Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

Volume 26 | Issue 5

Article 11

12-1-2009

The Relationship Between Soul and Spirit in Greek and Latin Patristic Thought

Alexey R. Fokin

Follow this and additional works at: <https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy>

Recommended Citation

Fokin, Alexey R. (2009) "The Relationship Between Soul and Spirit in Greek and Latin Patristic Thought," *Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers*: Vol. 26 : Iss. 5 , Article 11.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200926559
Available at: <https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss5/11>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUL AND SPIRIT IN GREEK AND LATIN PATRISTIC THOUGHT

Alexey R. Fokin

Some biblical texts suggest that man consists of two parts—body and soul—whereas others seem to indicate instead three parts—body, soul, and spirit. This paper examines how the Church Fathers dealt with this apparent contradiction. It finds that although they generally favor the body-soul dichotomy, they did not see it as contradicting a trichotomous view, for “spirit” can be interpreted in a number of ways: as another term for the soul, or as the lowest imaginative part of the soul, or as its highest rational part, or as the grace of the Holy Spirit. Different approaches can be found in different patristic authors depending on their theological interests and the biblical passages at issue.

I

The structure of human nature became a subject of investigation for the first time among the Greek philosophers, who were interested not only in the nature of the relationship between the material body and immaterial soul and the interaction between them, but also in the internal structure of the soul. For example, there is Plato’s well-known division of the human soul into three parts or faculties, *reason*, *passion*, and *desire* (*logikon*, *thymoeides*, *epithymētikon*),¹ and Aristotle’s division of the soul into three parts, *rational*, *sensitive*, and *nutritive* (*dianoētikon*, *aisthētikon*, *threptikon*).² Plato moreover distinguished two different elements in the rational part of the soul—namely the reason (*logos*) and the intellect (*nous*): the former is a faculty of discursive thinking or reasoning (*dianoia*), and the latter is a faculty of intuitive thinking or intellection (*noēsis*).³ Subsequently the Neoplatonists associated reason with the universal Soul, whose parts they considered the individual souls, and intellect with the universal Intellect, which emanates directly from the First Principle of the Universe and contains in itself the so-called intelligible world (*kosmos noētos*).⁴

Aristotle also identifies a “passive intellect” (*nous pathētikos*), which is one of the cognitive faculties of the soul, usually dormant (when a man is focused only on the external sensible world), but awakens when the soul

¹Plato. Resp. 439 d 4–e 5; 440 e 3; Phaedr. 253 c–254 e.

²Aristoteles. De anima II 2, 413 b 10–15.

³Plato. Resp. 509 d 1–511 e 4; 533 e 7–534 a 8.

⁴Plotinus. Enn. V.1.2–7; V.2.1–2; V.3.2–17.

tries to apprehend something immaterial. Aristotle posed the question as to what indeed wakes up this dormant passive intellect, coming to the conclusion that it must be a certain "active intellect" (*nous poiētikos*) which does not belong to the soul itself, but is an immortal, independent, and probably even divine substance. Thus there is some active entity in the human soul, which does not belong wholly to it, but is a part of the divine world.⁵

Similarly, the Stoics considered soul and mind (*nous*) as two different levels of organization of the so-called *pneuma* (spirit), which is a universal creative rational Principle. They regarded the human mind as the more fiery, intense, and divine *pneuma*, and the human soul as the more cold and less intense *pneuma*.⁶

II

Although the question of the structure of human nature and of its spiritual part first arose in Greek philosophy, it did not remain a purely philosophical question, but with the spread of the new world religion, Christianity, it very soon acquired a theological dimension. In fact, in the Bible we can see different and even mutually contradictory descriptions of human beings. On the one hand, human beings are quite often identified only according to their physical part as "flesh." For instance, in the book of Genesis God says: *My Spirit does not strive in men forever, for they are flesh; and their days shall be one hundred twenty years* (Gen 6:3).⁷ The apostle Paul in the Epistle to the Romans writes: *Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh (namely no man) will be justified in His (i.e., God's) sight* (Rom 3:20). On the other hand, human beings are also sometimes described only according to their spiritual part as "soul" (Hebrew *nepeš*, Greek *psychē*). For instance, in the book of Genesis it is said: *The sons of Joseph who were born to him in Egypt were two souls. All the souls of the house of Jacob who went to Egypt were seventy* (Gen 46:27). In the book of Acts we find: *Then those who gladly received his word were baptized; and that day about three thousand souls were added to them* (Act 2:41).

Finally, the Bible frequently mentions two principles of man, physical and spiritual, a doctrine subsequently in Christian theology called *dichotomy*. It is important to notice that in such passages the spiritual principle of man is sometimes called "soul" and sometimes "spirit" (Hebrew *rûah*, Greek *pneuma*). In fact, the book of Genesis in depicting the origin of man indicates his so-called double creation or the creation of the two parts of man: the physical part created from the ground, and the other spiritual part given to man directly from God by means of creative inspiration: *And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul* (Gen 2:7). Ecclesiastes in this

⁵Aristoteles. *De anima* III 5, 430 a 14–25.

⁶See *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. I 135, 137–138; II 439–444, 458, 836–841.

⁷Quotations from the Bible are based on the King James Version, with some modifications.

way describes the death of man: *Then the dust shall return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it* (Eccl 12:7). In the Gospel the Lord Jesus says to the apostles: *And you fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell* (Mt 10:28). The apostle Paul quite often uses dichotomic language, for instance, in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: *The unmarried woman cares about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit* (1 Cor 7:34).

From these and some other biblical passages⁸ it would appear that the soul and the spirit are two different names of the same spiritual part of human nature. But at the same time, in the Epistles of the apostle Paul we can find some passages in which the soul appears as something different from the spirit, and in the structure of human nature three parts are noted: body, soul, and spirit. This doctrine was subsequently called *trichotomy*. For example, in the first Epistle to the Thessalonians it is said: *And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and let your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ* (1 Th 5:23). Another passage is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews⁹: *For the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, penetrating even to the division of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart* (Heb 4:12). In addition, the apostle Paul divides people into three classes: "fleshly," "psychic," and "spiritual" (Rom 8:4-9; 1 Cor 2:14-15, 15:44-49).

Thus, reasoning from the biblical data, should we conclude that human beings consist of soul and spirit, or of body, soul, and spirit? Which doctrine is correct: dichotomy or trichotomy? In other words, should we think that soul and spirit are two different independent parts of man or even two different substances? Or should we think that one of them belongs to man, and the other does not, being a certain superior principle? Perhaps they differ from one another in some other way? Perhaps there is no difference between them at all? These questions, originating from the biblical doctrine of human nature, became the subject of long discussions among Christian theologians, who tried to resolve them by means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked out in Greek philosophy.

We shall examine the answers given to these questions in the writings of Christian theologians of the Patristic period, known as the "golden age" of the Christian Church. It is expedient to divide this large period into two parts: first, the Pre-Nicene period (till 325 A.D.), when the question of human nature's structure and of the relationship between soul and spirit had just arisen and Christian thinkers made their first attempts to resolve it; and second, the classical Patristic and early Medieval period

⁸See, for instance, Jn 10:15, 17; 19:30; Lk 8:55; 23:46; Mt 27:50; Acts 20:10.

⁹Concerning the Epistle to the Hebrews, the authorship of the apostle Paul is disputed by modern western Biblical scholars but traditionally admitted by the Orthodox Church.

(from the fourth to eighth centuries), when this question was finally resolved in the writings of the Church Fathers and the decisions of the Church Councils.

III

The first Christian theologians, the so-called *Apostolic Fathers*, simply quoted the related New Testament passages without any attempt to define what they mean. For instance, *St. Ignatius of Antioch* (also known as *Ignatius Theophorus*) simply lists the three parts of man: "Whom the Lord Jesus Christ will respect, in whom they hope by flesh, and soul, and spirit [in] faith, and love, and concord."¹⁰ In one edition of the Epistle of St. Ignatius to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, soul and spirit are identified with each other and the biblical dichotomy is confirmed: "You consist of soul and body [as] fleshly and spiritual in order to improve what is evident personally to you, but ask for manifestation of the invisible to you."¹¹ In one of the anonymous homilies attributed to another apostolic Father, *St. Clement of Rome*, spirit is again identified with soul: "Universal and earthly soul . . . joins with a cognate spirit, which is the human soul."¹²

The first attempts to posit a distinction between the human soul and spirit were undertaken by the *Christian apologists*; in so doing they used not only biblical material but also contemporary philosophical and even physiological doctrines. In the treatise "On Resurrection" sometimes attributed to one of the first Greek apologists, *St. Justin the Philosopher*, we find the following: "The soul exists in the body, and it does not live inanimate; you see that the body after it is left by the soul does not exist any more. For the body is a dwelling of soul, and the soul is a dwelling of the spirit. These three will be saved in those who have a firm hope and doubtless faith in God."¹³ Nevertheless St. Justin in his other writings recognizes only two parts of man—soul and body.¹⁴ At the same time he distinguishes the soul which only participates in life from a certain "spirit of life" (*to zōtikon pneuma*) due to which it lives and which can be taken away from it by the will of God: "For to live is not an attribute of the soul, as it is God's; but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not forever conjoined with the body, since, whenever this harmony must be broken up, the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer; even so, whenever the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it, and there is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken."¹⁵ The spirit of life mentioned here for St. Justin is not identical to the Holy

¹⁰*Ign. Ant. Philad.* 11.2; cf.: *Pseudo-Just. De resurr.* 10; *Hipp. Comm.* in Dan. II.38.5.

¹¹*Ign. Ant. Polyc.* 2.2.

¹²*Ps.-Clem. Hom.* 9.12.4.

¹³*Just. De resurr.* // *Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi.* Vol. 3. P. 595A.

¹⁴*Just.* 1 *Apol.* 19.7; 2 *Apol.* 10.1; *Dial. cum Tryph.* 5–6.

¹⁵*Just. Dial. cum Tryph.* 6.

Spirit, since it is inherent to all souls whereas the Holy Spirit joins only with righteous souls.¹⁶

The disciple of St. Justin, another Christian apologist, *Tatian the Assyrian*, distinguished two kinds of spirit, the lowest "material spirit" (*pneuma hylikon*), also named soul, and the "the highest spirit" (*to meizon pneuma*) which existed in the first people but is today present only in holy men. Tatian calls the latter "the image and similitude of God" and "the Divine spirit" (*to theion pneuma*), evidently identifying it with the Holy Spirit.¹⁷ In a similar way another apologist, *St. Theophilus of Antioch*, makes a distinction between soul and the "spirit of God" (*pneuma theou*), which however he does not identify with the Holy Spirit, because God gave it to all creatures just as He gave soul to all human beings. It is instead a spirit giving life to all living creatures and inhaled by men.¹⁸

One of the first representatives of the Alexandrian theological school, *Clement of Alexandria*, renders his own account of the relationship between soul and spirit. He distinguishes the rational soul (*psychē logikē*), which he also calls "the governing spirit" (*to hēgemonikon pneuma*), from the "corporeal soul" (*sōmatikē psychē*), which he calls "the spiritual principle given in creation," "the fleshly spirit," "the unreasonable spirit," "the subordinated spirit," and the "vital force."¹⁹ Each of these spirits has its own origin: the subordinated vital spirit is transmitted through the seed during the carnal conception of a man, and the governing rational spirit is given from heaven by God through the angels.²⁰

Another well-known Alexandrian theologian, *Origen of Alexandria*, made an attempt to introduce into Christian theology his own philosophical doctrine on the pre-existence of souls. According to Origen, before the creation of the visible corporal world God had created the immaterial rational substances—pure spirits (*pneumata*), or pure intellects, some of whom after abandoning their love for God and spontaneously falling from Heaven became souls (*psychai*), namely "cooled spirits," which required various bodies for their existence.²¹ However, as early as in the third century this doctrine was considered non-Christian and heretical because it distorted the biblical doctrine on the creation of man and reproduced pagan philosophical ideas.²² Despite his concept of soul as fallen spirit, Origen sometimes

¹⁶Ibid. 5.

¹⁷See *Tatian*. Orat. ad Graec. 4, 12–13, 15, 20; cf. *Orig.* De princ. III.4.2.

¹⁸*Theoph.* Ad Autol. I.5, 7; II.13.

¹⁹*Clem. Alex.* Strom. VI.6.52; VI.16.134–135; VII.12.79; cf. *Leont. Byz.* Contra Nestorianos et Eutythianos I // PG T. 86. Col. 1296D–1297A.

²⁰*Clem. Alex.* Strom. VI.16.135; IV.26.167; Eclog. prophet. 50.1–3; Quis div. salv. 33; cp. Hypotyp. // Phot. Biblioth. 109.

²¹*Origen.* De princ. I.7.4; I.8.1; I.8.4; II.3.1; II.8.3–4; II.9.6–7; III.5.4; Comm. in Jn. II.30.181–182; XX.7 etc.

²²See: *Iren.* Adv. haer. II.33.1–5; *Tert.* De anima, 4, 24; *Hipp.* Refut. VIII.10.1–2; *Method. Olymp.* De resurr. 2–3; *Petrus Alexandr.* Demonstratio quod anima corpori non praeexistit // PG. 18. Col. 520C–521A.

regards the soul as “something middle” (*quasi medium quoddam*) between flesh and spirit and asserts that the human being consists of body, soul, and spirit.²³ To this statement he connects his famous doctrine on the triple sense of the Holy Scriptures: just as a man consists of a body, soul, and spirit, so the Holy Scriptures have three senses: the lowest, firsthand and literal sense, the middle, psychical sense, and the highest, spiritual sense.²⁴

The Gallic theologian, *St. Irenaeus of Lyons*, who is usually considered one of the main representatives of trichotomy, made an alternative distinction between soul and spirit. According to St. Irenaeus, “There are three things out of which the complete man is composed — flesh, soul, and spirit. One of these does indeed preserve and shape [the man] — this is the spirit; while to another it is united and formed — that is the flesh; then [comes] that which is between these two — that is the soul, which sometimes indeed, when it follows the spirit, is raised up by it, but sometimes sympathizes with the flesh and falls into carnal lusts.”²⁵ In this case as in many others, St. Irenaeus identifies the spirit with the Spirit of God (*Spiritus Dei*) and the Spirit of the Father (*Spiritus Patris*), namely with the Holy Spirit who Himself is Life (*vita*),²⁶ unlike the soul, which is only “the breath of life” (*flatus vitae*).

Another tendency is found in the writings of well-known Latin apologist *Tertullian* who in his treatise “On the Soul” for the first time tried to develop a full Christian doctrine on the soul.²⁷ Although sometimes Tertullian only reiterates biblical expressions concerning man’s trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit,²⁸ in most cases he clearly teaches that “the human being consists of two substances (*ex duabus substantiis*), the body and the soul.”²⁹ Moreover, in this treatise he unequivocally asserts the complete identity between soul and spirit, the latter being understood as a function of breathing inherent in the soul. He writes:

Some maintain that there is another natural substance [besides the soul], the spirit inherent to [man] (*aliam substantiam naturalem inesse spiritum*), as if to have life (*vivere*) — the function which comes from the soul (*ab anima*) — were one thing, and to emit breath (*spirare*) — the function which comes from the spirit (*a spiritu*) — were another thing. Now it is not in all animals that these two functions are found, for there are many which only live but do not breathe in that they do not possess the organs of respiration, that is, lungs and windpipes. . . . Man, indeed, although organically furnished with lungs and windpipes, will not on that account be proved to breathe by one pro-

²³*Idem*. De princ. II.8.4; III.4.1–3; IV.2.4; Dial. Heracl. 3; Comm. in Matth. XVII.27; Comm. in Joann. XXXII.2.

²⁴*Idem*. De princ. IV.2.4–5. Sometimes Origen regards the spirit as the highest part of the soul, which is mind. See: *Idem*. Philocalia 12.1; Com. in Ep. ad Ephes. 19 etc.

²⁵*Iren*. Adv. haer. V.9.1.

²⁶*Idem*. Adv. haer. V.6.1; V.7.1; V.9.1–4 и др.

²⁷*Tert*. De anima 22.

²⁸*Idem*. Contr. Marc. V.15.

²⁹*Idem*. IV. 37; cp. De resurr. carn. 34; Scorp. 9; De paenit. 3.

cess, and to live by another. . . . For to live is to breathe, and to breathe is to live (*vivere spirare est et spirare vivere est*). Therefore this entire process, both of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that is, to the soul. Well, then, since you separate the spirit [from the soul], separate their operations also. Let each of them accomplish some act apart from the other—the soul apart, the spirit apart. Let the soul live without the spirit; let the spirit breathe without the soul. Let one of them quit the body, let the other remain; let death and life meet and agree. If indeed the soul and the spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union and meeting together of life and of death. But such a union never will happen; therefore they are not two, and they cannot be divided; but divided they might have been, if they had been two. . . . How much firmer ground you have for believing that the soul and the spirit are but one, since you assign to them no difference; so that the soul is itself the spirit (*ipsa sit anima spiritus*), respiration being the function of that of which life also is!³⁰

Apart from the main stream of the theological tradition of the Church there were the various *Gnostic systems* of the first two centuries A.D. In many cases they identified soul with spirit or considered it as an emanation (*aporroia*) or seed (*sperma*) of a certain divine *aeon*, or Demiurge, or the lowest angels.³¹ For instance, the Gnostic *Valentinus* and his followers believed that the body of man ("earthly man") was created by an evil Demiurge from worldly matter, the soul ("psychical man") originated from the inspiration of the psychical substance of the same Demiurge, and the spirit ("spiritual man") was an emanation of the spiritual substance of the lowest aeon of the divine Plenitude, the so called *Sophia-Hachamoth*.³² Another Gnostic, *Saturninus*, thought that the body of man was created by certain angels but received a vivifying soul from the highest Power as "a spark of life" (*scintilla vitae*) consubstantial with this Power.³³ The Gnostic *Basilides* and his disciple *Isidorus* believed that human beings have two different souls, one good and the other evil, and also many spirits³⁴—a thesis subsequently reiterated by the Manicheans. However, all these strange doctrines contradicted the Bible in many ways and were in fact religious and philosophical myths, so that they were very soon refuted by such outstanding Christian theologians as St. Irenaeus of Lyons, St. Clement of Alexandria, and St. Hippolytus of Rome, and also subsequently rejected by the Christian Church.

IV

On the basis laid down in the Pre-Nicene period, Christian theologians of the classical Patristic and early Medieval period succeeded in giving clear

³⁰*Idem*. De anima. 10.

³¹See: *Iren.* Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; I.7.3; I.24.1, 4; I.25.1; I.26.1; II.19.7; *Tert.* Adv. Valent. 24–29; *Clem. Alex.* Exc. ex Theod. III.50.2–3.

³²See: *Iren.* Adv. Haer. I.5.5–6; *Tert.* Adv. Valent. 24–25.

³³See: *Iren.* Adv. Haer. I.24.1.

³⁴See: *Clem. Alex.* Strom. II.20.113–114; cp. *Orig.* De princ. III.4.1–2.

and definite solutions to the question concerning the structure of human nature and relationship between soul and spirit.

First of all we see that all authoritative Church theologians in their dogmatic statements strictly upheld the dichotomy and unanimously taught that human beings consist of two different parts, principles or substances—of soul and body. In so doing they recognized in man only one spiritual principle and did not regard soul and spirit as two independent spiritual principles or substances.³⁵ Indeed, according to the definition of *St. Gregory of Nyssa*, “he who consists of intelligent soul and body (*ek psychēs noeras kai sōmatos*) is called man.”³⁶ *St. Gregory* calls these two parts following *St. Paul* “the outer and the inner man,”³⁷ or following the apostle *Peter* “the visible and the hidden man.”³⁸ *St. Augustine of Hippo* expresses a similar opinion: “Man is not a body alone, nor a soul alone, but a being composed of both. It is indeed true, that the soul is not the whole man, but the better part of man; the body not the whole, but the inferior part of man; and that then, when both are joined, they receive the name of man.”³⁹ Similarly *John the Grammarian*, presbyter of Caesarea, writes: “Everything that is equally observed in many and does not exist more in one and less in the other, is called essence. As every individual man is indifferently flesh animated by the rational soul, and this is humanity, accordingly we call humanity one essence although it is a sign of the two essences.”⁴⁰

At the same time it is important to notice that this dichotomy was not simply a product of abstract theoretical conclusions, but from the very

³⁵In the Eastern Church this opinion was maintained by *St. Athanasius the Great* (*Contra Gentes* 3, 30, 32–33; *De incarn.* 17.3; *Tomus ad Antioch.* 7); *St. Basil the Great* (*Hom.* 3.7 // *S.Y. Rudberg*, 1962. P. 35.17–18; *Hom. Ps.* 32 // *PG.* 29. Col. 337D); *St. Gregory of Nazianzus* (*Or.* 40.8; *Ep.* 101.19; *Carm. moral.* 10.111–114 // *PG.* 37. Col. 688A); *St. Gregory of Nyssa* (*Or. Cat.* 6.34–42; 37.1–2; *De op. hom.* 29; *Adv. Apoll.* // *GNO.* III.1. P. 133.25–30; 185.15–21; *De or. Dom.* IV // *Oehler.* S. 274.25–276.6; *De an. et res.* // *PG.* 46. Col. 69D–72A); *St. Cyril of Jerusalem* (*Cyr. Hier. Catech.* 3.4; 4.18); *St. John Chrysostom* (*In Gen. Hom.* 13.2; 21.6); *St. Cyril of Alexandria* (*Com. in Joann.* II.1 // *Vol.* 1. P. 219; *Com. in Malach.* II // *Vol.* 2. P. 596; *De incarn. Unigen.* // P. 679); *St. Theodore of Cyrus* (*Quaest. in Gen.* 23; *Haer. fab. comp.* V.9; *Eranist.* // P. 112–113); *St. Leontius of Byzantium* (*Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos I* // *PG.* T. 86. Col. 1281AB, 1296C); *St. Maximus the Confessor* (*Amb.* 2 (7) // *PG.* 91. Col. 1092B; *Amb.* 35 // Col. 1153A; *Quaest. ad Thal.* 33.26; 43.33–34; *Mystag.* 5.1–2); *St. John of Damascus* (*Exp. fidei* II.12 (26); IV.9 (82); *Contr. Jacob.* 56.1–2; *De nat. composit.* 7.6–8); *St. Photius of Constantinople* (*Amphil.* Qu. 73 // *PG.* 101. Col. 453A; Qu. 230 // Col. 1292A; *Com. in Matth.* Fr. 25) etc.; in the Western Church by *St. Hilary of Poitiers* (*Tr. in Ps.* 129.4–6; *De Trinit.* X.19; X.57); *St. Ambrose of Milan* (*De Abraham* I.4.29; *Expositio Euang. sec. Lucam* II.79; *De inst. virg.* III.17); *St. Jerome* (*Com. in Zachar.* 12.1; *Tract. in psalm.* 127 // *PL.* 26. Col. 1291C; *Dial. contr. Pelag.* III.11); *St. Augustine* (*De beata vita* 2; *De quant. anim.* 1.2; *De divers. quaest.* 7; *Confess.* X.6.9; *De Genesi ad litt.* VI.11); *St. John Cassian* (*Cassian. Coll.* 4.10); *St. Vincent of Lérins* (*Commonit.* 13); *Gennadius of Marseille* (*De eccl. dogm.* 14–16); *St. Gregory the Great* (*Moralia* XVIII.18; XXXV.16); *St. Isidore of Seville* (*De differen. rer.* 46); *St. Bede the Venerable* (*In Lucae Euang. Exp.* IV.12) etc.

³⁶*Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll.* // *GNO.* III.1. P. 133.25–30; cp. *Ibid.* P. 185.9–26; *Or. Cat.*, 6.34–42; *De or. Dom.*, IV // *Oehler.* S. 274.25–276.6; *De an. et res.* // *PG.* 46. Col. 69D–72A.

³⁷*Idem. Adv. Apoll.* // *GNO.* III.1. P. 185.15–21.

³⁸*Idem. De op. hom.* 29; *De an. et res.* // *PG.* 46. Col. 72D.

³⁹*August. De civitate Dei* XIII.24; cf. *Ep.* 238.2 etc.

⁴⁰*Joann. Gramm. Apol. concil. Chalced.* 1.

beginning was closely connected with Christian soteriology and asceticism. In fact, *St. Gregory the Theologian* in his famous sermon on holy Baptism says, "Since we are double-made, I mean [we consist] of body and soul, and of the visible and invisible natures, so the cleansing [in the baptism] also is twofold, by water and the Spirit; the one received visibly in the body, the other concurring with it invisibly and apart from the body; the one typical, the other real and cleansing the depths."⁴¹ *St. John Chrysostom*, commenting on the story from the book of Genesis concerning the creation of man, says: "Tell me whether we do not consist of two substances (*apo dyo ousiōn*), that is, of soul and body? Why then do we take unequal care of the former and the latter, trying in every possible way to please the body . . . while neglecting care of the soul?"⁴²

The dichotomy is even more evident in the Christological doctrine of the Church produced during the long Christological disputes of the V–VII centuries. Indeed, when they are talking about the completeness of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the incarnated God the Word, practically all orthodox polemicists of that age agree that He consists of "flesh, animated by both a rational and an intelligent soul" (*sarx epsychōmenē psychē logikē kai noera*), namely a soul possessing reason (*logos*) and intellect (*nous*).⁴³ For instance, the outstanding Byzantine philosopher and theologian *St. Maximus the Confessor* says that God the Word "by Himself became man, that is, took flesh possessing both an intelligent and rational soul."⁴⁴ Another famous Byzantine theologian, *St. John of Damascus*, in his treatise *An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, which is considered a summa of orthodox patristic theology and which became a prototype of the well-known medieval *Libri Sententiarum*, writes as follows:

God the Word omitted none of the things which He implanted in our nature when He formed us in the beginning, but took them all upon Himself, body and soul both intelligent and rational, and all their properties. For the creature that is devoid of one of these [properties] is not man. But God the Word in His fullness took upon Himself [man] in his fullness, and was united whole to whole that He might in His grace bestow salvation on the whole man. For what has not been assumed cannot be healed.⁴⁵

In the no less authoritative doctrinal treatise, *Doctrine of the Fathers on the Incarnation of the Word*, written in the seventh century by an anonymous

⁴¹*Greg. Naz. Or.* 40.8. Cp. *Cyril. Hier. Catech. ad illum.* 3.4; *Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* II.11 (25); IV.9 (82).

⁴²*Joann. Chrysost.* In Gen. Hom. 21.6.

⁴³*Didym. Caec. Fragm.* in Ps. Fr. 215; *Cyr. Alex. Ep. ad Nestor.* // ACO Vol. I.1.1. P. 26; *De sancta Trinit.* // PG. 77. Col. 1141; *Justinian. Edict. rectae fidei* // P. 132, 144, 148; *Joann. Gramm. Apol. concil. Chalced.* 1; *Cap. contr. monophys.* 1; *Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thal.* 20, 42, 63; *Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* III.6 (50); *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*, 9; *Contr. Jacob.* 68; *Or. de imag.* I.1.16; *Doctrina Patrum* // P. 70–71.

⁴⁴*Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thal.* 20.

⁴⁵*Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* III.6 (50). See also: *De duabus in Christo volunt.*, 9; *Contr. Jacob.* 68; *Or. de imag.* I.1.16 etc.

author (presumably by St. Anastasius the Sinaite), we similarly read: "Christ has taken not a part of human essence, such as only flesh without rational soul, as Apollinaris says, but the entire human essence, that is, flesh animated by both rational and intelligent soul. For only this essence, which perfectly belongs to every individual man, should be rightly called [human] essence."⁴⁶

Thus we can see that Christian theologians of the classical Patristic period strictly upheld the dichotomy, believing that human nature consists of two principles, soul and body, and not of three or more principles. But how did they understand human spirit, which is frequently mentioned in the Bible and in the writings of previous theologians? And what in that case did they think about the unity of the spiritual principle of man?

In resolving these problems and defining the spirit in human nature, Christian theologians quite often pointed out that in the Bible the term 'spirit' has many different meanings. Indeed spirit in connection with human beings is frequently considered a synonym of soul and identified with it.⁴⁷ For instance, *St. Cyril of Jerusalem* in his famous *Catechetical Homilies* remarks that "the name of spirit is given to different things . . . For many things are called spirits. Thus an angel is called a spirit, our soul is called a spirit, and this wind which is blowing is called a spirit; great virtue also is spoken of as spirit; and impure practice is called spirit; and the devil our adversary is called spirit. Beware therefore when you hear these things, lest from their having a common name you mistake one for another. For concerning our soul the Scripture says: *His spirit shall go forth, and he shall return to his earth* (Ps 145:4); and of the same soul it says again: *Who formed the spirit of man within him* (Zec 12:1)."⁴⁸ The same point is made by St. Augustine in his *Commentaries on the book of Genesis*,⁴⁹ by St. Anastasius the Sinaite in his "Hodegos" ("Guidebook"),⁵⁰ and by St. John of Damascus in his *Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*.⁵¹ *Gennadius of Marseille* in his treatise "On the Doctrines of the Church," reiterating Tertullian's opinion quoted above, writes: "Spirit is not something third in the substance of man, as asserts Didymus, but it is the soul [so named] because of its spiritual nature (*pro*

⁴⁶Doctrina Patrum // P. 70–71.

⁴⁷See: *Cyr. Hier. Catech.* 16.13; *Greg. Naz. Or.* 2.17; 38.11; 45.7; *Serap. Thmuit.* Eucholog. 30.2; *Didym. De Trin.* 2.20 // PG. 39. Col. 736A; *Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl.* 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 492A; *Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux*, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; *De definit.* I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D; *Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* I.13; II.12 (26); *Hilar. Pictav. Tr. in Ps.* 129.4; *Hieronym. Com. in Zachar.* 12.1; *Com. in Euang. Matth.* IV.27.54; *August. De Genesi ad litt.* VII.28; XII.7; *De natura et orig. anim.* II.2.2; *Cassian. Coll.* 7.13; *Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm.* 20; *Isidor. Hispal. Etymol.* XI.1.13; *Alcuin. De ratione anim.* 10 etc.

⁴⁸*Cyr. Hier. Catech.* 16.13.

⁴⁹*August. De Gen. ad litt.* XII.7.

⁵⁰*Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux*, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; *De definit.* I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D.

⁵¹*Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux*, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B; *De definit.* I.6 // PG. 28. Col. 536D; *Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* I.13.

spiritali natura), or it is named spirit because it performs respiration in the body (*spiret in corpore*)."⁵²

Christian ascetics also confirm this statement concerning the identity of soul and spirit. For instance, *St. John Cassian* observes: "For even if spirit is mingled with this crass and solid matter, namely flesh (as very easily happens), should we therefore believe that it can be united with soul, which is in like manner spirit, in such a way as to make it also receptive in the same way of its own nature: a thing which is possible to the [Holy] Trinity alone?"⁵³ Some authoritative theologians, such as *St. John Chrysostom* and *St. Cyril of Alexandria*⁵⁴ also identify soul and spirit in commenting on the passage of the apostle Paul's Epistle to Hebrews where a distinction is found between them (Heb 4:12). Instead of the original reading, (*the word of God*) is penetrating even to the division of soul and spirit, they sometimes read (*the word of God*) is penetrating even to the division of soul and body, which better corresponds to the universally accepted dichotomy. Those who quoted these words of the apostle Paul in their original form often understood them in the sense of the various conditions, actions, or parts of the human soul. For instance, *St. Maximus the Confessor* explains the words of the apostle Paul as follows: "Passing through all things, the powerful and living Word [of God] also penetrates the division of soul and spirit, that is, distinguishes which of [men's] acts or thoughts are psychical (*psychika*), namely natural kinds or movements of virtue, and which are spiritual (*pneumatika*), namely supernatural kinds proper only for God, but given to [human] nature by [Divine] grace."⁵⁵ *St. Cyril of Alexandria* also remarks that the apostle's words can be understood in this way: "The word of God distinguishes and divides parts of the soul (*ta tēs psychēs merē*), making it able to comprehend and to understand what it hears."⁵⁶

Another opinion also widespread among Christian theologians was the identification of spirit with the highest part of the human soul, namely the mind or intellect (*nous, mens, intellectus*).⁵⁷ Indeed, *St. John of Damascus*

⁵²*Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm.* 20.

⁵³*Cassian. Coll.* 7.13.

⁵⁴See: *Joann. Chrysost. Ad Stagirium* I.9; *Cyr. Alex. De St. Trinit.* I // *SChR.* N 231. P. 398.

⁵⁵*Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thal.* 56.122–128; cf.: *Theodoret. Interp.* in Ep. s. Pauli ad Hebr. 4.12–13 // *PG.* 82. Col. 705; *Cyr. Alex. Com.* in *Joann.* // *Vol.* 2. P. 554.

⁵⁶*Cyr. Alex. In s. Pauli Ep. ad Hebr.* // *Pusey.* 1872. P. 405.

⁵⁷See: *Athanas. Magn. Contra Gentes* 30; *Basil. Magn. Hom.* 21 // *PG.* 31. Col. 549A; *Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll.* // *GNO.* III.1. P. 172.23–30; P. 185.9–26; *In Cant.* II // *GNO.* VI. P. 45.1–2; VII // *GNO.* VI. P. 242.8–9; *V. Moys.* II.215; *De op. hom.* 12; *De virg.* V.1.30–31; *Olymp. Alex. Com.* in *Eccl.* 4.12 // *PG.* 93. Col. 532C; *Anastas. Sinait. Serm.* in *constit. hom.* 1.3 // *PG.* 44. Col. 1333BC; *Viae dux*, II.2.2 // *PG.* 89. Col. 56B; *Maximus. Confess. Amb.* 10/2 // *PG.* 91. Col. 1112B; 10/3 // *Col.* 1116A; 15 // *Col.* 1220A; 21 // *Col.* 1248B; *Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei* I.13; *August. De Gen. ad litt.* XII 7; *De Trinit.* XIV 16; *De fide et symb.* 10; *Ep.* 238.2. Despite such unanimous consent of the authoritative Christian theologians, there were some objections to the identification of human mind and spirit. Thus *St. Epiphanius of Cyprus* raised objections in his treatise "Anchoratus" (*Epiph. Ancor.* 77.3). Yet his intention was not so much to establish a distinction between mind and spirit as to show that both human mind and spirit are not independent hypostases, being inseparable from human soul. So if Christ took upon Himself

listing various meanings of the word 'spirit' in the Bible says, "Sometimes the mind is also called spirit."⁵⁸ St. Augustine in his Commentaries on the book of Genesis explains this opinion in detail:

Rational mind itself (*ipsa mens rationalis*) is called spirit (*spiritus*), which has a kind of eye of the soul (*oculus animae*), possessing an image of God and knowledge of God. Therefore the apostle says: *be renewed in the spirit of your mind (spiritu mentis vestrae)*, and *put on the new man, which is created according to God* (Eph 4:23–24). And in the other place he speaks about the inner man: *Which is renewed in knowledge according to the image of Him Who created him* (Col 3:10). And again after he has said: *So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh — the law of sin* (Rom 7:25), in the other passage he also remembers this statement: *Flesh lusts against the spirit (spiritum), and the spirit against the flesh . . . so that you cannot do the things that you would* (Gal 5:17). What in the first case he has called mind (*mentem*), in the second case he has called also spirit (*spiritum*).⁵⁹

It should be noted, however, that Augustine also adds another possible meaning in his treatise *On the Trinity*: "And we speak also of a spirit in man distinct from the mind, to which spirit belong the images that are formed after the likeness of bodies"⁶⁰; and in another passage he explains: "Spirit also is a certain faculty of the soul, which is lower than the mind (*vis animae quaedam mente inferior*), where the similitudes of corporal things are impressed."⁶¹ The identity of spirit and intellect is again found in St. Gregory of Nyssa, who remarks that "in Holy Scripture the governing principle [of man] (*to hēgemonikon*) is called by three [names], intellect, or spirit, or heart, [for it says]: *Create in me a clean heart, O God* (Ps 50:12); and *a man with intellect shall attain unto government* (Prov 1:5; LXX); and *Nobody knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him* (1 Cor 2:11)."⁶² St. Gregory draws upon Aristotle's division of the soul into three parts⁶³ to reconcile the dichotomy of body and soul with the trichotomy of the apostle Paul, explaining that the apostle "called the nutritive part [of the soul] the body, the sensitive part the soul, and the rational part the spirit."⁶⁴ Finally St. Anastasius the Sinaite in his "Sermon concerning the Creation of Man according to the Image and Similitude of God" makes the following analogy between the structure of the inner man and the Holy Trinity: just as in the Holy Trinity there is unbegotten and causeless God the Father, and the Word (*Logos*) begotten from Him, and the Spirit (*Pneuma*) proceeding from Him, so in us "there is our soul (*psychē*) and its intelligent word

a human soul, He also took a human mind, which was denied by the heresiarch Apollinaris of Laodicea (*ibid.*).

⁵⁸Joann. Damasc. Exp. fidei I.13. Cp. Anastas. Sinait. Viae dux, II.2.2 // PG. 89. Col. 56B.

⁵⁹August. De Gen. ad litt. XII 7; cf. De Trinit. XIV 16.

⁶⁰Idem. De Trinit. XIV 16.

⁶¹Idem. De Gen. ad litt. XII 9; cf. Ps.-August. De spiritu et anima 10 // PL. T. 40. Col. 785.

⁶²Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 172.24–28.

⁶³Idem. De op. hom. 8; 14; De an. et res. // PG. 46. Col. 53B; 60BC; 128A etc.

⁶⁴Idem. De op. hom. 8.

(*noeros logos*) and its mind (*nous*), which the apostle called 'spirit,' when he ordered us to be holy in soul, body, and spirit.⁶⁵ For the soul is unbegotten and causeless according to the image of the causeless God the Father; and its intelligent word is not unbegotten but ineffably, invisibly, inexplicably, and passionlessly begotten from it; and the mind is neither causeless, nor unbegotten, but proceeding, and everywhere penetrating, and observing and invisibly touching all according to the image and similitude of the most Holy and proceeding Spirit [of God]."⁶⁶

Nonetheless, there was one passage in which the Church Fathers found at least an apparent distinction between the spirit and the mind, the words of the apostle Paul: *I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the mind: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the mind* (1 Co 14:15). St. Maximus the Confessor understands these words as follows: "Someone sings with the spirit when he utters by tongue the words of singing, and sings with the mind when he understands the power of those words which are sung."⁶⁷ St. John Chrysostom explains them somewhat differently: "Wherefore [the apostle Paul] also said, 'If I pray with the tongue, only my spirit prays,' namely the [Divine] gift which is given me (*to charisma to dothen moi*) and which moves my tongue; 'but my mind is unfruitful.'"⁶⁸

It was in accordance with the latter opinion that many authoritative Christian theologians also developed the view, already pointed out in the apologists and St. Irenaeus of Lyons, that "spirit" sometimes can mean a certain supernatural condition of the human soul, when it aspires completely toward God and is filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit.⁶⁹ Besides the words of St. John Chrysostom quoted above, we find this opinion in the writings of the famous ascetic teacher *St. Macarius of Egypt*, who says in his *Spiritual Homilies*: "The soul perfectly enlightened by the ineffable beauty of the glory of the light of the Face of Christ and perfectly communicated with the Holy Spirit and honored to become a dwelling and a throne of God, itself becomes wholly eye, and wholly light, and wholly face, and wholly glory, and wholly becomes spirit."⁷⁰ We also find an exact doctrinal definition of this opinion in the treatise of Gennadius of Marseille, "On the doctrines of the Church": "Spirit, which is mentioned by the apostle as the third alongside soul and body, is grace of the Holy Spirit (*gratia Spiritus Sancti*)."⁷¹

⁶⁵Cf. 1 Co 7:34. The original words are: *in body and in spirit*.

⁶⁶Anastas. *Sinait*. Sermon in constit. hom. 1.3 // PG. 44. Col. 1333BC. Cf. *Greg. Nyss. Or. Cat.* 1-2.

⁶⁷Maximus. *Confess. Quaest. et dub.* 1.2.

⁶⁸Joann. Chrysost. In Ep. I ad Cor. Hom. 35.4.

⁶⁹See: *Macar. Aegypt.* Hom. 1.2 // PG. 34. Col. 452B; *Gennad. Massil.* De eccl. dogm. 20; *Olymp. Alex. Com.* in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; *Maximus. Confess. Quaest. ad Thal.* 56.122-128 etc.

⁷⁰See: *Macar. Aegypt.* Hom. 1.2 (Coll. H) // PG. 34. Col. 452B.

⁷¹*Gennad. Massil.* De eccl. dogm. 20.

Nonetheless, only a few among Christian theologians of the classical Patristic period distinguished between soul and spirit as between two independent principles or substances. Among them are heresiarch *Apolinarius of Laodicea* and the Origenist *Didymus the Blind*, who taught that man consists of three different substances: body, animal soul, and rational soul or spirit.⁷² Their contemporary, the Latin Christian philosopher and theologian *Marius Victorinus*, supposed that man has two souls: one is “divine,” possessing the intellect (*anima diviniore cum suo nōi*), and the other is material, possessing sensible and vital forces (*potentia sensibilis*); like Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus believed that each of these souls has its own origin.⁷³ The Manicheans maintained an opinion similar to that of the Gnostics, namely that there are two kinds of the human souls—good and evil.⁷⁴ Refuting some of these views, St. Theodoret of Cyrus wrote: “Apolinarius of Laodicea says that man consists of three [parts]: body, animal soul, and rational soul, which he calls mind. But the Divine Scriptures recognize only one and not two souls, as they clearly teach [in the history] of the creation of the first man.”⁷⁵ A similar objection we can find in the treatise of Gennadius of Marseille mentioned above: “We do not say that there are two souls in man, as Jacob and other Syrian disputants write, one psychical (*animalis*) which animates the body and is mixed with blood, and the other spiritual (*spiritalis*) governing the reason. But we say there is one and the same soul in man, which vivifies the body by union with it and disposes itself by its reason, having in itself free will to select by reasoning what it wants.”⁷⁶ Finally we can find a complete definition of the Church theologians’ opinion concerning the relationship between soul and spirit in the writings of Olympiodorus, a lesser-known Alexandrian exegete who lived at the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh century. He writes:

It is said, that man consists of three [parts]—soul, body, and spirit—nevertheless the spirit is not something other by its substance than the soul; for there are not in man two rational principles, but we say that the spirit differs from the soul only in conception (*kat’ epinoian*), and we call spirit the easily-movable and highest [part] of the soul. And I think it is the mind (*nous*). Or the spirit is a spiritual grace (*pneumatikon charisma*), enlightening and illuminating our souls.⁷⁷

The question of the unity of the soul also became a subject of special discussion at the Fourth Constantinopolitan Council of 869/870 A.D. (also known as the Eighth Ecumenical Council). Its eleventh canon defines:

⁷²See: Greg. Nyss. Adv. Apoll. // GNO. III.1. P. 185.10–12; Theodoret. Eranist. // P. 112; Didym. De Sp. St. 54, 55, 59; De Trin. 1.9; 1.15; 3.31; Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 20.

⁷³Mar. Vict. Adv. Ar., I.62. 11–14; 26–37.

⁷⁴See: August. De duab. anim. adv. Manich. 1.1; 13.19 etc.; cf. Nemes. De nat. hom. 2.

⁷⁵Theodoret. Eranist. // Ed. G.H. Ettlinger. Oxford, 1975. P. 112–113.

⁷⁶Gennad. Massil. De eccl. dogm. 15.

⁷⁷Olymp. Alex. Com. in Eccl. 4.12 // PG. 93. Col. 532C; cf. Com. in Job 12.9–10.

"Though the Old and New Testament teach that man possesses one both rational and intelligent soul (*unam animam rationabilem et intelligentem*), and all divinely inspired Fathers and Teachers of the Church confirm the same doctrine, some people thinking out pernicious fables have reached such a degree of impiety that they shamelessly teach that man has two souls."⁷⁸

V

In conclusion, let us summarize the basic principles of the doctrine concerning the structure of human nature and the relationship between soul and spirit which was developed by Greek and Latin patristic theologians.

Firstly, the basis of this doctrine is biblical anthropology and its particular manner of describing the human being as a body (flesh), or a soul, or a union of body and soul, or a union of body, soul, and spirit. At the same time this biblical doctrine in patristic thought was completed and developed by means of philosophical methods and concepts already worked out in Greek philosophy.

Secondly, it was clearly defined that man consists only of two different principles or substances: soul and body. In this connection the prevailing theory was dichotomy (as in Plato and Aristotle), in spite of some trichotomic expressions.

Thirdly, there is in man only one spiritual and rational principle, namely soul possessing many parts or faculties; thus spirit differs from the soul only in conception, and not in fact.

Fourthly, as a result of the comparative analysis of a considerable number of sources it was established, that the term 'spirit' applied to human nature has at least four different meanings:

- (1) *first*, the soul itself, called spirit because of its spiritual nature or because of its function of breathing;
- (2) *second*, the lower part of the soul, in which the similitudes of corporal things are impressed (namely, the faculty of imagination or imprinting);
- (3) *third*, the highest rational part of the soul, namely mind (intellect) or heart (rarely);
- (4) *fourth*, the Holy Spirit or His grace which may be acquired by the holy soul.

All these meanings, used by Christian theologians, have their parallels in Greek philosophy.

Fifthly, thus dichotomy does not contradict trichotomy, but as a rule the latter is included in the former or is a particular case of it.

Sixthly, the tripartite structure of the spiritual part of man, including (1) soul, (2) intellect (spirit) and (3) word (*logos*), is considered an image of the three Hypostases of the Holy Trinity.

⁷⁸Mansi. T. 16. Col. 166; Enchiridion symbolorum. N 637.

Seventhly, any introduction alongside the soul of more spiritual principles in man, as was done by the Gnostics, Manicheans, and some particular theologians, such as Apollinaris, Didymus, and Marius Victorinus, is considered non-Christian and false.

These basic principles of Christian anthropology were subsequently adopted by medieval Scholastic and Byzantine philosophy and in some degree by modern philosophy as well—but that subject goes beyond the scope of the present paper.

Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of the Sciences