beliefs can also be viewed as having been evoked by divine action, what Plantinga calls (following Aquinas) the “internal instigation of the Holy Spirit.”² Plantinga is quick to emphasize that all this is merely a *model* of religious-belief formation in the paradigmatic case. Still, he also maintains that were Christian theism true, it would be unsurprising if something close to the A/C model (in both its generic theistic and expanded Christian form) were to capture the way in which things actually go for many religious believers.³

Two features of the A/C model leap to the eye. The first is that human agency seems to play almost no role in the formation of warranted religious belief. When, for example, Plantinga presents cases in which ordinary people might form religious beliefs, these people hardly do anything. For

Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); Alvin Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Swinburne, *Faith and Reason*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Reason within the Bounds of Religion*, 2nd edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984) and *Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2*, ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief*, chaps. 8–9.

³*Ibid.*, 285.

their beliefs to be formed, they need do only such things as look up into the starry sky above or hear the Gospel proclaimed, at least in congenial circumstances. At no point does the A/C model hint at the fact that, in the paradigmatic case, religious beliefs might be the fruit of extended effort, including engaging in those activities that are so often central to religious life, such as prayer, meditation, fasting, and what the Eastern Fathers call “watchfulness.”⁴ Nor, for that matter, does the model hint at the fact that these practical activities might play a crucial role in determining whether religious beliefs enjoy warrant. *Warranted Christian Belief* includes an entire chapter dedicated to the topic of the cognitive consequences of sin. Still, it never broaches the topic of whether engaging in the religious disciplines might be the very sort of activity that removes various impediments to (or abets) the proper working of the *sensus divinitatis*. As the A/C model presents things, these activities seem merely to be that which *occasion* the formation of warranted religious beliefs but not that which *determine* (even partially) whether these beliefs are warranted.

The second striking feature of the A/C model is that it presents the outputs of the *sensus divinitatis* as beliefs whose objects are propositions concerning God (or God’s activity), such as *that God is the designer of the universe* or *that Christ has atoned for the sins of humanity*. Plantinga develops the idea that, in the paradigmatic case, when these beliefs constitute religious faith, they are accompanied by conative states of various sorts, such as desiring and enjoying God’s presence. The paradigm case of religious faith, says Plantinga, is “sure and certain knowledge” of God that is “sealed to the heart . . . in the having of the right sorts of affections.”⁵ Taken at face value, this formulation tells us that the role of the affections in faith is to cement or more deeply entrench the state of knowing various propositions about God.

I think we should find this striking. When, for example, the writer of *Hebrews* presents to the reader what it is to have faith, he presents what are not primarily reports regarding the mental lives of persons of faith but *action narratives*, stories of what these people have done. These narratives suggest that paradigmatic religious faith consists not merely or even primarily in a person’s being certain of propositions regarding God (or having certain affections that seal this knowledge) but rather in his being practically oriented toward the world in certain ways, such as being disposed to engage in acts of gratitude toward God.⁶

⁴See the section attributed to St. Hesychios the Priest (ca. eighth–ninth century) in G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, *The Philokalia*, Vol. 1 (London: Faber and Faber, 1979), 162.

⁵See *Warranted Christian Belief*, 291, 323.

⁶Although Plantinga comes close to entertaining a more expansive account of faith on page 293, it’s clear that his eye is on not the role of acting, but the role of the affections in faith: the “difference between believer and devil . . . lies in the area of *affections*” (ibid.). For reasons that will emerge later in this discussion, this seems to me incorrect.

My purpose in making these observations is, as I say, not to pour cold water on the contemporary discussion of the religious attitudes. Nor is it to suggest that the A/C model could not be amended to accommodate these observations. It is rather to illustrate the point that, by largely omitting the practical dimensions of the religious life, the contemporary discussion threatens to offer a distorted picture of the religious attitudes and, more generally, what it is to be a religious believer. Given the character of Christianity, it could not be otherwise. Christianity is not a body of propositions. Its fundamental aim is not to produce agents that form warranted beliefs about God. Nor is its aim to increase the likelihood that its adherents will have mystical experiences of God. Christianity is, rather, a way of life that is thoroughly practical. It is dedicated to *engaging* God in various ways by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God—activities about which, I should add, philosophers have said virtually nothing.

Although the aim of the Christian way of life is practical, there is nevertheless a perfectly good sense in which it aims to provide knowledge of God. But the knowledge in question, I suggest, is often not knowledge *that* one or another proposition regarding God is true but knowledge *how* to engage and live in communion with God. “If you wish to behold and commune with Him who is beyond sense perception and concept,” writes the fourth-century monastic Evagrius of Pontikos, then you must engage in such activities as prayer, singing the Psalms, giving alms, and engaging in the rites of the church.⁷ Under the approach that Evagrius advocates, knowing God is fundamentally a practical activity.

Appreciating this point about the practical aim of the Christian way of life, I believe, opens up new vistas in the epistemology of the religious attitudes. For it helps to bring together two sides of the Christian tradition that do not often meet in contemporary philosophical discussion. On the one hand is the insistence, which lies deep in the Christian tradition, that the Christian way of life includes as one of its central components ritualized activity, such as participating in the liturgical actions of the church. Gregory of Nyssa voices this conviction when he writes that the power of Christianity resides not in its philosophical sophistication but in the “power of regeneration by faith” and the “participation in mystical symbols and rites.”⁸ On the other hand is the conviction that a central aim of the Christian life is not to theorize about God but to know God. Were we to view knowing God as (in part) a species of practical knowledge, this would—or so I suggest—help us to see how these two sides of the Christian tradition fit together. It would allow us to see that knowing how to engage in ritualized activity is, when all goes well, a way in which we know God.

⁷*The Philokalia*, Vol. 1, 57.

⁸Gregory of Nyssa, *From Glory to Glory: Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings*, selected and with an introduction by Jean Daniélou S. J. (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1979), 18.

This last claim does not wear its meaning on its face, so let me unpack it. When I speak of knowing God, I have in mind a considerably broader notion of knowing than that employed by most epistemologists, who tend to think of knowledge as a species of knowing that or having acquaintance with an object. The sense of knowing that I have in mind is not easy to articulate, but it is probably best described as *being in rapport* with someone. When one is in rapport with another, one does not simply enjoy some sort of privileged epistemic contact with that person. One also knows how to engage that person and, often, what that person cares about. In this respect, the concept of knowing with which I am working belongs more nearly to a cluster of virtue-theoretic notions according to which knowing someone is not only a mode of understanding but also an achievement, typically accomplished only with time, familiarity, effort, and discernment. It goes without saying that knowing of this sort is often implicit—one needn't be able to articulate one's know-how—and acquired by osmosis when participating in practices in which such know-how is modeled by others. Under this understanding, then, the dictum that knowing God is a species of practical knowledge is the claim that knowing God (in the sense just specified) consists in (although is not exhausted by) knowing how to engage God.⁹

My project in this paper is to explore the contribution that knowing how to engage in ritualized activity plays in knowing God (in the sense just specified). Specifically, it is to explore the contribution that knowing how to engage in ritualized *liturgical* activity makes to knowing God (in the sense just specified). Engaging in this project will, however, require laying some conceptual groundwork. I'll begin by discussing the notion of knowing how, staking out a position on this issue that seems to me plausible. I'll then turn to the ancient Christian liturgies, developing the idea that it is by participating in these activities that we acquire and exercise ritual knowledge, which is a type of knowing how. In my judgment, it is not helpful to discuss Christian liturgical practices in the abstract. So, I shall focus on a liturgical tradition in which the theme of practical knowledge of God is especially prominent, namely, the Eastern Christian tradition in which figures such as Evagrius and Nyssa developed their own views. However, much of what I say about the Eastern liturgies can, I believe, be applied to other liturgical traditions in which ritualized forms of action are prominent.

It might be worth adding a final observation before diving into our topic. When compared to mainline philosophy of religion, my discussion will be thoroughly unorthodox. I will have almost nothing (more) to

⁹A word about how I am using the phrase "to engage God." We engage those around us in all manner of ways: by catching their attention, addressing them, and embracing them, for example. What these various activities have in common is that, when all goes well, they effect mutual recognition. I am using the phrase "to engage God" in a way that analogically extends our ordinary understanding of what it is to engage another. It is, when all goes well, to effect a state of divine-human mutual recognition.

say, for example, about the rationality of religious belief. And I will have a good deal to say about various elements of Christian ritual. In these respects, my discussion has something in common with the approach taken by so-called Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion, who have chided philosophers for paying insufficient attention to the fact that the religious attitudes are embedded in and have their distinctive roles in religious ways of life. Still, unlike the Wittgensteinians, I have no interest in defending a noncognitivist account of the religious attitudes, according to which the religious attitudes fail to express full-fledged beliefs about God.¹⁰ In my view, the religious attitudes come in a great variety of forms, including full-fledged religious belief. It is also my view that full-fledged belief needn't be a component of knowing how to dwell in communion with God, but this is a topic that I will broach only at the end of this paper.

I. Knowing How

Suppose Christianity is a way of life, incorporating activities such as prayer, fasting, and ritualized activity. If it is, then the thesis that some religious knowledge is (to some significant degree) a species of knowing how should have immediate appeal. For to engage in a way of life is to have a certain kind of competence or know-how. But what is it to know how to do something, to engage in those activities that constitute a way of life?

In this section, I sketch what seems to me a promising account of what it is to know how to do something. For reasons that will become apparent soon, I will call this position the *moderate view*. Roughly stated, the moderate view tells us that to know how to perform some activity Φ ing is to stand in a knowing or understanding relation to a way of Φ ing.¹¹

In the next few sections, I will conduct my discussion as if something close to the moderate view is correct. Nonetheless, I do not want the general project in which I engage—namely, to explore the contribution that knowing how to engage in ritualized liturgical activity makes to knowing God—to depend on the particularities of the moderate position. So, those unsympathetic with the moderate position—say, those who identify knowing how with a special sort of knowing that—should feel free to attempt to translate what I say into the idioms that belong to their favored version of knowing how. Let me also add that, although I will speak as if I am unpacking *the* concept of knowing how, it might be that there are multiple conceptions of knowing how. Some might be very thin, expressing

¹⁰The most thorough engagement with the Wittgensteinians of which I am aware is Wolterstorff, "Are Religious Believers Committed to the Existence of God?" (chap. 13 of his *Practices of Belief*).

¹¹This is the view defended in John Bengson and Marc Moffett, "Nonpropositional Intellectualism," in *Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action*, ed. John Bengson and Marc Moffett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161–195. In what follows, I borrow liberally from their fine paper. I have also been helped by Alva Noë, "Ideology and the Third Realm (Or, a Short Essay on Knowing How to Philosophize)," in Bengson and Moffett *Knowing How*.

the idea that knowing how to perform an activity is simply a matter of being able to perform it. Others might be thicker, expressing the idea that knowing how to perform an activity requires a lot more than this, such as understanding what one is doing. As will become evident, the moderate view expresses a thicker notion of knowing how (although there are accounts that are still thicker). If you prefer to work with a thinner concept of knowing how, then think of the moderate view as one that articulates a fairly advanced state of knowing how. Finally, I should emphasize that my aim is simply to sketch the main features of the moderate view so as to have an account of knowing how with which to work. A full presentation of the view would introduce nuances and refinements that I am going to ignore.

The Moderate View

The best way to understand the moderate view is to begin with the notion of a *way of acting*. A way of acting is a sequence of act-types that an agent can perform. Performing a work of music, swimming the crawl stroke, and offering thanks are all ways of acting. If, for example, an agent knows how to perform a work of music or offer thanks to God, that agent grasps a way of acting that is a way of performing that work of music or thanking God. If this is right, knowing how to perform an action is a species of objectual knowledge, having as its object not a proposition but a way of acting.

The thesis that knowing how is not a species of propositional knowledge or knowing that is controversial. Here, however, are several considerations in its favor. First, note that when an agent knows a proposition, this relation can be “upgraded” in certain ways. If you are in excellent epistemic position with regard to the proposition *that your mother’s maiden name is “Smith,”* for example, you might say, “I not only know that her maiden name is ‘Smith,’ but I’m also certain of it.” Knowing how, by contrast, cannot be upgraded in this way. When you know how to engage in an activity such as performing John Coltrane’s “Giant Steps,” you wouldn’t say, “I not only know how to perform ‘Giant Steps,’ I am also certain of it.” This is because when knowing how gets upgraded, it is often upgraded to the level of not certainty but *mastery*. When you are in excellent position with regard to performing an activity such that you know how to perform it, you would say, “I not only know how to perform ‘Giant Steps,’ but I’ve also mastered it.”¹²

¹²See Bengson and Moffett, “Nonpropositional Intellectualism,” 184. I say that knowing how is “often” upgraded in this way because one could distinguish between *excellence* in knowing how and *mastery* in knowing how. As I understand this distinction, one has excellence in knowing how to act in some way when one has understood to a sufficiently high degree how to act in that way. This is compatible, however, with not being able to act in that way. I could, for example, have excellence in knowing how to swim the crawl stroke, since I know all its ins and outs, but be too uncoordinated to perform it well. By contrast, one has mastery in knowing how when one has excellence in knowing how to act in some way and can perform that activity well.

A second consideration in favor of the claim that knowing how is objectual is that states of knowing how are not susceptible to Gettier-style cases in the way that states of knowing that are. Suppose, for example, I am a pianist who wishes to perform "Giant Steps." I consult a written score that I recently purchased, thereby grasping how to play the piece. Suppose, though, that I were extraordinarily lucky to consult this particular score, since all other available written scores are defective on account of including badly incorrect information regarding how to play the piece, such as including the wrong time signature and melody. Although I am very lucky to have the correct score, I know how to perform "Giant Steps" nonetheless. The fact that I was lucky enough to hit upon the correct score seems irrelevant to whether I have come to know how to perform the piece. This is in sharp contrast to the standard way in which philosophers think of knowing that. When an agent knows that something is the case, most philosophers believe, it cannot be due to a fluke, but must have been the upshot of a reliable belief-forming process operating in a congenial environment.¹³

These are, I believe, important considerations in favor of the moderate view's thesis that knowing how is not a species of knowing that. Still, knowing how to perform some action, such as performing Coltrane's "Giant Steps," requires more than merely grasping or apprehending that way of acting, as an agent's grasp or understanding of a way of acting can be deficient in several important respects.

Consider the following pair of cases. Imagine, first, a case in which I have not previously performed "Giant Steps," but gotten my hands on a score of this piece. If my copy of this score is incomplete in important respects, leaving out vital information about how to perform this piece, such as how to play its head, then I do not know how to perform it. Although there are actions that constitute performing this piece of music, they are unavailable to me. Alternatively, imagine a case in which I know how to perform some activity, such as playing a chord progression that consists in a progression of minor thirds, but I am unaware that performing that very activity is a way to perform the chord progression of "Giant Steps." If so, while I grasp a way of acting that is in fact a way to perform this work, I do not know how to perform it.

Not all deficiencies, however, are ones in which an agent's understanding of a way of acting is incomplete, as an agent's grasp of a way of acting can be deficient when it incorporates a mistaken understanding of how to perform that action. To stay with our example, suppose that I have been instructed to perform "Giant Steps" in 6/8 time and in the key of C#. Imagine, furthermore, that while I take myself to be doing exactly what I have been taught when I perform the piece, I in fact perform it in 4/4 time and visit several different tonal centers, which is the correct way

¹³The case is borrowed from Yuri Cath, "Knowing How Without Knowing That," in Bengson and Moffett, *Knowing How*.

to perform the piece. Do I know how to perform the piece? Arguably not. I have a mistaken understanding of how to perform it, since I am confused about its time signature and key. While I might in fact perform the piece correctly, I do not know how to perform it.

If this is right, for an agent to know how to perform some action, that agent's understanding of it must satisfy some threshold of completeness and accuracy. What is that threshold? It may be impossible to say. Indeed, the issue may be context sensitive, as so-called contextualists about knowledge claim. However that may be, let me now make several observations about the moderate view.

First, if knowing how to perform an action requires having a sufficiently complete and accurate understanding of a way of acting, knowing how to do something is not simply a matter of being reliably disposed to do it, as philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle claimed.¹⁴ The moderate view, then, is aptly titled, as it implies that knowing how is neither a species of knowing that nor a matter of being reliably disposed to act in a certain way. For, to say it once again, the moderate view implies that knowing how to do something implies having a sufficient degree of understanding concerning how to do something. Second, while the moderate view tells us that knowing how to perform an activity implies having a certain type and degree of understanding of that activity, the view does not imply that knowing how to perform an activity implies that one can actually perform it. It may be that one can know how to perform "Giant Steps" even when one has suffered paralysis. Nor, finally, does the moderate view imply that knowing how to perform some activity implies that one is able to articulate how to perform it. Knowing how to do something can be implicit.

To this point, I have spoken of knowing how to perform relatively discrete actions such as performing the musical work "Giant Steps." Often, however, these ways of acting are embedded in complex social practices, such as the social practice of playing jazz piano, which have their own histories, standards of excellence, and methods of evaluation. And, often, knowing how to perform some activity is part of the larger endeavor of learning how to engage in and navigate these social practices. Take, for example, the social practice just mentioned, namely, performing jazz piano. To be inducted into this practice involves learning not simply how to perform various musical works, such as works by Coltrane, but also learning how to listen to them—noticing their nuances and differences from one another. It involves, moreover, knowing how to interpret musical scores, motifs, chord progressions, and rhythmic patterns in such a way that one develops a certain degree of facility with performing musical works in the genre. Importantly, for my purposes, knowing how to engage in the practice of performing jazz piano involves knowing not only how to evaluate compositions and performances, but also how to engage with works of

¹⁴See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949).

music in such a way that one cares about how they are interpreted and performed. All this suggests that the best way to talk about the complex phenomenon that I am describing is probably not to speak of it as knowing how to navigate a social practice, so much as knowing how to navigate and inhabit a certain *life-world*—the world of jazz piano. For the latter way of talking has the advantage of conveying the idea that there is a musical reality with which one engages when one navigates a social practice.

Let me summarize: knowing how to perform some activity is, according to the moderate view, to stand in an understanding relation to a way of performing that activity. Knowing how is thus neither a species of knowing that nor merely a disposition to perform some action correctly. While understanding is crucial to knowing how, it is exceedingly difficult to identify some threshold of completeness and correctness that an agent's grasp of a way of acting must satisfy to count as a case of knowing how. Finally, the ways of acting that we grasp when we know how to perform them are often embedded in complex social practices. Because they are, the aim of knowing how is often not simply knowing how to perform relatively discrete activities but knowing how to navigate and inhabit a certain life-world of which these activities are a part. This last point will be important to the discussion of the Christian liturgy, which is my topic in the next section.

II. Liturgy

To the untrained eye, the ancient liturgies of the Christian East are a jumble of disconnected actions. Were you to observe one for the first time, you would see people doing such things as kissing, standing, bowing, prostrating, chanting, singing, anointing, processing, praying, kneeling, sensing, reading, listening, eating, washing, vesting, crossing themselves, and even spitting. With increased exposure, you would also recognize that, in many cases, these are not impromptu or improvised but scripted actions.

Call a repeatable sequence of actions that has a narrative structure—roughly, a proper beginning, middle, and end bound together in certain identifiable ways—a *narrative event*.¹⁵ Everything from family dinners to works of music are, according to this understanding, narrative events. Narrative events often have performance-plans or scripts. And when they do, these scripts can issue two rather different types of directives. They can prescribe, first, that some narrative event-type is to be performed on some regular basis, such as once a year, once a week, or once a day. Second, they can prescribe when, during the performance of that narrative event-type, which actions are to be performed, by whom, and in what manner. For example, a script might prescribe that bells are to be rung at the outset of the performance of a musical work.

¹⁵Thus understood, the concept of a narrative event is normative. It has appropriate beginnings and endings bound together in the right ways. While I will have to leave discussion of the senses of “appropriate” to some other occasion, Noël Carroll, “Narrative Closure,” in his *Art in Three Dimensions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) is a good place to start.

Call a script that issues both sorts of directives a *ritual script*. In the sense I understand it, a *ritualized action* is one that is prescribed by a ritual script. The actions that constitute the liturgies of the Eastern Christian Church are, under this account, ritualized. For not only are these liturgies repeatable narrative event-types; the scripts that govern them also issue both sorts of directives, indicating when these narrative events are to be performed and when, during their performance, which actions are to be performed, by whom, and in what manner. The script that governs the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, for example, prescribes that it is to be performed every Sunday (and at most once per day by some assembly). It also prescribes that when this liturgy is performed, it begins with a Trinitarian blessing. Both the performance of the liturgy itself and the various actions that constitute it are, under the account offered, ritualized actions.

The Christian tradition has long stressed the importance of ritualized actions. I noted earlier that, at one point, Gregory of Nyssa writes that the power of Christianity resides not in its philosophical sophistication but in the "participation in mystical symbols and rites." I have also suggested that there is an important sense in which knowing how to perform ritualized activities contributes to knowing God. But how could that be so? It is easy enough to see that knowing how to play a certain chord progression could positively contribute to knowing how to play a musical work, since playing that chord progression might count as playing that musical work. But how could knowing how to perform ritualized actions such as kissing, prostrating, and eating contribute to knowing God in any similar way?

The answer that I will develop comes in several stages. In outline, it tells us that the liturgy furnishes both a strikingly wide array of ritual actions and ways of understanding them such that, when all goes well, knowing how to perform these actions under these ways of understanding contributes in important ways to knowing God. Since the first stage concerns the performance of ritualized actions, let us start with these. I will then go on to discuss conceptions of God as they are presented in the liturgy.

Liturgical Actions

At one level of description, the actions that constitute the liturgy, such as prostrating, kissing, chanting, and eating, are diverse enough that one would be hard-pressed to discern what unites them; they look like a rag-bag of different activities. At another level, however, these actions are not disconnected but unified in a certain way, being the constituents of an identifiable pattern. This pattern, which is primarily constituted by the activities of blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God, is what I will refer to as the *central pattern* of the liturgy. Since the central pattern is especially apparent in the eucharistic liturgies of the Eastern church, especially those of St. Mark, St. Basil, and St. Chrysostom, let us take a closer look at the way it takes shape in them.

Each of these liturgies begins with the declaration that the Kingdom of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is blessed. After the celebrant declares this, the deacon, priest, and people engage in a pattern of call and response. In the liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom, for example, a Deacon offers a series of petitions for peace and safety:

For the peace from on high and for the salvation of our souls, let us pray to the Lord.

For the peace of the whole world, for the welfare of the holy churches of God, and for the union of all, let us pray to the Lord. . . .

For travelers by land, by sea, and by air; for the sick and the suffering, for captives and their safety and salvation, let us pray to the Lord.¹⁶

To each of these petitions, the people answer “kyrie eleison” or “Lord, Have Mercy.” Having completed this initial series of petitions, the congregation sings Psalm 103 (“Bless the Lord, O my Soul”), which is followed by a petition for deliverance. This, in turn, is followed by the singing of Psalm 143 (“Praise the Lord, O my Soul”). Although punctuated by the reading of the scriptures, the commemoration of the saints, and various prayers of repentance, this pattern of petitioning and blessing continues throughout the liturgy, segueing into a sequence of actions in which the people offer thanks to God, which itself culminates in the action of eating together. In its structure, the analogue that comes to mind is that of a work of music, such as a rondo. Much like a rondo, the liturgy introduces themes—and variations on themes—in an alternating structure, punctuating them at certain points with still other themes. (Perhaps there is another sense in which the liturgy is the work of the people!)

It is tempting for philosophers to think of activities such as blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God as things that we primarily do with words. But in this case the temptation must be resisted. While the liturgical script prescribes the performance of linguistic acts that count as blessing, petitioning, and thanking, it also prescribes actions such as kissing, prostrating, and eating. Actions of these latter sorts do not merely *accompany* the linguistic acts prescribed by the liturgical script, as if their function were merely to add emphasis to these linguistic acts. Rather, in the context of the liturgy, the kissing, prostrating, and eating also count as cases of engaging God by blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. In fact, these bodily actions are vivid cases of act-types by which a person can simultaneously perform multiple actions with expressive import without saying a thing. In the context of the liturgy, for example, prostrating is often simultaneously an act of petitioning, repenting, blessing, and offering thanks. Likewise, in the context of the liturgy, kissing is often simultaneously an act of greeting, blessing, adoring, and thanking. I should

¹⁶I am using the translation of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom found in Thyateira, *The Divine Liturgy of our Father Among the Saints John Chrysostom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

add that the act of eating, which stands at the center of all the eucharistic liturgies, is understood to be not simply one expression of thanksgiving among others. Rather, it is understood to be the paradigmatic case of expressing thanks to God.

The central pattern of the liturgy, I have said, is constituted by acts of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. Actions such as these have expressive import, since their function is not to state propositions but to express respect, affection, gratitude, and the like. Let me make a pair of observations about actions with expressive import.

The first is that there is no type of mental state such that for an agent to successfully perform an action with expressive import, that agent must be in that mental state. Thanking, when all goes well, expresses gratitude. But to thank someone at some time, one needn't be feeling gratitude at that time. Honoring, when all goes well, expresses respect. But to honor another at some time, one needn't have any thoughts to the effect that the recipient of one's action has worth of one or another sort.¹⁷

Call that which is expressed by the competent performance of an action with expressive import, its *expressive content*.¹⁸ The second point I would like to make is that the expressive content of an action can be evaluated along different dimensions of fittingness. Consider thanking, for example. Suppose I write you a note thanking you for a gift that you have given me. If the writing of this note is accompanied by feelings of gratitude toward you, the expressive content of my action perfectly fits the mental state I am in when I write the note. As such, the performance of my action is especially apt.

Things might be otherwise, however. I might write the note while being deeply resentful toward you. If I do, then my action's expressive content fails to fit the mental state I am in when I write the note. It is thus an especially inapt or defective case of thanking. Between the two extremes of feeling gratitude and resentment are, of course, various other grades of aptness. Thanking can be done absent-mindedly, mechanically, reluctantly, indifferently, or with one's focus entirely on performing the action well, such as when one focuses on what words to say because choosing them carefully matters a great deal. When agents are in these mental states, these actions can be more or less apt. Especially important for my purposes is the observation that actions with expressive import can enjoy high degrees of fittingness even when the expressive content of those actions fails to fit the mental states of the agents who perform them. I might, for example, form and reliably execute the resolution to write

¹⁷What about the state of intending to perform an action of that sort? Isn't that a mental state one must be in to perform an act of the relevant kind? Perhaps, but I doubt it. I hint at why at the outset of the next section.

¹⁸Philosophers often distinguish between the semantic content of the performance of a speech act (roughly, what is said, its propositional content) and what is pragmatically conveyed (information not contained in what is said but conveyed nonetheless). I use the phrase "expressive content" to capture both sorts of content.

your family a thank you note every year because of some great kindness they performed toward my family before I was alive. But I may often fail to feel gratitude when I write them; their actions may seem so remote in time that they fail to engage me emotionally. Still, arguably, my actions of thanking are highly apt. They are not apt because their expressive content fits the mental state I am in when I write these notes. Rather, they are apt because they are appropriate responses to what you have done on my family's behalf, which flows from a state of being resolved to express my family's gratitude.

The first thing to notice about the eucharistic liturgies, then, is that they make available a vast array of actions by which—and a context in which—we can do such things as bless, petition, and offer thanks to God—actions that can be assessed along various dimensions of fittingness.

Liturgical Images

It is one thing to perform an action that counts as expressing thanks; it is another to know how to do so. In the context of the Eastern liturgies, small children perform actions such as kissing a copy of the Gospels and eating the eucharistic meal. Arguably, in that context, their actions count as cases of offering thanks to God. But these children do not know how to thank God by doing such things as kissing a copy of the Gospels. It is noteworthy, then, that the actions that constitute the liturgy do not stand alone. The liturgical script furnishes an equally wide array of images for thinking about or conceiving of God and God's activity that are connected with these actions—images that often pull against one another in puzzling and striking ways. Here is a sample.

Just prior to the Trinitarian blessing that begins the eucharistic liturgies, the celebrant offers the Trisagion prayers. These prayers, which are a rare instance of a prayer whose primary addressee is the Holy Spirit, begin with the invocation:

O heavenly King, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, who is everywhere, filling all things; Treasury of Good and Giver of Life, come and dwell in us, cleanse us from every stain, and save us, O Good One. (Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom)

This fairly abstract presentation of God as the One Who Fills All Things is given an even more pronounced expression in the Anaphora ("the lifting up"), which occurs immediately prior to the eucharistic meal. In the Anaphora, the assembled address God in the following way:

It is right and fitting to hymn you, to bless you, to praise you, to give thanks to you, and to worship you in every place of your dominion: for you are God ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and eternally the same.

This is apophaticism in high gear. God is addressed as the utterly Transcendent One. Yet the liturgical script repeatedly juxtaposes these descriptions with a very different set of images that presents God as the

Immanent One, “the lover of humankind” who has acted in history. For example, soon after addressing God using the description quoted above, the assembled address God as the “Helper of the helpless, the Hope of the hopeless, the Saviour of the storm-tossed, the Haven of the voyager, the Healer of the sick.” The One who “did not turn away” from Creation, Ruler of Heaven and Earth, Author of Life, Conqueror of Death, The One Who Holds All Things Together—the list of images of God in the liturgical script continues on and on.

A moment ago, I noted that the liturgies make available a vast array of actions by which (and a context in which) we can do such things as petition, bless, and express thanks to God. I now want to emphasize that they furnish not only these act-types and contexts, but also a rich array of conceptions regarding God and God’s activity that agents can incorporate into a “mental file”—this being, roughly, a system of conceptions that an agent has with respect to an object, a repository of information that an agent takes to be about it, some items of which play a dominant role in an agent’s thinking about it. These informational components allow agents not simply to think of God and God’s activity in various ways, but also to perform liturgical actions such as chanting the Psalms, kissing a copy of the Gospels, or eating the eucharistic meal *under* these conceptions. Think of things this way: these conceptions provide specific ways of thinking about God and God’s activity such as the One Who Delivers, the One Who Fills All Things, and the One who “did not cease to do all things on our behalf” (Liturgy of St. Basil). When all goes well, these conceptions of God are incorporated into complex action-conceptions. When they are, agents conceptualize act-types such as prostrating before an icon of Christ as a case of petitioning the One Who Delivers, blessing the One Who Fills All Things, and thanking the One who “did not cease to do all things on our behalf.” In this way, the grasp and employment of these complex-action conceptions *guides* liturgical action.

There is a great deal of controversy over how to think about how the term “God” functions in religious discourse in the monotheistic traditions—whether, for example, it functions as a proper name or a cluster of definite descriptions. One view, which is defended by Mark Johnston, is that the name functions as an abbreviated title: The One from Whom Our Salvation Flows.¹⁹ If Johnston is right about this, then one could think of

¹⁹See Mark Johnston, *Saving God* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), chap. 1. I should add that I find Johnston’s case that “God” does not function as a proper name unconvincing. Johnston writes: “In the scriptures, no one actually turns up and says anything like ‘I am to be called by the name “God.”’ No one says anything like ‘I hereby introduce the name “God” as the name of THIS very impressive being.’ There is no original dubbing someone or something as ‘God,’ a dubbing we can hope to fall back on” (6). But it is highly controversial that such dubbings are necessary for a term to function as a proper name. Moreover, one would have to have an extraordinarily pinched understanding of how the scriptures function in the theistic traditions to infer that, since the scriptures do not contain a record of any such episode, the best way to understand the scriptural talk of God is that there has been no such episode.

the various conceptions of God presented by the liturgical script as specifications of this title or name, indicating ways in which God is the highest one or ways in which God has acted as the agent of salvation. Under this way of thinking, the conceptions of God presented in the liturgy, while incredibly diverse, are united (in part) by the fact that they are specifications of or variations on this title—the title itself being an abbreviated way of thinking about God’s role in the Christian salvation narrative.

Let me summarize the line of thought that I have developed in this section. The Eastern eucharistic liturgies, I have claimed, are constituted by a vast array of scripted or ritualized actions, such as chanting Psalms, kissing a copy of the Gospels, and eating together. Is there anything that unifies them? Yes, these ritualized actions, I have claimed, are all ways in which participants in the liturgy engage God by actualizing the central pattern of the liturgy of blessing, petitioning, and offering thanks to God. In addition to prescribing actions such as these, the liturgical script presents a vast array of ways of thinking about God and God’s activity, which appear no more unified than the actions that constitute the liturgy. Is there anything that unifies them? Yes, these images are the components of an overarching narrative regarding God and God’s salvific activity, which is itself presented in the liturgies and perhaps encapsulated in the title “God.” When competently employed, these conceptions allow an agent to perform actions such as prostrating, kissing, and eating as ways of intentionally enacting the central pattern of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God as the One Who Has Acted on Our Behalf.

The fundamental contribution of the liturgy, then, is to provide act-types and conceptions of God such that by performing those act-types under those conceptions one can engage God by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. In a moment, I will explain why this is important for knowing God. For now, let me return to a point made earlier, namely that learning how to perform certain actions is often not simply to gain facility at performing them. Rather, it is to learn how to navigate and inhabit a certain life-world in which those actions have their home. This is no less true of performing those ritualized actions that constitute the liturgy than it is of performing those actions that are cases of performing works of music. It is worth elaborating upon this observation, since to fail to do so would be to fail to take us to the heart of liturgical action.

At various points, I have drawn attention to the fact that liturgical action is not primarily a series of mental actions such as thinking certain thoughts or manufacturing certain feelings at certain times. Rather it is thoroughly bodily, involving actions such as bowing, kissing, and eating, which are oriented toward one’s physical surroundings. In many cases, these physical surroundings are utterly ordinary: they include metal, wood, bread, wine, and water. Why, then, in the context of worship, would the liturgical script direct those who participate in the liturgy to orient themselves toward these materials by doing such things as kissing them?

Here the liturgical scripts themselves are instructive. Consider the following bit of Byzantine theological poetry, which the celebrant recites during the Theophany or the blessing of the waters:

Today the grace of the Holy Spirit has descended on the waters in the likeness of a dove.

Today has shone the sun that does not set, and the world is lighted by the light of the Lord.

Today the moon shines with the world in its radiating beams.

Today the shining stars adorn the universe with the splendor of their radiance.

Today the clouds of heaven moisten humankind with showers of justice

Today the waters of the Jordan are changed to healing by the presence of the Lord.

This series of proclamations is remarkable if only because it forcefully presents the idea that, although we may in the context of the liturgy regularly engage with ordinary matter such as water, this matter is really not so ordinary. And, so, in the liturgical context, it is not treated as ordinary stuff but is the object of blessing, the vehicle of blessing, and the subject of poetry. (In the rite of the Theophany, the people not only bless, but are also blessed with the water by the celebrant.) In effect, the liturgical script of the Theophany prods those assembled to understand the salvation narrative that lies at the core of Christianity expansively. Not only is humankind being restored by the actions of God in time, but so also is matter, inasmuch as it too has become a means of God's presence, a source or point of contact with God. Indeed, as the Trisagion prayers illustrate, a prominent theme in Eastern Christianity is the omnipresence of God. God is the One Who Fills All Things, permeating the world with the divine energies. Because of this, some have described the tradition as advocating a version of panentheism.²⁰ However that may be, the tradition maintains that the relation between God and matter is intimate—so intimate, in fact, that to engage with matter *is* to engage with God.

The upshot is that ritualized activity such as the blessing of the waters has the effect, when things go moderately well, of honing one's sensibilities in such a way that one begins to view, experience, and treat matter differently than one would in one's day-to-day life. The analogue with music with which I have been working is, I believe, helpful in this respect. Being introduced to the performance of a musical work often has the effect of expanding one's ears, allowing one to hear things differently than one did in the past. Often, moreover, the expansion does not come easily to the listener; only with significant and repeated exposure on the listener's part

²⁰Kallistos Ware, "God Immanent yet Transcendent: The Divine Energies according to Saint Gregory Palamas," in *In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being*, ed. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 157–168 discusses the issue.

does she begin to hear sounds differently, make connections with music with which she is familiar, and value these new types and sequences of sounds. Indeed, such exposure is often not enough. Sometimes the expansion occurs only with significant work on the listener's part, which might include intently focusing on the sounds and seeking ways to understand them, such as trying to understand their mathematical relations. These activities are part of immersing oneself in the life-world of musical performance and listening. The parallel with engaging in liturgical action and immersing oneself in the life-world of the Christian narrative, I trust, is obvious. A central aim of immersing oneself in liturgical action is often to alter one's sensibilities. Often, moreover, this process requires repeated exposure and effort; it can be difficult to achieve.

III. Ritual Knowledge

There is a famous passage in the *Pensées* in which Pascal offers advice to those who have been persuaded that it is prudentially rational to accept that God exists. If you want to believe, says Pascal, then go do things. In particular, engage in liturgical actions such as taking holy water and attending mass. The natural interpretation of Pascal's advice is that engaging in these activities is the sort of thing that will increase the likelihood of coming to believe that God exists; the activities are simply the means to achieve this desirable cognitive state. But another interpretation of Pascal's advice is available, which is that engaging in the liturgical activities he mentions is not primarily a means to forming beliefs about God but that knowing God (in something like the virtue-theoretic sense identified earlier) *consists* in engaging in them.

This interpretation approximates the thesis that I have been interested in developing. But now it is time to pull together the strands of our discussion. To that end, let us begin with the conviction that has animated our discussion, which is that our thinking about the religious attitudes should be guided by the observation that Christianity is a way of life. This observation has not in fact guided the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of the religious attitudes. And because it has not, I have suggested, this discussion has threatened to produce a distorted picture of the nature and roles of the religious attitudes and, more generally, religious life "on the ground" — a picture in which the practical dimensions of religious life drop out. If, however, the Christian way of life is fundamentally practical in its orientation, it is natural to inquire: What would it be to engage in this way of life, to know how to engage in its central activities, such as thanking God?

The moderate view of knowing how can help to answer this question. It helps us to understand what it is to know how to do something — knowing how, if the view is correct, consisting in the understanding of not propositions but ways of acting. Still, the moderate view gives us only an abstract account of what it is to know how to do something. We also want to know what it is to know how to perform those actions that are central to

the Christian way of life, such as engaging God by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.

To address these questions, I have suggested, we should look more closely at Christian liturgical practice, which is a central component of the Christian way of life. Using the Eastern Christian liturgies as our focal point, we saw that the contribution of the liturgy to engaging God is two-fold. First, the liturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting, kissing, prostrating, and eating that count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God—these last act-types constituting what I have called the central pattern of the liturgy. And, second, the liturgy furnishes an array of conceptions of God and God's activity under which to perform actions such as chanting, kissing, prostrating, and eating. When all goes well, these conceptions guide one's performance of these actions by being the components of complex action-conceptions in which the assembled do such things as petition God as The One Who Delivers, bless God as the One Who Fills All Things, and thank God as the One who "did not cease to do all things on our behalf."

If this is correct, the liturgy provides the materials for not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: the liturgy provides the materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a context in which she can exercise or enact it. For if one grasps these ways of acting in such a way that one understands them to be ways of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God, then one knows how to engage God by performing actions such as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. Or more precisely yet: to the extent that one grasps and sufficiently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition, and thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.

A further nuance is worth noting. There are, I have claimed, many ways to do such things as bless, petition, and thank. Suppose I ask you to pass the salt when eating dinner together. I could do that by writing a formal request. Or suppose I thank you for writing a letter of recommendation. I could do that by slapping you hard on the back, despite your suffering from a degenerative back condition. These actions could even be expressions of practical knowledge, since I can understand them to be ways of petitioning and thanking. But they are egregiously inapt ways of acting. The liturgical script, interestingly, repeatedly draws attention to the fact that the ways of acting that it prescribes are not inapt. Mostly this is done by noting that the sacrifice offered to God in the liturgy consists not in shedding blood but rather in praising God and that the bowing that occurs is not to "flesh and blood" but to God, the Ruler of All (Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom). If the liturgical script's assessment of the very actions it prescribes is correct, the liturgy furnishes not simply ways of acting that are ways of engaging God, but also ways of acting that are apt ways of engaging God. Ritual knowledge, when all goes well, is knowing how to engage God in ways that are fitting.

Let me now draw out some implications of our discussion. One implication is that the conditions for knowing how to engage God are, in one regard, demanding, as an agent's knowing how to perform an action such as thanking God requires that there be a way of acting such that (i) that agent can engage in that way of acting with respect to the being who is God (if any such being exists) (ii) that way of acting counts as thanking God and (iii) that agent has a sufficiently complete and accurate understanding of that way of acting. Given the ontological distance between us and God to which the liturgy draws our attention, achieving this sort of know-how would not be a trivial matter.

But, as I indicated earlier, there are also respects in which the conditions for knowing how to perform such actions as thanking God are considerably less demanding than the conditions for knowing various propositions about God. One such respect concerns the role of belief. Imagine that you are a high-level theoretical physicist who suspects that there is a type of subatomic particle—hitherto undiscovered—that is responsible for various happenings in the quantum world. You devise various types of experiments to determine whether there is such a particle. The evidence that there is such a particle is promising but not decisive; consequently, you do not find yourself believing that such a particle exists. Still, when you devise and conduct your experiments, you act on the assumption that it does exist and proceed with your work on this assumption. Suppose, for argument's sake, that the particle does exist and has many of the properties that you suppose it has. Do you know how to do such things as discover it, manipulate it in various ways, and make evident its properties? Presumably, yes. For to have the relevant sort of know-how, you must have a sufficiently comprehensive and accurate understanding of how to manipulate the relevant particle. And, by hypothesis, you have that. To have the relevant sort of know-how, though, you do not have to believe (and, hence, know) that the object of your actions exists. In this regard, there is a crucial difference between knowing that and knowing how. If this is so, then one can understand why certain strains of Christianity have placed emphasis on knowing how to engage God by doing such things as blessing and thanking God rather than being in or trying to manufacture certain doxastic states. The relevant sort of knowledge how does not require being in these doxastic states.

Still, under the standard interpretation, figures such as Pascal have been especially concerned that their interlocutors form religious beliefs. The contemporary discussion of the religious attitudes, likewise, has been almost exclusively focused on the epistemic status of these beliefs, as if being in this type of state holds a special prominence in the Christian way of life. I have been suggesting that this tendency threatens to offer a distorted picture of the religious life, as this way of life is fundamentally concerned not so much with being in this type of doxastic state with respect to propositions about God as with conducting oneself in certain

ways with respect to God that count as engaging God, and knowing how to conduct oneself in those ways.

Suppose that one were to grant the point. A satisfactory account of the religious attitudes, you agree, would have to pay considerably more attention to their practical dimensions. It is still natural to wonder what is so special about those actions on which I have focused—those that constitute the central pattern of the liturgy. Why does their performance deserve a type of priority in the religious life, as the Eastern tradition holds?

The narrative that lies at the heart of the Christian way of life, I believe, points toward an answer to this question. At the heart of this narrative is a story of falling away, one that is wrapped in images of dust, fruit, reptiles, and nakedness. The story of falling away describes how it is that human beings have come to be at such deep variance with God and each other. In the Christian tradition, both the origin and the nature of this state are often presented in terms of disobedience—specifically, being in a state of disobedience with regard to God. In the narrative of salvation history in St. Basil's liturgy, for example, it is described along these lines.

But this is not the only or arguably the most penetrating way to understand the nature of the rupture. In his book *For the Life of the World*, the Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemmann writes that the falling away is not so much the result of disobedience as the consequence of living a "noneucharistic life in a noneucharistic world."²¹ "Not giving thanks," writes Schmemmann is the "'vital essence' of evil . . . the sin that tore" human beings "from God."²² If Schmemmann's diagnosis is correct, it holds the key to understanding why it is that enacting the central pattern of the liturgy enjoys such prominence in the Christian way of life: it is how we repair the rupture. For in knowing how to do such things as bless, petition, and thank God, one thereby knows how to engage God in such a way that one can know God in the sense of knowing how to live in communion or be in rapport with God. That, I believe, is where the importance of ritual knowledge lies.²³

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²¹Alexander Schmemmann, *For the Life of the World* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1969), 18.

²²Schmemmann, *The Eucharist* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 187.

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