Substantive Clauses in the New Testament

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An examination of the Greek grammars seems to indicate that, in the past, scholars have attempted to deal with the conjunction ἵνα in the New Testament upon an inadequate basis. Since its meaning in classical Greek was almost exclusively "in order that", introducing a purpose clause, scholars seem to have felt that it was thus limited in New Testament usage. Often the translation has had to be modified from "in order that" to "that" to avoid doing violence to the obvious sense of the passage; but since in English "that" can serve either as a shortened form of "in order that" or as a conjunction introducing a substantive clause, grammarians have apparently long attempted to press some sort of purpose idea into almost every ἵνα clause.

Some progress has, indeed, been made toward freeing ἵνα clauses from this limitation in New Testament usage. Winer,¹ who wrote approximately a century ago, admits the occasional use of ἵνα as an object clause, but it is easy to see that he insists upon a purpose idea for ἵνα clauses where it is even remotely possible.² Dods refers to a statement by Simcox which is a bit more broadminded, admitting that "Sometimes, beyond doubt, ἵνα is used where the final element in the sense is very much weakened—some times where it is hard to deny that it has altogether vanished".³

The statement attributed to Simcox at least expresses the basic principle which many scholars seem to have used with reference to ἵνα—that its "proper" meaning had to be "in order that", and that ἵνα would adopt any other meaning only at the peril of committing linguistic heresy.

Scholars of recent years have come to recognize the existence of a more or less limited number of "non-final" ἵνα clauses—clauses without the idea of purpose. Yet the twilight existence which grammarians have too generally granted these clauses is typified by Machen's statement in his New Testament Greek for Beginners: "In addition to the use by which it expresses purpose, ἵνα with the subjunctive is very frequently use after words of exhorting, wishing, striving, and in various ways that are not easily classified".⁴ Burton is forced to use six categories for the uses of ἵνα. One of these is the purpose clause, one is the clause of conceived result (which for the purpose of this article need not be considered separately from the purpose clause), leaving four classifications to which Burton gives the following rather vague

In Expositor's Greek Testament, I, p. 730.

Dods gives as the source of this statement Simcox's Grammar, a book which the present writer has not located.

² Burton, Ernest De Witt, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek, 1943, p. 84.


³ P. 197.
characteristics (italics are Burton's):

Object clauses after verbs of *exhorting*, etc.
Object clauses after verbs of *striving*, etc.
Subject, predicate, and appositive clauses.
Complementary and expository clauses.

Abbott-Smith* says that τα as a conjunction is “properly” a final conjunction, denoting purpose; but that in late writers it may be definitive, as the equivalent of an infinitive, after verbs of wishing, striving, saying, and after certain substantives and other words.

The only recognition Green* apparently gives at all to these non-final clauses is several lines of small print on pp. 320-1, and much of this seems to the present writer to be unsatisfactory. That Green considers these clauses of only minor significance is seen in his statement, “The Evangelist John often (with, occasionally, others of the New Testament writers) employs τα as explanatory . . . ; but in other passages the usual meaning of the particle may be taken . . .”

Robertson* devotes several pages to non-final τα clauses, especially pp. 991-7. He designates them “sub-final clauses”, and, while he acknowledges in parentheses that they are “really object or subject clauses like δτ clauses”, yet he seems reluctant to admit that they have any independent identity. “There are a considerable number of clauses,” he states, “which are not pure purpose and yet are not result. They are the bridge, in a sense, between the two extremes”. He does, however, go further than Green regarding the frequency of their occurrence, commenting that “the examples in the N. T. are too numerous to give a complete list”.

Blass* is aware of one aspect of these non-final clauses. He points out that there are several usages which may be expressed either by an infinitive construction or by a “peri-phrase”. He illustrates the fact that in some instances the alternative to an infinitive construction is a τα clause with the subjunctive mood, while in other instances the alternative is a δτ clause. The τα clause, he states, is the alternative to an infinitive for an explanatory construction and after certain verbs which he lists, while the δτ clause is the alternative construction after other verbs. Yet, even though in his discussion of the use of a τα explanatory clause he notes that “if the exegetical phrase consists of facts, John uses not τα but δτ”, he apparently quite fails to see the principle upon which, throughout the New Testament, an explanatory clause is a τα clause in some instances and a δτ clause in others.

Moulton,* however, takes a rather realistic view of this type of clause. He lists some examples of this “non-final” use of τα from the papyri to illustrate his opinion that this usage cannot be attributed to Latin influence. He continues by saying,

In such clauses, which remind us immediately of Mt 4:16-20, Mk 5:10 39 etc., the naturalness of the development is obvious from the simple fact that the purpose clause with τα is merely a use of the jussive subjunctive . . ., which makes its appearance after a verb of commanding or wish-

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*See also the later edition, Blass, Friedrich, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, siebte Auflage besorgt von Albert Debrunner, 1913.
ing entirely reasonable. . . . From such sentences, in which the object clause, from the nature of the governing verb, had a jussive sense in it which made the subjunctive natural, there was an easy transition to object clauses in which the jussive idea was absent. The careful study of typical sentences like Mt 10:25 88 (contrast 311) 186, Jn 127 (contr. Lk 1519) 434 158.12, Lk 143 (for which Winer quotes a close parallel from Epictetus), will show anyone who is free from predisposition that ίνα can lose the last shred of purposive meaning. If the recognition of a purpose conception will suit the context better than the denial of it, we remain entirely free to assume it; but the day is past for such strictness as great commentators like Meyer and Westcott were driven to by the supposed demands of grammar.".

It was apparently left for Dana and Mantey, in their Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament, to deal with these clauses for the less advanced student. Putting it in a more elementary form than does Moulton, these scholars say,

Then ίνα is also used frequently in a non-final sense in object-clauses in the New Testament. It is simply the equivalent of διό scores of times. At such times the translation that suggests its force . . . . Or the ίνα clause can be translated in many cases just as well by an infinitive clause".

The illustration they use is that in Mark 7:26, καὶ ἤρωτα σῶτόν ίνα τὸ δαμούνιον ἐκβάλη ἐκ τῆς θυγατρός σωτῆς, translating it by a substantive clause, "and she asked him that he cast the demon out of her daughter"; or by an infinitive clause, "and she asked him to cast the demon out". Dana and Mantey also refer to ίνα clauses used in apposition, quoting two examples, one of which is John 13:34, ἐντολὴν καὶ ἡμῶν δίδωμι ὧμιν ίνα ἀγαπάτε αὐτούς, translating it, "a new commandment I give to you (namely) that you love one another".

Dana and Mantey thus seem ready to break with tradition and to let these clauses stand in their own right yet even they seem to have failed to go all the way in identifying and properly classifying this type of ίνα clause. The purpose of the present article will therefore be threefold: 1) to point out the existence of ίνα substantive clauses as a distinct type in the New Testament, 2) to classify them, and 3) to set forth a practical means for identifying them.

The FIRST BASIC HYPOTHESIS of the present article is as follows:

In New Testament Greek there are two separate and distinct usages of ίνα which ought no more to be confused than the two distinct meanings of διό. The first of these meanings is to be translated "in order that"; and is to be used where the ίνα clause is a purposive clause. This type of clause answers the question "Why?" The second of these meanings is to be translated "that", in the same sense in which διό is translated "that", and is to be used where the ίνα clause is a substantive clause. This type of clause answers the question "What?"

It is to be further insisted that ίνα substantive clauses are not merely to be tolerated as being nothing more than wayward children from the fold of ίνα purpose clauses. This article will not attempt to deal with their origin, but simply maintains that in New Testament Greek these clauses are clearly distinct from ίνα purpose clauses. As such, they deserve the right to their own identity and meaning, not only when the idea of "purpose" has tried and failed to embrace them within its compass, but rather at any time when the sense of the passage in question naturally calls for a substantive clause rather than a purpose clause.".

"See Moulton, loc. cit. Ibid.
ings of ὅτι. There is no presumption in favor of one or the other of the meanings of ὅτι. If the context indicates that the ὅτι clause should be considered a causal clause, ὅτι is translated "because"; if the context indicates a substantive clause, ὅτι is translated "that". An even closer analogy is the usage of ὅτως. Even in classical Greek, from Homer on, ὅτως, in addition to its use in "final" clauses, was used to introduce object clauses after certain verbs meaning to strive, to effect, to plan, to take care, etc." Liddell and Scott say that ὅτως with the subjunctive is sometimes used after verbs of will and endeavor, instead of the infinitive."

An important point in this discussion is that these "non-final" or substantive clauses are not of only rare or occasional occurrence in the New Testament, as most scholars seem to have maintained. Robertson47 states that one scholar counts 746 ἵνα clauses in the Westcott-Hort text of the New Testament. An examination in Moulton and Geden's Concordance to the Greek Testament48 indicates that over fourteen percent of these are undoubtedly ἵνα substantive clauses, with an additional eight percent deserving of consideration. Even if quite a number which here are counted as substantive clauses be charged to the over-enthusiasm of the present writer, there must still remain a sufficient number to demand thoughtful attention.

Having pointed out that ἵνα substantive clauses are in the New Testament and therefore of appreciable importance, the question of proper identification suggests itself. Can a classification of them be made which will be more definite than that of Burton or that of Dana and Mantey?49 An examination of these clauses and their contexts seems to indicate clearly that such a classification can be made, upon the following basis:

In Greek, as in English, indirect statements may be given in either of two forms—the first is a substantive clause, the second is an infinitive construction. The substantive clause would be introduced by the word "that". An example of English usage is as follows:

Direct statement: "He is a good man."

Indirect statement: "I say that he is a good man"; or, "I know that he is a good man."

"I say him to be a good man"; or, "I know him to be a good man."50 These examples would accordingly appear in Greek as follows:

Direct statement: ἀγαθός ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν.

Indirect (substantive clause): λέγω ὅτι ἄγαθος ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν, or γινώσκω ὅτι ...

Indirect (infinitive): λέγω σο�能 ἄγαθον ἀνθρωπών εἶναι, or, γινώσκω σο�能 ...

These examples, however, involve only the indicative mood of the verb within the discourse. What form will the indirect discourse take if the original statement is an imperative, a hortatory subjunctive, or some such idea? This possibility seems to be avoided by grammarians, so far as Greek is concerned. Burton does give his reasons for omitting these constructions from his discussion:

\[\text{The term indirect discourse is commonly applied only to indirect assertions and indirect questions. Commands, promises, and hopes indirectly quoted.}\]

\[\text{The participial construction in indirect quotation, which is sometimes used in Greek—e.g., I Jn. 4:2—need not enter into this discussion.}\]
might without impropriety be included under the term, but are, in general, excluded because of the difficulty of drawing the line between them and certain similar usages, in which, however, no direct form can be thought of. Thus the Infinitive after a verb of commanding might be considered the representative in indirect discourse of an Imperative in the direct discourse; ... while for the Infinitive after verbs of striving, which in itself can scarcely be regarded as of different force from those after verbs of commanding and wishing, no direct form can be thought of."

The validity of these reasons may well be questioned. This article purposes to show that such constructions both can be classified and also need to be classified for a proper understanding of New Testament usage.

This classification can be made in English; and for the purpose of illustration the three forms of statement given above in the indicative mood are changed to the imperative mood, as follows:

Direct statement: "Son, be a good man."

Indirect (substantive clause): "I command my son that he be a good man."

Indirect (infinitive): "I commanded my son to be a good man."

Dana and Mantey agree with the present writer's conclusion that this sort of construction can be expressed in Greek under a regular rule. The substantive clause construction could be expressed by ἵναι with the subjunctive, the alternative form above being expressed in Greek, as in English, by an infinitive construction. Thus the Greek equivalents of the examples above would be as follows:

Direct statement: αὐτῷ τὸν ὑιόν μου ἵναι ἄθροισθαι.

Indirect (substantive clause): κελεύω τὸν ὑιόν μου ἵναι ἄθροισθαι.

Indirect (infinitive): κελεύω τὸν ὑιόν μου ἵναι ἄνθρωπος.

This principle may be most simply illustrated, as above, by using the indirect form of a statement of direct discourse—in the former illustrations, with the verb of the direct discourse in the indicative mood; in the latter, with the verb of the direct discourse in the imperative mood. However, from these rather obvious illustrations the principle may be extended from actual indirect discourse to include indirect statements after such verbs as knowing, thinking, feeling, beseeching, etc., and after certain nouns and adjectives. Abbott-Smith, Burton, Blass, and Robertson admit the existence of these constructions. What they fail to do is to point out the principle involved—viz., that these constructions with ἵναι are the indirect form of a statement whose (actual or hypothetical) direct form would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

It is in the nature of some of the ideas expressed by the subjunctive mood that they should be expressed indirectly by some construction other than substantive clauses. When, however, such a thought is stated indirectly as a substantive clause, a ἵναι clause is regularly used. The following New Testament passages appear to be examples of this type:

Matthew 14:36 Παρεκάλεσε γάρ ἰησοῦς ἵναι μάτων ἄσωμαι ὁ Κρατοῦσα τοῦ Μουσίου σώσας. "They were beseeching him (to the effect) that they might only touch the hem of his garment." The postulated original idea, "Permit us to touch the hem of thy garment", or, "May we touch the hem of thy garment?"

Mark 5:18 Παρεκάλεσε γάρ τὸν ἀρτοφυλάκιον ἵναι ἐπικεφαλής ἵναι μετ' αὐτοῦ ἴησος. "He who had been demon-possessed was beseeching him (to the effect) that he might be with him." Original idea, "Let me be with thee."

John 11:50 Ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ. . . . "It is better for you that one person should die for the people, than that all perish;" The subjunctive clause is the direct form, the thing which is "better

See above.

The subjunctive mood is regularly used in these substantive clauses as in the purpose clauses. No special notice need be taken in this article of the occasional use of the future indicative.
for you" would be something such as, "One person ought to die for the people", or "One person should die for the people"."

Allowing, then, that not all the uses of the subjunctive are subject to being written indirectly in a substantive clause, the following may be given as the SECOND BASIC HYPOTHESIS of this article:

The majority of ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses whose content is the indirect statement of an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the imperative or subjunctive mood.

The above hypothesis does not, however, include quite all of the ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament. There seems to be one other type, in which the idea seems to be practically a simple future idea. Here the direct statement would be in the future indicative, and therefore the clause would ordinarily be expected to be expressed by δὲ with the future indicative; although in some cases the idea may be thought of as being a subjunctive idea."

The four probable examples of this type of clause in the Fourth Gospel are as follows:

12:23 ἐλήλυθεν ὁ ὀρα ἵνα δοξασθῇ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "The hour is come that the Son of Man shall be glorified."
13:1 εἶδος ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὅτι ἦλθεν αὐτῷ ὁ ὀρα ἵνα μεταβῇ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου..."Jesus, knowing that his hour had come that he should depart from this world..."
16:2 ἔρχεται οὗτος ἵνα πᾶς ὁ ἀποκτενισμὸς ὕμως δοξῇ..."There comes an hour that everyone who kills you will think..."
16:32 ἔρχεται οὗτος καὶ ἐλήλυθεν ἵνα σκορπισθῇ..."An hour is coming and is come that ye will be scattered..."

These examples, all referring to an "hour", are obviously not purpose clauses" nor result clauses, in which case a further identification of the "hour" seems to be needed. They are almost, if not quite, the equivalent of temporal clauses with δὲ ("when") and the future indicative. This Gospel freely uses δὲ, however, and sometimes with the idea of "the hour has come"—e.g., 4:21, 5:25, 16:25; so it may be valid to see in these ἵνα clauses, as substantive clauses, a further identification of the "hour" rather than a temporal idea. The ἵνα clauses in the above examples might then be given in direct form as follows: "The Son of Man will be glorified", "I will depart from the world", "Everyone who kills you will think...", and "Ye will be scattered".

Approximately half of the examples of ἵνα substantive clauses expressing a future idea in Revelation are found after the verb ποιεῖν.

A tentative list of the New Testament examples of ἵνα substantive clauses expressing a future idea is as follows:

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<tr>
<td>12:23</td>
<td>4:17 9:5 13:17</td>
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<td>13:1</td>
<td>5:3 13:12 14:13</td>
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<td>16:2</td>
<td>Rev. 3:9 13:13 19:8</td>
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To illustrate the principle involved, reference may be made to I John 5:3. In this passage, αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἑντολὰς αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν—"For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments"—the ἵνα clause seems clearly to be exegetical of "the love of God". It is not too easy to put the thought into direct form, but it seems to be something such as, "We will keep his commandments; this is the content of the love of God."

Rev. 3:9, ποιήσον αὐτοῖς ἵνα ἐρωτεύσιν καὶ προσκυνήσουσιν ἐνώπιον τῶν ποιῶν σου—"I will make them that they

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Abbott-Smith (op. cit., p. 217) refers to this passage as an example of the substantive clause "after words expressing expediency, etc."

It may be significant that this type of clause seems to be found only in the Johannine books, except for one example in Matthew.

Contra Winer, op. cit., p. 355.
will come and worship before thy feet . . ."—is clearly a noun clause expressing an idea in future time. (The verb in this clause, it will be noted, is a future indicative.) The ἤνα clause could be directly stated, "They will come and worship", or perhaps with a declarative sense, "They shall come and worship".

Rev. 6:11, ἔρρέθη αὐτοῖς ἤνα ἀναπάυσονται ἐπὶ χρόνον μικρὸν—"it was said to them that they should rest yet a short time"—refers to the content of what was said, which is, stated directly, either "You will rest yet a short time", or possibly, "You may rest yet a short time." (The latter translation would place this example with the previously discussed type of ἤνα substantive clauses.)

The evidence of this list of references point to the THIRD BASIC HYPOTHESIS of this article:

A second and much smaller class of ἤνα substantive clauses in the New Testament are clauses which express indirectly an idea which, if stated directly, would have its verb in the future indicative.

There now remains to be presented the evidence from the New Testament upon which these three hypotheses are based. For this purpose, herewith is given a list of examples from the New Testament which seem rather clearly to be substantive clauses. A second list is given of examples which may be debatable but which merit consideration. These examples are taken from Moulton and Geden’s Concordance but are not classified as substantive clauses in that work.

ἄνα CLAUSES—POSSIBLY SUBSTANTIVE

Matt. 12:16 Luke 8:31 John 17:2 II Cor. 12:8
20:31 18:39 27:42 Eph. 2:10
26:41 18:41 Rom. 15:31 6:19
26:63 21:36 16:2 Phil. 1:9
27:20 22:32 1 Cor. 7:29 2:2
27:32 22:46 7:34 Col. 2:2
28:10 John 1:27 7:35 4:3
Mark 3:12 5:7 10:33 4:17
5:10 9:22 14:1 II Thes. 3:1
5:18 9:39 14:5 3:2
13:18 11:53 14:12 I Tim. 1:16
14:38 11:57 14:13 Tit. 2:12
15:11 12:10 16:10 3:8
Luke 1:43 13:15 II Cor. 1:17

It is to be insisted once more that the above examples are not to be considered substantive clauses only if it is impossible to give them a purposive sense. Rather, both meanings should be equally considered and the interpretation given which best suits each example. There may, of course, be a difference of opinion concerning individual examples without invalidating the general claim.

Some discussion of a few of the examples in the above list may well be given, in order to illustrate the process of reasoning.

Matt. 4:3, εἶπεν ἦνα οἴ λίθοι οὗτοι ἀρτοὶ γενόνται—"Say that these stones should become bread", or, "Tell
these stones to become bread”—deals with the content of what is to be said, not the reason why something should be said.\(^8\) The ἵνα clause is therefore a substantive clause, used as the direct object of the verb “say”, not a purpose clause.

Luke 6:31, καθὼς θέλετε ἵνα ποιῷ-σιν ὦμιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι—“just as you wish that men (should) do to you”—deals with the content of the wish, answering the question, “What do you wish?” The hypothetical direct form of the “that” clause might be, “Oh, that men would do to me (thus)!” A purpose clause here would give the absurd idea that wishing would serve the purpose of inducing men to act in a certain manner. This example is therefore a ἵνα substantive clause.

John 2:25, σὺ χρείαν εἶχεν ἵνα τις μακρυρης—“he did not have need that anyone should testify”—is an example of a ἵνα clause explaining the content of a noun. The content of the “need” which “he did not have” is, “Someone must testify”. The passage is obviously not setting forth the purpose of the need.

I Cor. 4:2 reads, ζητείται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις ἵνα πιστὸς τις εὑρέθῃ. “it is sought in stewards that one (i.e., anyone, any steward) be found faithful”. The “that” clause refers to the content of what is sought, not the reason why it is sought. The passage could be paraphrased, using a direct statement, “What is sought in stewards? Namely, he ought to be faithful (or, He must be faithful).” If the “that” clause were a purpose clause, it would be necessary to have something else stated as the object of the search. The thought would then be to the effect that “(Something or other) is sought for in stewards in order that they may be found faithful.” This is clearly not the meaning of the passage in question.

With these criteria for judging between substantive and purpose clauses after ἵνα it will not be necessary to depend upon the nondescript classification of “non-final clauses after various verbs of wishing, striving, exhorting, saying, commanding, etc., and other epexegetical and object clauses”. Indeed, one of the failures of Burton’s classification is due to the fact that a ἵνα clause after such verbs might in some instances be a purpose clause, in other instances a substantive clause. For example:

Substantive clause: “Plead with him that he should be good.”

Purpose clause: “Plead with him, in order that he may be good” (i.e., “... in order that your pleading may serve the purpose of helping him to be good.”)

The verb “to say” generally requires an object. Therefore a ἵνα clause in the predicate of the verb “to say” will generally be an object clause unless there is something else to serve as the object. For example:

Substantive clause: “Say to this stone that it become bread.” (Luke 4:3).

Purpose clause: “Say the proper words to this stone, in order that it may become bread.”

With the phrase “the proper words” supplied to serve as the direct object of “say”, the ἵνα clause may still be interpreted, however, either as a substantive or as a purpose clause. Interpreted as a substantive clause, the clause would be in apposition with the object of the verb, giving the meaning, “Say this stone—namely, the proper words to the stone—that you want it to become bread.” In such a case the choice of meanings would be a matter of interpretation, just as is the case sometimes in determining whether a ἵνα clause is to be understood as a causal or a substantive clause. The verb “to pray”, on the oth-
er hand, may or may not take an object. Therefore in most instances of a ἵνα clause after the verb “to pray” it will be a matter of interpretation as to whether it is a purpose clause— “Pray, in order that this may come to pass”—or a substantive clause—“Let this be the content of your prayer.” In many, if not most, of these instances in the New Testament, the sense seems to favor a substantive clause.

Up to this point, the discussion has dealt only with ἵνα. The related word ἵνας is found in the New Testament approximately 55 times, which is less than eight percent as often as ἵνα. Four of these instances seem definitely to be in substantive clauses; these are Matt. 8:34; Luke 7:3, 11:37; and Acts 23:20. The following additional instances are worthy of consideration in this classification:

Mark 3:6  Acts 8:15  23:15
Luke 10:2  8:24  25:3

The fact that the grammarians have been slow to recognize the nature of ἵνα substantive clauses apparently implies that they have tacitly assumed that a statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood would be given indirect form by some other means. As a matter of fact, an examination of the New Testament would reveal that an infinitive construction is quite commonly used for this purpose.

With the two possible alternatives for expressing these ideas, the question might arise as to whether any reason could be given for using one construction in preference to the other in specific instances. In many instances of ἵνα substantive clauses there is no clear reason why this construction should have been preferred to the infinitive construction except that the writer simply chose to express it that way. There are, however, two possible reasons for giving the ἵνα clause preference in some instances. First, if the subject of the verb in the substantive clause is not the same as the object of the verb governing that clause, then the infinitive construction might be less desirable, possibly being somewhat cumbersome; e.g., John 18:39, ἐστιν δὲ συνήθεια ὤμιν ἴνα ἔνα αὐτο- λύσω ὤμιν—“there is a custom with you that I should release one to you”. An infinitive here would be translated, “There is a custom with you for me to release one to you”. (See also I John 2:27, etc.) In other instances the writer may have desired to place emphasis upon the subject of the verb in the ἵνα clause, which may be the case in one of Paul’s rare usages of the construction, I Cor. 1:10, παρακολῶ δὲ ὤμας... ἴνα τὸ αὐτό λέγητε πάντες, καὶ μὴ ἦ ἐν ὦμιν σχείσασα—“And I beseech you... that you all say the same thing and that there be not divisions among you”. Moulton refers to I Cor. 14:5, in which the verb θέλω is followed by both the infinitive and the ἵνα substantive clause, and suggests that there may be found a greater urgency in the ἵνα clause than in the infinitive construction, which he says is demanded by the meaning of the passage.”

Assuming, therefore, that the substantive clauses of the type under discussion may be expressed by ἵνα and the subjunctive mood, the question arises as to whether these ideas could also be expressed in a διὰ clause, preserving as Machen puts it, “the same mood and tense as those which stood in the direct discourse lying back of the indirect”. An inspection of the ἵνα substantive clauses in the New Testament, in which the subject was generously assisted by several of his students, brought the writer simply chose to express it that way. There are, however, two possible...
two types of construction where the verb in such a clause was not in the indicative mood. One type was the idiom of strong negation, ὁ μὴ with the aorist subjunctive, which is not properly a subjunctive idea; the other was instances such as John 9:11 and Rom. 3:8, where δὲ merely introduces a direct quotation and is not itself to be translated. This would seem to be additional evidence for the hypothesis presented in this article, that a δὲ substantive clause expresses indirectly an idea of the indicative mood, while ideas of the subjunctive and imperative moods would similarly take ἵνα with the subjunctive mood.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to bring the foregoing discussion down to the level of practical application to the exegesis of the New Testament, some practical results may be pointed out.

If the hypothesis set forth in this article be accepted, the following outline of the uses of ἵνα clauses in the New Testament may be set forth as follows:


II. Clause of conceived result (in-frequent use). Possible future result; to be distinguished from the more common ὅπως with the infinitive result clause. Examples: Rom. 11:11, I John 1:9 (?).

III. Substantive clause (noun clause). Answers the question, “What?” Deals with content rather than purpose. ἵνα is to be translated “that”, in the same sense in which δὲ is translated “that”. (ἀπὸς is occasionally thus used in the New Testament; e.g., Matt. 8:34, Acts 23:20.) This type of clause is an indirect statement, or the extension of that idea, whose direct form would fall into one of the two following classes:

A. A statement in the imperative or subjunctive mood. Examples: Mark 5:43, John 4:8, II Cor. 9:5.

B. In a few instances, a statement in the future indicative (like a δὲ clause), although perhaps closely related to a subjunctive idea. Examples: Matt. 18:14, Rev. 6:4.

Upon this foundation, the task of the exegete is to use his own experience with the Greek New Testament, together with the standard reference commentaries upon that text, to give the best interpretation to each passage.