The Queen of the Sciences

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Henry Osborn Taylor, in The Medieval Mind, superbly exhibits the genius of the Middle Ages. The climax of his study rests upon Dante, especially the Divina Commedia, as the “medieval synthesis”. What St. Thomas had accomplished in the Summa, what the architects of Chartres had accomplished in stone, what the Roman Catholic Church had accomplished in its political-religious coalition, Dante had accomplished in poetry. He not only spoke with the voice of “ten silent centuries”, he set the medieval synthesis to music. It was the Gospel of “one world” — political, ethical, artistic, religious — fused into one master symphony.

This was an age where there were not simply voices — but a Voice. Perhaps it were better to speak of a choir: voices there were, all singing the same song, in perfect harmony. And Dante was the chorister.

One may acknowledge this medieval synthesis of Aristotle-Thomas-Dante and still note its inadequacy. On the other hand, one need not be a medievalophile to appreciate its significance. Man, in his pilgrimage from the city of the dark night to the City of God, had once stood on the borderland, at least, of a Christian Weltanschauung.

In an age which loosely hangs together a voice which proposes to speak of a single world-view goes unheeded, almost unheard. The chaotic voices of contemporary confusion — in politics, in education, in jurisprudence, in economics, in international relations, in ethics, in aesthetics, in religion — make more than a discord — they make a Babel. But out of what is so often regarded as a dim shadowy past comes the ghost of a world-order to haunt us. In our more hopeful moments we wistfully wonder if what once was might not be again.

It has been well said that the medieval period received its mind from Greece and its soul from Israel. Under this double heritage all human disciplines were gathered into one comprehensive political-intellectual-religious structure: Scholasticism.

What was the motif of this medieval synthesis? It was religious — even Christian. And the undisputed ruler of it all was “The Queen of the Sciences”, Divina Scientia, Theology.

This all sounds strange to modern ears. To speak, for example, of the physical and social sciences, the arts, the humanities, philosophy and religion, as all having a common point of reference is to speak madness to the mind of contemporary man. It may well be that this “madness” might be the cure for the spectacle of each intellectual discipline blithely going its own selfish way, feeling dizzily self-sufficient, and a bit snobbish toward all others.

It is our thesis that the hour has come to restore the Queen of the Sciences to her throne. This is not to return to the barren quarrels of a decadent Scholasticism. Surely, not that! Nor is it even an idealized nostalgia for the “good old days”. It is, rather, a plea to see again all truth in the light of Truth as it is personalized in God. It means, precisely, that all truth is theological truth, all problems basically theological problems, and all disciplines destined to be judged by their God-reference. It was put most dramatically by General Douglas Hough, Lynn Harold — The Christian Criticism of Life, p 52.
MacArthur in his words on board the Battleship Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay. After surveying the futility of war as a method of facing international tensions, he spoke prophetically:

"We have had our last chance. If we do not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advance in science, art, literature and all material and cultural development of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh." (Italics ours)

At a time when the validity of any discipline depends upon its practicality, it is incumbent upon theology, as with any other, to justify its claim to sit in judgment upon all other disciplines. It is our claim that this is where Theology must demonstrate her genius.

Suppose, for example, we call the roll of some of the human interests and see the relevance of Theology to them.

I. ETHICS

In the first place, suppose we consider the realm of ethics. What do we find? We find intricate discussions of codes of conduct—what ought to be done, what ought to be avoided. These are legitimate concerns for ethics. And it should be said that any attempt to ascertain the content of the "good life" should be warmly welcomed: because our pragmatic philosophy has almost led to ethical anarchy. As a brilliant high school senior once said to me: "Now, in this matter of right and wrong, it is only the way you look at it." Being a product of one of our most sophisticated eastern schools, his view may be cited as the logic of our utilitarian ethic: what succeeds is right. Apparently what is overlooked is this: evil likewise may easily become a glorious success, and ergo, on this basis, gloriously right!

What is the evil of this philosophy of truth being the intellectually expedient, and the philosophy of the right the expedient in conduct? Essentially it is the fallacy that all truth and all conduct are relative. It is the denial of any absolute in truth or ethics. In a word, it is a subtle form of atheism.

the denial of God's right to absolute loyalty in conduct and of His Truth as absolute criterion for truth.

It is strange how each generation apparently must learn all over again the ruin of this ethical relativism. Centuries ago, long before the fountain of modern wisdom was opened in ancient Greece, this fatal principle infected the life of Israel.

"In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes." ( Judges 17:6; 21:25. ASV)

Now, with Theology as the "Queen", what restraint is placed upon ethics? It is the restraint that no ethic is adequate which has a standard less than the Personality of a God of Holy Love. This is to indicate the inadequacy of the Kantian ethic, the "categorical imperative." For the "moral law within" can never be autonomous; it is required that it be subservient to the Moral Law above. Emil Brunner's term is much more Christian: "The Divine Imperative." In passing, however, one could wish that the austerity of Brunner's ethic could be mellowed by the warmth of a more evangelical faith, such as that expressed in Winston King's "Holy Imperative."

In the end, therefore, Theology insists that right is right and wrong is wrong because God is God. It means not only that ethics and religion cannot be divorced. It means that ethics per se can do little more than turn like the weathervane with every passing breeze. There must be a firm anchor for the good life in the God of Holy Love who saves only as He suffers. This is Theology. Ethics, philosophy, science, even religion as such cannot supply it. Peter T. Forsyth saw this most clearly at the beginning of his volume: The Principle of Authority:

"The religious authority at last settles all things. All questions run up into moral questions; and all moral questions center in the religious, in man's attitude to the supreme ethic, which is the action of the Holy One."*
He moves on to his conclusion in this matter of ethical authority:

The Redeemer from moral death is the seat of final authority for a moral humanity . . . . . Our final moral standard is the Gospel of the Cross with its ethical restitution of things, its restoration of all things from our moral centre. It was the eternal and immutable morality of holiness that was effectually established there for history and for ever. There are ultimately no ethics, therefore, but theological.

II. EDUCATION

Again, consider the human interest of education. It is doubtful if any age was ever so education-conscious or more technically equipped to educate as ours. Two criteria are inseparable from the goals of our contemporary progressive education: 1) the avoidance of authoritarian indoctrination; 2) the cultivation of delicate interests of the individual student. This latter ideal underlies our plea for a "practical" education which trains children to do things and seeks to avoid the terrifying demons of Fourth Declensions, tedious memory work, and the accumulation of specific historical data. This craze for functional education was illustrated, albeit in an exaggerated style, by a father who said: "I want my boy to do something useful; I want him to learn to milk a cow"; to which a not-yet-converted-die-hard replied: "I want my boy to learn to milk a cow too; but I also want him to learn to do something that a calf can't do any better."

There is also the protest against indoctrination. But the question arises as to how far an insistence upon no indoctrination can go before it, in turn, becomes authoritarian indoctrination itself.

But is indoctrination evil? Who says that confronting pupils with the verified facts of yesterday is evil? Who is to tell us that every generation must learn through trial and error and much tribulation those basic truths underlying our Christian civilization? What is wrong with confronting our youth with evidences that the same evils which worked like termites in the social and political structure of Babylon, Egypt, and Rome, are already at work within our Democracies? Why should not our youth know that "righteousness exalteth a nation but sin is a reproach to any people?" Why deny to the coming generation the knowledge that "the soul that sinneth it shall die," that at heart evil is self-destructive and goodness is confirmed by morality integral in the structure of God's universe?

If these things are indoctrination—so be it. They ought to be known. And just as there is ruin in our ethical relativism so there is ruin in our false fear of indoctrination lest it become an imposed authority rather than one freely accepted. No one yet has answered William E. Hocking's accusation that education has failed to expose our pupils to the dynamics of their own heritage:

If I were to name the chief defect of contemporary education, it would not be that it turns out persons who believe and behave as their fathers did—it does not; but that it produces so many stunted wills, wills prematurely grey and incapable of greatness, not because of lack of endowment, but because they have never been searchingly exposed to what is noble, generous, and faith-provoking.

Hocking's plea is not that pupils should be left as infantile experimenters to choose their own way of life, but that they should be confronted with the best which the past has to offer.

But this is indoctrination. It judges this course of action as better than that. It is, to that extent, authoritarian.

The late Professor Irving Babbitt, the brilliant Harvard Humanist of the last generation, regards this excessive emphasis upon exploration and experimentation in education as an evidence of naturalistic intoxication. He specifically mentions Professor John Dewey "and his followers", then adds:

1"Ibid, p. 456.
4Babbitt, Irving, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 388.
I am reminded of what a friend of mine has written in a manuscript, yet unpublished: “One trouble with modern education is that it is in danger of committing Dewey-cide.”

What relevance has this for Theology—or what relevance has Theology for this? Theology asserts the first law of education—not freedom of self-expression, but the free acceptance of authority. As Forsyth says in another context, but equally applicable to education, “The first duty of every soul is to find not its freedom but its Master.”

Theology would insist, not that modern education has eliminated authoritarianism in its plea for experimentation, but that it has substituted inferior authorities for the final authority. And these inferior authorities which have been imposed are justified on the basis of a progressive education which would do away with authorities altogether. As a substitute, Theology would urge the ancient formula: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” (Psalm 111:10).

In Christ and Man’s Dilemma, Dr. George A. Buttrick has laid a severe, yet justified, indictment upon this excessive movement away from indoctrination:

In our fear of indoctrination we have practiced a worse indoctrination: by our silences in secular education we have indoctrinated children to believe that God does not exist and that Jesus Christ does not matter.11

III HISTORY

Consider, further, the human interest of history. We assume that some reference to our origin will help clarify our destiny, to know whence we have come will be an index to where we shall go. However, not without a protest have we learned that a mere chronicle of events falls short of being history. Victims of the false hopes of objective science, even in the area of human relations, we cherish the illusion that a catalog of events will tell the story of man to date. Scientific and objective we must be in our collection of historical data. But the historian must select, delete, accentuate and diminish this event or that—until the result is really a philosophy or interpretation of history. Macaulay was right:

No picture, then, and no history, can present us with the whole truth: but those are the best pictures and the best histories which exhibit such parts of the truth as most nearly produce the effects of the whole.12

The problem becomes one of the principle of selection and focus. In short, it is a matter of a point of view. Amos preaching at the altar in Bethel meant one thing for Amaziah and Jeroboam, another for the exploited and oppressed people, and even another for the prophet himself. And, as we read the account in an age cursed by the same example of injustice and cruelty, it means even more than when first proclaimed. Today it has become an indictment of sin against human rights, an ideal which struggled for recognition amid great tribulation and which still exists precariously in the midst of greed, luxury, and professional religion.

Theology agrees that history must be written from a point of view. But she insists that the point of view must be adequate to “exhibit such parts of the truth as most nearly produce the effects of the whole.” That point of view is this: history is the actualization of events under divine providence, God always operating against the foil of human freedom, or utilizing it for good. Involved in this is the position that every “fact” of history has meaning only in relation to Calvary.

It is not an accident that we are today being reminded that history is, after all, Heilsgeschichte, holy or sacred history, or even the history of salvation. The idea is being given much attention in contemporary thought. It would seem that Professor

1Forsyth, Peter T., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, p. 42 (Italics ours)
2Buttrick, George A., Christ and Man’s Dilemma, pp. 135-136, (Italics his)
D. M. Baillie has placed the emphasis which evangelicals would heartily approve. For him the "center of history" (to use Tillich's phrase) rests upon an adequate Christology. He says:

Christology stands for a Christian interpretation of history, but it can stand for that only because it stands for the conviction that God became man in the historical person of Jesus.4

It is admitted that this affirmation is theological. It could never be read out of the mere data of history as such. It is the "faith-principle" which must be employed to interpret history -- but which "history itself does not provide."5

It means, fundamentally, that the point of reference of all history is the divine intervention in history, especially as that intervention is exhibited in the redemptive action in Christ: the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Parousia.

IV SCIENCE
Perhaps no discipline will more quickly challenge the right of Theology as the "Queen of Sciences" than science itself. No word more adequately describes the intellectual mood of the twentieth century than the word "scientific". There is assumed an autonomy of science as the only valid court of appeal for truth. This rests upon the assumption of the omnicompetency of human reason. And while this mood does not necessarily deny the truth affirmed by, say, philosophy or religion, it tends to relegate such truth to the area of speculation or perhaps fantasy.

The ideal of the scientific method is to collect data with unbiased objectivity, to classify it with an unprejudiced mind, to measure it with instruments of precision, to check it against "control" groups, and to adopt tentative interpretations until they are either established or disproved. Science waves the banner of "open-mindedness" "loyalty to the facts" reverence for the verification of facts through proof which cannot be disregarded. So complete has been the victory of this scientific method that to question its validity is to run the risk of being regarded naive, obscurantist, or perhaps reactionary.

Of all the features of our civilization today, this scientific outlook is perhaps the most distinctive.6

In fairness it should be said that science itself has produced its own critics -- especially in the area of neo-physics. Professor Stanley Hopper indicates that the convergence of these neo-physicists, Continental theologians, the "existential philosophies," the "world-view" interests of Nietzsche, Dilthey, Spengler; the Personalists; and the Critical Humanists has resulted in a dénouement for this excessive scientism.7

But one looks in vain for any mention of the contribution of Evangelical Christians! We have been quick to pronounce our pious maledictions but slow to analyze intrinsic deficiencies.

It might be suggested that we render unto science the things that are science's and unto Theology the things that are Theology's. But this is inadequate. Why? Science seeks to measure data in terms of generalizations, moving "always away from individuality toward an undistinguishable commonness."8 But on the other hand, the genius of Theology is to accentuate the unique. The most significant events of religion are those which happen only once, as for example, Bethlehem, Calvary, the Opened Tomb. Upon these science cannot presume to pronounce. But it is precisely the implication, intrinsic in the scientific method, that what lies beyond the ken of science is less important, which the theologian cannot allow. Rather, he asserts that what lies beyond the realm of the demonstrable is determinative. To be specific, the theologian asserts that the Christian faith rests upon a miracle, centrally, the miracle of the Resurrection. The man of science here admits he is unable to speak. However, the theologian not only regards the

4D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ, p. 79.
5Richardson, Alan, Christian Apologetics, p. 100.
7Slater, R. H. L., God of the Living, p. 39.
8O.J. Cits., p. 33.
Resurrection (and miracle per se) as definitive for the faith; he likewise regards it as definitive for any adequate view of the universe -- and hence of any aspect of the universe, e.g., those very aspects which science claims as data for its discipline.

It is interesting how, from at least two viewpoints, this exclusive claim of Theology is being supported. We have referred above to science producing its own critics. The rise of the neo-physicists has challenged the older materialistic concepts until one might almost say that, in the name of Christianity, to fight scientific materialism is essentially to fight a straw man. However this qualification should be added: there is a time-lag in the demise of this deterministic concept. Like other outmoded philosophies, all its advocates have not yet learned of its passing.

I am not approving his particular view of Christianity nor his acceptance of the quantum theory, but I cannot but be impressed with the manner in which Jacques Maritain utilizes the findings of the neo-physicists to support his own brand of Thomistic theology. 2 And this I do approve: when those who are in the front ranks of scientific research repudiate the idea of a "closed universe" and, with Heisenberg, Eddington, and others, recognize an element of unpredictability even within the natural processes, we have a right to claim that Theology's affirmation of a Personal God is not precluded by a strict cause and effect view of things. This is at the basis of Maritain's Weltanschauung. It should likewise be in ours.

The other significant criticism of an exclusive scientism has been made by the Critical Humanists. While the neo-physicists have been pointing out the elements of "freedom" in the physical world, the Humanists have been emphasizing the importance of freedom in man. This is a plea made for "the larger conception of science, in which "truth as it comes from all departments of life and thought" is brought together into a theological understanding of all things. 3 The world of human relations is but an index to a larger relationship which the human sustains to the Divine. Thus, implicit in man's inseparability from the universe and his inescapable involvement in society is the further fact: the necessity of the Perfect Person exercising perfect freedom to account for the restricted freedom of man. To put it more theologically: the very fact of man implies the existence of God.

This further word should be added: one must recognize the contributions which science brings to human life. Whatever be the revisions which science must make in the light of its own discipline of the open mind, we can never return to the pre-scientific era. But in the end, the questions and answers of science are not the ultimate questions and answers. Science can and must deal in matters of precision measurement, of controlled observation, of quantitative distinctions. But to these questions of the whatness of things must be added the question of the meanings of things. And science cannot answer the question of the meanings of things. That is left to Theology. And Theology not only speaks concerning the meanings of things, she refuses to permit science to make pronouncements beyond the reach of the scientific method. Theology, on the other hand, in its affirmation of the Personal Nature of God as Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer, asserts that nothing may be included in the findings of science which would preclude the operation of God in all things.

V. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

At the outset it should be said that Theology can offer no economic program. While it readily affirms the affinity of Christianity and Democracy, it also recognizes that Christianity has survived -- and may have to do so again - in the midst of hostile economic philosophies. However, since we are not now confined to what is but to what ought to be, the theological voice has a right to be heard.

Several principles, integral we believe, to the genius of the Christian faith, will serve to illustrate our point of view:

1. No Economy is secure if it possesses the element of exploitation. That is, no economy can permanently endure, if it disregards the rights of free men under God.

Reinhold Niebuhr has restored the word "demonic" to theological respectability -- with a meaning peculiarly his own. The demonic is that which demands unconditional devotion rightly belonging only to God. It is thus a "pretension of divinity." It may be a nation, a race, a class, an ideology. Niebuhr wrote of this demonic in the context of World War II and hence gave much attention to its political aspects. But it should have wider application. Intrenched social evils, in their very nature of exploiting the rights of free men, are indices of eventual ruin.

To be more specific, the threat to the sobriety of the world incarnate in the demonic nature of beverage alcohol is not only a serious ethical malady: it is fundamentally an index to the perverted values operative in our greedy society. It is a serious question how long a culture can endure which spends more upon liquor than it does for education and more for tobacco than it does for the Gospel.

The gambling mania is not simply evidence of a desire for a thrill involved in the element of expectancy. It is a desire to get something for nothing; but the ruin of it lies in the exploitation inherent in the institution itself. It is an institution of exploitation of the rights of man.

The denial of the rights of racial or religious minorities also is an exploitation of free men. And while the Church, even the vocal evangelical section, has been steady in a protest against other social evils, her voice here has not been clear. Perhaps it should be said, her voice has been raised in resolutions and official proclamations—but her conduct has often been one of expediency.

It is doubtful if any specific fault has done more to discredit evangelical Christianity in the eyes of intelligent people than our implicit "Jim-Crowism" practiced, and often advocated, by proponents of Bible Christianity. The recent action of the National Association of Evangelicals in repudiating the United Nations on the basis of its declaration of human rights is a glaring example at least of expediency if not of downright unchristian politics. One does not impugn the motives of these Christian brethren—one does say the action has further discredited the faith they have desired to foster.

What relevance have these matters for Theology—as the "Queen of the Sciences"? This relevance: Theology affirms the rights of free men under God by virtue of the Atonement of Christ. Under this Atonement there is neither Jew, Gentile, Negro, Caucasian, neither bond nor free—only free men under God. For one group to presume to discriminate against another group is exploitation, a violation of the final court of appeal: God Himself. It is no less such even when it is done in the name of a defense of the "faith once for all delivered unto the saints."

This is a strange phenomenon: the scientist, who so often is regarded as an enemy of the faith, is much nearer the truth of God than are some Evangelicals. In the light of his anthropological studies he has come to the insight of the New Testament that "He (God) made from one every nation of men to live on all the face of the earth." (Acts 17:26—RSV)

2. No economy is secure if it has a motif less than that of mutual cooperation. The relative merits of socialism versus free enterprise need not here be analyzed. The chances are the whole truth is not found in either extreme. Surely there is a truth in the idea that the genius of Protestantism has encouraged the rise of Capitalism.

On the other hand, the influence of evan-

**Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, volume II. p. 111.**
gelical religion on collective bargaining, the rights of the workman, and the encouragement of better production, can also be documented."

This much should be said: so often “free enterprise” means freedom only for “those who possess the means of production or have the skill to attain such control.” Thus:

“...there is no parallel freedom for the masses of men, but rather an oppressive preconditioning to economic, social, and cultural poverty and dependence because of the anti-social freedom...”

When “free enterprise” becomes this type of exploitation it then exhibits the same evils as the collectivisms against which it protests so vehemently.

Is it not true here that there must be a proper recognition of the rights of a proper free enterprise and still an insistence upon mutual cooperation for the good of all—laborer, employer, and consumer? The details of this ideal do not rest with Theology. But Theology does have a right to insist that, since both employer and laborer are to be regarded as free men under God, their relations should be such that together they will each promote the interests of the other for the benefit of both. And while we may well recognize the need for intelligent leadership in the proper handling of “capital”, we believe there will never be an amicable solution to the problem until labor is given its proper share in management and also a proper participation in accrued gains.

It is easier to accuse E. Stanley Jones of being a “dreamer” than to put into practice the “program” which he asserts is intrinsic to any solution of the capital-labor “war”. But even while we may feel something of the idealistic suggestions he makes and the unlikelihood of them being incorporated into the policy of capital-labor in the near future, we also feel that nothing less will succeed. For example, Stanley Jones makes a plea that industry must be a cooperative endeavor, from “top to bottom.” "Capital and labor must start on the basis of equality—not on the basis of master and servant.” Then he concludes:

It must go back to what it really is—a cooperative endeavor in which there is cooperation in production, in management, in hiring and firing men, and in the division of profits and losses. Then both labor and capital will come to a new motivation; they will not be working against each other, but for each other.

In all this discussion it must not be concluded that we are seeking to deny to capital a legitimate profit on its investment. In this sense there is a risk which the employer takes which the laborer does not. What we are saying is that we believe it is a principle of a theological understanding of free men that this profit must be a fair profit, not an exploited profit.

The thing for which Stanley Jones, the Evangelist, pleads also is set forth by the Theologian, Nels F. S. Ferre:

Christianity cannot be less socially effective than communism, and it seems altogether obvious that we Christians must from now on take more seriously the challenge to provide those economic patterns which shall be naturally conducive to a Christian society.

The pleas of both Stanley Jones and Nels Ferre must be regarded as expressing the genius of the Christian faith as it finds itself in the complex social order of our day. It would seem difficult to deny that at least this ideal must become a reality if we are to combat effectively the rising tide of unchristian or anti-christian totalitarianisms.

Also, in addition to the application of Christian policies to economics, they must be extended also into all areas of human relations: international affairs, racial understanding, educational programs, political planning, jurisprudence, religious endeavors. Insofar as this is done we shall approximate the Christian ideal. Insofar as economics is concerned, one way is the application of the Christian faith to the problem of collective bargaining as they are presented herein.

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6E.g., the work of the Methodist Lay Preachers and the Trades Unions.
8Ferre, op cit, p. 69.
as we fail we shall expose ourselves even further to the devastation of other totalitarianisms.

It is not an accident that a young Negro Methodist minister in New York City said to me: "The Communists are doing more for my people in practicing brotherhood than is the Church." Even after allowing for the nefarious motives of Communism, there is still enough truth left in the statement to produce an uncomfortable sting.

No economy is secure if it is at variance with the Kingdom of God. Perhaps no term of theology has more fuzzy edges today than that of the "Kingdom of God." But this much seems assured: we have recovered from that era of naive optimism in which, largely through a type of social action, the "kingdom" was to be established in the earth. Seldom today does one hear the slogan, long since worn thin between the upper and nether millstones of concrete evils, "bringing in the kingdom," or "building the kingdom of God." In other words, we have recovered something of the necessary eschatological element in our view of the Kingdom.

It is the task of Theology to remind our generation that the kingdom is fundamentally God's Kingdom. This is not to urge any sort of religious isolationism. It is, rather, to say that the proper dynamic of the Kingdom is not "of this world." And while the Kingdom is truly "in your midst," "among you," there is another sense in which it is eschatological. While it was personally embodied in the life of Our Lord, and is participated in by those who constitute His Body, the Church, it likewise looks to that day when the "kingdom of the world has become the Kingdom of Our Lord and of His Christ." (Revelation 11:15 RSV).

Theology, therefore, must insist that any economy which omits this eschatological reference is insecure. Notice, we are not saying "apocalyptic." Theology need not resort to apocalyptic in its insistence upon an eschatological reference for all temporal economies. But, inasmuch as the very idea of the Kingdom of God carries with it strong teleological elements, it inevitably involves an "otherworldly" or "beyond-history" goal. John S. Whale gives a succinct statement of this view in his volume, Christian Doctrine:

Christian eschatology means the true evaluation of this world must rest against the background of its impermanence. 'Otherworldliness' is the differentia of Christian life in this world...... Therefore I am neither afraid nor ashamed to remind you that Christian doctrine may never forget the same but quite definite otherworldliness, which is one indisputable aspect of our religion in all its transcendent absoluteness.

This is a reminder that we are a "colony of heaven," that here we have no "continuing city but seek one to come." This does not imply in the least that the Pilgrim, on his way to the Celestial City, need not grapple with the setting social sins of his time. While he knows that complete amelioration is never the result of temporal economies, he also knows that the presence of any evil demands his total opposition. Indeed, it is the dynamic of the vision of the City of God which makes the Pilgrim most effective in social action within the city of man.

This is a proper juncture to remind those who are tempted to despair in the face of corporate evil that He Who most decisively proclaimed a proper eschatology likewise was most dedicated to the correction of the evils of the day: none other than Christ Himself. He who is so impressed with the power of the "causes of sin" that he ascribes all recovery to an otherworldly reference has not discerned the mind of Christ. For He Who specifically said: "My Kingdom is not of this world" likewise exhibited those principles and released that dynamic which could "turn the world upside down."

If only we as disciples might recapture the secret of the early Church: to greet the dawn of each new day as the possible "day of the Lord," to believe that One Day the sun would rise but never set, to live under the constant hope that God would again act in the "fulness of the time": to this end they: Маранея!

"Whale, John S., Christian Doctrine, pp 184-185"
It is impossible to call the roll of all human interests in our reference to Theology as the "Queen of the Sciences." What we have done with reference to education, history, science, the economic structure—we believe will obtain in all others. As the *Divina Scientia* of the Middle Ages ruled the constituent disciplines of the *Trivium* and the *Quadrivium*, so, we believe, Theology today must be the final criterion by which all modern disciplines are measured.

Theology would remind the arts of their sacramental character—both the embodiment of the vision of the artist and the conveyance of that vision to others. But the artist, as artist, can never be sure that the "evil and earthly side" of his art will not overshadow the heavenly. "That is a conviction that can only be given by Revelation and its answer, Religion, by faith, by the Christian faith of Redemption, and not by the artist’s dream."\(^a\)

Theology would remind philosophy of its exalted history and contribution to clarity of thinking, but that it is not sufficient for the man of religion. As William Temple says:

> The heart of Religion is not an opinion about God, such as Philosophy might reach as the conclusion of its argument; it is a personal relation with God.\(^b\)

It is this "personal relation" which is the province of Theology to define.

Theology would remind ethics that no lofty ideal of human conduct will ever be adequate which ignores man’s need of Redemption. "The truth is that in the last analysis a Christian does not live by practicing any ethic or moulding himself to any ideal, but by a faith in God which finally ascribes all good to Him."\(^c\) Theology asserts that this "faith in God" is faith in God as Redeemer.

Theology would remind politics that the struggle for freedom, now so acute in our international frictions, is basically a religious matter.

In spite of the relativities attaching to all political systems and political actions the de-\(^d\)

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\(^a\)Forsyth, Peter T., *Christ on Parnassus*, p. 252.


\(^e\)Hopper, Stanley R., *op. cit.*, p. 54.
understood from 'above,' according as he stands related to God's Word in purely personal relatedness.\footnote{Ibid., p. 225.}

This means: man stands before God—a sinner.

Perhaps no one in contemporary Protestantism has with more discernment urged a proper understanding of "Theology as the Queen of the Sciences" than has Lynn Harold Hough. In \textit{The Meaning of Human Experience} he employs a different metaphor, "the keystone of the arch," to express what we have been attempting to do with the classic figure of the "Queen." The meaning of the universe is understood in terms of God as a Person of Holy Love, the Creator and Sustainer of the world and man. Thus Theology is regarded as the "keystone of the arch of existence." Man's own significance within this universe is seen in his use of freedom. Man has needed to hear God speak to him lest he abuse this dangerous gift. God has spoken. Thus Theology is seen as the "keystone of the arch of human life." Man, however, has misused his freedom with such tragic consequences that God the Creator has revealed Himself as God the Redeemer. Thus Theology is the keystone of the arch of salvation. But man may still refuse the offer of redemption in which case God supports, through judgment, the moral structure of His universe. Thus Theology becomes the keystone of the arch of judgment. The final hope of man rests upon his recognition of the moral nature of God as Redeemer who suffers in order to save. It has been the repudiation of Theology, and hence of God exhibited as Suffering Moral Love in Christ, which has brought despair and ruin to our world.

We have cast theology from the throne, and the world has fallen into chaos. When we restore theology once more, there will be genuine hope for civilization.\footnote{\textit{Hough, Lynn Harold, op. cit., p. 207.}}

When man sees God as One Who has suffered and Who continues to suffer, and when he, in repentance and faith, yields his life to that Strange Man on the Cross, he finds the key to the mastery of all life's disciplines. Until then, he lacks an adequate anchor for the soul.

I should like to conclude this study with a reference to Henry Osborn Taylor's volumes, \textit{The Medieval Mind}, to which allusion has previously been made. If the reader will substitute for the Medieval setting the analysis which Taylor makes and transfer it to our own time, something of the concern which we feel relative to the place of Theology in human life will be evident.

All knowledge should make for the knowledge of God, and enlarge the soul's relationship to its Creator and Judge. "He that is not with me is against me." \textit{Knowledge which does not aid man to know his God and save his soul, all intellectual pursuits which are not loyal to this end, minister to the obstinacy and vainglory of man, stiff-necked, disobedient, unsubmissive to the will of God. Knowledge is justified or condemned according to its ultimate purpose. Likewise every deed, business, occupation, which can fill out the active life of man. As they make for Christ and salvation, the functions of ruler, warrior, lawyer, artisan, priest, are justified and blessed—or the reverse.}"\footnote{\textit{Taylor, op. cit., volume II, p. 530 (Italics ours)}}

What is this "ultimate purpose of knowledge?" What else save that it will enable man to love God and glorify Him forever?

If this be our holy ambition -- there is only one proper response: repentance and faith in order to true wisdom. For the despair of man is also the hope of man: to see himself at once as both sinner and the object of God's suffering love. The insight of Theology is: no man ever becomes the man of God's design until he hears the words of Christ: "Thy sins are forgiven; go and sin no more."