


THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN

VOL VIII

1954

NO. 1



The ASBURY SEMINARIAN

Vol. VIII

Wilmore, Kentucky, Fall-Winter, 1954

No. 1

The Wesleyan Message In The Life And Thought Of Today

Copyright 1954

by

ASBURY THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Wilmore, Kentucky

Printed in the United States of America

The ASBURY SEMINARIAN

Table of Contents

EDITORIAL	3
-----------------	---

ARTICLES

The Preacher-Expositor.....	Paul S. Rees	11
-----------------------------	--------------	----

Virgin or Young Woman?.....	Dewey M. Beegle	20
-----------------------------	-----------------	----

Problems for Personalists.....	Paul R. Lundy	35
--------------------------------	---------------	----

The Redemptive Purpose in the Perfection of Human Personality.....	Charles W. Carter	42
---	-------------------	----

Unamuno's Unsolved Problem.....	Roberta Day Corbitt	57
---------------------------------	---------------------	----

BOOK REVIEWS	61
--------------------	----

BOOK NOTICES	70
--------------------	----

OUR CONTRIBUTORS	72
------------------------	----

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Harold B. Kuhn, chairman; W. D. Turkington (ex officio);
J. Harold Greenlee; W. C. Mavis; Milo Nussbaum; J. D. Robert-
son; G. A. Turner.

Contemporary Thinking on the Christian Hope

Eschatology is, whether men like it or not, an integral part of the biblical revelation. Teaching concerning future things admittedly held a large place in the thinking of our Lord while He was on earth, and was prominent in the witness of the New Testament and in the *Kerygma* of the early Church. The historic Church has, whenever she has been sensitive to her original heritage, recognized this. It is for a deviant type of theology that Harnack, in his now-famous statement, spoke when he held that apocalypticism was "an evil inheritance which the Christians took over from the Jews."

Conventional liberal theology, following the mood of Harnack, has disparaged eschatological teaching as a "retrograde form of prophecy," ruling out entirely the live possibility that "It is the final stage in God's redemptive plan as revealed in History . . . it is an integral and essential part of redemptive history."¹ But whatever men may prefer to think about the eschatological teaching of Christianity, the question is one which possesses remarkable vitality, and which shows a genius for forcing itself upon the attention of the Church, even in those times and situations in which it would be more convenient for the Church to forget it.

In this editorial it is undertaken to note, first, the manner in which scholarship has been compelled *from within itself* to return in contemporary discussion to a consideration of the subject; and second, the impact of the contemporary Ecumenical Movement upon current thought of the Church on the question of eschatology.

I.

The publication of Albert Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus* forty years ago forced all sections of the theological world to come to grips in a new way with the subject of eschatology. The emphasis which Schweitzer presented in such inescapable fashion was, of course, that all which our Lord said was said with judgment

¹ Charles T. Fritsch, "The Message of Apocalyptic for Today" in *Theology Today*, October, 1953, p. 360.

in mind, and that his message had a primarily *interim* significance.² Although his work was doubtless one-sided, it was wholesome in that it challenged the non-futuristic temper of theological liberalism.

It goes without saying that the eschatological outlook, with its contention that God exerts pressure on the world at decisive points in its history in the form of a series of judgments, culminating in a final divine stroke in history, was *l'enfant terrible* to modernist theology. This latter was a belated expression of two Continental movements. The first of these was, of course, the Hegelian movement in criticism, with its emphasis upon *ideas* as more important than historical fact, and a doctrinaire belief that ideas (and with them, history) develop dialectically after a uniform and traceable pattern. The second was the Religious-Historical movement, with its stress upon the elements of similarity in all religious systems, its reductions of Christian doctrines to elaboration of "folk motives" existing in religion-in-general, and its assertion that differences between religions were quantitative rather than qualitative.

To the outlook engendered by the foregoing, eschatology was a stone of stumbling. Temporary adjustments were made, chiefly through the methods advanced by Johannes Weiss in Germany and C. H. Dodd in Great Britain. This newer movement, taking form under the title of "Realized Eschatology," emphasized the statements of our Lord to the effect that the Kingdom was "at hand" or "within you," to the neglect or exclusion of statements whose thrust was obviously futuristic. This was combined with the somewhat mystical concept of *Heilsgeschichte*, in which objective history was held to be paralleled by a transcendental 'double' in which, somehow, the denizens of ordinary history dwelled (in lesser or greater degree), and in which God's eternal purposes were projected back into time. This was accompanied by the motif which Rudolf Otto elaborates in Chapter V of his work, *The Kingdom of God and the Coming of the Son of Man*, of the allegedly irrational and mystical quality of all eschatological teaching.

More recently this type of thought is proposed as a solution of the 'problem' of eschatology in terms of H. G. Wells' theme in his *Time Traveler*. In the spirit of Wells, John S. Hoyland suggests that:

Eschatology thus became a dynamic master motive for thought and action

² In his *Out of My Life and Thought* Schweitzer modified his position regarding the purely *interim* quality of the Gospel ethic. See pp. 69ff.

inspired by the Spirit, which was the actual unseen presence of Jesus with his believers, as he voyaged "back" through time at their side.³

To this view, eschatology becomes a sort of mythical expression of the mood of the man who stands "outside of time" in which he gropes to find language to express his belief that "God had sent Jesus back through time from his kingship of the future, which was God's one world sovereignty as it shall some day exist on earth."⁴

From the foregoing it appears that conventional theological liberalism, confronted with an inescapable fact underlined by the work of one of its own number, has sought to take refuge in some reinterpretation of the eschatological message (taking its cue from the "Realized Eschatology" school) in such a manner as to allow itself a new lease on life. This reinterpretation involves a shelving of the idea of a Second Coming, and relegation of the Kingdom to a purely spiritual order in the hearts of believers. This drew the fangs of eschatological emphasis, and left it a form of theological vagary which could not interfere with a doctrinaire emphasis upon a unilinear and inevitable progress in human history toward "the Kingdom" through what Kant called "the progressive operation of the good principle."⁵

The relegation of eschatology to a place of harmlessness has been accompanied by at least two lateral thrusts at the alleged implications of apocalyptic teaching. The first of these is the familiar disparagement of those who take eschatology seriously, as indifferent to the "world that now is" and to social evils in contemporary society. The editor of the *Christian Century* in an article "Why Speak in Tongues of Hope?" (issue of April 2, 1952) apparently quotes Dean Walter Muelder as charging that "The 'sodden complacency' with which too many Christians view the evils of our present life sometimes stems from eschatology."

While there may be a grain of truth in this and kindred charges, it may be said with some degree of justice that leaders in liberal theological thought tend to assume that believers in the contemporary relevance of eschatology are socially reactionary simply because they do not usually adhere to the Socialist Party, and because they do not view the National Association of Manufacturers

³ John S. Hoyland, "The Necessity of Eschatology" in *The Christian Century* for January 9, 1952, p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵ *Religion Within the Frontiers of Mere Reason*, III, 7.

as an incarnation of the evil one. It seems to escape these leaders that there may be those who question some of the doctrinaire notions of Socialists concerning ownership and concerning profits, who are nevertheless not blind to social injustices, and who may in the long run be as socially constructive, if not more so, than those who dogmatically equate "social action" with systematic opposition to the American system of free enterprise.

Another attack upon eschatology, this time upon speculative grounds, is that levelled by S. B. Frost in his *Old Testament Apocalyptic, Its Origins and Growth*. He asserts that eschatology implies a deterministic view of history.⁶ This is a serious charge, if by 'deterministic' he means that history is the expression of blind force or inexorable fate. A study of eschatological literature will reveal, however, that this is not its meaning at all. Rather it declares that God is Lord of history, shaping things teleologically, and of course according to an essential framework which lends coherence and order to its ongoing toward its goal. But—and this is important—there is always a place for human responses; there is likewise an involvement of human beings in the divine purposes. What is *certain* is, that God *will* complete His plan. It is this certainty which engenders the faith which sustains men in the hour of difficulty and trial.

The objection that eschatology implies determinism, along with that which holds that eschatology causes men to be blind to history in general, and to the present in particular, fails to discern that stern times may be much more 'normal' than liberals are accustomed to think; it may be that the Christian message is intensely realistic when it turns the eyes of men to faith in the future, and to God as Lord of the future. Along with the hope which eschatological faith gives for a final, cosmic victory over evil at Christ's Second Coming, there is the constant undergirding of the individual to meet his limited and proximate struggles with the forces of darkness.

II.

Recent Continental theology has been a source of bewilderment and sometimes of embarrassment to the major sectors of American Christianity, as represented by the Federal Council of Churches, and by its successor, the National Council of Churches.

⁶ See especially pp. 239ff.

There was a day when the eschatological outlook could be dismissed as a foible of German theology, with its lack of social emphasis. Charles A. Ellwood rather gaily dismisses the work of Schweitzer upon this basis.⁷ A generation ago the problem could be left unsolved, with Continental thought moving one way and American thought another. However, with the launching of the World Council of Churches, such theological isolation became impossible.

There is reason to believe that many theologians and churchmen in this country are far from happy over the choice of the general subject of Eschatology for the theme of the Evanston Conference in 1954. (It is conceivable likewise that some churchmen of other lands are less than enthusiastic over the plan of meeting in the United States!) Indeed, there is some expressed fear that this theme may prove to be critically divisive. In this connection, the writer recalls the treatment of the Jewish question at the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948. While the delegates from the United States wished to deal with the economic, social and psychological causes of anti-semitism, the Continental delegates proposed to analyze again Romans, Chapters IX to XI.

Two reports have been brought in preparatory to the Evanston Conference. The First came out of the Rolle Conference in Switzerland early last year. The Second was drafted in September of 1952 at Bossey, near Geneva. The difference between the prevailing mood in Europe and that in United States liberal Christendom is clear from a quotation from the Rolle Report, and a comment upon it:

It is he [Jesus Christ] who is to come at the last in the glory of his Kingdom as judge and Saviour of the world, to reveal and consummate his victory . . . There is a special need today to remind the Church and the World that the Christ who has come and who is with us today is also he who is to come.⁸

The Editor of the *Christian Century*, in comment upon this, says:

Insofar as it bases its conception of the future on apocalyptic annihilation, on direct divine intervention to win through catastrophe what cannot be won through suffering love, it is a doctrine of despair.⁸

⁷ *The Reconstruction of Religion*, note on pp. 83f.

⁸ Editorial, "Hope or Despair?" in *The Christian Century*, April 9, 1952, p. 424.

In this same connection, the Editor suggests that the emphasis upon eschatology arises from "a combination of historical factors" growing out of frustrated nationalisms of a "fantastically divided sub-continent." Do we seem to sense here a faintly patronizing attitude toward Continentals?

What seems to be most menacing to the planners of the Evanston Conference from this side is that some of the 'realism' with respect to the present world, growing out of the troubles through which Europe has passed, will be incorporated in "a document which presumes to interpret the mind of God for mankind."⁹ It is clear that many thinkers in the United States consider that Continentals are overly occupied (perhaps perversely so) with the problematic, the fragmented quality of this present life, and that in consequence they seek a ground for faith in expected Divine, as opposed to human, activity.

The Continental may counter with the charge that Americans are provincial and parochial in their outlook. Having known little of the ravages of war on their own land, and having been victorious in the wars into which they have been drawn, they fail to comprehend the depth of tragedy with which human life is confronted.

The reaction of the General Council of American Baptists to the Rolle Report may be typical of the more moderate response of American churchmen. It objects to the phraseology of the proposed theme, "The Crucified Lord, the Hope of the World," saying that it is not sufficiently comprehensive, and that it might seriously limit the scope of the conference. Seeking to be understanding, and yet determined to suggest the proper place for the accent, the General Council says:

We wish that the report might put more emphasis upon the presence and work of the Holy Spirit as an abiding source of hope even in such tragic circumstances (as in Europe) as those through which so many of our brethren have passed in recent years.¹⁰

The Second Report (of Bossey) is more extensive than the First and at first glance seems to tone down the eschatological emphasis a bit. It warns against undue preoccupation with dates, and against undue speculations concerning the "how" of the *parousia*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 425.

¹⁰ In "Baptists on the Christian Hope" in *Christian Century*, Aug. 6, 1952, p. 898.

However, the Report as a whole cannot be pleasing to the generality of American churchmen. Professor Haroutunian suggests that its writers still labor under the thought that the *parousia* is "an event which will occur at the end of 'earthly history' " and that they contemplate an intervention of God which would compel us to "turn our backs on the modern man's understanding of . . . the probable duration and end of history, or of the earth, or of the universe."¹¹ It seems from this that the conceptions of the world and of history dictated by contemporary science must be fairly determinative for Divine action!

In similar vein, the Editor of *The Christian Century* for October 7, 1953, expresses the fear that the Evanston Conference may find its discussions to be so "eschatological in tone" (p. 1126) that the gathering may be reported by the gentlemen of the press in such a way as to sound like a convention of premillennialists. He feels that this would lead to tragic repercussions among the rank and file of American congregations. One is tempted to wonder what effect it might have upon classes in theological seminaries.

Whatever one may say concerning the impact of Continental eschatological emphasis upon American theologians, it remains that the subject is far from palatable to them in the form which those who take the language of the Bible seriously believe and express it. Thinking still of Evanston, Georgia Harkness wrote:

All valid Christian theology makes a central place for the ultimate triumph of God in his eternal Kingdom . . . But this is not to say that such eschatology must posit Christ's return or take literally the affirmation that Christ will "come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead."¹²

Miss Harkness finds in the first chapter of the Second Report (of Bossey) eighteen references to the return of Christ or to his final coming glory, exclusive of scriptural references. It seems that there is an incorrigible quality in the Continental Christian mind at this point!

In the same article, Miss Harkness suggests that the really relevant phase of eschatology is that which concerns itself with personal immortality, rather than with the activity of God in human history and in cosmic destiny. Concern with Christ's return seems

¹¹ "The Christian Hope and the Modern World," *Theology Today*, Oct. 1953, p. 316.

¹² "Progress in Eschatology," *The Christian Century*, Jan. 14, 1953, p. 44.

to her to be a denial of the essential gradualism of Kingdom building, and an abdication of responsibility for man's daily spiritual problem.

* * * *

Enough has been said to indicate that contemporary thought concerning eschatology has proceeded in a two-pronged manner. In Continental theology, the events consequent upon two World Wars have shaken the optimistic and man-centered view of Kingdom-building, and have turned the best and most searching minds to a quest for the contemporary significance of the Biblical message concerning "last things." In the United States, the commitments of liberal theology to a secular culture are too deep. The absence of overt social conflict, the semblance of prosperity in America, and the present strength of American influence in the world, seem to reassure the liberal churchmen to the point at which a divine intervention in the affairs of men and of temporal history is unthinkable.

With a very few exceptions, our scholars tend toward a non-futuristic and symbolic interpretation of eschatological passages. Most of them now agree with Dodd in his belief that criticism can scarcely eliminate entirely from the New Testament teaching the element of a cataclysmic end of this age.¹³ There is also a good deal of sympathy with his method of resolution of the dualism which he believes to be posed by the fact that our Lord spoke eschatologically, and at the same time envisioned a continuation of man's life under historical conditions. The solution presented is, that this dualism is symbolic of the tension between "realization and continuation" in which the Christian must inevitably live.¹⁴

The Christian hope is thus considered symbolically, as a counteractive agency to our tendency to absolutize finite movements or events, and as an agency in the production of an attitude of expectancy, which is held to be essential to Christian living. Precisely *what* the Christian should expect is not made clear, either in the general trend of American liberal thinking or in the Continental emphasis upon an impending cosmic intervention of God. Neither group seems at the moment to come to grips with the words of I Thessalonians 4:16 and 17 and Revelation 20:5-15.

H. B. K.

¹³ *Parables of the Kingdom*, p. 105.

¹⁴ C. H. Dodd, *The Coming of Christ*, p. 8.

The Preacher-Expositor

PAUL S. REES

Not long ago the Gallup Poll revealed that ninety-seven per cent of our population considers "the sermon to be the paramount feature in a service of public worship." The sermons of today may be good, bad or indifferent, and occasionally a discouraged and dyspeptic cleric may call for "a moratorium on preaching," but the overwhelming majority of those who compose our congregations still accord to the ministry of the Word a preeminent status. That fact alone, I should suppose, offers both comfort and challenge to any man who has been tempted to feel that the pulpit is something less than a throne.

Christianity is uniquely a preaching affair. It is much more, to be sure; but, in a distinctive sense, it is just *that*. Someone has pointed out that "Hinduism lives by ritual and social organization, Buddhism by meditation, Confucianism by a code of manners; but Christianity lives 'by the foolishness of preaching'." (I Corinthians 1:21.) In the pointed language of Dr. Paul Scherer, "The only thing in God's economy that can ever take the place of preaching is better preaching." And that, if I judge aright, is why we are here today.

I. THE DECLINE OF EXPOSITORY PREACHING

In this first coming to grips with our common task I want us to think about a type of preaching that largely disappeared from the scene before your day and mine. I refer to the expository sermon. Dr. Luccock contends that "Much of it died for very good reasons. It had paralysis and a weak heart and a clot on the brain and finally succumbed to senile decay." (*In the Minister's Workshop*, p. 150.) But more on this score in a moment. Whatever the reasons, legitimate or illegitimate, it died. It is my conviction that we are due to witness a much-needed resurrection.

As to the *decline* in popularity of the expositional sermon—a decline which began in America some forty or fifty years ago—its causes might be set down as follows:

1. It was *devalued*. What the New Deal did to the American dollar when it took the nation off the gold standard, is precisely what liberalism did to the expository sermon when it discredited

the historicity and authority of the Holy Scriptures. I can think of few exceptions—George Adam Smith, for example—to the rule that great expositors of the Word are men who regard the Bible as being, in its total message, an essential and reliable revelation from God. The school of destructive historical criticism has, in the main, produced detractors but not expositors.

2. It was *dull*. Even where faith in the Word continued unabated, the exposition was too often weighted down with the excess baggage of scholarly paraphernalia. Greek and Hebrew roots have their value, but their market price is usually lowest in the average Sunday congregation. As times changed, and a new generation came on with mental processes geared to sprightly newspaper English, the old exegetical discourse just couldn't keep up. It gasped itself out.

3. It was *detached*. That is, it failed to connect with life. Too often it was a scholarly attempt at illumination which fell far short of application. It failed in the vital thing that Daniel Webster had in mind in his reported statement, "When I attend upon the preaching of the Word I wish to have it made a personal matter, a personal matter, a personal matter."

4. It was *difficult*. In one sense it is true, of course, that *all* preaching is difficult. I do not say that it is onerous or that it is drudgery; I only say that it means mental and spiritual sweat. That was the feeling of whomsoever it was who originated the dictum that the first step toward good preaching is hard work, the second step is more hard work, and the third step still more. But, while this applies to preaching in general, it has particular bearing upon expository preaching. In this area of a man's pulpit activity he is most rigidly shut up to careful preparation. He is least able to scurry about at the last minute, and, tugging frantically at the ropes, hoist a big white sail in the fervent hope that some kindly breeze of inspiration will fill it and send his otherwise marooned craft skipping over the bright waters.

For these reasons, and perhaps for others unnamed, the expounder of the Word has been for years a rare brother among us. Now there are signs of his return.

All has not gone well since the expositor lost caste. The liberal brethren are returning to the Bible as a source-book for preaching. Like prodigals, they have wasted their substance in the far country of book reviews and science and psychology, and they have begun

to be in want. Some of them have even come to themselves. Having waked up to the fact that in the Father's Book there are sermons enough and to spare, they have frankly announced, "I will arise and go to the Bible."

However, you and I have not been prodigals in this sense of the parable. In our evangelical communions we ministers have been, with respect to expository preaching, more like the elder brother who stayed at home. And I fancy that when we complain that *we* were never given a "kid" of expository genius, like Alexander Maclaren, or F. B. Meyer, or G. Campbell Morgan, the Father smiles at us, half-reproachfully and half-indulgently, as He says, "Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have in my Book is thine!"

II. THE DESCRIPTION OF EXPOSITORY PREACHING

Now if I may be forgiven for that touch of pleasantry, I should like to say a word descriptive of the meaning and character of the expository sermon. First, we shall do well to concede the limitations of language. Our words befriend us, but they may also betray us. When we are thinking of preaching as something that lives and functions outside the stiff backs of a textbook on homiletics, we simply must remember that no sermon is to be strictly expository, or strictly topical, or strictly textual. If you wish to include in that statement other shadings of the conventional homiletical types, you may do so. It still remains true that overlapping and cross-fertilization are well nigh inevitable. More than that, they are, within limits, eminently desirable. Says Dr. Scherer, in his *Yale Lectures*, "A sermon without exposition, with nothing that leads to a clearer understanding of God's Word, is without its highest sanction. A sermon without doctrine, with nothing that leads to a clearer understanding of the cardinal tenets of the Christian faith, is without foundation. A sermon without the ethical is pointless. . . . A sermon without the pastoral is spiritless. And a sermon without the evangelistic is Christless and useless altogether!"

If, then, we allow ourselves some breadth of understanding as to sermonic types, what may we say as to the distinctive character of the expository sermon? Well, if the topical sermon is one "whose form is determined largely by the wording of its title"—and I am quoting Blackwood here—if "the textual sermon is one whose form is determined largely by the order of the words in the text," then

we may say that, in general, the expository sermon is one "whose form is governed by the order of the parts in a passage longer than one or two verses." (*The Fine Art of Preaching*, pp. 28, 32, 34, Blackwood.)

When Professor Blackwood speaks of a "passage longer than one or two verses," he is purposely vague. This raises the question of what is technically described as the "expository unit." The unit is the passage, long or short, which one undertakes to expound. It may be a single paragraph, such as we have in the parables and many of the psalms. It may be a whole chapter, in which case the length of it is obviously an important consideration. On occasion it may even be an entire book, but again it is plain that the book must be one of the shorter ones if anything like respectable treatment is to be achieved.

It is said that George Lyman Kittredge, the famous teacher of Shakespearian literature at Harvard, insisted on asking two questions concerning any passage in Macbeth or Hamlet or Othello: first, what do these words say? Second, what do they mean? Precisely those questions should be set before any expositor who undertakes to "open" a section or chapter of the Holy Scriptures. Only, since he is a preacher and not merely a Shakespearian interpreter, he should add a third question: What difference do these words make? If this question be omitted, the sermon will lack thrust and drive and application.

In passing, it is probably true to say that the best known sermon in this category of pure exposition is Henry Drummond's "The Greatest Thing in the World." Graham Scroggie, too, has a superb sermon on I Corinthians 13. It runs into a series of sermons instead of coming within the compass of a single presentation.

At this point some notice should be taken of the possible variations and modifications of the expository pattern of preaching. I have spoken of the "expository unit" as consisting of the particular passage to be analyzed and applied. This, as was pointed out, may vary in length from a paragraph to a whole book. In any case it forms a *natural* unit.

But there are times when the expositor may not find it possible or desirable to develop a sermon from any unit that appears before his eye as a natural whole whose parts he may investigate and illumine. He need not on that account feel that his only alternative is a topical sermon or even a textual. Skillful and competent exposi-

tors sometimes use what may be called the *constructed* unit as distinguished from the natural or *discovered* unit.

As an example, I think of a treatment suggested by Dr. H. Framer Smith in an article of his entitled, "Can Expository Preaching Be Effective?" He proposes John 3:16 as a text. By way of introduction he would carry the congregation back to that vivid Old Testament scene in Deuteronomy where the two mountains, one of blessing and the other of cursing, stand opposed to each other. Between the two lies the unbridged chasm. The preacher would then show that the mount of curses corresponds to the word "world" in the text—the world of sin, under a curse. He would show that the mount of blessings symbolizes the phrase "everlasting life" in the text. Between the two, yawns the chasm of despair of which the word "perish" is descriptive.

Now the preacher is ready to show that John 3:16 gives us the bridge which mercifully spans the otherwise uncrossable valley between the world in its lostness and the everlasting life which is the gift of God. That bridge consists, as the text clearly indicates, of three spans: the love of God, the death of Christ, and the faith of man. God loved! Christ came! Man must believe!

Technically, I suppose it might be argued that such a sermon represents an expansion of the textual method. Perhaps it does. It might just as readily be argued that it represents a contraction of the expository technique. At any rate it is clear that such a sermon, if competently handled, will leave any congregation far richer in its Biblical insights and appreciations. Its danger is that it will appear artificially ingenious; its potential is that it will do something fresh and memorable for a familiar but inexhaustible text.

Another variation within the expository pattern takes us back to the discovered or natural unit. But now, instead of making it his main purpose to expound the original and primary message of the inspired writer, the preacher establishes a point of departure in what may be a secondary truth of the passage involved, and then proceeds to gather light and enrichment from the context. In employing this method one must be constantly sensitive to the distinction between the *suggestive* and the *logical* value of his supporting sentences or verses.

For example—if you will pardon a quick dip into my own preaching pool—I preached on a recent evening from James 4:3, "Ye ask and receive not, because you ask amiss." "Why Some

Prayers Are Not Answered" was the topic. So far as the body of the message was concerned, it consisted of a fourfold answer to the implied inquiry of the theme. Each of these four answers was found in the "expository unit" that composed the Scripture reading and provided the field of thought, namely, the first twelve verses of the chapter. The answers were given in the following form: Prayers are sometimes unanswered

I. Because Our Asking is Unworthy—"that ye may consume it upon your lusts" (v. 3).

II. Because Our Actions are Unbecoming—"Ye adulterers and adulteresses, know ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with God?" (v. 4).

III. Because Our Approach is Unimpassioned—"Resist the devil and he will flee from you. Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you." (vs. 7, 8.)

IV. Because Our Attitude is Unbrotherly—"Speak not evil one of another, brethren." (v. 11)

Consider the third heading: "Because Our Approach is Unimpassioned." The supporting sentences, from verses 7 and 8, are: "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you. Draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to you." From the standpoint of an exegete who is interpreting the primary meaning of the apostle, one would have to say that the thought of prayer has by now dropped away into the background of the apostle's thought. At the same time it is obvious that the intensity of his words about fighting off the devil and making a hearty approach to God are immensely *suggestive* of what the New Testament teaches about prayer, particularly that aspect of it which calls for "importunity."

Any example of mine is poor enough, but this sampling will illustrate, I trust, the distinction I have drawn—validly enough, it seems to me—between several modifications or variants of the expository sermon. Don't be afraid that the method is hopelessly stereotyped. It need not be. If it is, the fault lies with somebody's stereotyped brain and static soul, not with the method itself.

III. THE DANGERS OF EXPOSITORY PREACHING

And now a frank word about the drawbacks of the expositional technique. That it is not without its perils is readily granted. Some of these were indicated in our discussion of the decline of this manner of preaching: academic dullness, for example, or that un-

reality which arises when the Biblical text is left unrelated to the contemporary scene with its vexing problems and often its excruciating agonies.

There are other perils. There is the danger that the preacher shall think he is expounding Scripture when he is only allegorizing it. Dr. H. C. Morrison had a perfectly charming sermon on the courtship of Isaac and Rebekkah, which he chose to use as a prophecy about Christ and the Church. In the hands of a genius like Dr. Morrison, with his opulent imagination and his histrionic skill, it became a sheer inspiration to listen to it. But at best it was scarcely expository preaching. At the worst it is the sort of thing that one finds among his highly imaginative colored brethren of the cloth. Along that highway there ought to be posted many a caution sign: "Slippery When Wet!"

There is the danger, too, that the aspiring expositor shall wade in beyond his depth. When he does, the whole congregation may be sucked under in a pitiable reenactment of Pharaoh's host in the swirling waters of the Red Sea. You have only to go a little way into Spurgeon's *Treasury of David*, that immortal study of the Psalter, to discover how much there is in the parallelisms and idioms of Hebrew poetry that does not meet the eye of the untutored English reader.

Mind you, I do not say that a knowledge of Hebrew is a "must" if you are going to succeed as an expositor. Thanks to such works as *The Treasury of David*, some of us who missed our Hebrew can partake of the ripened fruits of a competent scholarship. Abundant materials are now available for the guidance of the journeyman preacher who knows that, while an intrusive scholarship will spoil any sermon, a sound workmanship is indispensable to the conscientious expositor.

IV. THE DEFENSE OF EXPOSITORY PREACHING

I dare not, however, conclude this word to you without saying something in *defense* of the expository pattern of preaching. If it has liabilities, they are as nothing compared with its assets. Let me name a few, with the most sparing comment:

1. Expository preaching drives you to your Bible. Topical preachers can get on with little Scripture; textual preachers must have slightly more; but expositors are as helpless without it as David was without his sling.

2. Expository preaching demands "fair play" with the mind and purpose of the inspired writer whom we are endeavoring to interpret to the people. Some years ago a book of sermons was published under the title "Quick Truths in Quaint Texts." I have never had an ambition to read it, for to me the preacher is not called to be an ecclesiastical magician, pulling funny looking rabbits out of odd looking hats, but is rather summoned to be the flaming herald of the everlasting Gospel of Jesus Christ our Lord. You can rightly divide the Word of God or you can cut capers with it: the two things are poles apart.

3. Expository preaching, if its possibilities are soundly exploited, give you the maximum opportunity for being personal without indulging in "personalities." A friend of mine preaches in a city where Roman Catholicism and Christian Science are both strong. Both of his Sunday services are broadcast. Recently, when we met, he told me of a series of Sunday morning sermons he had given from St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. "It's astonishing," said he, "how effectively one can expose and combat the errors both of Rome and of Christian Science by unfolding the truth of Galatians." And he added, "You don't have to mention either one of them to do it!"

If a man wants to preach *to* people without preaching *at* them, he can find no finer instrument for his purpose than the expository sermon.

4. The expository sermon provides the sort of preaching that gives a man his best chance of remaining fresh, resourceful and perennial across the years. "Current events" preaching: it can be thin as dish water, and about as nourishing; even when it is good, it doesn't pass as a staple. "Book review" preaching: most of the time it is the broken reed on which a man leans when Holy Writ has become for him an antiquated word. "Life situation" preaching: I do not deny its value or even, betimes, its power; but the situations run out before long and members of the congregation wish they could follow! "Topical" preaching: at its best it is arresting and rewarding; at its worst it is a travesty and an insult—both to God and the people.

But expository preaching, given half a chance in the diligent mind and the consecrated hands of a lover of the Word, will instruct and convict and correct and comfort and inspire and enrich, Sunday in and Sunday out, come summer or winter, spring or fall.

When Charles Haddon Spurgeon had finished a quarter of a century of ministry in his Tabernacle in London, an anniversary service was held. Speaking at this celebration, Spurgeon dropped a word which I leave with you to ponder well: "If anybody had been standing in this place and preaching politics and temperance for twenty-five years, I wonder if he could have kept a congregation. All other subjects become exhausted; but give me the Bible and the Holy Ghost, and I can go on preaching forever."

Virgin or Young Woman?

An Exegetical Study of Isaiah 7:14

DEWEY M. BEEGLE

When the Revised Standard Version (RSV) of 1952 appeared with "young woman" in the text of Is. 7:14 and the traditional "virgin" relegated to the footnotes, a barrage of heated articles appeared charging that the translation was a denial of the virgin birth of Christ. Many evangelicals did not take such an extreme view and in time a variety of opinions were expressed. This diversity gave rise to real questions in the minds of laymen which are still unanswered. The exegesis of this verse is far more complex and intricate than most of the articles would indicate, and if all the facts are to be faced objectively it is necessary for the writer (and also the reader) to approach the study with a cool head and a warm heart.

The works by Wilson¹ and Machen² are classics among evangelicals and generally considered to be the last word on the subject; therefore, this article will make repeated reference to the findings of these scholars. Delitzsch³ and Orr⁴ will also be referred to.

The Hebrew word which gives rise to this whole problem is 'almah. No variant readings are indicated by any of the known manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible, and even the Dead Sea Isaiah Scroll (from about 100 B.C.) has this form. Thus, the Hebrew text is clear and consideration may be given to the etymological and contextual phases of the study.

I. THE USE AND MEANING OF 'ALMAH

The word actually occurs nine times in the Old Testament (O.T.), but two of these (1 Chr. 15:20 and the heading of Ps. 46) are musical terms and the versions and translations generally transliterate them as "Alamoth"; therefore, only the seven remaining occurrences are indicated in the following table:

¹ Robert Dick Wilson, "The Meaning of 'Alma (A.V. 'Virgin') in Isaiah VII.14," *The Princeton Theological Review*, XXIV (1926), pp. 308-316.

² J. Gresham Machen, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, New York, Harper, 1930.

³ Franz Delitzsch, *Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah*, trans. by James Martin, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1949.

⁴ James Orr, *The Problem of the Old Testament*, London, Nisbet, 1909.

Ref.	LXX (Septuagint)	KJV	ASV	RSV
Gen. 24:43	<i>parthenos</i>	virgin	maiden	young woman
Ex. 2:8	<i>neanis</i>	maid	maiden	girl
Ps. 68:25	<i>neanis</i>	damsels	damsels	maidens
Prov. 30:19	<i>neotes</i>	maid	maiden	maiden
Cant. 1:3	<i>neanis</i>	virgins	virgins	maidens
Cant. 6:8	<i>neanis</i>	virgins	virgins	maidens
Is. 7:14	<i>parthenos</i>	virgin	virgin	young woman

Wilson⁵ tabulated the renderings of the versions which appeared after the translation of the LXX, but such a compilation has been omitted here inasmuch as the readings generally followed the LXX. The glaring exceptions to this generalization were the uses of *neanis* in 7:14 in the translations by Aquila, Theodotian, and Symmachus. Wilson noted that these translators "were all probably renegades from Christianity and Jewish proselytes,"⁶ and there can be little doubt that the deep feelings between the Jewish and Christian groups places suspicion on these readings.

Some would point to the general unanimity among the versions as proof that the traditional view is correct. It points in that direction, but clear proof must come from the study as a whole.

The derivation of '*almah*' has bearing on the basic meaning of the word. The most logical source would seem to be the verb '*alam*'. It occurs about 26 times in the O.T., always meaning "hide, conceal," so the supporters of the traditional view have been inclined to define '*almah*' as a young woman or girl who had not been uncovered; i.e. not known by a man, therefore, a virgin. Wilson concurred in this etymology though his qualification "possibly"⁷ is an indication that he was not completely convinced in his own mind.

The study of comparative Semitic linguistics has greatly increased our knowledge and given us new tools to use in determining the meaning of a word. It is now known that the original Semitic alphabet had more consonants than the 22 found in Hebrew. The related letters '*ain*' and '*ghain*' (still preserved in Arabic) fell together in Hebrew and appeared only as '*ayin*'. Thus, in attempting to determine the etymology of any word which contains an '*ayin*' we must also allow for the possibility that it was originally a '*ghain*'. A clear example of this phenomenon is the Hebrew proper name '*azzah*'. The LXX transliterated it as *Gaza* and the English form

⁵ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-310.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁷ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

was derived from it. The letter "g" is clear proof that the name originally began with a *ghain*, and that the pronunciation continued on after the letter had become an 'ayin in Hebrew. The name Gomorrah ('*amorah*) is similar.

Arabic literature has a root *ghalima* "to be lustful," and a related noun *ghulam* "young vigorous man." Wilson cited this and noted further that "under this root the Arabs put the words corresponding to the Hebrew '*elem* and '*alma*.'"⁸ He had the evidence and the technical training to determine the correct etymology of the word in question, but his zeal to defend a point of view unconsciously influenced his judgment in this instance. Oswald T. Allis wrote a series of articles in 1952 in which he attacked the RSV. In discussing Is. 7:14 and Wilson's study of the problem he concluded, "The situation has not changed nor has the evidence presented by Dr. Wilson been weakened or nullified during the quarter-century which has elapsed since he penned these words."⁹ This sweeping statement is evidence that Allis has not taken the pains to keep up to date in his research. Wilson wrote his article in 1926, but in 1929 and the following years excavations at Ugarit on the shores of the Mediterranean north of Palestine unearthed clay tablets inscribed in a completely unknown script and dialect. This linguistic find proved to be related to Hebrew and study of the contents revealed occurrences of the word *glm* (probably vocalized *galmat*). It is used once in parallel with *btlt*¹⁰ which is equivalent to Hebrew *bethulah* "virgin." This further evidence has proven conclusively that '*almah* originated from the root *ghalima* which in Hebrew would have become '*alem*. This verb does not appear in the O.T., and it may have dropped out of Hebrew entirely, but the derived noun survived.

The masculine form corresponding to '*almah* is '*elem*. It is found twice (1 Sam. 17:56 and 20:22) and is translated "stripling, youth, boy, young man." This word occurs in Ugaritic as *glm*. The abstract plural form '*alumim* occurs in Job 20:11; 33:25, Ps. 89:46(45), and Is. 54:4 and is translated "youth, youthful vigor." It is clear that all three words discussed thus far are derivatives of

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

⁹ Oswald T. Allis, "Evangelicals and 'The New Version,'" *United Evangelical Action*, Nov. 15, 1952, p. 10.

¹⁰ Cyrus H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Literature*, Rome, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1949, pp. 63-64.

'alem, and it is equally certain that the etymology has primarily the idea of "youth"—the time of sexual vigor and special inclination to lust. Nothing is implied either one way or the other as to virginity or marriage. Such connotations must be derived from the context.

In Gen. 24:16 Rebekah is called a *bethulah* "virgin," and this definition is made explicit by the statement, "no man had known her." In vs. 43 Rebekah is called an *'almah*, so it is absolutely certain that this *'almah* was a virgin, but we learn this from the context, not the word itself. When we examine Ex. 2:8, Ps. 68:25, and Cant. 1:3 there is nothing in the context which would deny the element of virginity, but at the same time there is nothing to indicate that this idea was *specifically* intended.

In the passage in Cant. 6:8 the plural form *'alamoth* is used in a series with "queens" and "concubines." In vs. 9 the same three groups are referred to, but this time *banoth* "daughters, young women" appears as the parallel form of *'alamoth*. Had the author intended the idea of virginity in this case he would certainly have used the plural form *bethuloth*.

Prov. 30:19 "the way of a man with a maid(en)" has been used as a "proof text" for widely divergent views. The author of the verse did not give enough evidence to fix the situation, so the assumption of each interpreter is the determining factor. If one assumes a courtship situation as the background then the idea of "virgin" is preferable, but if the author had a picture of a young married couple in mind then "young woman" is to be preferred.

The use of *glmt* in parallel with *btlt* in Ugaritic text 77 shows that it could be used as a close equivalent of *btlt*, and this adds support to the use of *'almah* in Gen. 24:43. However, the "poetical license" present in parallelism does not permit us to conclude that the two terms were synonymous.

It has been claimed that the appearance of *glmt* in the second part of the parallelism is proof that it was not only a true synonym of *btlt*, but that it was the more definite, distinctive term to express "virgin." The basis for this deduction is the assumption that in Hebrew poetry the second of two words in parallel is the stronger term. This is surely true in some cases, but by no means can it be proven to be the general rule. Furthermore, it is venturesome, to say the least, to cite a 14th or 15th century B.C. example as etymological proof of the usage of a word in the 8th century B.C.

It should be noted that the expression *bn glmt* also occurs. It

has been translated "sons of (the goddess) *Ġalmat*" but it also has been read "son(s) of a *ġalmat*." If the former is correct then nothing can be said further concerning *ġlmt*, but if the latter is correct then it could be said that "virgin" was definitely not intended.

If it were true that *'almah* was the real synonym of *bethulah* it would be natural to expect the LXX to translate it by *parthenos* in each case, but the preceding tabulation shows that in five of the seven instances the forms *neanis* and *neotes* "girl, maiden, young woman" were used.

II. THE USE AND MEANING OF BETHULAH

This word occurs 50 times in the O.T. Its basic meaning is "a female who has not had sex relations with a man." The first use is in Gen. 24:16 and this definition is made crystal clear. However, some scholars feel that *bethulah* had a wider usage and cite Biblical evidence to support their view. Ps. 148:12, Jer. 51:22 and Zech. 9:17 have been so used, but these are simply a few of the occurrences of the combination of *bahur* with *bethulah*. This expression appears (in singular or plural) 12 times¹¹ in the O.T. indicating an idiomatic usage in which case the whole expression might appear in a context where *bethulah* by itself would not have been used. Therefore, to cite such examples is no proof that *bethulah* had other meanings than "virgin."

Joel 1:8 is often used to demonstrate that *bethulah* had a wider usage. At first glance the argument seems clear, and the LXX use of *numphe* "young wife, bride" seems to concur in the interpretation. However, it is well known that the Hebrews had a custom of sealing a marriage contract some period of time before the actual consummation of the marriage when the bridegroom took the bride to himself. This verse could very well apply to a young woman who was legally a bride and yet still a virgin inasmuch as her legal husband died before actually living with her. Deut. 22:23 begins a law pertaining to a virgin that is betrothed to a man, whereas vs. 28 deals with a virgin who is not betrothed. Both of these are in contrast to vs. 22 which deals with a woman who is married and living with her husband. Thus, in the Hebrew mind there was a distinct classification of "betrothed virgins" who were truly virgins, and

¹¹ Singular forms: Deut. 32:25, 2 Chr. 36:17, Jer. 51:22, and Ezek. 9:6. Plural forms: Ps. 78:63; 148:12, Is. 23:4, Jer. 31:13, Lam. 1:18; 2:21, Amos 8:13, and Zech. 9:17.

Joel 1:8 could well be an accurate description of such a virgin in her time of bereavement.

Job 31:1 and Jer. 2:32 have also been cited, but again, there is nothing to clearly indicate that *bethulah* was used in a broader sense than "virgin." Job 31:9 "If my heart has been enticed to a woman," seems to be supplemental to "how then could I look upon a virgin?" of vs. 1.

The LXX *never* translates *bethulah* by *neanis* or *neotes* (as in the case of 'almah) so we can be sure that the translators considered *bethulah* as more specifically virgin than 'almah.

The evidence from Arabic, Syriac, Aramaic, and Assyrian is equally clear and unanimous. Robert Dick Wilson after noting this evidence wrote, "There seems no doubt that *bethula* is the specific and unambiguous word for 'virgin,'"¹² and with this all must agree.

III. THE USE AND MEANING OF NA'ARAH

This word occurs 63 times in the O.T. In Gen. 24:16 Rebekah is called a *na'arah* and in this case it refers to a virgin, but Ruth 1:4 proves that the *na'arah* of Ruth 2:5, 6 and 4:12 was definitely not a virgin. In Gen. 34:3, Dinah, after being humbled by Shechem, is twice called a *na'arah*. Thus, the term referred more to the idea of youth and the implications of virginity or marriage had to come from the context. In this respect *na'arah* is similar to 'almah, but there is a slight difference in that the former is qualified five times (including Deut. 22:23, 28) by *bethulah*, whereas the latter is never thus qualified.

IV. THE USE AND MEANING OF PARTHENOS

It has been indicated above that the LXX usage of *parthenos* in Is. 7:14 was the basis for most of the readings of the versions. Tradition has held that *parthenos* was used only in the sense of "virgin," therefore, it has also held that the LXX is an early witness to the true meaning of 'almah. However, in Gen. 24:16, 43 *parthenos* is used for *na'arah*, *bethulah*, and 'almah, while in Gen. 34:3 it is used for both cases of *na'arah*, referring to Dinah *after* she had been seduced.

Machen in studying this problem wrote, "On the whole, it seems evident that the Septuagint is inclined to use the Greek word for 'virgin' in rather a loose way, or in places where no special emphasis upon virginity appears. The word, therefore, might well

¹² Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

have crept into the translation at Is. vii. 14 without any special cause, or certainly without influence from any Jewish doctrine of a virgin birth of the Messiah. It must be remembered that such a doctrine is entirely without attestation elsewhere. To find it merely in the Septuagint translation of *'almah* by 'virgin,' a translation that appears in another passage where there is no suspicion of any doctrinal significance, and that is paralleled by the occasional use of the same Greek word to translate a simple Hebrew word for young woman, is surely venturesome in the extreme."¹³

V. SUMMARY OF THE ETYMOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

It is by no means clear that the idea of "virginity" was in the mind of the LXX translator of Is. 7:14. The loose usage of *parthenos* and the failure to translate *'almah* consistently by *parthenos* are indications that the translator did *not* intend to stress the aspect of "virginity."

On the other hand, it is quite certain (from Hebrew and Greek) that *bethulah* is the specific term for "virgin." The word is found in Is. 23:4, 12; 37:22; 47:1; 62:5 and the Dead Sea Isaiah Scroll reads the same in each case, so Isaiah knew the term and had he intended to point out *solely* the idea of "virginity" he would have used *bethulah*, but the unanimous witness of the manuscripts is that Isaiah used *'almah* in 7:14.

It is certain that *'almah* had the basic idea of youthful vigor and nothing was implied one way or the other as to virginity or marriage. The contexts in Hebrew and Ugaritic indicate its usage as a close equivalent of *bethulah*, but there is not enough evidence to show that the two were synonymous. Gen. 24:16, 43 cannot be used for this purpose as the same verses can be similarly employed to prove that *'almah* is a synonym of *na'arah*.

Wilson, after his etymological study concluded, "that *'alma*, so far as known, never meant 'young married woman'; and secondly since the presumption in common law and usage was and is, that every *'alma* is virgin and virtuous, until she is proven not to be, we have a right to assume that Rebecca and the *'alma* of Is. vii. 14 and all other *'almas* were virgin, until and unless it shall be proven that they were not."¹⁴ It is true that *'almah* is never qualified by *bethulah*, and further, that there is no case of a *clearly defined* married

¹³ Machen, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

¹⁴ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

woman being called an *'almah*. However, Cant. 6:8 negates the *assumption* of virginity, and possibly Prov. 30:19 does the same. It is on the basis of these verses and Is. 7:14 that the definitions "young woman (ripe sexually; maid or newly married),"¹⁵ and "marriageable girl, young woman (until the birth of her first child),"¹⁶ were derived. However, the idea of marriage comes from the context and *not* the etymology. The will to see the meaning "virgin" in each occurrence of *'almah* is the basis for Wilson's assumption and not etymological data.

On the basis of the facts at hand the writer is inclined to agree with Delitzsch when he states, "It is also admitted that the idea of spotless virginity was not necessarily connected with *'almah* (as in Gen. xxiv.43, cf. 16), since there are passages—such, for example, as Song of Sol. vi.8—where it can hardly be distinguished from the Arabic *surrije*; and a person who had a very young-looking wife might be said to have an *'almah* for his wife."¹⁷

Yet, having said all this, it should be apparent that Machen was correct in concluding that the problem "cannot be settled merely by a consideration of the meaning of the Hebrew word *'almah*."¹⁸ We must turn our attention to the total context in which Is. 7:14 is found.

VI. THE CONTEXT OF ISAIAH 7:14

The broader context of this prophecy extends from 7:1 through 9:1 (8:23 in the Hebrew). The background is the Syro-Ephraimitic war which dates about 734 B.C. Pekah of Samaria in Israel, and Rezin of Damascus in Syria had allied themselves against Ahaz, king of Judah, and came to wage war against Jerusalem. The king and his people were terribly frightened (7:2), but instead of trusting God for deliverance Ahaz sent a present of gold and silver to the king of Assyria along with an urgent plea for help (2 Kgs. 16:7-9). At this time the Lord sent Isaiah to reassure Ahaz and to challenge him to believe in God rather than to trust in foreign kings. Isaiah prophesied that within 65 years Ephraim (Israel) would no longer be a people. We know that Samaria fell in 721 B.C., but

¹⁵ Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1907, p. 761.

¹⁶ Koehler and Baumgartner, *Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros*, Leiden, Brill, 1952, p. 709.

¹⁷ Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

¹⁸ Machen, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

Ezra 4:2 tells of Esarhaddon's importation of people to Samaria. This probably occurred in connection with his long military journey to Egypt and the subsequent destruction of Memphis in 671. If such is the case, then the prediction is generally accurate.

At any rate, Ahaz was warned that if he did not believe the prophecy he would not be established (7:9). Then the Lord challenged Ahaz to ask for the most difficult sign (Hebrew *'oth*) he could imagine. This was intended to give reassurance to Ahaz, but he had made up his mind to depend on the king of Assyria so he declined the Lord's offer, and then rationalized his refusal by adding that he did not want to put the Lord to the test. Then in vs. 13 Isaiah addresses a rebuke to the "house of David." Some interpreters cite this as proof that vs. 14 was addressed to the people of Israel and not to Ahaz, but in vs. 2 "the house of David" is referred to as "his heart and the heart of his people." Without question Isaiah was speaking to Ahaz in vs. 13 and following, and *the prophecy had to have meaning for the king in his situation* or else God would not have sent Isaiah to him with this message.

After rebuking Ahaz, Isaiah informs him that the Lord will give him a sign whether he wants it or not. It has often been held that this sign (*'oth*) had to be a *miracle* of extraordinary proportions, and that the birth of a child in the time of Ahaz would not have been any sign at all. It seems that the prediction of the boy's birth, his name, and events which would transpire in his youth constitutes a very good *sign* for Ahaz. The best means of settling this issue is to let Isaiah himself define what the Lord meant by "signs." In 8:18 Isaiah wrote, "Behold, I and the children whom the Lord has given me are signs (*'othoth*) and portents (KJV and ASV "wonders") in Israel from the Lord of hosts, who dwells on Mount Zion." Isaiah's own name meant "salvation of the Lord" and it was a sign to Ahaz. In 7:3 Isaiah is told to take his son, Shearjashub, with him to meet Ahaz. The boy's name meant "a remnant shall return," and it too was a sign. Some would interpret it as an encouragement, but Delitzsch sees in it a threat to Ahaz.¹⁹ In either case the name was indeed a sign.

Another son of Isaiah was named Maher-shalal-hash-baz, meaning "the spoil speeds, the prey hastes." He was so named since the "riches of Damascus," and the "spoil of Samaria," would be carried away to the king of Assyria before the child would be able

¹⁹ Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

to cry, "My father, and, My mother." The name of this boy was also a sign to Ahaz. If the context is to count for anything, it seems clear that the sign of vs. 14 is similar. The boy is to be named Immanuel, "God with us," and before he knows how to choose between good and evil the lands of Rezin and Pekah will be deserted. This too was a *real* sign to Ahaz, and in no way does the *immediate* context demand the idea of miracle in the sense in which we find it in Mt. 1:23.

We know that Tiglath-pileser III came to the aid of Ahaz, and in 733-732 B.C. he conquered Damascus, took away Galilee and Gilead, and placed Hoshea on the throne of Israel after Pekah was assassinated (2 Kgs. 15:30). Ahaz met his ally at Damascus and while there he observed the altar which was used for the Syrian worship and had Urijah the priest construct a copy and substitute it for the regular altar in Jerusalem (2 Kgs. 16:10-16).

Later, when Hoshea refused to pay his yearly tribute to Assyria, Shalmaneser V besieged Samaria. His successor, Sargon II, finished the destruction of the city in 721 B.C. This same king gave Judah a scare (Is. 20:1), and his son Sennacherib devastated most of Judah. Thus, Isaiah's prophecy in vss. 15-17 was literally fulfilled.

Inasmuch as the child of vss. 15-16 is the Immanuel of vs. 14 it would seem necessary to consider 14-17 as a unit, and, further, it would follow that Immanuel was born in the time of Ahaz. However, this view has difficulties too. Who was this '*almah*? If she were Isaiah's wife she would have been referred to as the "prophetess," as she was in 8:3. Furthermore, there is no *clear* statement that this child was ever born in the reign of Ahaz. However, Immanuel is addressed in 8:8 and a distinct person is indicated thereby, and the connection with the Assyrian difficulties ties the person to the contemporary scene. The implications are apparent, so it requires more than the argument from silence to disprove an immediate fulfillment.

Some interpreters place great stress on the use of the definite article with '*almah*. If the article is important it only serves to show that Isaiah had a definite '*almah* in mind. However, the Hebrew O.T. is filled with examples of the article being used in an indefinite sense so one cannot speak too dogmatically in this case. On the other hand, Delitzsch goes so far as to say, "the expression itself warrants the assumption that by *ha'almah* the prophet meant one

of the *'alamoth* of the king's harem (Luzzatto); and if we consider that the birth of the child was to take place, as the prophet foresaw, in the immediate future, his thoughts might very well have been fixed upon *Abijah* . . . who became the mother of king Hezekiah, to whom apparently the virtues of the mother descended, in marked contrast with the vices of his father. This is certainly possible."²⁰

Machen in discussing this possibility says it is an ancient idea which was later refuted by Jerome.²¹ If the refutation was so conclusive one wonders why Delitzsch (no mean scholar) would revive it. Jerome probably reasoned as follows: Hezekiah came to the throne when he was 25 (2 Kgs. 18:2), but inasmuch as Ahaz reigned only 16 years (2 Kgs. 16:2), it would appear that Hezekiah was born before Ahaz became king, therefore, Isaiah would not have thought of Hezekiah's mother as the *'almah* who was to bear a child in the future. However, if all of 2 Kgs. 16:2 is read and taken into consideration the only conclusion possible is that Ahaz was 36 when he died. If Hezekiah was 25 at the death of his father then Ahaz was 11 at the birth of Hezekiah. This is quite improbable, and it certainly indicates that something has happened to the dates regarding Hezekiah's reign. As further evidence 2 Kgs. 18:13 can be cited. Sennacherib is said to have invaded Judah in the 14th year of Hezekiah. Archaeological and linguistic evidence has accurately fixed this event in 701 B.C. Thus, Hezekiah began his reign in 715; i.e., after the fall of Samaria. This line of reasoning does not purport to prove the suggestion of Delitzsch; it only shows that Jerome's refutation has failed to remove the possibility.

In summary, it should be noted that the evidence from the context is not sufficient to settle the issue with certainty. As in the case of the etymology, the theological presuppositions seem to be the deciding factor. Before discussing these it is necessary to define the theoretical possibilities of treating our problem.

VII. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF IS. 7:14

From a theoretical standpoint there are four possible interpretations of Is. 7:14; (1) the prophecy relates only to the time of Ahaz and Matthew was wrong in applying it to Jesus, (2) the prophecy pertains only to the birth of Jesus and Isaiah in writing vss. 15-17 is picturing what would happen *if* such a child as de-

²⁰ Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

²¹ Machen, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

scribed in vs. 14 should be born in the time of Ahaz, (3) the prophecy pertains only to the birth of Jesus, but Isaiah thought it was to happen shortly, therefore he wrote vss. 15-17 to indicate how near the event would be, and (4) the prophecy has a dual application, being fulfilled in the time of Ahaz, but in a fuller, deeper sense in the birth of Jesus.

The first possibility is that held by the extreme liberal segment of the Church, but the basis for such a view is entirely subjective and stems from a spirit which denies the inspiration of the Scriptures; therefore it need not be considered further.

The second possibility is best represented by Machen. He wrote, "it may be held that the prophet has before him in vision the birth of the child Immanuel, and that irrespective of the ultimate fulfillment the vision itself is present. 'I see a wonderful child,' the prophet on this interpretation would say, "a wonderful child whose birth shall bring salvation to his people; and before such a period of time shall elapse as would lie between the conception of the child in his mother's womb and his coming to years of discretion, the land of Israel and of Syria shall be forsaken.'"²² Machen recognized the difficulties of this view when he added, "This interpretation, we think, is by no means impossible. It is difficult, indeed, to set it forth adequately in our bald modern speech; but the objections to it largely fall away when one reads the exalted language of the prophet as the language of prophetic vision ought really to be read."²³

Those who hold this view do so because of two basic reasons. First, they are reacting violently from the excesses of the liberals who hold the first view; and, second, they are inclined to deny any human element in the Scriptures for fear of divesting them of all-pervading inspiration. If one's theological outlook is rooted in these then the objections to this second possibility will "fall away," but is it really necessary to take such an irrational view in order to protect God's Word and the prophet Isaiah? Machen claims to be an adherent to the grammatico-historical method of exegesis and adds that he is not wishing to return to the allegorical exegesis of Origen, but the mental gymnastics involved in ignoring the clear sense of immediacy in the mind of Isaiah appears to cut the Gordian knot instead of untying it.

²² Machen, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

The third possibility is that expressed by Delitzsch. He concluded, "On the other hand, however, we may see from what he says, that the prophecy has its human side as well. When Isaiah speaks of Immanuel as eating thickened milk and honey, like all who survived the Assyrian troubles in the Holy Land, he evidently looks upon and thinks of the childhood of Immanuel as connected with the time of the Assyrian calamities. And it was in such a perspective combinations of events lying far apart, that the *complex* character of prophecy consisted. The reason for this complex character was a double one, viz. the human limits associated with the prophet's telescopic view of distant times, and the pedagogical wisdom of God, in accordance with which He entered into these limits instead of removing them. If, therefore, we adhere to the letter of prophecy, we may easily throw doubt upon its veracity; but if we look at the substance of the prophecy, we soon find that the complex character by no means invalidates its truth."²⁴ Thus, Delitzsch is willing to say that the true fulfillment was Jesus and Isaiah saw it so clearly, as viewing a distant mountain on a clear day, he felt it was to come soon. This view surely has its merits and it is an improvement over the view of Machen in that it frankly admits the presumption that the context of Is. 7:14 is the result of Isaiah's inaccurate judgment with respect to the time factor. This is not to agree with Delitzsch that Isaiah was incorrect, but to point out that *if* there was no contemporary fulfillment it is more objective to recognize Isaiah's inaccuracy than to insist that Isaiah knew there would be no immediate application but he gave the prophecy in the form he did just to frighten Ahaz.

The fourth possibility is that of a dual fulfillment of the prophecy. It considers the context as sufficiently clear to warrant the birth of a child in the time of Ahaz. It recognizes that there are difficulties to such a literal interpretation, but such is the case in Mt. 1:23. Matthew quotes Is. 7:14 as having been fulfilled in the birth of the Christ, yet 1:21, 25 tell of his being named Jesus according to instructions from the angel. There is no mention of his ever being called Immanuel.

Machen mentions the dual fulfillment view and comments, "Does an immediate reference to a child of the prophet's own day really exclude the remoter and grander reference that determines the quotation in the first chapter of Matthew? Certainly it does so

²⁴ Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

in accordance with the prevailing view which rejects altogether the typology in which the Church of all the ages has found so much of beauty and so much of the grace of God. But has that prevailing view really penetrated to the full meaning of these Old Testament books? We think not; and because we think not (or else because we adopt the other of the two possible interpretations that have just been set forth) we are able to accept still the use which the First Evangelist makes of the prophecy in the seventh chapter of Isaiah.”²⁵

However, Machen does not really give a good reason for rejecting this fourth view. He rejects it on the assumption that only liberals who reject typology would think of holding it. Therefore, he and those who think like him are in effect saying *either* a person believes in the translation “virgin” *or* he is denying the virgin birth of Christ. Instead of this problem being a rigid *either/or* situation, there is more evidence to warrant a *both/and* situation, but to see this involves a different view of prophecy than the view held by Machen. Orr, in setting down a basic view of prophecy wrote, “It was certainly an error of the older apologetic to place the essence of prophecy, as was often done, in prediction. The prophet was in the first instance a man speaking to his own time. His message was called forth by, and had its adaptation to, some real and urgent need of his own age: it was the word of God to that people, time and occasion. It needs, therefore, in order to be properly understood, to be put in its historical setting, and interpreted through that. It must be put to the account of modern criticism that it has done much to foster this better way of regarding prophecy, and has in consequence greatly vivified the study of the prophetic writings, and promoted a better understanding of their meaning.”²⁶ Orr is without doubt one of the great conservative scholars of all time, and often he is quoted to bolster evangelical views, but these same persons who use him for a witness in other areas refuse to acknowledge his judgment in this area.

It is to be admitted that in a few cases like Micah 5:2 the contemporary application is not apparent from the facts, but a few exceptions cannot refute the solid basis on which Orr’s statement rests.

²⁵ Machen, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-293.

²⁶ Orr, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-453.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present writer prefers the fourth possible interpretation: i.e. the dual fulfillment; therefore he prefers the reading "young woman." To admit the possibility of an immediate application and still to insist on "virgin" would put one in the awkward position of holding to a virgin birth in the time of Ahaz, but all would reject this. To contend for the reading "unmarried woman" or "maiden" does not solve the problem. The former is simply following Wilson's assumption and is thus equivalent to reading "virgin." The technical meaning for "maiden" would allow its use in Is. 7:14, but the cases in KJV, ASV, and RSV where *bethulah* is translated "maiden," and Williams' use of "maiden" in Mt. 1:23 indicate that in the minds of most people the word is synonymous with "virgin."

The translation "young woman" accords with the etymology of '*almah*, it permits the contemporary fulfillment of the prophecy without postulating a "virgin birth," and in a real sense it allows for the more glorious fulfillment in the birth of Jesus Christ our Savior. Furthermore, it supports the accuracy of Isaiah and at the same time it accords with the doctrine of the "virgin birth" which is clearly taught in Mt. 1:18,20,23 and Lk. 1:34,35. It must be remembered that it is the N.T. which explicitly teaches this doctrine. The O.T. cannot be made to say exactly what the N.T. says concerning it or it would be necessary to change Is. 11:1b "a branch shall grow out of his roots," to read "He shall be called a Nazarene," in order to justify Matthew's play on words (*Nezer*, i.e. branch, and *Nazareth*) in 2:23.

Isaiah envisioned the child Immanuel as an immediate event, therefore he did not use *bethulah*, but the Spirit of God, knowing the end from the beginning, must have moved on the prophet in his choice of '*almah*. It appears that notwithstanding any conscious motives on the part of the LXX translators the use of *parthenos* made it possible for Matthew to see in Is. 7:14 a prophecy of the Incarnation of Christ.

To deny the translation "young woman" because it appears in a version which was translated by men who are liberal in theology is to resort to dogmatism and prejudice. In the areas where the liberals are in error they must be refuted with facts. Furthermore, if our position as evangelicals is as sound as we claim, then we should have no fear of being completely honest with the facts.

Problems for Personalists

PAUL R. LUNDY

Personalism is not a closely defined philosophical discipline. Occasional attempts have been made to achieve a consensus among personalists as to what they believe. But their "platforms" have so far provided no precise index to the metaphysics of personalism. Hence any discussion, especially a critical exposition of personalism, is a difficult venture. The constant risk is that one should find himself dealing with a sport rather than the true vine. Yet it may be fairly said that the current phase of personalistic thought in America, exemplified in the philosophy departments of Boston University and the University of Southern California, owes its basic principles to the systematic work of Bowne.

I. THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS

This paper undertakes to set forth three major areas in which personalism leaves searching questions unanswered, in metaphysics, in the philosophy of science, and in the theological area of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural.

Bowne constructed his metaphysics from two ideas and a conclusion. The two ideas were (1) that only that which acts exists and (2) that substance, since it is by definition non-active, is non-existent. His conclusion was longer. The problem of change and identity demands an abiding, enduring reference for the flux of continual becoming in order that, from the fading panoply, organization sufficient for experience be achieved. Were there no factor providing for permanence, no conscious experience would be possible. The uncomprehending coming and going of discrete, completely unrelated items would be the result. Only as there is an abiding something to bridge from one item to the next can there be the sort of cumulative acquisition which we term knowledge or experience. Bowne found this need met only in the fundamental nature of personal self-consciousness. Hence, though things are merely phenomenal, persons are real.

Now if it be true that the natural order is merely a system of qualities, how can certain vital metaphysical distinctions be maintained? How shall we achieve any of the distinctions proper to the various levels of nature? For example, how shall one differentiate

the living from the non-living? The barest distinction between the organic and inorganic requires that the organic sustain something of its past as it proceeds to its future. But this is what qualities cannot do. The issue attending a phenomenalist interpretation of experience is that, with the rejection of substance, there necessarily follows the denial of essence and causation. Bereft of these, nature is without dimension and can have no history, for there is nothing enduring. Thus, the minimal conceptual needs of biology cannot be met. The predisposition of a thing to develop or to be modified in one way rather than another and the capacity of a thing to yield present evidence of past influence are impossible notions for phenomenism. If the cosmos is but a rootless surface of qualities, then history is lost in its own making, it dies as it is born. History is possible only if there is something objectively enduring in nature. And the distinction between life and non-life is meaningful only as history is a material reality.

It was Bowne's conviction that the universe did not come to its full meaning except in the consciousness of persons. (How he could know that nature was thus wanting, since he knew nothing of things-in-themselves, is a mystery.) By this he meant that the objective order was not an order except as it was organized by personal self-consciousness. That is, the hierarchy of the sciences, with their supposed reference to the essential gradation of nature, is subjective. But, as was shown above, this will not do. Brightman noticed the problem as early as 1921.¹ Cranston has also shown that a major endeavor of contemporary personalism is to meet this inadequacy in one way or another.² The inherent weakness of personalism in treating of the metaphysical status and function of nature tends always to drive it to absolute idealism (panpsychism) or to realism (occasionalism). Phenomenism, to date, is not an adequate metaphysical basis for common experience. It ends in a version of positivism which has, in secular quarters, long since been given up.

The attempt to round out the phenomenalist account leads consistently away from the metaphysics implicit in evangelical theology. Thus, Bowne's students have defended much that he denied.

¹ Edgar S. Brightman, "The Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Philosophy," *Personalist*, Vol. II (October, 1921), pp. 257-258.

² Mildred Welch Cranston, "Tensions Within Personalism," *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. IV (Spring 1946), pp. 23-25.

Bertocci has frankly affirmed that "Personalism is pantheistic so far as the world is concerned, for it holds that Nature is God's energizing."³ After all if, as personalism claims, the only reality is personal then nature, if it has any metaphysical status whatever, must be personal. This is merely to go back, as Bowne should have more consistently done, to Berkeley's doctrine of "*esse est percipi*." Nothing in the phenomenalistic scheme can stand exempt from this rule. It matters not at all—and here is the difference between Berkeley's and Bowne's insight—that the realm of nature be considered objective to finite persons. Bowne insisted that he was in some sense a realist because he regarded the order of qualities as external. It was something found, not made. But this does not alleviate in any degree the threat of pantheism, for though nature be altogether objective to finite persons it is nevertheless a feature of some personal experience, if not ours, then God's. This is to say that if nature does not exist in its own right as a metaphysical reality it cannot exist, on personalistic grounds, except as it shares in the nature or experience of some person. Bowne's adherence to objectivism rules out the possibility of identifying nature with finite persons; hence, it must be identified with God.

II. THE PROBLEM OF A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Phenomenalism is a surface philosophy, satisfied that the nature of the thing-in-itself, if there be such, is beyond our grasp. Substance is an illegitimate notion of uncritical thought and the causal relation is not found in experience. This was Hume's famous discovery. Restricting experience by definition to our straightforward interplay with the external order of qualities removes any hope for realism. What happens to science in this context is adequately expressed in Humean skepticism and in the successive varieties of positivism which have stemmed from the phenomenalistic tradition. Moreover, though it is true that Bowne was in complete disagreement with Hume on certain issues, he is nevertheless implicated in much that Hume was able to show as resulting from his own denial of substance and causation.

What Hume found was that his doctrine necessitated the strictest uncertainty as to the future. After all, if one cannot get beneath the phenomenal thing to its fundamental nature, there is no know-

³ Peter A. Bertocci, *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 115-116.

ing its necessary deportment. Indeed, there is no knowing whether it has a necessary line of behavior at all. If the essential nature of a thing cannot be grasped, there is no providing for it a limiting definition. This means that, if from our knowledge of the past we do not and cannot penetrate to the unambiguous, hard core of reality, we can never have certain knowledge regarding the future. Thus the strictest science ends in mere probability. Experience knows only that a thing is now colored, figured, textured, etc., and that these qualities, sometimes modified, sometimes not, successively appear through the intervals of perception. The modification or its opposite merely happens and there is no possibility of explaining these phenomena. Thus, one state of a thing, however exceptional, is as appropriate as any other. There is no arbitrating between conflicting states of qualities (e.g., mirage versus undistorted image) in order to learn which is expressive of the true nature of the thing. Qualities simply are what they are. They refer to nothing beyond themselves or, if they do, we cannot infer that reference. The conclusion is that the laws of science are not regulative in nature. Rather they are, in one way or another, conveniences or conventions of the mind in its handling of experience. (It is here that the most radical doctrines, e.g., positivism, pragmatism, operationalism, etc., appear.) Then, if there be no regulative scheme that we can discover in nature, there is no telling what the next moment might produce. Perhaps cuckoo eggs will stand forth and expound metaphysics. Any absurdity whatever is just as possible as the uniformity we have come to know.

Bowne, at this point, forsook the strict phenomenalism of British empiricism and for a very good reason. He realized that the qualities of things can never reveal their true nature.⁴ He was aware of the predicament of Humean phenomenalism and sought to avoid it. It is not that he differed in his doctrine of ontology from that of phenomenalism generally. He was committed to the notion that there is no existence of any kind underlying qualities. But he tried so to arrange his premises as to reach a different conclusion. What he suggested was that though we know only qualities we can nevertheless perceive a thing's true nature from the law of its activity.⁵ This was Bowne's philosophy of science.

⁴ Borden P. Bowne, *Metaphysics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1882), pp. 61ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 59ff.

He believed science to be the passive Baconian discipline of cataloging data. One observes and records and this is science, the limit of our knowledge of nature. Seemingly this is adequate as a definition of science—is it not true that our only knowledge of a thing is gained by the empirical encounter, observation of a thing's activity through the various phases of its career until we have discovered the laws of its behavior?—yet actually its inadequacy is well known. No later than Galileo it was found that science is not a spectator discipline. Data, by themselves, do not constitute science. Data must be understood, intellectualized, if systematic advance beyond sheer fact is made possible. Every modification of nature proceeds upon discernment that the desired modification is within the possible range of a thing's nature. Otherwise science would be a blind swinging in the dark hoping to hit upon some fortunate combination of events so as to produce a desired end. Science is more than the recording of the states of a thing as it proceeds through its own history.

Bowne glimpsed the difficulty attending his definition. He realized that certainty, for this sort of science, is possible only in the presence of an exhaustive knowledge of a thing's actual and possible history.⁷ This is a manifest impossibility. Bowne should have further realized that it amounted to a total upset of his description of science. More especially he ought to have understood that if the law of a thing's activity is identical with its true nature or essence and that if this law or essence is found only in exhaustive knowledge of the thing then he had no basis for real knowledge of nature at all. He has not superseded Hume. Skepticism and probability are his inevitable companions.

III. THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURAL-SUPERNATURAL DISTINCTION

Phenomenalism—and personalism is merely a version of phenomenalism—is doomed in the area of metaphysics by its chosen limitations to the state in which Hume left it. Now a pertinent and crucial theological question must be raised. If experience yields nothing but qualities and if these have no necessary connection or require exhaustive knowledge in order to be known, then every successive or new state of a thing is as native to the thing as any other. No one state is more natural than any other. Each is to be

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

either accepted as a valid member of the passing parade (Hume) or subsumed, together with all other contributing data, under the unfinished history of the thing (Bowne). In either case there is no point in the development of science where one may stop and content himself with the assurance that he knows the real nature of the objects of experience. But if one cannot know their true nature, what is natural to them, neither can he know what is non-natural. He cannot know miracle!

Miracle is not merely a departure from the norm of a thing's behavior. It is not simply a radical sample. Miracle is the non-natural, a contradiction of nature which, without the back-drop of the causal relation, would be indistinguishable. It is no extravagance to claim that within the frame-work of phenomenalism, whether Bowne's variety or other, miracle is meaningless.

The very notion of miracle is peculiarly demanding in the realm of metaphysics. If it is to survive the systematic interpretation of experience then that interpretation must furnish certain minimal requirements. On the side of ontology there must be provided a real uniformity in nature. And that uniformity must be objectively real and necessary, not merely logical. The restrictive, limiting, necessary relations proper to the causal principle must be resident in the structure of things. On the side of epistemology there must be provision for such rapport between subject and object as to permit knowledge of the true nature of the object. And this knowledge must amount, in terms of scientific discipline with its finite limitations of time and place, to virtual prediction, not to mere possibility or probability. Only if these requirements are met can miracle have significance. Personalism does not furnish the designated minimum.

It is strange indeed that upon the very principles which provided the foundation for the most extreme forms of naturalism and skepticism should be erected a venture into Christian metaphysics. Bowne was a Christian. His tradition has been carried on by men of like conviction. But commendable as this is it does not eclipse the philosophical short-comings and, more, the theological perils of Bowne's formulation. Before the turn of the century, his work was under suspicion; discerning persons sensed the direction in which his system would lead. Since that time the implications of his thought have reached full flower. This unfolding has been in the form of a long display of the endemic radicalism of personalism.

This system has nevertheless been attractive to many who reject the liberalism which Bowne helped to shape. It has claimed the distinction of being the major contemporary protest against naturalism. This claim has yielded a measure of prestige which seems hardly justifiable, in view of the fact that the consistent trend of personalism has been *away* from Christian supernaturalism.

The Redemptive Purpose in the Perfection of Human Personality

CHAS. W. CARTER

The divine redemption of the human race is a necessity if mankind is to be saved from ultimate destruction here and hereafter. Such redemptive necessity is attested alike by the multitude of religious systems of the world, and the humanistic utopian dreams of economic, social and political philosophers. The provision of such redemption is no less a necessity to the integrity of the character of God who must satisfy the demands of human intelligence and spiritual aspirations. That divinely provided plan of redemption is clearly revealed in the Christian Scriptures.

An ultimate divine purpose is a prerequisite to the completion and perfection of human redemption. Our English word *purpose* is especially meaningful when considered in relation to redemption. Webster defines the word as, "That which one sets before himself as an object to be attained . . . The object or result aimed at." Closely related to our word purpose, but more philosophical in its content, is the word *teleology* which derives from two Greek words: namely, *telos* which means end, and *logia* which means a doctrine, theory or science. This word is defined by Webster as, "The fact or the character of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose . . . The doctrine or belief that design is apparent, or ends are immanent." The perfection of human personality through the divine redemptive scheme as the ultimate purpose or end which God has in mind is the thesis of this discussion.

Among the profoundest passages in the Bible that treat of God's ultimate purpose in human redemption are: Christ's High Priestly Prayer as recorded in the 17th chapter of the Gospel according to John; Paul's prayer for the perfection of the Thessalonian Christians as recorded in I Thessalonians 5:23, 24; and the Hebrew Epistle author's citation of the end result of redemption in Hebrews 12:22-24.

The golden keys that unlock the inner treasures of these profound divine utterances are *first*, Christ's words in the following passages from the gospel according to John: "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth" (John 17:17); "That they may be one,

even as we are" (John 17:11); "That they may be one, even as we are one" (John 17:22); "That they may be perfected into one" (John 17:23): and *second*, Paul's prayer for the Thessalonian Christians in I Thessalonians 5:23a, which reads, "And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire": and *third*, the Hebrew Epistle author's climactic declaration as contained in Hebrews 12:22, 23: "But ye are come unto . . . the spirits of just men made perfect."

It immediately becomes evident to the discerning reader that the keynote of this revealed truth is the perfection of human personality through the atoning and sanctifying provisions of the cross of Christ. That this sanctifying provision may be the more clearly understood, let us note *first* that the sanctification of his disciples, both those present with him and those yet future, was the purpose and the burden of Christ's High Priestly Prayer as recorded in the seventeenth chapter of the gospel according to John. Concerning the word *sanctify* as that word is used by Christ in this prayer, Dr. Adam Clarke remarks:

This word has two meanings: 1. It signifies to consecrate, to separate from earth and come out, and to devote or dedicate to God and his service. 2. It signifies to make holy or pure. The prayer of Christ may be understood in both of these senses.¹

Thus God's means for the redemption, restoration and ultimate perfection of human personality is Calvary's provision of the reconciliation and sanctification of the soul. Nowhere is this grand purpose more beautifully and lucidly expressed than in the book of Revelation, chapter one and verses five and six, which reads thus:

Unto him that loved us, and loosed us [many authorities, some ancient, read *washed*. Compare Heb. 9:14 and Rev. 7:14] from our sins by his blood; and he made us to be a kingdom, and to be priests unto his God and Father; to him be the glory and the dominion for ever and ever.

In order to grasp adequately the significance of God's ultimate purpose in human redemption, one must consider three important factors, namely: 1. *The constitution and nature of human personality*, 2. *The effect of sin on human personality*, and 3. *The divine restoration of human personality*. Three great questions immediately arise from these considerations: namely, 1. What is man?, 2. What has sin done to man?, and 3. What is God's redemptive

¹ Comment on John 17:17, Adam Clarke, *Clarke's Commentary*.

purpose for man? The ancient Psalmist voiced one of the most significant queries of the ages when he inquired of God, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?, and the son of man, that thou visitest him." (Psa. 8:4) To a consideration of the problems that arise out of these profound inquiries we shall now devote our interest.

I.

First, a knowledge of the constitution and nature of human personality is basic to an understanding of the ultimate divine redemptive purpose.

Human personality has been variously conceived by the leading thinkers of the ages. While it is beyond the purpose of this study to pursue an extended survey of those varied concepts, a few of the major representative scholars may be profitably noted.

We shall *first* take cognizance of certain inadequate and erroneous views of personality. Pantheism is perhaps, of this class, the most widely accepted view, when considered in relation to its several variants. The philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) is the classic example of pantheism. His system reduced the universe to a single substance with an infinite number of *modes*. Personalities were, with Spinoza, but quasi, rather than real, entities and they thus constituted in part the Spinozaic "modes," or modifications of the single substance. No true consciousness, self-consciousness, nor cognition are afforded in this pantheistic view. Ultimately all things are realized as one. The Spinozistic modes of a single universal substance call to mind the highly imaginative story of the earthworm that is supposed to have crawled out of its burrow one bright, fresh spring morning after a warm shower and, projecting several inches of its body upward, looked all about until it sighted another earthworm with an extension of its body projecting from its burrow a short distance away. Stirred by a feeling of romance, the first earthworm addressed itself to the second with a proposal of marriage with a view to establishing a home and raising a family of little earthworms. To the proposal of the first earthworm the second indignantly replied, "Keep quiet and crawl back down in your hole; I am only your other end." Likewise, if the Spinozistic pantheistic view were correct then everything, including all persons, would be but varied aspects of one and the same thing.

But there are also other pantheistic variants that reduce the world view to monism. Significant is the Early Greek hylozoism as held mainly by Thales (625 B.C.), by the Milesians, in a modified form by the Stoics, and later developed with a naturalistic emphasis by the French philosophers of the 18th century. Likewise, Indian Hinduism with its Oriental cognates, inclusive of both Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, falls in the class of pantheistic monism and brings approximately a fourth of the world's inhabitants either directly or indirectly under a false concept of personality. The primitive animists of Africa, the Dravidian aboriginals of Central India, the Ainus of Hokkaido in Northern Japan, the primitive South Sea Islanders, and the North American Indians and Eskimos all hold a view of the universe which in some sense ultimately reduces all things, including human personality, to a single divine substance. When there is added to these the adherents of such monistic systems as Emersonian pantheistic transcendentalism, Christian Science, and modern theistic evolutionary Christianity the extent of this pantheistic error begins to impress the serious student. This view, in any of its many forms, offers no true view of the personality of either God or man, since it reduces the universe to one impersonal divine substance.

Panpsychism is another influential variety of monism. While it differs in certain essential respects from pantheism, mainly in making impersonal mind rather than God the substance, it is none the less destructive of any true concept of personality. Notable representatives of this erroneous view of reality are the Italian philosopher Bruno (1548-1600), especially in his earlier views; the representatives of German thought including Leibnitz (1646-1716), Fechner (1801-1887), and Lotze (1817-1881); and the American philosopher William James (1842-1910). Spiritism, or spiritualism as it is commonly but erroneously called, both in its ancient and modern forms is panpsychic and consequently affords no true concept of a personal entity. Panpsychism, like pantheism, allows no true concept of personality since individuality is, in the final analysis, lost in the single substance of impersonal mind.

Materialistic naturalism, like panpsychism and pantheism, is monistic and thus reduces mind or personality to a sort of Huxleyan epiphenomenalism, with mind as simply the conscious aspect of matter. So long as materialism dominates the field of modern psychology and mind is denied as an entity after the fashion of

Thorndike and Watson, there can be no adequate concept of the reality and dignity of human personality.

Metaphysical dualism poses two insurmountable problems: namely, two self-subsistent distinct entities, and the apparently unsolvable problem of the interaction of mind and matter. This essential dualism may be best represented in its metaphysical form by the French philosopher Descartes (1596-1650), and in its religious form by Zoroastrianism. Perhaps Descartes has been as successful in solving the problem of interaction between mind and matter as distinct entities as any subsequent thinker, and his unsuccessful attempt is too well known to merit consideration here.

Empiricism as proposed by John Locke (1632-1704) or John Dewey (1859-1952) affords no real personalities since *mind*, with Locke, is little more than an organization of percepts that abide for a time, and then with insanity or death dissolve and personality becomes extinct; or as with Dewey, mind is little if anything more than momentary conscious experience, changing constantly with the flow of experience.

There is found in John Bunyan's immortal allegory, *Pilgrim's Progress*, a most interesting encounter between Christian and Apollyon, an incident that seems to quite clearly reflect Bunyan's apprehension of the effect of Locke's new empirical psychology on the Christian belief in the personality and immortality of the soul. It will be noted that John Locke (1632-1704) and John Bunyan (1628-1688) were direct English contemporaries. John Locke had set forth his theory of the mind or soul as a *tabula rasa*, meaning a blank sheet or tablet, at the outset of life's experiences, and the developed mind as but the record of experience written by the hand of environment upon this *tabula rasa*. Indeed mind became a sort of organization of these percepts acquired from the stimuli of environment. However, in the end mind would prove to be only temporary and with mental derangement, deterioration or death, disorganization and dissolution would follow and the mind would cease to be, and immortality would become a myth. John Bunyan, while formally unschooled, was exceedingly discerning of the effects that the new Lockian psychology might have on the Christian faith in the personality and consequent immortality of the soul. Bunyan seems to represent the new Lockian empirical psychological threat to Christianity by Apollyon's obstruction of Christian's progress and his threat to destroy Christian on the spot. Bunyan's

account of the incident is most graphic. It is reproduced in part as follows:

Then Apollyon straddled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and said, I am devoid of fear in this matter. Prepare thyself to die; for I swear by my infernal den, that thou shalt go no farther; here I will spill thy soul. And with that he threw a flaming dart at his breast: but Christian had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the danger of that.²

Apollyon's threat to Christian, expressed in the words "*here I will spill thy soul*," seems clearly to indicate that Bunyan understood the inadequacy of the new Lockian psychology to provide for either personality as an entity or afford a personal basis for Christian immortality. As much may be said for any of the monistic views of the universe, whether pantheistic, panpsychist, or materialistic, which have been discussed here.

Second, consideration will be given to the true Christian view of the constitution and nature of human personality. It should be noted that Christ, and Christianity of the first century, were the first to define with clarity the concept of personality. Indeed the Hebrews, and other ancient thinkers, attained fairly definite ideas of the person, but found it difficult to disassociate the individual from the community. In general, human personality was taken for granted, rather than defined, in the Old Testament. It remained for Christ to define and dignify human individuality. His was a higher concept than had ever been attained by preceding world thinkers.

Only a unitary or simple, as opposed to a compound, concept of personality will ultimately accord with the teachings of Christianity concerning man. The synonym *individual*, so frequently used for person in the English language, is exactly expressive of the fundamental nature of human personality. *Individual* is a mathematical term and will bear careful analysis in relation to person. Concerning this term Webster remarks: "Not divisible; inseparable Existing as a distinct entity; particular; opposed to general and universal. Of the character of an individual, or indivisible entity. Having personality A single or particular being or group of beings; esp.: A person . . . An indivisible entity or a totality."

In the light of the recent division of the *atom* and the inability of science to determine finally the true nature of material reality, beyond the conclusion that it is energy, it seems logical that the

² *Pilgrim's Progress*.

only true *atom*, or ultimate finite reality, has been discovered when personality is properly understood and defined. The idea which the word *atom* represents, namely the ultimately real and thus simple and indivisible particle of matter (Gr. *a-toma* = not cuttable or divisible), is no longer of significance since the division of the *atom*, it remains to seek elsewhere for the true *atom*. That quest ends in some form of Christian idealism, in which personality is a basic unity with varied possible functions.

Human personality was created in the image, or after the pattern, of the divine personality. Since God is incorporeal, then the divine image borne by man through creation must of necessity be of the divine spiritual personality. Personality as an entity, logically considered, is necessarily characterized by certain essential notes. Dr. Paul Glenn, in his book entitled *Dialectics*, sets forth these essential notes of human personality as "subsistent, bodily, living, sentient, and rational being."³ There may be, however, a serious question as to whether body is an essential note of personality. Physical body, as it is presently known, certainly is not an essential element of personality if we are to retain our concept of immortality as an everlasting spiritual existence. Otherwise it seems that there should be no serious objection to Dr. Glenn's outline of the essential notes of personality.

It should be noted that the aforementioned essential notes are not "parts of personality" but rather "characteristics" of the unitary personal entity. These characteristic essential notes may also be properly regarded as functions of personality. When thus considered, these facts afford a sure foundation for the Christian doctrine of the indestructibility of human personality, either in the life that is or in the life that is to come. The Greek philosopher Plato based, in part at least, his view of the immortality of the human soul on its simplicity. Such a view of the soul cuts away forever any grounds for the spiritual annihilation theory, as held by the Seventh Day Adventists, the Russellites or the materialists, and as well the *Nirvana* theory of Buddhism.

Likewise, it is logical that we conceive of the divine personality as answering to the essential notes of personality as they have been set forth in relation to human personality. If man was created in the personal image of God, then the essential notes of man's

³ Paul Glenn, *Dialectics* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1939, p. 315.)

personality are the essential notes of God's personality. The divine personality cannot be less than human personality. Without objecting to Glenn's catalogue of personal essential notes, except for the inclusion of "bodily," a more satisfactory summary of these essential notes might be as follows: *subsistent, spiritual, living, rational, volitional, sentient* and *emotional being*. Such an infinite personal being is God and such a finite personal being is man.

When it is recorded in the Genesis account that "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them" (Gen. 1:27), it should be understood that it was in conformity to these essential notes of the divine personality that human personality was created. This is not to say that man was made of the essence of God. If such were the case then man would be an emanation of divinity. Such a view would approximate pantheism. Rather, man became a new essence by a divine creative fiat, although patterned after the divine person.

According to the Genesis record the subsistent human soul emerged when "Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and *man became a living soul*." (Gen. 2:7) Whatever may be the significance of the *dust* from which God formed the human body, and the *breath of life* which God *breathed* into the nostrils of that human form, it appears evident that the human soul as a new living entity emerged at the union of the divine breath with the material form. The "living soul" which man there "became" constituted the human personality which reflected and reflects the divine personal image. Concerning the human likeness to the divine, Dummelow's Commentary observes:

The likeness to God lies in the mental and moral features of man's character, such as reason, personality, free will, the capacity for communion with God. These distinguish man from the animals with which on the physical side he has much in common, and inevitably insures his dominion over them.⁴

This union of the divine breath and the human physical form, with the resultant personal spiritual emergent, may be likened to the synthesis of the parents through procreation with the resultant emergent of a personal entity in the offspring. It seems evident that Paul has this in mind when he quotes Genesis 2:24 thus: "For this

⁴ *A Commentary on the Holy Bible* (New York: The Macmillan Company, Ed. J. R. Dummelow, 1951), p. 5.

cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one flesh. This mystery is great." (Eph. 5:31, 32) Certainly Paul does not mean to teach that there is the loss of either the male or female personality through the marriage union. Such a conclusion would be contrary to recognized individual ethical responsibility as well as legal responsibility. Rather the fact of "*becoming one flesh*" points to the human offspring, as a new personal entity, or a personal emergent as the accomplished unity of the male and female personalities through the procreative process. The parents become one in the child. But while the child represents a synthesis of the elements and characteristics of both parents, he is something different from either or both parents—he is a new spiritual entity, an individual. The child's personality bears the essential notes that characterize the personalities of the parents, but they are the essential notes of *his* personality and *not* of *their* personalities. So God created man after the pattern of his personality but not of his essence. Through the creative divine fiat man *became* a new "*living soul*."

In summary, as the divine personality is simple (as opposed to compound), subsistent, spiritual, living, rational, volitional, sentient and emotional being, so human personality, while of a different essence, reflects the divine pattern in respect to these essential notes of personality, not as parts but as balanced and harmonious functions of a personal unitary entity.

II.

Second, the effect of sin on human personality must be understood if one is to grasp the significance of the ultimate divine redemptive purpose.

Sin is a condition, an attitude or disposition, and an act foreign to the nature and the will of God. However, it was necessary that sin originate in a moral decision and an act before it could become a condition. Otherwise it would be necessary to posit the origin of sin in something other than the misuse of moral freedom. Wesley's concept of sin as a wilful act of disobedience against the revealed or known law of God stands well to the test of the divine revelation and human intelligence. The effect of the tragic enactment of sin was to warp, pervert, throw out of balance, and misdirect human personality, but not to destroy, in the sense of annihilation, that personality. Sin depraves *thoroughly* but not *totally*

the personality of man. Depravity is indeed *extensively total*, but *not intensively total*. If depravity were *intensively total* the effect would be to destroy entirely the image of God in man and thus obliterate moral cognition and render man incapable of receiving or responding to the divine overtures. In short, man through *intensive total depravity* would lose the divine image entirely and thus he would cease to be a personality and would be reduced to the animal level. In this event, salvation would not be a renewal and restoration of man's moral nature under the influence and operation of the Holy Spirit, but rather it would mean the re-creation of human personality in the image of the divine personality. The theory of *intensive total depravity* logically leads to the doctrine of complete divine predestination of the soul either to eternal life or eternal damnation. They are part and parcel of the same religious philosophy, neither of which will stand up to the teachings of the scriptures, or of sound human reason.

The parable of the lost coin and its recovery, as given in the fifteenth chapter of the Gospel according to Luke, suggests the retention of this divine image in fallen man. It should be observed that though the coin was lost it was possible for the woman to recognize it when she found it by Caesar's inscription which it still bore. As much may be said for the lost son, in the same chapter, concerning whom the father asserted, "This *my son* was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found." (Luke 15:24) The marks of personal identification remained, notwithstanding the lost condition. In this connection Paul adds his testimony to the evidence that fallen man retains the essential notes of the divine personality, even though that divine image be hopelessly marred, without the intervention of divine redemption. Having given the most awful and complete portrayal of the moral and spiritual degeneracy and degradation of the Gentiles in the first chapter of the Roman letter, Paul proceeds to say, concerning these same moral and spiritual degenerates, in the second chapter of Romans:

For when the Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them. (Romans 2:14, 15)

Concerning St. Augustine's doctrine of the *intensive total depravity* of man, Dr. Arthur Holmes, professor of psychology and

philosophy of religion of Butler University School of Religion, once remarked that St. Augustine went to the altar of the Lord and left there God's most precious gift to man, *his free will*. Without moral cognition and human volition salvation would be a divine imposition upon fallen man, rather than a human appropriation by faith of that gracious saving provision of the Cross of Christ.

Though perverted and unbalanced by the innovation of this factor of sin, which was not native to nor harmonious with human personality, yet personality by virtue of its very nature, *spiritual simplicity*, could not be dissolved nor completely destroyed by sin. It could only be perverted. And perversion is the true definition of evil in human experience. With this view of the effect of sin on human personality, the scriptural doctrines of the immortality of the soul of the redeemed or the everlasting damnation of the lost must stand or fall.

Again, sin divides and confuses the motives and aims of personality. It is to this effect of sin that James seems to allude in his epistle when he exhorts, "Cleanse your hands, ye sinners; and purify your hearts, ye doubleminded." (James 4:8) And again, when he says, "A doubleminded man [is] unstable in all of his ways." (James 1:8)

The effect of sin in human experience is not to annihilate personality or any of its essential notes, an act possible only by a divine fiat, but rather to weaken, unbalance, pollute, pervert, becloud, distort, and misdirect human personality away from God, righteousness, and moral sanity and render it incapable of attaining unto righteousness of itself, though possibly having righteous aspirations, without the divine enabling through spiritual renewal, restoration and animation. Without divine renewing, unregenerate human personality is destined by its own perversion to a downward and "away from God-ward" course, into deeper and denser outer darkness, time without end.

III.

Third, we shall note God's purpose in the redemption and sanctification of human personality.

In his High Priestly Prayer Christ prayed for his disciples: "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth. . . . that they may be one, even as we are one." (John 17:11b, 22) Says Adam Clarke concerning this prayer:

The union which Christ recommends here and prays for is so complete and glorious as to be fitly represented by that union which subsists between the father and the son.⁵

Again, Alexander Maclaren remarks concerning this prayer of Christ:

The depths of that saying are beyond us, but we can at least see thus far—that the true bond of unity is the name in which all who are one are kept; that the pattern of the true unity of the believers is the ineffable union of father and son, which is oneness of will and nature, along with distinctness of persons; and that therefore this purpose goes far deeper than outward unity of organization.⁶

It is clear that both of these eminent scholars, though representing different theological position, see in this word from Christ's prayer a far deeper meaning than that ordinarily assigned to it. The sanctification of the human personality is an essential part of human redemption. Says Paul to the Thessalonians: "God chose you from the beginning unto salvation in [through] sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." (II Thess. 2:13b) Again in the Hebrew letter we read: "Follow after peace with all men, and the sanctification without which no man shall see the Lord." (Heb. 12:14) God's purpose in sanctification is to restore sin-warped human personalities to the original divine pattern: "That they may be one, as we are one," Christ prayed. This divine unity or oneness referred to in Christ's prayer defines the nature of the Trinity. The Trinity, as the age-old orthodox Christian concept holds, is *one in essence, but three in persons*, or, *one in essence, but three in personal functions*.

First, sanctification has as its primary purpose the elimination of the dividing, distracting and perverting sin-nature from the renewed nature of the Christian believer. Perhaps nowhere, apart from Christ's words in the seventeenth chapter of John, is this purpose made clearer than in Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians, chapter five and verse twenty-three: "And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." (I Thess. 5:23) This passage makes clear that the sanctifying agent is "the God of peace himself," suggesting that man's inner nature contaminated by sin is divided in motives and in aspirations

⁵ Comment on John 17, Adam Clarke, *Clarke's Commentary*.

⁶ Maclaren, Alexander, *Expositions of Holy Scripture*: St. John: (Grand Rapids, Michigan, Wm. B. Erdman Pub. Co., 1932), John 17.

and is in conflict within itself, making the unsanctified soul a spiritual battleground. This "God of peace," through the blood of his cross, alone is able to destroy and cleanse away the foreign factor of sin that disturbs the inner peace of man's nature, thereby rendering him at peace with God and within himself.

Second, it is evident from this word of Paul to the Thessalonians that sanctification is a work of restoration to wholeness or spiritual perfection. Paul prays: "the God of peace himself *sanctify you wholly*." By eliminating the distracting and dividing sin nature, the personality is automatically restored to its normal balance, or wholeness. As if to emphasize this fact, the Apostle continues, "and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire [or in wholeness, completion, perfection, unity, even simplicity], without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Then, lest there should remain any doubt in the minds of these sincere seeking souls, Paul adds the following reassuring word: "Faithful is he that calleth you, who will also do it." (I Thess. 5:24) The nature of this call referred to in verse twenty-four is clearly defined in chapter four, verse seven: "For God called us not unto uncleanness, but in sanctification." To this explanation Paul adds a grave warning to the holiness rejector when he states: "Therefore he that rejecteth, rejecteth not man, but God, who giveth his Holy Spirit unto you." (I Thess. 4:8)

Third, God's purpose in sanctification is to restore human personality to normality. Said Paul concerning the new man in Christ Jesus: "Ye have put off the old man with his doings, and have put on the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him." (Col. 3:9, 10) Now, it is impossible that the redeemed and sanctified individual should be "*renewed* unto knowledge after the image of him that created him" had he not first borne that image of the divine.

In Romans 12:2, Paul writes: "Be not fashioned according to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is the good and acceptable and perfect will of God." This "being transformed *by the renewing of your mind*" to which Paul here refers, again suggests that man originally bore the intellectual image of God but that this image was perverted through the fall, and that provision for its restoration to normality is made in the atonement of Christ.

Again, Paul asserts, in his second letter to Timothy, chapter

one, verse seven, as read in the King James version: "God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind."

Whatever else sin may signify in personal and social experience, it cannot mean less than lack of moral sanity and soundness. Redemption fully provided in the atonement of Christ, when appropriated, restores the individual to personal sanity and to a balanced personality. The note concerning the Gadarene, out of whom Jesus cast the demons, is particularly significant at this juncture. Of him it is said, when he had been delivered from demon possession, that "he sat clothed and in his right mind."

Fourth, the ultimate divine purpose in sanctification is to restore the personality of redeemed man to spiritual singleness or simplicity. It is here that we come to the deeper significance of the words of Christ in his High Priestly Prayer as recorded by John in the seventeenth chapter and verses 17, 11, 22, and 23. "Sanctify them in the truth: thy word is truth. . . . That they may be one, even as we are. . . . That they may be one, even as we are one. . . . That they may be perfected into one."

The traditional interpretation of the unity for which Christ here prayed is that through the sanctification of the souls of the disciples personal differences might be eliminated and spiritual harmony and cooperation be restored among them. Christ's prayer, in this particular interpretation, is often invoked by the supporters of the modern ecumenical movement. However, ecclesiastical union can never take the place of spiritual unity, and it is a foregone conclusion that ecclesiastical organic union, in the modern ecumenical sense, can never be realized until spiritual sanctification has become a reality in the lives of the believing members of the body of Christ.

This traditional interpretation of Christ's prayer for the unity of the disciples will not stand in the light of his word, "That they may be one, as we are one." Here it is clear that Christ is praying that sanctification may effect in the lives of his disciples that same unity that characterizes the Godhead. When it is remembered that the Godhead is *one in essence, but three in persons*, it will be seen that it is impossible that the disciples of Christ should become one body in this sense. For them to become so would eliminate their individualities or personalities and reduce them to a common substance, and such was never the intent nor purpose of the atoning provisions of Christ, nor his High Priestly Prayer to the Father. He

does not wish to eliminate our personalities, but to purify and make them whole. The unity for which he here prays is the unity of each personality within itself through the elimination of the discordant element, the sin nature. It was in such unity that God originally created individual man, and it is to this unity that God desires, through the provisions of the atonement, to restore to individual man. As the Godhead is one in essence, that is simple as opposed to compound, though varied in personal function, so man was created simple in spiritual personality, though with varied possible functions; and full redemption makes possible the ultimate restoration of the personality to its original nature.

Finally, sanctification is designed ultimately to complete or perfect personality. A pre-vision of this glorious reality is given to us in the letter to the Hebrews, the 12th chapter, verses 22 and 23, a characterization that reaches beyond the limits of the present existence: "But ye are come unto mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable hosts of angels, to the general assembly and church of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven, and to God the judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect." Thus it becomes evident that God's final purpose in human redemption is to perfect human personality through the redemptive provision of his Son, Jesus Christ. "*Ye are come . . . to the spirits of just men made perfect.*" This word of the author to the Hebrews suggests that human personalities are justified from sin through the atonement of Christ, "the spirits of *just men.*" Again, this word suggests that human personalities are sanctified, purified, restored to normality, made whole, complete, unitary, through the provisions of the atonement of Jesus Christ the Son of God; "the spirits of just men *made perfect.*"

While the atonement of Christ presently provides for the justification and sanctification of human personality, and through it the personality may be made perfect initially in the Christian sense, both negatively and positively, it is subsequently and progressively perfected in this life and continues in developmental growth in the world to come.

Unamuno's Unsolved Problem

ROBERTA D. CORBITT

The search for moral truth is said to characterize the "generation of '98,"¹ the leaders in Spain of a patriotic and intellectual renaissance brought about by the shock of the Spanish-American War and the final loss to Spain of her vast empire. Don Miguel de Unamuno and Jugo, born in Bilbao in the Basque provinces of Spain in 1864, one of the "generation," is called by George Tyler Northup "this fighting Christian . . . the noblest Spaniard of the present moment."²

In the words of Don Miguel himself: "All who invoke the name of Christ with love and respect I consider Christians, and the orthodox are odious to me, be they Catholic or Protestant—one is as intransigent as the other—who deny Christianity to those who do not interpret the Gospel as they do." And "I do have . . . a strong leaning toward Christianity without embracing the special dogma of any Christian creed."³

Don Miguel cannot properly be called a philosopher, for he developed no system of philosophy; although he has written a number of novels he is not a novelist; he wrote poetry and drama, but he is neither poet nor dramatist. He was a man of culture, widely read in French, English, Italian, German and Latin, and won for himself by competitive examination the chair of Greek language and literature at the University of Salamanca in 1891. He was a personality, an individual, a man of "flesh and bone" with a problem of human destiny which is, according to him, the only one that philosophy is called on to solve.⁴ For him it springs from his vital instinct for immortality versus his skeptical European culture gleaned from such writers as Prudentius, Kierkegaard, Pascal, Ibsen, Spinoza, and Bergson. It is a battle between intuition and logical thought. Moved by the fear of nothingness, of the destruc-

¹ Ferrater Mora, José, *Unamuno; Bosquejo de una Filosofía* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1944), p. 16.

² Northup, George Tyler, *An Introduction to Spanish Literature* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 439.

³ Unamuno, Miguel de, *Perplexities and Paradoxes* (New York: Philosophical Society, 1945. Translated by Stuart Gross), p. 4.

⁴ Unamuno, Miguel de, *La vida de Don Quijote y Sancho* (Madrid: Fernando Fe, 1905), p. 425.

tion of the personality, he turns to hope. The reasons in favor of mortality are not sufficient to destroy this hope. "Those arguments," he says, "do not make any impression upon me, because they are arguments, and nothing but arguments, and the heart does not nourish itself on such. I don't want to die; no, I don't want to, nor do I desire to want to [a very representative statement from Unamuno]; I want to live forever, and forever, and forever, to be myself, this poor self which I am and which I feel myself to be now and here, and therefore the problem of the duration of the soul, of my own soul, tortures me."⁵

Reason is the enemy of life. The thirst for life, for immortality, is in collision with reason. The conflict in his own mind arose between this thirst, this demand for immortality, and the influence of James and Bergson, and even more of Kierkegaard. Unamuno takes up the unsolved problem of the incompatibility of existence and movement, as identified with reason and faith, left by Kierkegaard,⁶ that Nordic Socrates, worried and ironical, who haunted the foggy streets and squares of Copenhagen from 1813 to 1855, and who set the defiance of individual, personal existence over against rational and abstract thought. But Unamuno was not capable of a solution either. Reason cannot satisfy the man of "*carne y hueso*" as to whether or not he is to die completely and forever—that is, to lose his individuality. But reason and faith are two enemies which cannot exist without each other. The irrational asks to be rationalized, and reason can operate only on a basis of irrationality.⁷

The New Testament, especially St. Paul's writings, was his favorite reading matter, "but the word preached did not profit [him], not being mixed with faith . . . for we who have believed do enter into rest."⁸ "Rest yes," says Unamuno, "when we can do no more . . . There are, nevertheless, two kinds of rest: a temporal one in order to return to the struggle after having regained strength, and this rest is like sleep, a preparation for living: and the other, definitive and lasting, which is like death, the end of life."⁹ "Don't preach peace to me because I fear it. Peace is submission and falsehood.

⁵ Marias, Julián, *Miguel de Unamuno* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1943), p. 204.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸ The book of Hebrews, 4:2-3.

⁹ Unamuno, *Perplexities*, p. 24.

... I seek religion and faith in war."¹⁰ "The believer who refuses to examine the fundamentals of his belief is a man living in insincerity and in falsehood."¹¹ "I don't care if you agree with me or not . . . I want us all to struggle, for out of the struggle rises love . . . War has been and is the mother of compassion, which we call love; peace is the mother of envy."¹² How like Emerson in his essay entitled "Self Reliance!" For instance: "Whoso would be a man must be a non-conformist. He who would gather immortal palms must not be hindered by the name of goodness, but must explore if it be goodness."

But let reason and faith be at war! "Most of my endeavor has been to unsettle my neighbors, to rouse their hearts, to afflict them when I can . . . Let them seek as I seek, struggle as I struggle, and between us all we shall extract one particle of the secret from God, and this struggle will at least increase our spiritual stature."¹³ He will send them elsewhere who seek solutions from him, for he has none to sell—only uncompleted thoughts, not bread but yeast and ferment, for to awaken the sleeping is a work of supreme mercy. Restful solutions are for lazy spirits.

Although Unamuno was passionately fond of Christ, since He died to give us life, he had little faith in God. "No one has been able to convince me rationally of the existence of God, but neither of his non-existence . . . and if I do believe in God, or at least believe that I believe in him, it is principally because He reveals Himself to me through my heart, in the Gospel, through Christ, and through history. It is a matter of the heart."¹⁴

In 1913 Unamuno published his *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida—Of the Tragic Sense of Life*. The gist of this tragic concern is:

Where do I come from and whence comes the world in which I live and from which I live? Where am I going and where is all that surrounds me going? What is the meaning of this? Such are the queries of man . . . and if we look carefully we shall see that underneath these questions there is not so much the desire to know the why as to know the how: not of the cause but of the outcome . . . , but in reality these causes are, for us, ends. And the Supreme Cause, God, what is He but the Supreme End? . . . We want to

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

know where we come from so as to ascertain the better where we are going . . . And this is the basis of the tragic sense of life.¹⁵

But why does he want to know whence he came and where he is going? Because he does not want to die completely, and he wants to know definitively whether he has to die or not. Man needs to know in order to live, and reason is not sufficient for this *cuestión única*, that of life everlasting. "Faith in life everlasting is the supporting conviction of Christian existence."¹⁶

Del sentimiento trágico de la vida is called by Brennan "without doubt the greatest book of its kind to have been written in Spanish."¹⁷ In this book Don Miguel poses the theory that the anxiety not to die, the hunger for personal immortality, the endeavor to persist indefinitely in our own being, which is our very essence, is the effective basis of all knowledge and the intimate point of departure of all human philosophy.

Don Miguel de Unamuno with his Christian ideals pitted against his practical logic (or logical practice) represents Spain's Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, faith and reason, which could not exist without each other until Sancho, the materialist, had become Quixotized and Don Quixote, the idealist, had become Sancho-panzaized. Because he was so deeply moved by the affairs of his nation that he opened his mouth violently against abuse, he was banished to the Canary Islands for some months (February to July, 1924) and spent more than five years in voluntary exile in France, but he died in Salamanca, his Salamanca, where he had taught for forty-five years, on the last day of December, 1936.

¹⁵ Unamuno, Miguel de, *Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida* (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, S.A., 8th ed., 1947), pp. 33-34.

¹⁶ Marias, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹⁷ Brennan, Gerald, *The Literature of the Spanish People from Roman Times to the Present Day* (The Cambridge Press, 1951), p. 423.

Book Reviews

Books reviewed in THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN may be ordered from the Seminary Bookstore, Wilmore, Kentucky.

The Biblical Faith and Christian Freedom, by Edwin Lewis. Westminster Press, 1953. 224 pages. \$3.50.

The noted Professor emeritus of Drew Theological Seminary and present Professor of Theology at Temple University has gathered some recent lectures on the Bible and faith into an important volume on a subject which is one of keen interest at the present time. It is the same concern which occupied John Knox in *Criticism and Faith* (1952), namely, to define and affirm the faith which survives "the acids of modernity" in the historical criticism of the Bible. The volume embraces the lectures delivered at Southwestern University, Georgetown, Texas, in 1952. The fourteen chapters deal with such questions as "the emancipation of the word of God," "free faith and the Old Testament," "free faith and the Gospels," "the Epistles and criticism," and "free faith and the church."

The point of view stressed is that the Bible deals not with a God whom men found for themselves but with a God who found men—a God who must reveal himself if he is to be known by man (p. 49). The "central issue" dealt with is the extent to which the Bible is identified with God's revelation to man. As in other books by Professor Lewis the position is taken that God's revelation does not become such unless there is a "faith" response on the part of man—the Word of God is in the Bible but it must be subjectively validated. The author accepts most of the conclusions of modern Biblical criticism, particularly the emphases in vogue about a generation ago. At the same time he has been responsive to the newer trends in the direction of Biblical theology, the unity of the Bible, the importance of faith, and the confirmations of Biblical data by archaeology. He is concerned with a vigorous and enlightened "evangelical" faith and seeks to interpret the Bible in a way that will do justice to historical criticism, to intellectual honesty, and to the Christian faith.

At many points the viewpoint is soundly and fervently Christian—much of it reads like an evangelistic sermon. At many other

points positions are taken quite unsatisfactory to the orthodox Christian faith. The viewpoint is in harmony with most "neo-orthodox" interpreters. Thus, the Bible contains both truth and error and even "deliberate historical perversions" (p. 57). Genesis, chapters 1-11, is largely "folklore and legend" (p. 67), man is descended from the brute (p. 68), the stories of the patriarchs are both fact and fiction, and the Gospels do not preserve the actual words of Jesus as the Gettysburg Address preserves the actual words of Lincoln (p. 154). Yet, imbedded even in such a bloody book as Judges with a Samson about as historical as Paul Bunyan is a religious insight recognizable as the true "Word of God" (Jud. 2:11-22). The centrality of Christ is presented much more satisfactorily, yet even here there is circular reasoning—"the gospel is in who he (Jesus) was and what he did . . . totally considered," and yet the New Testament gives no sure clue to what his actual words and deeds were! In short there is a God who revealed himself in word and deed culminating in Jesus Christ as apprehended by man's faith. This combination of revelation and interpreting faith resulted in the Bible in which is embedded fragments of the truth of God. The Bible reader, therefore, can find truth in the Bible, especially if someone like Dr. Lewis is present to separate the truth from error. This volume is designed to provide such guidance.

GEORGE A. TURNER

How to Preach the Word of God With Variety, by Frank T. Littorin. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1953. 157 pages. \$2.50.

This slender volume is an attempt to outline the method rather than the message of preaching. The author makes it clear, however, that sermon technique is but the handmaid of sermon content. By preaching the Word with variety, Dr. Littorin means preaching the several types of Bible expository sermons, as for instance, the Bible book sermon, the chapter, the paragraph, the text, and the Bible topic. Anyone who shies away from the work of digging out textual and expository outlines from the Bible will not be likely to take to this treatise. The kinds of messages the author suggests are built only on hours of patient, energetic research, but in the end they should prove highly rewarding for both preacher and people. If the author has his way he will make Bible preachers of all of us.

The numerous outlines illustrating the varieties of expository preaching will be profitable if used suggestively. Occasionally the critical student will come across an outline that is faulty either in form or content or in both. Notwithstanding, here is a stimulating text for the topical preacher who would get out of a rut.

NOEL LIDDLE

Crucial Questions About the Kingdom of God, by George E. Ladd.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmann, 1952. 193 pages. \$3.00.

The recent revival of biblical theology and eschatological studies has been felt afresh in Dr. George Ladd's examination of the "crucial questions" about the kingdom of God. Making no claim to presenting "a systematic or a comprehensive exposition of the New Testament doctrine of the kingdom of God," Ladd endeavors to come to grips with questions inherent in this highly relevant theme.

Having been trained during his college and seminary days in "dispensational premillennialism," Dr. Ladd came to question the "scriptural soundness" of some of the interpretations of dispensationalists and to sense the necessity of facing afresh the exegetical problems incident to the premillennial view. In graduate studies at Boston and Harvard the author "determined to go as deeply as possible into the background of biblical eschatology." Familiarizing himself with relevant literature in English, German, and French, he brought to his task a scholarly equipment.

After *briefly* surveying the eschatological and non-eschatological interpretations of the Scriptures in ancient, medieval, and modern times, Dr. Ladd concludes that "no single interpretation has established itself so firmly as to commend universal recognition" among critical scholars (p. 39). Neither the "consistent eschatology" of Schweitzer, nor the non-eschatological interpretations of the Wellhausenian adherents; neither the "realized eschatology" of Dodd, nor any attempted synthesis or mediating view such as Manson's or Cadoux's, holds the field today.

Among the conservative thinkers four interpretations seek prominence: the *postmillennialism* of Warfield; the *premillennialism* of Zahn, Godet, Alfred and Tregelles; the *dispensationalism* of the Plymouth Brethren movement and of the convinced readers of

the *Scofield Reference Bible*; and the *amillennialism* of Vos and Allis. As for himself, Dr. Ladd has abandoned dispensationalism but feels compelled by Scripture exegesis to maintain a premillennial interpretation.

Recognizing the kingdom as central in Jesus' teaching, Ladd has moved to a position of viewing the kingdom as spiritually present in the lives of Christians but also as something future in an earthly, eschatological, and apocalyptic sense. He acknowledges that the point of departure among the various thinkers usually centers in the meaning given to the expression, "the kingdom of God." Having studied the word for kingdom (*basileia*) (its linguistic significance and its exegetical and theological difficulties), Dr. Ladd formulates a definition of the kingdom which he believes to be the key to the most satisfactory and consistent exegesis of the concept as found in the diverse New Testament passages on the subject. ". . . *the kingdom of God is the sovereign rule of God, manifested in the person and work of Christ, creating a people over whom he reigns, and issuing in a realm or realms in which the power of his reign is realized*" (p. 80).

Viewing the kingdom of God as primarily soteriological, and as both progressively revealed in the New Testament and progressively realized *in* history, not just beyond it, Ladd sets forth a fourfold unfolding of the kingdom: first, in the person and activity of Jesus, the King; secondly, in "salvation" as individually experienced—as righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit—between the Ascension and Parousia; thirdly, in the millennial kingdom of Christ on earth; and fourthly, in the ultimate kingdom of a new heaven and a new earth.

Four basic questions conclude the author's treatment: Was the "kingdom of Heaven" postponed, as dispensationalists claim? How is the Kingdom in Revelation twenty to be interpreted? Is not the whole millennial interpretation Jewish and not Christian? and, Why the silence concerning the millennium in the Gospels and Epistles, if it is a genuinely Christian view?

Ladd's answers, in part, to the questions are these: Nothing was postponed which Jesus' first coming was intended to accomplish; again, all other considerations concerning the future kingdom are subservient to the exegesis of Revelation twenty. Whatever a sound hermeneutics requires of the passage in Revelation, Ladd affirms, will determine one's millennial view. Reducing the possible

interpretations to two, the natural and the spiritual, our author finds the natural interpretation most in accord with sound hermeneutics and the millennial views of the Early Church Fathers.

This volume has its shortcomings, even for Dr. Ladd's colleague on the Fuller faculty, Wilbur M. Smith, author of the "Preface" to the book. Nevertheless, it has forthrightly faced basic problems with which conservative scholarship must grapple if it is to maintain a biblical eschatology, traditionally understood as such, in the face of the Historical-Critical and the Social-Historical Schools of Interpretation. A much larger place could have been given to the bearing of "crisis theology" upon traditional eschatology. As an introduction to a much larger work on the whole field of the New Testament Doctrine of Last Things (which the author is contemplating), this volume deserves a careful reading by all interested in the kingdom of God as present or future or both.

DELBERT R. ROSE

A Faith to Proclaim, by James S. Stewart. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1953. 160 pages. \$2.50.

This book contains the Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered at Yale in 1952. The author exhibits the same originality of thought and expression one finds in *The Strong Name* and *Heralds of God*. Dealing with sermon content rather than sermon technique the lectures call attention to the essential message of Christianity. The themes treated are as follows: "Proclaiming the Incarnation," "Proclaiming Forgiveness," "Proclaiming the Cross," "Proclaiming the Resurrection," and "Proclaiming Christ." Old themes; but one reads Stewart as though he had never heard of these things. In addition to this fresh point of view, the lectures are charged with a strong, virile Christianity. Indeed, not a little of the force of Stewart of Edinburgh lies in his robust, positive testimony to the truth that is in Christ Jesus. The minister, young or old, reading these pages will find himself spiritually and mentally exhilarated.

The lecturer understands his times. He knows men. And he knows how to present the Gospel in the light of contemporary needs. This little volume needs to be read and pondered by every man called to herald the good news of God to our generation.

JAMES D. ROBERTSON

Psychology of Pastoral Care, by Paul E. Johnson. Nashville: Abingdon Cokesbury, 1953. 362 pages. \$4.75.

The purpose of this book is to consider the work of the pastor from the standpoint of dynamic, interpersonal psychology. It is written for students, pastors and counselors in other professions who are interested in the work of pastors.

The scope of this work is broad and there are a number of hearty and healthy emphases in it. The author emphasizes that the pastor must be a man who has a genuine love and concern for men. The needs and wants of people are clearly and cogently set forth. The principles of pastoral care, based on the interaction of persons, are applied to basic pastoral situations: personal counseling, marriage counseling, family counseling, the ministry of healing, and the pastoral care of the dying and the bereaved. The author raises some basic questions concerning the philosophical grounds of interpersonal psychology. His assumptions, given tentatively, need to be further examined.

The author makes a significant contribution in his proposal of a new name for pastoral counseling. In avoiding the old and frustrating antithesis between directive and nondirective counseling, Johnson views the pastor's work in this area as *responsive counseling*. In developing this concept, he preserves the values of empathy, understanding, acceptance and good listening that have characterized nondirective counseling; but, on the other hand, he recognizes that in many situations the pastor needs to say more than a non-directive "uh huh." The responsibility for the progress of the interview rests with both the counselee and counselor.

Many evangelical ministers will be impressed with the fact that Johnson fails to consider sin realistically in this volume. Sin is portrayed too largely as maladjustment or a general failure to attain goals. Thus, with a light view of sin, salvation is considered too greatly in terms of psychological adjustment and personal integration. There are other theological concepts such as prayer that are treated too humanistically.

This book, however, has unusual merit for evangelical ministers. The appreciation it demonstrates for people is a good example of healthful pastoral attitudes. It typifies shepherd heartedness in a splendid way.

W. C. MAVIS

Sermons and Outlines on the Seven Words, by F. W. Robertson, James Stalker, Charles Simeon, and others. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1953. 107 pages. \$1.75.

Seven Simple Sermons on the Saviour's Last Words, by W. Herschel Ford. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1953. 89 pages. \$1.50.

This little book is the fifth one of a series being published by Baker entitled, "Minister's Handbook Series." Other previously printed titles are *Sermons and Outlines on the Lord's Supper* and *Sermons and Outlines for Special Occasions*. This one furnishes sermon material for each of the seven words of our Lord on the cross. Such names as Seiss, Ryle, Spurgeon, F. W. Robertson, and James Stalker are represented—names we can hardly afford to neglect. The Baker people are to be commended for giving us this brief yet rich anthology in this very specialized area of "the seven words."

Still another slender volume is at hand dealing with our Saviour's last words, this time from the pastor of the First Baptist Church, El Paso, Texas. Dr. Ford is also the author of "God Bless America." These messages are distinctly oral in style, evangelistic in import, the overflow of a heart that loves God and the souls of men. Of value for their practical insights into a timeless theme.

JAMES D. ROBERTSON

The Puritan Heritage, by George M. Stephenson. New York: MacMillan, 1952. 282 pages. \$3.50.

Dr. Stephenson has been for many years professor of history at the University of Minnesota. As a writer of American History he has demonstrated his interest in the influence of religion upon the development of American society, as in his *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration*, published in 1932. The years of interest and study in this area manifests itself in the book under review.

The term "Puritan Heritage" seems to be used in a somewhat confusing manner. While Dr. Stephenson places a major emphasis upon the English Puritans who transplanted their faith in the colonial settlements of New England, he seems to include also the

“people of kindred spirit from every land.” Even the transplanted English Puritanism seems to have been much modified before it produced the influences upon American life which he traces throughout the book. Unless the reader bears in mind that it is really “left wing” Protestantism which is under discussion he is apt to feel a sense of intellectual discomfiture while reading.

Dr. Stephenson develops, in a manner unusual to the secular historian, the thesis that it was the Puritan influence which has been influential in the development of those main currents which form our distinctive American heritage. Such diverse religious groups as the Quakers, Methodists, and Unitarians were developed under the Puritan influence. Such apparently unrelated reform movements as the revivals of both the colonial and the national periods, the Anti-Masonry campaign of the middle nineteenth century, the Temperance Movement, and the Crusade for the Abolition of Slavery were all affected by the Puritan impulse. Most Americans are proud of our ability to develop interdenominational organizations for the advancement of God’s Kingdom upon earth. Outstanding among these institutions have been The American Home Missionary Society, The American Tract Society, The American Bible Society, and the American Sunday School Union. Each of these, as Stephenson points out, must give credit for its success to the penetration of Puritanism into the various avenues of American life. A short but enlightening chapter is given to each of these subjects.

Of special interest to this reviewer is the contrast between the development of religious life and freedom in America under the influence of “left wing” Protestantism with that life which was developed under the jurisdiction of the hierarchy of the state-controlled churches of the European Continent. This contrast may be illustrated by a comparison of the European and the American Sabbath, and by looking at the differences in the ministers of the two areas. In his chapter on “The Old World Against the New World” Stephenson says that “emigrants from Europe—from Protestant countries—quickly sensed the difference between pastors in America and in Europe. They found ministers in America democratic and warm-hearted; they sought the sheep, unlike ministers in Europe where the sheep sought the shepherd and were careful to address him by the proper gradation of titles. . . .”

Some weaknesses of the book seem to be the author’s tendency to become so much interested in the development of the theme of

each individual chapter that it is difficult to see just how it ties into the central theme of the book. He has crowded so much factual material into so small a space and has made such sweeping generalizations that there are at times errors in historical detail. These seem to be a result of style rather than a lack of accurate information, however, for the book gives indication of abundant research by the author. The lack of definite footnotes makes it impossible for the reader to check his sources in those places where questions arise.

This book should prove an inspiration to those religiously minded persons who can still see the uplifting influence of a spiritual church upon the development of our American way of life, in spite of the materialistic trend of the age. As Stephenson says in his concluding chapter, "Twentieth-century America appears to have lost the Puritan heritage. A generation whose 'literature' is more akin to the licentiousness of the press which ridiculed the Puritans in England, whose 'movies' revel in the filth of the muckrake, whose radio and television programs serve a fare of vulgarity, and whose mechanism has degraded the superior man and has enhanced the power of the inferior man, is incapable of understanding a religious movement whose appeal is to the 'remnant,' to those who are conscious of the brevity of human life and recognize the spiritual life as one of great reality."

PERCIVAL A. WESCHE

Book Notices

Within These Borders, by John R. Scotford. New York: Friendship Press, 1953. 151 pages. \$2.00.

An up-to-the-minute account of the Spanish-speaking Americans in America. Their whereabouts, culture, contributions, and problems. A sympathetic, illuminating study written in a lively, reportorial style.

Great Is the Company, by Violet Wood. New York: Friendship Press, 1953. 167 pages. \$2.50.

A fascinating account of the spread of the Scriptures from the sixteenth century till now. The story of the great company of heroic men and women who translated the Book into obscure tongues and who fought for the people's rights to study it reads like a romance.

The Making of a Preacher, by W. W. Melton. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1953. 150 pages. \$2.00.

A guide for the young preacher: his preparation, ethics, development, and pitfalls.

Where There Is Life, by Leslie C. Sayre. New York: Friendship Press, 1953. \$1.50.

A book of photographs from many lands telling the story of the life and work of the Church. The thesis of the book: "There is a striking difference in the lives of human beings wherever the Church is vitally at work."

New Hearts and New Faces, by Emory Ross and Gene Phillips. New York: Friendship Press, 1953. 121 pages. \$2.00.

A history of one phase of medical missions—leprosy. Illustrated with personality sketches that show the progress being made in this field.

God's Order: The Ephesian Letter and This Present Time, by John A. Mackay. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. 214 pages. \$3.00.

In this lucid exposition of St. Paul's Letter to the Ephesians, Dr. Mackay presents the fundamental truths of the Christian faith and applies them to modern life and thought.

The Art of Effective Teaching, by C. B. Eavey. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1953. 295 pages. \$3.75.

A worthy volume on teaching and learning written from the point of view of an evangelical Christian.

Ideas for a Successful Pastorate, by John Huss. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1953. 144 pages. \$2.00.

A practical book by one who has achieved considerable success as a pastor.

Literal Translation of the Holy Bible, by Robert Young. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1953. 765 pages. \$5.00.

A valuable work, long out of print, by the author of the *Analytical Concordance*.

Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports, by Seward Hiltner. Association Press, 1953. 238 pages. \$3.00.

A rethinking of the Christian view of sex in the light of the Kinsey studies.

Spurgeon's Sermons, Memorial Library. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, n.d. 20 volumes. \$2.95 each.

The themes treated in the sermons are completely indexed. This is the largest set of Spurgeon available.

Our Contributors

DR. HAROLD B. KUHN is Professor of Philosophy of Religion in Asbury Theological Seminary, and Editor of this journal.

DR. PAUL S. REES is pastor of First Covenant Church in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and President of the National Association of Evangelicals.

DR. DEWEY M. BEEGLE is Professor in Hebrew and Old Testament in The Biblical Seminary in New York, and an alumnus of Asbury Theological Seminary.

MR. PAUL R. LUNDY is a graduate student in the University of Kentucky, and assistant to the Chairman of the Department of Philosophy in that institution.

PROF. CHARLES W. CARTER, an alumnus of Asbury Theological Seminary, is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Missions in Marion College.

ROBERTA DAY CORBITT is Instructor in Spanish in Asbury College and has been for fifteen years a missionary in Cuba.

* * *

The coming Spring-Summer issue of THE ASBURY SEMINARIAN will deal with the contemporary movement in Biblical Theology.

Asbury Theological Seminary

Associate Member, American Association of Theological Schools

Accredited Member, American Association of Schools of
Religious Education

Courses offered leading to the following degrees:

Bachelor of Divinity

Master of Theology

Master of Religious Education

Winter quarter opens January 5, 1954

Spring quarter opens March 23, 1954

Tuition Scholarship Available to Qualifying Students



First Fruits
THE ACADEMIC OPEN PRESS OF ASBURY SEMINARY

About First Fruits Press


Under the auspices of B. L. Fisher Library, First Fruits Press is an online publishing arm of Asbury Theological Seminary. The goal is to make academic material freely available to scholars worldwide, and to share rare and valuable resources that would not otherwise be available for research. First Fruits publishes in five distinct areas: heritage materials, academic books, papers, books, and journals.

In the Journals section, back issues of *The Asbury Journal* will be digitized and so made available to a global audience. At the same time, we are excited to be working with several faculty members on developing professional, peer-reviewed, online journals that would be made freely available.

Much of this endeavor is made possible by the recent gift of the Kabis III scanner, one of the best available. The scanner can produce more than 2,900 pages an hour and features a special book cradle that is specifically designed to protect rare and fragile materials. The materials it produces will be available in ebook format, easy to download and search.

First Fruits Press will enable the library to share scholarly resources throughout the world, provide faculty with a platform to share their own work and engage scholars without the difficulties often encountered by print publishing. All the material will be freely available for online users, while those who wish to purchase a print copy for their libraries will be able to do so. First Fruits Press is just one way the B. L. Fisher Library is fulfilling the global vision of Asbury Theological Seminary to spread scriptural holiness throughout the world.

asbury.to/firstfruits



ASBURY
theological
SEMINARY

asburyseminary.edu
800.2ASBURY