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ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINATION AND THE GROUNDING OBJECTION TO COUNTERFACTUALS OF FREEDOM

Theodore Guleserian

Alvin Plantinga's reply to *the grounding objection* to propositions now called counterfactuals of freedom, originally made by Robert Adams, can be interpreted as follows: if, for the sake of argument, we require counterfactuals of freedom to be grounded in something that makes them true, we can simply (and trivially) say that there are corresponding counterfactual *facts* that ground them. I argue that such facts, together with the facts about the situations in which moral agents find themselves, would *ontologically determine* that the agents perform their acts, rendering these acts unfree. Thus, I maintain that, contrary to Plantinga's intent, allowing the grounding facts into the divine creation situation entails the falsity of Molinism. If there is no other way that God can know what free creatures would do than through counterfactuals of freedom, divine foreknowledge of human acts is inconsistent with human freedom and moral responsibility.

I

According to Alvin Plantinga's well known conception¹ of what have since come to be called the "counterfactuals of freedom," God, by knowing these subjunctive conditional propositions about his creatures (or creature essences), the truth values of which are not within his will to determine, is able to know what any free creature would do in any situation. This view has also come to be known as Molinism, named after its originator, the sixteenth century Jesuit priest Luis de Molina. On Plantinga's view, these propositions are expressed by sentences of the form

- (1) If x were in situation S , then x would do act A

where situation S includes the condition that agent x is free with respect to doing A and free with respect to refraining from doing A . Here, act A is to be thought of as an act-particular, not an act type. The grounding objection, famously voiced by Robert Adams especially in "Plantinga and the Problem of Evil,"² can perhaps be most simply stated as follows: *counterfactuals of freedom are not true because there is nothing to make them true*. As I shall indicate in the quotation below, Plantinga questions the need for these propositions to be grounded in anything, but he suggests that if a ground is needed it would be a kind of counterfactual *fact*. I intend to argue that these facts, together with the agents' situations, would *ontologically determine* that



the agents perform these acts, and hence that the acts of the created agents which are assumed to be free are not free.

II

In his "Replies"³ Alvin Plantinga considers two objections of Robert Adams to the view that there are true counterfactuals of freedom, the first of which has come to be known as *the grounding objection*. I suggest that, where situation S includes the condition that agent x is free with respect to doing act A, the species of statements of the form

- (1) if x were in situation S, then x would do act A

should properly be called *the subjunctive conditionals of freedom*. The variety of subjunctive conditionals wherein the antecedent is contingently false can then be deemed to be *the (genuine) counterfactuals of freedom*. Even among those who are willing to assume that some agents are free in the Libertarian sense, it is a matter of dispute that there are at least some true subjunctive conditionals of freedom. Robert Adams seems to hold that all such conditionals of freedom are false,⁴ as does William Hasker.⁵ Hasker also calls into question David Lewis's axiom that for any two true propositions *p* and *q*, it is true that if *p* were true then *q* would be true.⁶ I think that Hasker is right to question this axiom in all its generality. However, one can reject the general principle but recognize certain types of true instances of it. I want to allow the epistemic possibility that there are some true subjunctive conditionals of freedom. If George is in situation S in which he is free to attack Yorktown at time *t*, and George *does* attack Yorktown at *t*, it surely *seems* to be true that if George were in situation S, he would attack Yorktown at *t*. His being in S, together with his act of attacking Yorktown at *t*, *make it true* that if George were in S he would attack Yorktown at *t*.⁷ I can think of no counterexamples to the principle that any subjunctive conditional of freedom (as specified above) that has true antecedent and true consequent is true. The consequent of such a proposition has a built-in relevance to its antecedent due to the metaphysical connection between the act-particular mentioned in the consequent and the freedom to do the act assumed in the antecedent. This relevance filters out the counterexamples to Lewis's axiom.⁸ So, in my judgment, the grounding objection is best deemed to be an objection to the truth of the *genuine* counterfactuals of freedom, where the relevant situation does not obtain and in which in many cases the relevant act never takes place. The objection can be simply restated as follows: genuine counterfactuals of freedom are not true because there is nothing that makes them true.⁹

Plantinga's response to the grounding objection is first to express doubts about the thesis that "if a proposition is true, then something *grounds* its truth, . . . or *makes* it true."¹⁰ The doubt he raises is one as to whether *every* true proposition is grounded in something that makes it true. It is his second response that I want to examine. In it, he is willing to assume, if only for the sake of argument, that there is something that grounds statements of the form

- (2) Yesterday I freely performed some action A

and something that grounds genuine counterfactuals, such as:

- (3) If Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it.¹¹

He states:

But suppose we concede, for purposes of argument, that propositions must be thus grounded. . . . Suppose, then, that yesterday I freely performed some action A. . . . So what grounds the truth of the proposition in question? Perhaps you will say that what grounds its truth is just that in fact I did A. But this isn't much of an answer; and at any rate the same kind of answer is available in the case of Curley. For what grounds the truth of the counterfactual, we may say, is just that in fact Curley is such that if he had been offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would have freely taken it.¹²

What I want to do here is to take this second response seriously, and *not* just "for purposes of argument." I believe that if any counterfactuals are true, there must be something that makes them true. I take David Armstrong's general position that truth requires a truthmaker to be overwhelmingly plausible.¹³ I intend to flesh out Plantinga's response ontologically, and then to argue that adding this body of ontological assumptions to Plantinga's existing ontological framework has as a consequence that either agents are not truly free and morally responsible or no genuine counterfactuals of freedom are true. On either alternative, Molinism is false.

We want to know, What could be the ground, the truthmaker, of a genuine counterfactual of freedom? Two ontological expressions come to mind which could be used in an answer: 'state of affairs' and 'fact.' What is the difference between a state of affairs and a fact? On some uses of these terms, nothing. But on others, there are important differences. On one conception of states of affairs, they are wholly abstract entities that exist necessarily, none of which have contingently existing concrete objects as constituents. Within this conception there are two species. (i) States of affairs are structured entities that have only abstract entities as constituents. The state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed contains no individuals, only properties and perhaps a relation; an essence of Socrates rather than Socrates himself is the subject constituent. Alternatively within this view, states of affairs are structured entities that have only abstract entities and *possible* concrete individuals as constituents. In the latter case, the merely possible concrete individuals are necessary existents, just as are the abstract constituents. The state of affairs that Socrates is snub-nosed has the possible individual Socrates as a subject constituent. If the state of affairs *obtains* (*is actual*), then Socrates is actual. (ii) States of affairs are utterly simple entities like sets. Like sets, they have no constituents but have relations to the various entities they are "about." Unlike some sets, they all exist necessarily, and are not dependent on the entities that they are "about." Under either of these views, truthmakers could be conceived of, i.e., not identified with but at least defined in terms of, states of affairs *provided that states of affairs are distinct from propositions, distinct from the propositions that they make true*. The proposition that Socrates is snub-nosed cannot make itself true. If the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed, or more accurately the

obtaining (or *being actual*) of that state of affairs, makes the proposition that Socrates is snub-nosed true, the obtaining (or actual) state of affairs (i.e., the truthmaker) must be distinct from the proposition made true.

In Plantinga's ontology, states of affairs, even *actual* states of affairs, are purely *abstract* entities, just as propositions are. Both states of affairs and propositions exist necessarily, both exist in every possible world. In fact, there is (intentionally) no clear distinction made in his system between propositions and states of affairs.¹⁴ In his framework, no state of affairs or proposition has a contingently existing concrete individual as a constituent. Since in Plantinga's system there are no merely possible individuals, Socrates cannot be a constituent of the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed, which exists in every world, including worlds in which Socrates does not. Plantinga does not commit himself to an answer to the question of whether there is a distinction between states of affairs and propositions, perhaps because for his purposes he does not need to. So we don't know whether in Plantinga's framework actual states of affairs could be construed to be truthmakers of propositions, including such propositions as counterfactuals of freedom. Still, it is clear that in his framework the proposition

(4) That Socrates is snub-nosed

and the state of affairs of

(5) Socrates being snub-nosed

are both such that *if* they are structured entities that have constituents, all of those constituents are abstract entities, such as essences and other properties and relations.

The other ontological type of entity that could serve as a truthmaker is a fact. The difference between a state of affairs (as conceived above) and a fact is that a fact cannot exist independently of whatever it is "about." The fact that Socrates is snub-nosed cannot *exist* independently of Socrates, whereas the state of affairs of Socrates being snub-nosed *does exist* independently of (the actual individual) Socrates but *does not obtain* (*does not have actuality*) independently of the existence of (the actual) Socrates. With facts, there is no distinction between existing and obtaining (being actual). Under this conception of facts, there are two species that mirror the two species of views regarding states of affairs, namely, (i) facts are structured entities, and (ii) facts are simple entities that nevertheless have an ontological dependency on whatever they are "about," just as sets have on their members. (There are yet other views, ones that consign the role of individuals to "aspects" of facts or else ultimately eliminate individuals or reduce all discourse about individuals to discourse about facts. We can consider such facts to be simples or safely just ignore these as they will not affect the principal arguments.) On the structured view, Socrates is literally a constituent of the fact that Socrates is snub-nosed, as is the property of being snub-nosed.

Of these four alternative possible conceptions of truthmakers, I take the conception of facts as structured entities to be the most philosophically satisfactory view as to the nature of what makes propositions such as (2), (3), and (4) true. So, in exploring Plantinga's second response, in which he is willing to assume—if only for the sake of argument—that counterfactuals

of freedom like (3) are grounded, I will adopt a sketch of a theory of facts as structured entities. We need to adopt a specific conception of truthmakers to explore Plantinga's for-the-sake-of-argument response. But my conclusion will not in the end depend on which of the four views of truthmakers outlined above one adopts. The conclusion is not affected by the *nature* of the truthmaker. Analogous arguments will go through on any one of the four conceptions of a truthmaker, or indeed on any conception of truthmakers that I know of.

Now, in taking Plantinga's second response seriously, I am adding *facts* to his existing ontology, to provide what I believe can be the most philosophically satisfactory truthmakers of propositions like (4) and of propositions expressed by (2) and (3). But I am taking first order singular facts, such as the one depicted by proposition (4), to have concrete particulars, such as Socrates himself, as constituents. What makes the fact that Socrates is snub-nosed such a good truthmaker for proposition (4) is that *it is a piece of reality involving a real concrete object*. I take the *real world* to be, as the early Wittgenstein says, a totality of facts. We can continue to speak of the *possible* worlds, including the *actual* world, as maximally consistent states of affairs (or better, propositions) and hence as *abstract* entities. But unlike merely possible states of affairs, there are, on my view, no merely possible facts. A fact either exists or it doesn't. Now, I'm not going to attempt to give an entire theory of facts or anything close to it. I won't assume that there are general facts, or negative facts, or disjunctive facts, or even conditional facts. Nor will I assume that there are none. I will assume that there are singular facts, facts that are contingent and facts that are necessary, facts that attribute a property to a single (concrete or abstract) entity, and facts that attribute a relation to two or more entities. I will assume that there is such a thing as an aggregate or sum or conjunction of facts. And I will assume that logical constants, quantifiers, and operators can enter into expressions that designate properties. So, I allow that there are conjunctive properties, conditional properties, and even subjunctive conditional properties, such as the property that *x* has such that if *x* were offered a \$35,000 bribe, *x* would take it.

So first order singular facts make first order singular propositions true. The truth does not make the facts exist, rather the facts make the truth exist. The truthmaker relation can be conceived to be a relation between a fact and a proposition: the fact makes the proposition true. But there is a fundamental relation involved here that can be used to partially specify the truthmaker relation, namely, *ontological determination*. We can say that fact *F* is a truthmaker of proposition *p* only if *F* ontologically determines the fact that *p* is true. I think of the relation of ontological determination as being irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Like others, I take ontological determination to be best understood through some form of *entailment*. Some restrict the form of entailment to a relevance relation, such as captured in the Anderson-Belnap system *E* of entailment.¹⁵ I think that it may be necessary to accept ontological determination as a primitive, and give axioms for it as one would for any primitive term. I have no doubt that an investigation of this notion will reveal an entire family of relations, just as have the notions of implication, strict implication, and entailment (including relevance relations).

Putting that and other details aside, let us say that fact F1 *entails* fact F2 just in case F1 exists and F2 exists and the proposition that fact F1 exists *entails* the proposition that fact F2 exists. Then we can assert: a necessary condition for fact F1 to ontologically determine fact F2 is that F1 entails F2. But there are plenty of cases where F1 *coentails* F2. In some of these cases, there is no ontological dependency, and neither fact *determines* the other. This is the case for many pairs of necessary facts, e.g., that triangles have three sides, and that squares have four angles. However, there are also cases of coentailment wherein there is a one-way determination. Here are some cases:

(6) The fact that Plato is broad-shouldered
coentails

(7) The fact that the proposition that Plato is broad-shouldered is true.

Our intuitions tell us that while (7) entails (6), as well as conversely, it is (6) that ontologically determines (7) because the truth is determined by reality rather than the other way around. Here are a couple of cases of ontological determination that do not directly involve one fact making true the propositional constituent of another fact. The fact that the number 3 exists ontologically determines the fact that the unit set of the number 3 exists (even though they also coentail each other). The fact that part *a*, part *b*, and part *c* of an object have mass ontologically determines the fact that the object has mass. There are many more examples involving the part-whole relationship: the positions of the outermost parts of an object ontologically determine the shape, the volume, and the position of that object.

Assuming that, necessarily, God exists and his will never fails, the fact that God *wills* that Earth is the third planet of Sol during time *t* *ontologically* determines the fact that Earth is the third planet of Sol during time *t*. The latter fact in turn ontologically determines the fact that God's *belief* that Earth is the third planet of Sol during *t* is *true*. These ontological relationships hold in spite of the coentailment of each pair of these three facts. Notice that while these relationships are not causal, the relation between the fact about God's volition and the fact about Earth somewhat resembles causality. It is *not* causality because it is not a relation that contingently holds between the two facts. Causality holds contingently and only between *events* (including temporal states), which are facts that essentially have a time as a constituent.

As there are cases of *causal overdetermination*, so also are there cases of *ontological overdetermination*. For example, the fact that Socrates is snub-nosed and the fact that Plato is broad-shouldered ontologically overdetermine the fact that the proposition that either Socrates is snub-nosed or Plato is broad-shouldered is true. Again, assuming the impossibility of the failure of his will, perhaps God's volition is sufficient to ontologically determine the truth of his belief that Earth is the third planet of Sol during *t*. If so, then the truth of his belief may be ontologically overdetermined by that knowledge and the fact that Earth is the third planet of Sol during *t*. It is important to notice that the ontological determination of a fact is a *sufficient* condition for the existence of that fact. It may also be a necessary condition, as in the case of the fact that individual *o* exists ontologically

determines that a unit set of individual *o* exists. But it need not be a necessary condition. In some cases the ontologically determined fact may have *counterfactual independence* from the ontologically determining fact. Fact F2 is counterfactually independent of fact F1 just in case if F1 were to exist then F2 would exist and if F1 were not to exist F2 would (still) exist. Ontological overdetermination provides just one case of this kind of independence. (From this point forward, the term 'independent' will always be used in the sense of 'counterfactually independent' just defined, unless explicitly specified otherwise.) There may also be cases in which F1 ontologically determines F2, but F2 would exist without F1 and without being ontologically determined by any other fact. If F1 and F2 ontologically overdetermine F3, then F3 is only *conditionally* ontologically dependent upon F1. But suppose now that F2 does not exist, F1 ontologically determines F3, no fact other than F1 ontologically determines F3, and F3 is not independent of F1. Then F3 is *unconditionally* ontologically dependent on F1.¹⁶

When the paragraph from Plantinga's "Replies" quoted above is interpreted in terms of facts, what it states is that just as the proposition expressed by (2) is made true by the fact that yesterday I did act A, the proposition expressed by

(3) If Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it
can be deemed to be made true by:

(8) The fact that Curley has the property of being such that if he were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it.

Let's call Plantinga's framework when enhanced by facts 'P+'. It is in P+ that we are to understand Plantinga's paragraph quoted above. It is only in P+, and not in Plantinga's own framework, that the fact (8) exists.

In Plantinga's own framework one can specify states of affairs that Alfred Freddoso calls 'creation situations.'¹⁷ A creation situation in this framework is a state of affairs that includes all and only actual states of affairs that are not directly or indirectly within God's power to actualize.¹⁸ Such a state of affairs includes all necessary states of affairs and all actual states of affairs depicted by true subjunctive conditionals of freedom. There is a state of affairs that is the *actual world*, which includes just one creation situation, the *actual* creation situation, which includes the genuine counterfactual state of affairs depicted by (3) above:

(S3) The state of affairs that if Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it.

Propositions are also necessary existents, along with states of affairs; so the following proposition exists:

(P3) The proposition that if Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it.

Hence, the following state of affairs

(SP3) The state of affairs that (P3) is true

is included in the actual creation situation in Plantinga's framework.

Now, P^+ contains all of this; but it also contains facts as truthmakers. There will be not only the actual world (an abstract entity) but also the *real* world, a highly complex totality of facts, including facts that have real concrete objects as constituents. In addition to the abstract *actual* creation situation, there is the *real* creation situation, which is that totality of facts that are beyond God's power to create or prevent.¹⁹ It would seem that it is to the latter that we must look to find truthmakers for the genuine counterfactuals, such as (P3), if these counterfactuals are to be made true independently of any of God's decisions. But (P3) cannot be made true by the presence of fact (8) in the actual or real creation situations because fact (8) cannot exist in either creation situation. For fact (8) has a real, contingent, concrete object as a subject constituent, to which a subjunctive conditional property is attributed, and such created concrete objects cannot exist in any creation situation in either framework. If there are conditional facts, the same point will apply to this one:

(F3) The fact that if Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it.

In spite of being a conditional fact, this fact has a contingent concrete object as a constituent, unlike (P3) or (S3) which may have Curley's essence, but not the actual individual Curley himself, as a constituent. So if, contrary to the solution suggested by Plantinga's paragraph, fact (8) or even (F3) cannot make (P3) true in the real creation situation, what fact in that situation can do it?

Where E is an essence of Curley, the following sort of fact, if it exists in the real creation situation, would be a truthmaker of proposition (P3):

(9) The fact that E has the property of being such that if the instantiation of E were offered a \$35,000 bribe, the instantiation of E would take it.

If the genuine counterfactual proposition (P3) is true in Plantinga's framework, as we are assuming, then fact (9) exists in the real creation situation in P^+ . This can be true precisely because, unlike fact (8), neither the truth of (P3) nor the existence of fact (9) requires the existence of Curley. Now, fact (9) in the real creation situation is a truthmaker of proposition (P3). This entails that fact (9) ontologically determines (FP3):

(FP3) The fact that (P3) is true.

Next, let's ask what happens when God decides to create Curley, i.e., when he brings about:

(10) The fact that Curley exists.

My objection to Plantinga's defense of Molinism rests on this claim: that facts (9) and (10) not only jointly *entail* fact (8); they jointly *ontologically determine* fact (8). I find this claim to be overwhelmingly plausible, and I believe that it would be recognized by those who object to Molinism as a fundamental basis for the objection to that doctrine. Thus, the source of Curley's having his subjunctive (counterfactual) property (of being such that if he were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it) is fact (9), a contingent fact about Curley's essence that exists independently of Curley.

Could the Molinist reverse the direction of this argument? After all, while (9) and (10) entail (8), they are also entailed by it. That is,

- (8) The fact that Curley has the property of being such that if he were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it

entails

- (9) The fact that E has the property of being such that if the instantiation of E were offered a \$35,000 bribe, the instantiation of E would take it

and

- (10) The fact that Curley exists.

Why not then say that the ontological determination goes the other way, from (8) to (9) and (10)? Why not say that the fact that Curley has his subjunctive (counterfactual) property ontologically determines that his essence has a corresponding subjunctive property, rather than allowing that Curley's having his property is ontologically dependent on his essence's having the corresponding property?

Fact (9) is being assumed to be the truthmaker of the true counterfactual proposition

- (P3) If Curley were offered a \$35,000 bribe, he would take it

because (P3) is being assumed to be true in the real creation situation, and (P3) cannot be made true there by (8). For (8) assumes the existence of Curley and hence (8) cannot exist in the real creation situation. Fact (9), that the essence of Curley has the relevant subjunctive property, is thus being assumed to be in the real creation situation, and therefore beyond God's powers to bring about or prevent. Hence it seems that Curley's essence E would have had this subjunctive conditional property whether or not God had decided to create Curley, and hence whether or not fact (8) ever came to exist. In other words, (9) is *counterfactually independent* of (10).²⁰ And hence it seems to be true that fact (8) is ontologically dependent on fact (9), rather than (9) on (8), i.e., (8) is ontologically determined by the conjunction of (9) and (10), rather than vice versa. Of course, it would be possible for the Molinist to agree that (8) coentails the conjunction of (9) and (10) but simply to deny that either side of the coentailment *ontologically determines* the other. So too, I suppose, it would be possible to admit that the fact that Socrates is snub-nosed coentails the fact that the proposition that Socrates is snub-nosed is true, and yet to deny that either ontologically determines the other. In my judgment, this would have to be due to a certain kind of blindness to the facts of ontological determination.

It is natural to suppose, however, that if the above holds for Curley's essence, it holds for all the subjunctive conditional properties involving freedom that belong to any essence of any free creature, whether those properties turn out to be genuinely counterfactual or not. We have been assuming that the case of Curley and his essence involves *genuine* counterfactuals. Now let us consider a case of a subjunctive conditional with *true* antecedent and consequent. Where S is an essence of Socrates,

- (11) The fact that S has the property of being such that if the instantiation of S were offered escape from prison, the instantiation of S would refuse

And

- (12) The fact that Socrates exists

not only jointly *entail*

- (13) The fact that Socrates has the property of being such that if he were offered escape from prison, he would refuse;

facts (11) and (12) jointly *ontologically determine* fact (13). Finally, the following comes to be:

- (14) The fact that Socrates is offered escape from prison.

Fact (13) and fact (14), and more importantly also facts (11) and (14), ontologically determine

- (15) The fact that Socrates refuses to escape.

But this is inconsistent with the thesis that *Socrates himself* is morally responsible for his act, *and* with the thesis that Socrates *freely* refuses to escape. For if the fact about his essence, together with the offer to escape, ontologically determine that he refuses, he was not morally responsible for his act, and he could not have avoided refusing to escape. I hold that ontological determination of the act by facts about one's essence and situation is just as inimical to both the moral significance *and* the freedom of the act as temporally prior sufficient *causal* determination of the act is held to be, within the Libertarian framework we are assuming.²¹

Let me be very clear on one point. To make it I'll first suggest an analogy. If God has foreknowledge that Socrates refuses to escape, his foreknowledge *entails but does not ontologically determine* that Socrates refuses to escape. Rather, Socrates' act ontologically determines that God's forebelief is true. That is one reason why God's foreknowledge would not threaten human freedom. Just so, it is not the *entailment* of fact (15) by facts (11) and (14) that is inconsistent with the freedom of Socrates to refuse. The entailment could hold and Socrates' act still be freely performed. If under Molinist assumptions it were plausible to maintain that facts (14) and (15) jointly *ontologically determine* fact (11), and that (11) would not exist if (14) and (15) were not to exist, so that the essence S of Socrates has its subjunctive property *entirely due to* the act in the situation of the offer,²² rather than (11) and (14) ontologically determining (15), then the mere entailment of (15) by (11) and (14) would present no problem for the Molinist. But is it possible for the Molinist to hold that (14) and (15) jointly ontologically determine (11)? I shall argue that it is not possible.

There are three *prima facie* possible ways in which the subjunctive conditionals of freedom might be related to the situations (in which the agents are free with respect to their possible acts) and the actions that they choose to perform. In considering these alternatives, one must keep in mind that a fact F1 may ontologically determine F2 and yet F2 be counterfactually independent of F1. But this is *not* to say that in *every* case in which F1

ontologically determines F2, it is possible that F2 is counterfactually independent of F1.

(i) In every world, the subjunctive conditional is true if and only if the relevant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the conditional. The relevant situation and the agent's performance of the act jointly ontologically determine the fact that is the immediate truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional, namely, the fact that the agent has the property of being such that if the agent were in the situation, the agent would do the act. The fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive conditional property, together with the fact that the agent exists, do not ontologically determine the truthmaker. Rather, the truthmaker ontologically determines the fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive conditional property. The fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive property is not independent of the agent's existence, i.e., it is not the case that the essence would have its property if the agent were to fail to exist and hence not have its corresponding property.

(ii) In some worlds, some subjunctive conditionals are true even though it is not the case that the relevant situations occur and the agents do the acts referred to in those conditionals, but in every world in which the relevant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the conditional, the agent's being in the situation and performing the act jointly ontologically determine the truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional.

(iii) Again, in some worlds, some subjunctive conditionals are true even though it is not the case that in those worlds the relevant situations occur and the agents do the acts referred to in those conditionals, *and* in every world in which the relevant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the conditional, the situation and the agent's performance of the act *do not* ontologically determine the truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional. In every world, the truthmaker would exist whether or not the situation ever arises and even whether or not the agent ever exists. The truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional proposition, which according to this alternative is the fact consisting of the agent's essence having its subjunctive conditional property, is in every case independent of the existence of the situation and the agent.

Clearly, alternative (i) could not be used by the Molinist, for two reasons. First, there would be no *genuine* counterfactuals of freedom, i.e., subjunctive conditionals of freedom with contingently false antecedents, that are *true*. The only true subjunctive conditional of freedom on this alternative would be one that is made true by the fact that makes its antecedent true together with the fact that makes its consequent true. That is, (14) the fact that Socrates is offered escape from prison, together with (15) the fact that Socrates refuses, ontologically determines (13) the fact that Socrates has the property of being such that if he were offered escape from prison he would refuse. The latter is the immediate truthmaker of the subjunctive conditional proposition, and can also on this alternative be viewed as ontologically determining the fact (11), which attributes the corresponding subjunctive conditional property to the essence of Socrates. This preserves the freedom of the individual, but only by giving up of the possibility that God has foreknowledge of what free beings would do by knowing the contents of the real or actual creation situation.

Second, if every true subjunctive conditional of freedom is made true only by the fact that makes its antecedent true together with the fact that makes its consequent true, God would have power over the truth value of that subjunctive conditional; for God could prevent the existence of such facts simply by not creating the agent. But such a subjunctive conditional of freedom could not be included in either the actual or the real creation situation, since the only truths in a creation situation are those beyond God's power. There would be no truthmakers of these propositions available in the creation situation. And without an awareness of the truthmaker of these contingent propositions, even God could not know which counterfactuals of freedom are true.²³ If these propositions are excluded from the creation situation, then God could not know what the relevant free beings would do *by* knowing the contents of the creation situation.

Under alternative (ii) there are a number of *prima facie* possible subalternatives, all of which fall under one of two types. Subalternatives of the first type are those in which the fact about the essence is not independent of the fact that the agent exists, and on these the fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional property is ontologically determined by a fact that requires the existence of the agent. These succumb to one of the same objections as does alternative (i). On these subalternatives, the fact about the essence could not be in the real creation situation, because God could prevent the existence of such a fact by not creating the agent. However, on first consideration, the subalternatives of the second type seem more promising for a defense of Molinism, because they posit the counterfactual independence of the fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional property from the agent's existence. This independence permits the fact about the essence to be in the real creation situation. God could know just by inspecting the creation situation what the agent would do, since the fact about the essence with its subjunctive conditional property would be there. This fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional property is not, on these scenarios, ontologically determined by anything requiring the creation of the agent.

There is good reason to reject these subalternatives of the second type as defenses of Molinism. The independence that they all claim for the essence's property is a two-edged sword. They all affirm that the fact that the essence has its subjunctive conditional property is independent of the fact that the agent exists. This means that the essence would have its property whether or not the agent ever comes to exist. Hence, were the agent to exist, the agent would immediately have its subjunctive conditional property to do act A when in situation S *due to* the fact that the essence has its property and the fact that the agent exists. That is, the conjunction of the two latter facts ontologically determines the fact that the agent has its property. There are two closely related factors here that are incompatible with the freedom and moral responsibility of the agent. First, the essence does not get its property *from the agent*. Rather, the agent, once it exists, gets its property *from the essence*. The problem for these subalternatives is not that the fact about the essence and the existence of the agent jointly entail that the agent has its corresponding subjunctive conditional property. The problem is *the source* of the agent's property of being such that if it were in situation S it would do A. Because the essence has its property

independently of the agent, and indeed independently of the agent's ever coming to be in the situation, the fact that the essence has that property precludes the agent from doing anything in the situation other than the act mentioned in the specification of the property of the essence. When a fact about an essence such as (11) is incompatible with all the alternatives to an act in the specified situation but one, namely, the act itself, and the fact is counterfactually independent of all of the alternatives in that situation, I say that the fact *precludes* all the alternatives to the act. This is necessarily equivalent to asserting that this fact of independence, together with the fact that the agent exists in the situation, if it ever arose, would *ontologically determine* the fact that the agent does the act. Hence, the agent is deprived of freedom and moral responsibility with respect to performing that act.²⁴

Second, on these subalternatives, the fact that the agent has its subjunctive conditional property is itself independent of the fact that the agent comes to be in the relevant situation. Due to the essence having its property, the agent, once it exists, would have its property whether or not the relevant situation ever arose. But, even if we put aside consideration of the source of the agent's property, the fact that the agent has its property (of being such that the agent would do act A in situation S) *independently* of whether the situation ever arises precludes the agent from doing anything other than A when in S. That is, it precludes the agent from doing otherwise in S or even avoiding doing A when in S. So, the agent would not be freely doing A in S when the agent acts.

There remains alternative (iii), which is perhaps more in the spirit of Molinism than either alternatives (i) or (ii). On this alternative, the Molinist adopts the position that nothing like (14) and (15) ontologically determine fact (11), and that fact (11) would exist whether Socrates exists or not.²⁵ So, in *every* possible world, the possession of the contingent subjunctive conditional property by the given essence of the free creature is counterfactually independent of the existence of the creature. On alternative (iii), there is nothing in any world that ontologically determines the fact that the essence has this subjunctive property. This secures all facts like (11) a place in the relevant creation situation, and so makes foreknowledge of free acts possible by means of knowledge of the contents of the given creation situation. But then, as argued above in considering the majority of the subalternatives under alternative (ii), if the essence contingently has the subjunctive conditional property independently of whether the essence is instantiated or not, and the essence *were* instantiated, the action of the agent would become ontologically necessitated by the essence's possession of the property together with the situational fact. The crucial point that deprives the agent's act of both freedom and moral significance is the fact that the essence's having the subjunctive property, together with the bare existence of the agent, ontologically determines the fact that *the agent himself* has the corresponding subjunctive property.

It follows that, under the assumptions that I have made, including those regarding the nature of facts and the framework P+, Molinism is false.²⁶ The view of subjunctive conditionals that I have portrayed is one in which for each subjunctive conditional of freedom the fact that the subjunctive conditional proposition *exists* is included in the real creation situation. But for each such proposition, there is in the real creation situation *no* fact that

the proposition is true. For all of these propositions lack a truthmaker in the real creation situation that would *not* ontologically determine, together with some created facts, the agent's performing her act. On this view, there are some true subjunctive conditionals of freedom, but their truthmakers are facts about agents' acts done in circumstances in the real world, outside of the creation situation. Hence, the facts that these propositions are true are within God's power to prevent, and therefore cannot be included in the real creation situation. Hence God cannot, *just by knowing the contents of the real creation situation*, know what his free creatures would do in various situations. There are no true genuine counterfactuals of freedom.²⁷ But if there were, the truthmakers of these truths would ontologically determine that the acts would be performed if the relevant creatures and situations were to exist—depriving the agents of their freedom and moral responsibility.

III

Would the conclusion of the above argument be affected by replacing the conception of structured *facts* that it employs with one of the other three candidates for truthmakers that were outlined above? The answer is no, because the relation of ontological determination would still hold between the relevant items regardless of their nature. Nevertheless, certain differences between these conceptions, especially between the conceptions of facts and states of affairs should be acknowledged. We can deal simultaneously with both the structured and unstructured views of states of affairs because their differences won't matter to the points I want to make. On both views, for any two states of affairs *S1* and *S2*, *S1* includes *S2* if and only if it is impossible that *S1* obtains and *S2* does not.²⁸ (This is virtually a form of *entailment* for states of affairs; we could just as well say 'entails' instead of 'includes'.) There is an important difference between

(F13) The fact that Socrates has the property of being such that if he were offered escape he would refuse

and (if there is such a *conditional fact* as)

(F13*) The fact that if Socrates were offered escape from prison, he would refuse,

on the one hand, and

(S13*) The state of affairs that if Socrates were offered escape from prison, he would refuse,

on the other, namely, the existence of (S13*) does not require the existence of Socrates. Perhaps, then, (S13*) could serve as a truthmaker of

(P13*) The proposition that if Socrates were offered escape from prison, he would refuse.

Perhaps the *actual* creation situation includes (S13*) and the existence of (P13*), where (P13*) is being assumed to be true. The argument against the position that all this is in fact so cannot under this conception of truthmakers be that (P13*) must not be true in the creation situation because its truthmaker must have a *concrete constituent* such as Socrates.

Upon further examination, however, it becomes apparent that (S13*) cannot itself be a truthmaker of (P13*) in a system like that employed by Plantinga, which does not contain *facts* but does employ states of affairs of some sort. It cannot even be the state of affairs *that* (S13*) *exists* that is the truthmaker of (P13*), because (S13*) *exists* in every world (at least on Plantinga's conception). It must be the *obtaining* of (S13*) that is the truthmaker. So, the following *obtainings* are truthmakers for the propositions (P11)–(P15) that correspond to them.

- (OS11) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S11) that S has the property of being such that if the instantiation of S were offered escape from prison, the instantiation would refuse
- (OS12) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S12) that Socrates exists
- (OS13*) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S13*) that if Socrates were offered escape from prison he would refuse
- (OS13) The obtaining of the state of affairs (S13) that Socrates has the property of being such that if he were offered escape from prison he would refuse
- (OS14) The obtaining of (S14) the state of affairs that Socrates is offered escape from prison
- (OS15) The obtaining of (S15) the state of affairs that Socrates refuses to escape.

There are certain other features of this framework of states of affairs that distinguish it from the framework of facts, which result from the feature that states of affairs like (OS13*) do not require the existence of their subjects, in this case Socrates. For one thing, the conjunction of (OS13*) and (OS12) co-include (= coentail) the state of affairs (OS13). More important to our present purpose, while (OS13*) co-includes (OS11), (OS13*) can in every case be regarded as ontologically determining (OS11). As a result, (OS11), the fact about the essence of Socrates, is never needed to play the role of *truthmaker* for (P13*). The role of immediate truthmaker of the conditional of freedom (P13*) can always be filled by (OS13*). Since the latter does not require the subject's existence, (OS13*) can be claimed to be in the actual creation situation.

In Section II above I applied alternatives (i), (ii), and (iii) to Molinism from within a framework of structured facts, and offered arguments for rejecting Molinism. Assuming that those arguments were sound within that framework, we must now ask if applying these alternatives, or rather their appropriate counterparts, to Molinism from within a framework of states of affairs, such as Plantinga offers but with the added requirement that a true proposition is made true by a truthmaker consisting in the obtaining of a state of affairs, alters the force of these arguments so as to salvage Molinism. I shall argue that the switch to a framework of states of affairs makes no difference. The three alternatives in the framework of states of affairs are basically isomorphic with the three alternatives in the framework of facts, the principal difference being that (OS13*) fills the role of truthmaker, rather than fact (11) or its counterpart (OS11).

For brevity I shall summarize the alternatives by using the names of the states of affairs in our example of Socrates, rather than stating the alternatives in a completely general way.

(i) (P13*) is true if and only if (S14) and (S15) obtain. The conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) ontologically determine (OS13). (OS13) ontologically determines (OS13*), which is the truthmaker of (P13*). The conjunction of (OS13*) and (OS12) does not ontologically determine (OS13). (OS13*) is not independent of (OS12), (OS13), (OS14), or (OS15).

(ii) In some worlds (P13*) is true but it is not the case that both (S14) and (S15) obtain. However, in every world in which (S14) and (S15) obtain, the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) ontologically determines (OS13), which ontologically determines (OS13*).

(iii) In some worlds (P13*) is true but it is not the case that both (S14) and (S15) obtain. However, in every world in which (S14) and (S15) obtain, the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) *does not* ontologically determine (OS13), which in turn *does not* ontologically determine (OS13*). Rather, in every world in which (S13*) obtains, (OS13*) is independent of (OS12).

According to alternative (i) in the framework of facts, a subjunctive conditional is true if and only if the relevant situation occurs and the agent performs the act referred to in the conditional. We saw that this entails that there are no true genuine counterfactuals. This consequence holds regardless of the ontology of the framework, and so it also holds in the framework of states of affairs. On alternative (i) in this framework, (OS14) and (OS15) ontologically determine (OS13), which ontologically determines (OS13*). (OS13*) is not independent of the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15). On this alternative, the agent doing the act in the situation is the only reality that brings about the obtaining of (S13*), i.e., brings about (OS13*).

All this preserves the freedom of Socrates' act of refusal, but gives up the view, required for Molinism (with truthmakers), that the truthmaker of (P13*) is in the actual creation situation, since on this alternative the truthmaker would not exist without (OS14) and (OS15) which require the creation of Socrates. Secondly, just as in the framework of structured facts, this alternative would entail that every true subjunctive conditional would have a truth value within God's power. God could prevent the truth of the conditional just by choosing not to create the agent. Hence, on alternative (i), the effect of the arguments is unaltered by the switch from the framework of structured facts to the framework of states of affairs.

On alternative (ii), in some worlds some subjunctive conditionals are true even though the relevant situations and acts do not occur; but in every world in which the agent does the act in the relevant situation, the agent's being in the situation and performing the act ontologically determines the truthmaker. With some differences of content, my objections to this alternative (ii) parallel the objections made to alternative (ii) in the framework of facts. As before, the objections can be divided into two camps: one that deals with subalternatives of the type in which the truthmaker is not independent of the agent's existence, and one that deals with those of the type in which the truthmaker is independent of the agent's existence. On subalternatives of the first type, (OS13*) is ontologically determined by (OS13) and is not independent of the agent's existence, (OS12). (OS13), unlike (OS13*), could not exist in the actual creation situation. Whether

(OS13) is ontologically determined jointly by (OS14) and (OS15), or is a brute state of affairs that ontologically determines (OS13*) and is not determined by (OS12) and (OS13*), the truthmaker (OS13*) could not exist in the creation situation. Hence, God could not know what Socrates would do just by knowing the contents of the actual creation situation.

Subalternatives of the second type are those which have the truthmaker (OS13*) as being independent of (OS12), the state of affairs that Socrates exists. First, consider that the peculiar state of affairs (S13*) is one which not only fails to entail that Socrates exists, it also does not contain Socrates as a constituent. It is a wholly abstract entity, like an essence or other property. So, when Socrates, the real, living, actual person, does come to exist, he is immediately ontologically determined jointly by his existence and by the obtaining of this abstract entity (S13*) to possess the property of being such that if he were offered escape from prison he would refuse. In short, (OS13*) and (OS12) ontologically determine (OS13). In evaluating the freedom and moral significance of the act, this is really no better than the agent deriving the subjunctive conditional property from the contingent state of affairs that his essence has a corresponding subjunctive conditional property. In both cases the agent gets its property from the abstract entity rather than the property of the agent determining that the abstract entity has its corresponding property. When the agent comes to be in the relevant situation, the abstract entity, which exists independently of the agent, does not permit the agent to do anything other than the act mentioned in the specification of the abstract entity.

Second, under these subalternatives, (OS13), that the agent has its subjunctive conditional property, is itself independent of (OS14), that the agent comes to be in the relevant situation. The agent, Socrates, would have his property whether or not the relevant situation (offer of escape from prison) ever arose. So, even when we put aside consideration of the *source* of the agent's property, the obtaining of the state of affairs that the agent has its property *independently* of whether the situation ever arises precludes the agent from doing anything other than the relevant act. When (S14) comes to obtain, its obtaining and (OS13) jointly preclude any alternative act to Socrates' act of refusal. Socrates' act of refusal would be deprived of moral significance; and he would not then freely refuse to escape.

On alternative (iii), as in (ii), there are some worlds in which some subjunctive conditionals are true even though their antecedents and consequents are not; the relevant situations and acts simply do not take place. There are also worlds in which the states of affairs that make the antecedents and consequents true do obtain, but in none of these worlds is it the case that the obtaining of these states of affairs ontologically determines the obtaining of the states of affairs that are the truthmakers of the subjunctive conditionals. To apply this alternative to our example: on alternative (iii), the subjunctive conditional is (P13*), and its truthmaker is (OS13*). The truthmakers of the antecedent and consequent of (P13*) are (OS14) and (OS15) respectively. Now, whether or not the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) *includes* (OS13*), under alternative (iii) the Molinist is bound to hold that the conjunction of (OS14) and (OS15) does not *ontologically determine* (OS13*). Rather, (OS13*) would exist (that is, (S13*) would obtain) whether or not Socrates ever existed. The truthmaker of the

subjunctive conditional is, in this sense, independent of the obtaining of the state of affairs that the agent exists.

The basic problem, therefore, still remains. If the obtaining of the state of affairs (S13*) is independent of the existence of the agent, in the sense that the state of affairs would obtain whether or not the agent were to exist, then as soon as the agent comes to exist he has the subjunctive conditional property, the having of which *is* ontologically determined by the obtaining of (S13*) and the state of affairs that Socrates exists. On alternative (iii), the Molinist must hold that the obtaining of (S13*) is *not ontologically determined* by anything else, such as future situations and events.

Finally, there is the conception of truthmakers that view them as unstructured facts, simple entities none of which have individuals as constituents, but which are entities (like sets of individuals) that have an ontological dependence on individuals, i.e., facts about individuals cannot exist without them. By now I take it to be evident that all the principle arguments about ontological determination would go through in a framework of unstructured facts as well as of structured facts.

IV

My conclusion is that the principal arguments against Molinism which were stated in the framework of structured facts have parallels in the other frameworks of structured and unstructured states of affairs, and also of unstructured facts. If these arguments are sound, there are just two alternatives. (1) Our acts are not freely performed and we are not morally responsible for them for the reason that they are ontologically determined by the situations in which they are done and the truthmakers of the relevant subjunctive conditionals. (2) No genuine counterfactuals of freedom are true because the only true subjunctive conditionals of freedom are those which have truthmakers that are ontologically determined by the relevant situations and acts themselves. On either alternative, Molinism is false. If in the creation situation the only way that God could know what free creatures would do is by knowing which subjunctive conditionals of freedom are true, or by knowing something that makes these conditionals true, then God could not have foreknowledge of their free acts. It seems to me that this *is* the only way that God could know *on the basis of the creation situation* what free creatures would do. So, it seems to me that if there is no other way to account for divine foreknowledge of free human acts than through knowledge of subjunctive conditionals of freedom, divine foreknowledge of human acts is inconsistent with human freedom.

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NOTES

1. Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. IX, pp. 164–95.

2. Robert M. Adams, "Plantinga on the Problem of Evil," in *Alvin Plantinga* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985), pp. 225–55.

3. Alvin Plantinga, ed. James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen (Reidel, 1985), pp. 374–75.

4. Robert M. Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," reprinted in *The Virtue of Faith* (Oxford University Press, 1987). See note 4, p. 91.

5. William Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge* (Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 52, final sentence of the chapter entitled "Middle Knowledge."

6. William Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge*, op. cit., footnote pp. 50–51.

7. Hereafter, for simplicity, I shall omit references to times. Similarly I shall completely ignore issues having to do with tense, usually using the present tense. Issues about the nature of time are beyond the purview of this work.

8. It seems to me to be possible to defend a modalized version of David Lewis's axiom, one that asserts that if p and q are true then it is metaphysically possible that the subjunctive conditional $p \Rightarrow q$ is true. Even more generally, I would defend the principle that if p and q are *contingent* then it is metaphysically possible that $p \Rightarrow q$ is true. Nevertheless, I agree with Hasker that Lewis's general principle is false, e.g., it is false that if Bush were re-elected in 2004, the moon would not be made of blue cheese, which is not a subjunctive conditional of freedom.

9. Robert Adams pursued a related objection in terms of *explanatory priority* in his "An Anti-Molinist Argument," in *Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. James E. Tomberlin, vol. 5 (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1991), pp. 343–53. This set off a series of articles in this journal and elsewhere, including William Lane Craig, "Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54.4 (December 1984); William Hasker, "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited," in *Faith and Philosophy* 12.2 (April 1995); William Hasker, "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William Craig," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57.2 (June 1997); William Lane Craig, "On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism," in *Faith and Philosophy* 15.2 (April 1998); Thomas P. Flint, *Divine Providence: The Molinist Account* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998); William Hasker, "A new anti-Molinist argument," *Religious Studies* 35, pp. 291–97; Thomas P. Flint, "A new anti-anti-Molinist argument," *Religious Studies* 35, pp. 299–305; William Hasker, "Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!," in *Faith and Philosophy* 17.1 (January 2000); Wes Morriston, "Explanatory Priority and the 'Counterfactuals of Freedom,'" *Faith and Philosophy* 18.1 (January 2001); Scott A. Davison, "Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge," *Faith and Philosophy* 21.3 (July 2004).

10. Alvin Plantinga, op. cit., p. 374.

11. We shall assume throughout, even if only for the sake of argument, that Curley is a real person and that Curley was never offered a \$35,000 bribe. This is contrary to Plantinga's original scenario (in *The Nature of Necessity*, op. cit., p. 173) wherein Curley is offered and takes a \$35,000 bribe; Plantinga later considers a genuine counterfactual of freedom as to whether Curley would have accepted a \$36,000 bribe if one were offered (p. 177). But in the context of the reply to Adams in his "Replies," (3) is clearly meant to be a genuine counterfactual of freedom.

12. Alvin Plantinga, op. cit., p. 374.

13. D. M. Armstrong, *A World of States of Affairs* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 113 ff. Also, *Truth and Truthmakers* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially pp. 1–9.

14. *The Nature of Necessity*, op. cit., pp. 45f.

15. See Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, "Truth-makers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* XLIV, No. 3 (March 1984), p. 313; also see Greg Restall, "Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74.2 (June 1996), p. 339; and D. M. Armstrong (2004 and 1997), op.

cit. For a discussion of *ontological determination*, see Jaegwon Kim, *Supervenience and Mind* (Cambridge University Press 1993), pp. 131–60; and Phillip Bricker, “The Relation Between General and Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience,” forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, ed. Dean Zimmerman.

16. Here, ontological dependence is being conceived of as the converse of the relation of ontological determination. There are several quite different conceptions or relations of ontological dependence that are not conceived in this way. Some recent treatments of ontological dependence follow. E. Jonathan Lowe, “Ontological Dependence,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* May 2005; Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism,” draft of 1/16/06; Kit Fine, “Ontological Dependence,” read at the Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, June 1995; and “Essence and Modality,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 8, Logic and Language, (1994).

17. Luis de Molina’s *On Divine Foreknowledge*, trans. Alfred Freddoso (Cornell University Press 1988), Introduction, pp. 47–48; see also p. 3, especially notes 3 and 4.

18. Such a “creation situation” must really be something like a *set* of states of affairs that is not closed under entailment.

19. In this work, I am assuming that both the real world and the real creation situation include all the singular facts that we need to provide truthmakers for those propositions, such as the genuine counterfactual (P3), which are in our main focus.

20. See note 25 for an argument supporting this claim. The example switches to Socrates in place of Curley.

21. My position requires that a free choice is not ontologically determined by properties of the agent’s essence and her situation. Strictly speaking, it does not require adherence to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. However, I would defend that principle as compatible with certain forms of Libertarianism. Moreover, I think that there is a conditional form of PAP, consistent with almost any form of Libertarianism, that clearly avoids the Frankfurt-style counterexamples: in the absence of the abnormal conditions of the Frankfurt-style interveners and blocks, alternative natural possibilities are *essential* to freedom and moral responsibility.

22. This should be the anti-Molinist stance regarding subjunctive conditionals that are *true*.

23. William Lane Craig, in “Middle Knowledge, Truth-makers, and the “Grounding Objection,” *Faith and Philosophy* (July 2001), takes the position that if propositions are truthbearers, as truthmaker theorists claim, then “God most certainly can by an immediate inspection of the proposition itself discern whether it bears the property of truth or not.” (Italics are mine; see his endnote 27, p. 351.) Under this scenario, truth would be a *quality* of a proposition, one that can be known (at least by God) to adhere independently of any awareness of a fact that makes the proposition true. I find this utterly and completely implausible. I believe that truth is either a *relational* property of “correspondence” itself or at least a property which requires that there be a fact that makes the proposition true, and even God could not know that a contingent proposition is true just by inspecting the qualities of the proposition.

24. There is an affinity of this claim with a passage in Robert Adams’s “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” *op. cit.*, p. 82, where it is suggested that if whether person *c* would do an action *a* in *s* depends, not on a property of the person *c*, but on a property of God’s idea of *c*, this fact “might seem to compromise *c*’s freedom of will.”

25. I am representing this claim as being part and parcel of the Molinist position. The claim contains two propositions. A) If Socrates were to exist then fact (11) would exist (i.e., the essence of Socrates would have the relevant subjunctive conditional property). B) If Socrates were not to exist then fact (11) would (still) exist. In evaluating B, we are to assume that in the actual world fact (11) exists, i.e., the essence actually has the subjunctive conditional property. Since there is no ontological, causal, or entailment relations between the antecedent of B, viz., the proposition that Socrates does not exist, and the consequent of B, viz., the proposition that fact (11) exists, it would seem to be true that the most similar world without Socrates to the actual world—that is, a world wherein Socrates does not exist but *everything else is as much the same as the actual world as possible*—would have to be a world in which the essence of Socrates has as many of the same subjunctive conditional properties as it has in the actual world as is consistent with the nonexistence of Socrates. So the consequent of B, viz., the proposition that fact (11) exists, is true in that world. Therefore, under alternative (iii), Molinism seems to be committed to the counterfactual independence of (11) from the existence of Socrates. The same applies to the case of Curley's essence considered above.

26. In (3), (P3), (S3), (9), (11), (13), (14), and (15) I have deliberately left out an explicit reference to the condition of freedom. In Plantinga's original works the freedom condition is put into the antecedent of the subjunctive conditionals of freedom, whereas in Adams's relevant works it is placed in the consequent. I have argued that if facts such as (9) and (11) exist in the real creation situation, the actions of persons are neither morally significant nor free. If the argument is correct and the freedom condition is placed in the antecedent, the antecedent will be false in every world which contains a creation situation with the purported truthmaker of the conditional in it. Hence, the conditional of freedom will in every such case be only vacuously true. In that case the subjunctive conditional will not be a subjunctive conditional of freedom. They are required to be both contingent and capable of being nonvacuously true. If the freedom condition is placed in the consequent, then given the argument the consequent will be false in every world which contains a creation situation with the purported truthmaker of the conditional in it. This would make the conditional false in every such world wherein the antecedent is true. Again, the subjunctive conditional will not be one of freedom.

27. In replying to Robert Adams's demand for a ground of counterfactuals of freedom, Plantinga makes this observation: "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way." *Alvin Plantinga, "Replies,"* op. cit., p. 374. I want to make two comments about this remark in order to compare my own stance with Plantinga's. First, I agree that any genuine counterfactual of freedom that has a contingent antecedent and a contingent consequent is *possibly* true. This is the case because for every such proposition there is a possible world in which both the antecedent and the consequent are true. No matter how alien and disconnected the consequent is from the antecedent, we can always conceive of a scenario in which there is a subjunctive conditional relation between the two. But second, if we take Plantinga to be implying that

it is more certain that some genuine counterfactuals of freedom are *true* than that the truth of propositions must be grounded, then I must strongly demur. It seems to me that it is much more certain that every true proposition must have a truthmaker than that there are genuine counterfactuals of freedom that are true. I really do not know what property one would be attributing to a proposition in saying that it is true but that it has no truthmaker. I think that the fact that there is a very near relative of the counterfactual of freedom, namely, the probabilistic formulation of Robert Adams "if *x* were in *S* then *probably* *x* would do *A*," examples of which do very much seem to be true, helps to explain how we could mistakenly think that genuine counterfactuals are true.

28. Cf. *The Nature of Necessity*, op. cit., pp. 44–45.