The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies

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Is the divine glory a creature, or is it God? The awkwardness of the question suggests that there is something wrong with the dichotomy in terms of which it is posed. A similar question can be asked about the divine “energies” (energeiai) in the New Testament. Both of these Scriptural themes challenge us to rethink our preconceptions about the nature of God and the relationship between creatures and Creator. In this paper I describe the interpretation of the divine glory and divine energies given by the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century. I argue that their view is both philosophically cogent and Scripturally sound, and is one that Christian philosophers today would do well to recover.

One of the most striking aspects of the Biblical depiction of God is the divine glory. From Exodus onwards, we seem to meet the divine glory at every turn—in the Temple at Jerusalem, in prophetic visions, in Christ’s ministry to his disciples, in the final visions of Revelation. Yet despite its prominence in Scripture, the divine glory has been met by a seeming conspiracy of neglect among philosophers. My purpose in this paper is to challenge that neglect. In order to do so, I shall seek both to explain the historical origins of the attitude toward the divine glory that has prevailed within western philosophy, and to point to the existence of an alternative (and superior) approach.

Regarding the first point, my argument will be that the cause lies in a certain framework for thinking about God that was articulated by Augustine and adopted throughout the medieval western Church. Despite the many vicissitudes of western philosophy and theology since the Middle Ages, there seems to have been little interest in challenging the particular assumptions that led to the neglect of the divine glory. The peculiarity of this framework stands out in sharp contrast when one turns to the Eastern Fathers roughly contemporary with Augustine, particularly the Cappadocian Fathers of the fourth century. I will argue that the Cappadocians succeeded in doing justice to the divine glory in a way that Augustine did not.

More radically, I shall make a similar claim about another Biblical concept that has scarcely entered western consciousness at all—namely, that of the divine energies. My argument will be that these two concepts, the divine glory and the divine energies, open up a way of thinking about God that is far better suited than that of Augustine for articulating the basic contours of Biblical revelation. If I am right then plainly this framework should be of great interest for Christian philosophers.

Let us first recall the major Biblical texts bearing on the divine glory. The “glory of the Lord” first appears in the cloud that follows the Israelites...
in the wilderness (Ex. 16:7, 10). Soon thereafter they behold it in the cloud atop Mount Sinai, where the sight of it is “like devouring fire” (Ex. 24:16-17). At the completion of the Tabernacle the glory of the Lord fills it to such an extent that Moses is unable to enter (Ex. 40:34-35). The same thing happens at the dedication of Solomon’s Temple, this time accompanied by a fire from heaven that consumes the burnt offering (II Chron. 5:14, 7:1-3). These local and specific manifestations of the divine glory are echoed in the prophetic vision of Ezekiel, who beholds the divine glory passing from the cherubim to “the Lord’s house” (that is, the Temple), and thence to a mountain to the east of Jerusalem (Ezek. 8:4, 9:3, 10: 4, 19, 11:22-23). There are also repeated prophecies—in the Pentateuch, Isaiah, Habakkuk, and Ezekiel—of a time when the whole earth will be filled with the glory of the Lord. It is perhaps in fulfillment of these prophecies that St. John describes the heavenly Jerusalem as needing neither sun nor moon because it is illuminated by the glory of God (Rev. 21:11, 23).

Throughout these passages it is clear that the divine glory is a special and uniquely fearsome form of the presence of God. Can we go further and say that the divine glory is God? One hesitates to do so, for at least two reasons: first, because the divine glory is visible and has a specific location; and second, because Scripture itself, in speaking of the divine glory rather than simply of God, seems to intend a distinction. On the other hand, one also hesitates to say that the divine glory is a creature. That would fail to do justice to the vivid sense running throughout these passages that the divine glory constitutes the direct and unmediated presence of God. In fact there are at least some signs that the divine glory really is God, after all. The Pentateuch says not only that the divine glory appeared in the Tabernacle, but that God himself appeared there (Lev. 16:2). St. John, shortly after saying that the heavenly Jerusalem is illuminated by the divine glory, says simply that it is illuminated by God (Rev. 22:5). Isaiah begins the account of one of his most famous visions, “I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne” (Is. 6:1); yet the Gospel of John, in alluding to this vision, refers to it as a vision of the divine glory (Jn. 12:41).

The most striking passage suggesting some sort of identity is the enigmatic encounter between God and Moses in Exodus 33. The chapter begins by describing how the cloudy pillar descended upon Moses in the Tabernacle, and “the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend” (v. 11). One would think that there could be no higher form of personal encounter with God. Yet when Moses leaves the Tabernacle he immediately presses God for more: “shew me now thy way, that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy sight” (v. 13). God promises that His presence will go before them in the wilderness. Moses is apparently still not satisfied, for he next beseeches God, “shew me thy glory” (v. 18). God’s reply is as follows:

And he said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy. And he said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live. And the Lord said, Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock: And it shall come to pass,
while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a clift of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: and I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen. (Ex. 33:19-23)

Here the divine glory is described as God’s “back parts,” as opposed to His “face,” which no man can see and live. This suggests an answer to our question about whether the divine glory is God. It both is and is not, as a man’s back parts both are him, in that they are the part of him seen from behind, and are not him, for he cannot be reduced or equated to them. Of course to speak of God’s “face” and “back parts” is a metaphor. Whether any more literal sense can be given to the distinction remains to be seen. For this purpose one should note that the divine glory is equated here not only with God’s “back parts,” but with His goodness, and perhaps also with His exercise of providence and mercy. (The latter is suggested by the statement that “I... will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy,” assuming that it is not just a digression.) All of these are points that a philosophical interpretation of the divine glory should seek to accommodate.

So far we have spoken of the divine glory only as something beheld visibly, whether publicly (as in the Tabernacle and the Temple) or in the intensely personal encounter attributed to Moses. In the New Testament it appears also as something that can be shared. Admittedly, it is not always clear that such passages have in mind specifically the glory radiant from God’s very being, as opposed to a more general sense of honor or renown. At least one passage, however, is clear on this point. It occurs in the high priestly prayer of the Gospel of John. At the outset of chapter 17, Jesus prays: “Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee” (v. 1). It soon becomes clear that the glory Jesus has in mind is something far greater than any earthly praise or reputation. He continues, “I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was” (v. 4-5). Clearly Jesus here speaks of the glory that is an intrinsic attribute of God. Paradoxically, however, although the entire prayer leaves no doubt that he is divine, he nonetheless seeks to receive this glory from the Father. As the prayer proceeds we see that his seeking is wrapped up with his ministry to his disciples. He goes on to speak of them as a kind of bond uniting him to the Father: “I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them” (v. 9-10). It is precisely in the act of offering back to the Father that which is already His that Jesus is glorified. Yet the disciples are not only, so to speak, the bond of glory uniting Jesus to the Father; they also enter into that glory. Jesus goes on to describe the transmission of glory from the Father to him, and from him to his disciples: “And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one... Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovest me before the foundation of the world” (v. 22-24).
It is not my purpose here to plumb all the depths of this passage. I bring it up only for the assistance it can provide toward a philosophical interpretation of the divine glory. The entire prayer should caution us against any tendency to think of the divine glory as a kind of show or spectacle that God puts on for creatures. The glory existed already with the Father and the Son "before the world was." More than that, it existed in their mutual relation, as "the glory which I had with thee before the world was." Precisely because it is a concomitant of their mutual love, it can also be shared with others; in a sense, that is what Jesus' ministry has been all about. Note that he views the sharing of his glory with his disciples, at least from one standpoint, as an accomplished fact: "the glory which thou gavest me I have given them." Yet he also seems to look forward to it as something yet to be completed: "that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me." This is in keeping with the way Jesus here regards his own glory. It is both enjoyed from all eternity with the Father, and something that he now earnestly seeks from the Father. This is not simply a matter of temporal events manifesting an eternal reality. Time and eternity here interpenetrate: what is true eternally is true, in part at least, because of what Jesus has accomplished, and what the Father is accomplishing, here and now.

Part of what we learn from the high priestly prayer, then, is that the eternal glory of God is not "merely" eternal, but is accomplished and fulfilled through the events of salvation history. This is all the more true of the sharing of the divine glory with the disciples. Other passages in the New Testament that speak of sharing in the divine glory frequently associate it with sharing in Christ's suffering through persecution. To quote only one, there is the statement in Romans that we are "if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together. For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us" (8:17-18). Here the glory is both something already present merely waiting to be revealed, and something achieved or accomplished by enduring through persecution. There is again an interpenetration of time and eternity.

To share in the divine glory is one way in which the New Testament speaks of participating in the divine life. There is also another way—one that is equally prominent in Scripture, and equally fundamental for the Greek Fathers. One of the most familiar verses of the New Testament is that in which St. Paul urges the Philippians to "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." The full passage is as follows: "Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you (ho energon en humin) both to will and to do (energein) of his good pleasure" (2:12-13). What is remarkable here is that the exhortation to act is coupled with a reminder that it is God who is acting. Neither negates the other; the Philippians are both free agents responsible for their own salvation, and the arena in which God works to bring about that salvation. St. Paul shows no interest in distinguishing precisely what is contributed by God, and what by the Philippians; he writes as if the whole process were the activity of both.
The English translation of this passage somewhat obscures the force of the Greek, in that ‘worketh’ and ‘to do’ both translate the same Greek verb, energein. The noun that is cognate to this verb, energeia, is the word from which we derive the term ‘energy.’ By the time of the New Testament it had in some contexts already acquired that meaning. Likewise, although energein normally means simply to act or to operate, in theological contexts such as this one it often has a further shade of meaning: that of acting in a way that itself imparts energy. That is perhaps why St. Paul and other early Christian authors tend to reserve both terms for the action of supernatural agents (God, angels, or demons), since only such agents are capable of entering as a force into others. Giving this notion full weight, we could render the passage as follows: “it is God who energizes in you both to will and to energize of his good pleasure.” This rendering helps bring out why for St. Paul there is no contradiction in urging the Philippians to do something that he also sees as the work of God. The peculiar nature of God’s activity is that it imparts the energy to do His will; yet this energy must be expressed or “worked out” (katergazesthe) in order to be effective.

Another passage that speaks of a coalescence of human and divine energy is that in Colossians where Paul refers to himself as “striving according to his [Christ’s] working, which worketh in me mightily (agôzizomenos kata tên energeian autou tên energoumenên en emoi en dunamei)” (Col. 1:29). Giving full weight to the connection between energeia and energein, we could render this, “striving according to his energy, which is being energized in me mightily.” It is important to note that the divine energy here serves two distinct functions. It is at work within Paul, transforming him, so that from this standpoint he is the object of God’s activity; at the same time it finds expression in Paul’s struggle to promote the Gospel, so that he can also be seen as the agent or conduit through whom God is working. Yet nothing in such external direction prevents his actions from remaining his own. It would be possible to fill out in detail the events in Paul’s life that this passage alludes to, for he has left us some vivid descriptions of his various trials and exertions. Not only do they exhibit full engagement and self-control, they do so more than did his actions prior to his conversion. As the story is told in Acts, Saul was trapped in self-deception until God set him free on the road to Damascus. Now the divine energy that works in him is also his own energy, more truly than anything he did was his own before he ceased to “kick against the pricks” (Acts 9:5).

The belief that God is active in human beings is, of course, deeply rooted in the Old Testament. There it is usually God’s Word or Spirit that is the vehicle of divine indwelling. These ways of speaking tend to suggest a kind of control from without—most obviously in cases of prophetic inspiration, but also even in cases where the Spirit is present continually and in ordinary actions, as with Kings Saul and David. Paul’s use of energeia and related terms, such as sunergein and sunergos, shifts the emphasis from one of external control to one of cooperation. This is true even where Paul himself speaks of the Spirit. A passage that would prove particularly important for the Greek Fathers is Paul’s description in I Corinthians of the gifts of the Spirit.
Wherefore I give you to understand, that no man speaking by the Spirit of God calleth Jesus accursed: and that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost. Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operation (energēmatōn), but it is the same God which worketh (ho energōn) all in all. . . . For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues; but all these worketh (energei) that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will. (12:3–11)

This passage begins by asserting that even such an ordinary and voluntary action as calling Jesus Lord requires the cooperation of the Spirit. It goes on to list a variety of spiritual gifts, each one an energēma (something performed) of the Spirit. They include not only extraordinary gifts like the working of miracles, but also more ordinary qualities such as faith and the "word of wisdom." Again there is no dividing line between the natural and the supernatural. Any believer is called to a life of continual cooperation with the Spirit, a cooperation that can manifest itself in any number of ways both exceptional and mundane.

We now have two ways in which Scripture speaks of participating in the divine life: through sharing in the divine glory and through sharing in the divine energy or activity—that is, through synergy, including the particular kind of synergy that Paul identifies with the gifts of the Spirit. The final Scriptural theme I wish to mention is one that stands in counterpoint to these. Even as God reveals His glory to Moses, He also warns Moses that no man can see His face and live. More generally, Scripture always presents the divine glory as the presence of a hidden majesty—one that is hidden, not because it refuses to reveal itself, but because it is too awesome and overwhelming for any creature to apprehend. That is why, when the divine glory descends, Moses cannot enter the Tabernacle and the priests cannot enter the Temple. It is also why the disciples, when they behold Christ in glory at the Transfiguration, are cast down on their faces in fear (Matt. 17:6). Even in John 17, the glory that Jesus shares with his disciples is that "which I had with thee before the world was," and is rooted in the fact that "thou loveth me before the foundation of the world." In sharing it with his disciples, Jesus ushers them into a bottomless and unfathomable mystery.

The paradox here is that as God is known, He is known precisely as unknowable. Scripture has many ways of pointing to this paradox. One that the Greek Fathers found particularly significant is its treatment of the divine name. In the Old Testament, one thinks of episodes such as Jacob's wrestling with God, where the mysterious wrestler pointedly refuses to reveal His name (Gen. 32:29). There is also the puzzling warning God gives the Israelites in the wilderness to beware the angel who goes before them, "for my name is in him" (Ex. 23:21). In the New Testament, St. Paul proclaims that God has given Jesus "a name which is above every name"
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(Phil. 2:9) and has exalted him “far above . . . every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come” (Eph. 1:21). Exegetes point out that in such passages “‘name’ is virtually equivalent to a person or being,” so that “the name above every name” means “the person higher than any rival being.”

No doubt this is true, but it does not explain why the concept of name is endowed with such significance. Paul could have said simply that God has exalted Jesus above all other beings; surely there is some point to his saying instead that God has bestowed on Jesus a uniquely transcendent name.

Of course the fullest treatment of the divine name in Scripture is the episode of the burning bush. This episode has frequently been cited—by Augustine, Aquinas, and others—as demonstrating the identity of God with Being. Before leaping to such a conclusion, let us take a look at the Biblical text. Here is how it is rendered in the King James Version:

And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say unto me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you. And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you: this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations. (Ex. 3:13-15)

The question posed by Moses is not one of philosophical theology, but a request for concrete guidance. Perhaps Moses thinks that the Israelites, having lived in Egypt for four hundred years, will assume that any god must have a name as do the Egyptian gods; or perhaps he fears that they will ask him the name of their God as a kind of password, to see if he is truly one of them. In any case, God turns this relatively innocuous question into the occasion for a deliberately ambiguous and tantalizing answer. As is well known, the Hebrew phrase here translated “I AM THAT I AM” can also be rendered “I am what I am,” or even “I will be what I will be.” In other words, it is a refusal to answer the question. Yet, having so refused, God goes on to answer it—twice! The first answer (‘Ehyeh, “I AM”) is both a more abbreviated form of the refusal, and a claim to a uniquely unfettered kind of existence. It is as if to say, “I need no name, because I am not x, y, or z; I simply am.” Perhaps at this point God pities Moses, knowing how baffled he must be. He goes on to give a second and more familiar answer: that He is “the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” Only this answer does he identify as His name.

Clearly the point of this exchange is not to give a philosophical account of what God is. It is to remind us that we cannot know what God is. The only name that can be given Him is one based upon His faithful acts. Those acts always appear, much as does this episode, as the unpredictable and ungovernable irruption of a sovereign majesty. To say that God “has no name,” or that He has only “the name above every name,” is a way of summarizing this fundamental aspect of Biblical revelation. Nor is it
a coincidence that the revelation (or non-revelation) of the divine name occurs at the burning bush. As Nahum Sarna has observed, God's reply to Moses is "the articulated counterpart of the spectacle of fire at the Burning Bush, fire that is self-generating and self-sustaining." Just as the fire in the bush burns without fuel, thereby demonstrating its freedom from the natural order, so God's reply demonstrates His freedom from the conceptual categories involved in the human act of naming. The entire theophany thus encapsulates the dual truth that even as God reveals Himself, He is revealed as beyond our knowing.

With these thoughts in mind, let us turn to the Greek Fathers.

I will begin by examining the exegesis of Exodus 33 in St. Gregory of Nyssa's Life of Moses. This text brings out as well as any the complex interrelationships between the Cappadocians' views of God, being, revelation, and the spiritual life.

Gregory begins by commenting on Moses' persistence in pressing to know God better. Reading Moses' life in a "spiritual sense," he takes this persistence as indicative of how the pursuit of the good and the beautiful causes the appetite of one seeking them to grow without end. Part of the reason they do so is that virtuous activity, unlike other kinds of activity, leads not to exhaustion but to an increase in the capacity for such activity, along with an increase in the desire for it. Another part of the reason is that it is the nature of moral beauty (to kalon) to draw the soul forward to that beauty's transcendent source.

Hope always draws the soul from the beauty which is seen to what is beyond, always kindles the desire for the hidden through what is constantly perceived. Therefore, the ardent lover of beauty, although receiving what is always visible as an image of what he desires, yet longs to be filled with the very stamp of the archetype. (231)

One can hardly miss here the echoes of Plato's Symposium. Just as in the Symposium, sensible beauty is an image of a transcendent archetype, and therefore can—for the true and fervent lover—lead the soul upward to that archetype. Such borrowing raises the question of whether Gregory's Platonism leads him astray as a reader of Scripture. Exodus says nothing about the pursuit of the beautiful, nor about visible beauty being an "image" of an "archetype." On the other hand, the Old Testament does share with Plato a vivid sense that any revelation of the transcendent is always partial because it is limited by the capacity of those who receive it. It also presents such revelation as having precisely the property that Gregory attributes to it—that of drawing one who is rightly oriented, in faith and love, onward to seek more. I see no reason why Platonic language should not be used to formulate these insights. Of course one has to take care that such language does not get in the way of actually hearing the Biblical text. Whether it does so in the present case will have to be determined as we proceed.

Gregory next pauses to puzzle over the statement that no one can see God's face and live. He finds this troubling, for if God is Life itself, how can the sight of Him bring death? Gregory's answer is important
for what it reveals about his understanding of the relationship between being and intelligibility.

Scripture does not indicate that this [to see God’s face] causes the death of those who look, for how could the face of Life ever be the cause of death to those who approach it? On the contrary, the divine is by its nature life-giving. Yet the characteristic of the divine nature is to transcend all characteristics. Therefore, he who thinks God is something to be known does not have life, because he has turned from true Being (\(Io\)\(u\) \(o\)\(n\)\(t\)\(o\)\(s\) \(o\)\(n\)\(t\)\(o\)\(s\)) to what he considers by sense perception to have being. True Being is true Life. This Being is inaccessible to knowledge. . . . Thus, what Moses yearned for is satisfied by the very things which leave his desire unsatisfied. (234–35)

One again recognizes Gregory’s Platonism in the slighting reference to sense perception, and perhaps also in the identification of God with true Being and true Life. But these are only incidental to the main point of the passage, which is to dissociate God as Being from intelligibility. The linkage between being and intelligibility had been axiomatic for Greek philosophy at least since Parmenides. Gregory denies the association, not primarily because of any philosophical argument, but because of his reading of Scripture. In Exodus 3:14 God asserts, “I AM”; yet in the very act of doing so He remains beyond any name, more hidden than revealed. From this episode (and the Biblical theme that epitomizes) Gregory draws the lesson that “the characteristic of the divine nature is to transcend all characteristics.” Indeed, he adds that to think that God is an object of knowledge is to turn away from true Being to a phantom of one’s own making. It is in light of this radical apophaticism that Gregory reads Exodus 33. As Gregory sees it, God grants Moses’ desire to know Him precisely in remaining unknown, for anything that could be known would be only a substitute for God, not God Himself.

What then of the vision of the divine glory? Is not that a kind of knowledge? Gregory’s answer emerges gradually in the course of the subsequent exegesis. He notes that the “perpetual progress” of Moses into virtue is in a sense a kind of standing still, for “the firmer and more immovable one remains in the Good, the more he progresses in the course of virtue” (243). That leads Gregory (following a hint in St. Paul) to identify the rock in which Moses is placed with Christ, the summation of all good.

For, since Christ is understood by Paul as the rock (I Cor. 10:4), all hope of good things is believed to be in Christ, in whom we have learned all the treasures of good things to be. He who finds any good finds it in Christ who contains all good. (248)

For Gregory, of course, Christ is himself the One who spoke to Moses on the mount. What is indicated symbolically by Moses’ placement in the rock is that to see God is to be a follower of God, and, more particularly, a follower of Christ. That at last brings Gregory to his explanation of why only the “back parts” of God can be seen, but not the face.
He who follows sees the back. So Moses, who eagerly seeks to behold God, is now taught how he can behold Him: to follow God wherever He might lead is to behold God. . . . For he who moves to one side or brings himself to face his guide assumes another direction for himself than the one his guide shows him. Therefore, He [God] says to the one who is led, "My face is not to be seen," that is, "Do not face your guide." If he does so, his course will certainly be in the opposite direction, for good does not look good in the face, but follows it. (251-53)

This passage makes plain how Gregory understands Moses’ vision of the divine glory. Moses did not approach God as “something to be known”—that is, as an object that can be understood objectively, apart from personal commitment. To do so is to attempt to look God in the “face” rather than to follow Him. One who does so “turns from true Being to what he considers by sense perception to have being,” a way that can only lead to death. Moses instead sought to know God by seeking the good and the beautiful, and ultimately by finding refuge in the “rock,” the absolute Good that is Christ. His vision of the divine glory is his experiential knowledge of God as a follower of Christ.

Although Gregory does not allude to John 17, it is easy to see how his exegesis could be applied to that passage. Christ has shared his eternal glory with his disciples precisely in that they are those who follow him. It is by following him that they come to know him, and through him, to know the Father. In doing so they enter into the mutual love of the Father and Son that is manifested in the divine glory from “before the foundation of the world.”

I have dwelt on Gregory’s Life of Moses because it illustrates well both the Platonism of the Fathers and their anti-Platonism. Gregory is a Platonist in that he identifies God with the aim of all striving—the Good and the Beautiful—as well as with true Being. He is also a Platonist in that he sees visible manifestations of goodness and beauty as images of a divine archetype. Where he parts company with Plato is his insistence that God is not an object of conceptual knowledge, but can be known only experientially, as a follower of Christ. For Gregory, of course, this entails a commitment to follow the commandments of the Gospel. Yet insofar as Gregory identifies Christ with the absolute Good, he would presumably recognize anyone who truly seeks the good and the beautiful as in some sense a follower of Christ. This is a large question that I do not wish to enter into here, save to note that Gregory’s position contains the possibility of development in that direction.

More to the point, for our purposes, is the use Gregory makes of the concept of Being. Reading Exodus 3:14 in light of his Platonism and his anti-Platonism, Gregory identifies God with true Being, yet denies that God as Being is an object of conceptual knowledge. One finds a similar combination of Platonism and anti-Platonism in a striking passage from Gregory’s colleague, St. Gregory Nazianzen. For Gregory Nazianzen, as for Gregory of Nyssa, it is precisely the unknowability of God that draws us forward to seek Him.
In Himself [God] sums up and contains all being, having neither beginning in the past nor end in the future; like some great sea of being, limitless and unbounded, transcending all conception of time and nature, only adumbrated by the mind, and that very dimly and scantily—not from the things directly concerning Him, but from the things around Him (peri auton); one image being got from one source and another from another, and combined into some sort of presentation of the truth, which escapes us when we have caught it, and takes to flight when we have conceived it, blazing forth upon our master-part, even when that is cleansed, as the lightning flash which will not stay its course does upon our sight—in order as I conceive by that part of it which we can comprehend to draw us to itself . . . and by that part of it which we cannot comprehend to move our wonder, and as an object of wonder to become more an object of desire, and being desired to purify, and by purifying to make us like God.\(^{18}\)

Precisely because God “sums up and contains all being,” He is not to be known directly, but only from the things “around” Him. From these we obtain images that can be combined into “some sort of presentation of the truth,” one that, like a flash of lightning, escapes us even as it illuminates everything. Thus the unknowability of God, far from rendering Him irrelevant to human life, draws us onward to seek Him, and this desire in turn purifies us, making us “like God.”

To speak of being made “like God” may seem extravagant. Yet is it any more so than Christ’s description of his disciples as participants in the divine glory, or than Paul’s description of the divine “energy” at work within him? We can gain some insight into the Cappadocians’ approach to these questions from St. Basil the Great. Basil’s work *On the Holy Spirit* (circa 375) includes an extensive discussion of the gifts of the Spirit. He emphasizes that the bestowal of these gifts is in no way a division of the Spirit, for the Spirit is wholly present in each gift. The appearance of division arises, not from the Spirit, but from the varying capacities of the recipients.

[The Spirit is] by nature unapproachable, apprehended by reason of its goodness, filling all things with its power, but communicated only to the worthy; not shared in one measure, but distributing its energy (energeian) according to the proportion of faith; in essence simple, in powers various, wholly present in each and being wholly present everywhere; impassively divided and shared without loss, after the likeness of the sunbeam, whose kindly light falls on him who enjoys it as though it shone for him alone, yet illumines land and sea and mingles with the air. So, too, is the Spirit to everyone who receives it, as though given to him alone, and yet it sends forth grace sufficient and full for all mankind, and is enjoyed by all who share it, according to the capacity, not of its power, but of their nature.\(^{19}\)

One is reminded of how Moses is able to perceive only the “back parts” of God: the limitation is not one in God Himself, but in Moses’ ability to apprehend Him.\(^{20}\) In the same way, although the Spirit is wholly present
in His energies, He is received only in proportion to the capacity—that is, the faith—of the recipient. (Basil's reference to faith shows that when he speaks of the Spirit as given to “the worthy,” he does not mean worth in the sense of merit, but as the desire and readiness to receive such a gift.) Basil goes on to point out that to participate in the divine energy in this way results not only in particular miraculous acts but in enduring and habitual states of the soul.

As is the power of seeing in the healthy eye, so is the energy of the Spirit in the purified soul. . . . And as the skill in him who has acquired it, so is the grace of the Spirit ever present in the recipient, though not continuously active (energousa). For as the skill is potentially in the artisan, but only in operation (energeiai) when he is working in accordance with it, so also the Spirit is present with those who are worthy, but works (energei) as need requires, in prophecies, or in healings, or in some other carrying into effect (energēmasin) of His powers.21

In other words, to be a participant in the divine energy is not just a momentary contact with divine power, but a thoroughgoing transformation. It is in that sense that one can legitimately speak of becoming “like God.”

Of course God is active not only in a special way in the Church, but in various forms throughout all creation. Thus there is not only the energy of the Spirit in the Church, but also, as St. Paul puts it, “the energy whereby he [God] is able to subdue all things unto himself” (Phil. 3:21, my trans.). St. Basil also uses the term in this broader sense. One point where he does so is particularly helpful for clarifying the relationship between the Cappadocians’ apophaticism and their understanding of divine revelation. Eunomius, a prominent Arian of the later fourth century, had maintained that the divine essence (ousia) can be known. One of his arguments was that otherwise we would be in the absurd position of worshipping what we do not know. He further maintained that, since God is simple, any property attributed to Him must in fact be a description of the divine essence. In his Epistle 234, Basil replies:

We say that we know the greatness of God, His power, His wisdom, His goodness, His providence over us, and the justness of His judgment, but not His very essence (ousia). . . . But God, he [Eunomius, or a Eunomian objector] says, is simple, and whatever attribute of Him you have reckoned as knowable is of His essence. The absurdities involved in this sophism are innumerable. When all these high attributes have been enumerated, are they all names of one essence? And is there the same mutual force in His awfulness and His loving-kindness, His justice and His creative power, His foreknowledge and His requital, His majesty and His providence? In mentioning any of these, do we declare His essence? . . . The energies are various, and the essence simple, but we say that we know our God from His energies, but do not undertake to approach near to His essence. His energies come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach.22
Here Basil identifies God’s greatness, power, wisdom, goodness, providence, and justice not as attributes, but as activities or energies (energeiai). The meaning of this passage has been much debated, and here I will merely state the conclusion that I have argued for elsewhere. The distinction between God’s essence and energy is much like that in the passage quoted from Gregory Nazianzen between “that part of it [i.e., the divine nature] which we can comprehend” and “that part of it which we cannot comprehend.” In other words, it is the distinction between a source and its manifestation. Despite the language of “parts,” it is not a distinction of parts in any normal sense, spatiotemporal or otherwise. Both Basil and Gregory are speaking of a single God who acts, and in so doing manifests Himself even as He remains unknowable. This is, as we have seen, the repeated pattern of Biblical revelation. God as He is manifested, “the part which we can comprehend,” is what Basil terms the divine energies; God as He is in Himself, “the part which we cannot comprehend,” is what Basil terms the divine essence.

There are two major advantages to speaking of essence and energies, ousia and energeiai, rather than “parts.” One is in reminding us that God’s manifestation always takes the form of activity. Even God’s greatness, power, wisdom, goodness, providence, and justice are “merely” divine energies, in the sense that they are determinate patterns or forms of divine activity. God Himself remains ineffably beyond them. He is never to be equated with (in the sense of brought fully under) any conceptual determination, including even these, which are the highest that human language can bestow. To do so is to commit the error denounced by Gregory of Nyssa, that of thinking that God is “something to be known.”

The other advantage is in reminding us that the manifestation of God in His activity is not merely a kind of show or spectacle, for God gives Himself only that He may be shared. Gregory Nazianzen makes this point by observing the subtle dialectic of “the part which we can comprehend” and “the part which we cannot comprehend” in calling us forward to become “like God.” Basil makes the same point by drawing upon the Pauline description of the gifts of the Spirit as “energies,” God as He is present to us and as we can know Him through our own activity. Although Gregory of Nyssa in the Life of Moses does not use the term energeia, he too is making a similar point. To behold God, to share in the divine glory, is to follow Him; there is no other way.

Let us return now to the question I raised at the outset of this paper—that of whether the divine glory is God or a creature. For the Cappadocians, the answer is that it is God as He is manifested (His “back parts”) but not as He is in Himself (His “face”). In other words, the divine glory of the Old Testament and the divine energeia of the New Testament are one and the same. Although the Cappadocians do not explicitly state this identity, it seems to be implied by much that they do say. For example, consider the use made of Exodus 33 by Gregory Nazianzen as he describes his own spiritual experience:

What is this that has happened to me, O friends and initiates and fellow lovers of the truth? I was running up to lay hold on God, and thus I went up into the mount, and drew aside the curtain of
the cloud, and entered away from matter and material things, and as far as I could I withdrew within myself. And then when I looked up I scarce saw the back parts of God, although I was sheltered by the rock, the Word that was made flesh for us. And when I looked a little closer I saw, not the first and unmingled nature, known to itself—to the Trinity, I mean; not that which abides within the first veil and is hidden by the Cherubim, but only that nature which at last reaches even to us. And that is, so far as I can tell, the majesty, or as holy David calls it, the glory which is manifested among the creatures, which it has produced and governs. For these [i.e., majesty and glory] are the “back parts” of God, which He leaves behind Him, as tokens of Himself like the shadows and reflections of the sun in the water, which show the sun to our weak eyes because we cannot look at the sun itself.25

We notice here the same distinction as in Basil between “that nature which at last reaches even to us,” identified here with the divine glory, and “that which . . . is hidden by the Cherubim.” Just as in Basil, the “nature which reaches even to us” is God Himself insofar as we are able to receive Him. Although Gregory does not use here the terms ousia and energia, there can be little doubt that the distinction is the same. Later Greek Fathers use more or less interchangeably the language of “energy” and of “glory” for describing God as He is manifested and as He can be shared by creatures.26

The Cappadocians were, along with St. Athanasius and St. Ambrose, the most prominent and authoritative Church Fathers of the fourth century. It is surely surprising that their distinction between the divine essence and energies, God in Himself and as He “reaches down to us,” has played so little role in western theology. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that most of the works we have cited were not translated into Latin during the Middle Ages.27 That alone was not decisive, however, for there were various channels of indirect influence, such as the Divine Names of St. Dionysius the Areopagite and On the Orthodox Faith by St. John of Damascus, both of them based largely on the thought of the Cappadocians. More decisive in the long run was the massive influence of Augustine. I have pointed out elsewhere how sharply Augustine’s philosophical theology, and especially his understanding of divine simplicity, is at odds with the Greek patristic tradition.28 Particularly significant for our purposes is how it constrained western interpretations of the divine glory.

In Books II and III of On the Trinity Augustine discusses at length a wide range of theophanies: the angels who visited Abraham and Lot, the burning bush, the fiery pillar that followed the Israelites in the wilderness, the cloud atop Mt. Sinai, the dove that descended upon Christ at his baptism, and the tongues of flame at Pentecost. His fundamental premise is that “the substance of the one and only God . . . remains ever not only invisible, but also unchangeable.”29 On this basis he urges his readers to deny “that God . . . ever appeared to bodily eyes, except through a corporeal creature made subject to His own power.”30 It will be noticed that behind this exhortation there seems to be a missing premise—namely, that if God is to appear to bodily eyes it must be either in His substance or through a created medium. We will return to this point in a moment. Since the
divine substance is invisible, Augustine goes on to identify all of the Biblical theophanies as creatures—whether angels taking bodily form, or creatures expressly created for the purpose by God, or (as possibly in the case of the dove) a vision seen not with bodily eyes but with the spirit alone. The second category is the most important. Within it he places the burning bush, the fiery pillar, the cloud, the tongues of flame, and possibly the dove, stating that “the corporeal form of these things came into being for the very purpose that it might signify something and then pass away.”

What about the vision of the divine glory in Exodus 33? Here, too, he denies that “not the creature serving God, but that itself which is God (hoc ipsum quod Deus est) appeared to the eyes of a mortal man.” Interpreting the passage figuratively, he identifies God’s “face” with the divine nature, His “back parts” with Christ in the flesh, and the rock with the faith of the Catholic Church. Although he does not explicitly discuss the divine glory in relation to Exodus 33, clearly his view at this point implies that it was a “creature serving God.” Later he appears to have changed his mind. In the Literal Interpretation of Genesis and an epistle entitled On the Vision of God he concedes that Moses, along with St. Paul (in the rapture described in II Corinthians 12), enjoyed a direct vision of the divine substance. The vision was not through corporeal eyes, however, but by the intellect, much like that of the blessed in heaven. In fact it would appear that the “intellectual vision” he ascribes to Moses and Paul became for Augustine the template for understanding the beatific vision. Thus in his developed thought Augustine takes the divine glory seen by Moses as equivalent to the divine substance.

For our purposes the important point is that Augustine consistently assumes that the object of vision must be either the divine substance or a creature. The explanation for this assumption lies in his doctrine of divine simplicity. Augustine holds that God’s being (esse) and that which He is (the divine essentia) are one and the same, and furthermore that both are identical with God’s essential attributes. As he explains in the On the Trinity:

In the Godhead is absolutely simple essence (summe simplex essentia), and therefore to be is there the same as to be wise (hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere). . . . For what to be wise is to wisdom, and to be able is to power, and to be eternal is to eternity, and to be just to justice, and to be great to greatness, that being itself is to essence. And since in the divine simplicity to be wise is nothing else than to be, therefore wisdom is there the same as essence.

He puts the same point in the City of God as that the divine nature “is what it has.” In the Confessions it appears as that in God “to be and to live are not different things, since to be in the highest degree and to live in the highest degree are the same.” Whatever else one might make of these statements, clearly they leave no room for a tertium quid such as the divine glory or divine energy, understood as both truly God and not identical to the divine essence.

How quickly Augustine’s views on this subject became authoritative for the West can be seen in Pope Gregory the Great. In his Moralia in Job Gregory writes:
Some have said that even in beatitude God will be contemplated in His glory (claritatem) but will not be seen in His nature. Assuredly they have been led astray by a lack of exactness in inquiry. For that simple and immutable essence, nature cannot be one thing and glory another, but its very nature is its glory, and its very glory its nature.

Like Augustine, Gregory understands the Biblical theophanies as occurring through created intermediaries. He also affirms that the blessed will enjoy a direct vision of the divine essence in the afterlife. The teaching of Augustine and Gregory on these points was widely disseminated, not only through their own works, but by its inclusion during the twelfth century in the *Glossa ordinaria* (the standard medieval Biblical commentary) and the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.

However, there remained one last window of opportunity, as it were, when the theology of the Greek Fathers made a bid to achieve some influence within the Latin tradition. Eriugena had incorporated aspects of the Greek view in his *Periphyseon*, especially in his understanding of theophany as a divine manifestation that is truly God (and not a creature) and yet not identical to the divine substance. He also held, with the Greeks, that the divine essence is an object of knowledge neither in the present life nor in the afterlife. During the later twelfth and early thirteenth century the works of Eriugena enjoyed something of a vogue, aided no doubt by the increased circulation of the Dionysian corpus (in the recent translation of John Sarracen) and the translation of *On the Orthodox Faith*. A number of authors at this time, such as Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St.-Cher, endorsed the Eriugenian understanding of theophany, thereby at least implicitly rejecting the Augustinian teaching about the beatific vision.

Unfortunately the views of Eriugena were suspect because of their association with pantheism, and any attempt to understand the Greek tradition independently in its own terms remained hampered by inadequate access to the sources. In 1225 the *Periphyseon* was condemned and ordered burnt by Pope Honorius III. This action did not imply the condemnation of all of Eriugena's views, and a number of authors (such as Alexander and Hugh) continued to side with Eriugena on the points that we have examined. The decisive action was taken in 1241 in a council at the University of Paris. There a number of propositions apparently of Greek inspiration were condemned, among them that “the divine essence will be seen in itself by neither man nor angel.” This effectively ruled out of court, not only the view of the afterlife held by the Greek Fathers, but the entire apophatic foundation of their theology. Coupled with the continuing authority of the *Glossa ordinaria* and the *Sentences*, it signaled a decisive victory for the native Augustinianism of the West over the eastern alternative. Aquinas, as is well known, adopts the Augustinian understanding of divine simplicity as the cornerstone of his philosophical theology. He also adopts the other essential features of the Augustinian view: the created nature of the theophanies, the vision of the divine essence in the afterlife, and the foreshadowing of that vision in the raptures of Moses and Paul.

In later scholasticism, controversy over these issues was limited to various subordinate questions, such as whether the beatific vision occurs imme-
diately upon death or only after the resurrection. There was also some
disagreement regarding whether St. Benedict, whose vision of the divine
light is recorded by Pope Gregory, actually beheld the divine essence (as
did Moses and Paul) or only a created intermediary. The very terms in
which these questions were posed reveal the pervasiveness of the Augus­
tinian framework.

Here at last is the explanation of the "conspiracy of neglect" I men­
tioned at the outset of this paper. The divine glory has not appeared to
western philosophical theology as a significant topic because of a tacit
assumption that any such "glory" must either be something created, or
simply another name for the divine being. Even more is this true of the di­
vine energies. Likewise the apophaticism which the Greek Fathers rightly
recognized in Scripture, and which is the essential complement to their
emphasis on the knowledge of God by partaking in the divine glory (or
energies), has largely been lost. The reason is that, if there is to be a vi­
sion of the divine essence in the afterlife, then God is in Himself intrinsi­
cally intelligible, however much we may be unable to apprehend Him in
our current state. The locus of mystery in God accordingly shifts from
God Himself to the limitations of our current bodily and temporal ways
of knowing.

For most philosophers today the Augustinian understanding of divine
simplicity holds little appeal. Even its Thomistic version, which is consid­
erably more sophisticated than that of Augustine, seems to have few ad­
erents except among committed Thomists. I have elsewhere provided
reasons why I believe that the Thomistic version will not do. What has
perhaps not been widely enough recognized is that once the Augustinian­
Thomistic understanding of divine simplicity goes, then the constraints it
imposed upon western theology and Biblical exegesis must go along with
it. My goal here has been to show that this is very much a change for the
better. It need not be, and indeed should not be, a revolt against ortho­
doxy. The Christian tradition has always contained the resources for a view
of God that is both philosophically cogent and Scripturally sound. All we
have to do is to look to the East.

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NOTES

1. Biblical quotations are from the King James Version.
2. For other appearances of the divine glory in the Tabernacle see Lev.
72:19.
4. Note also John 13:31–32, where the Son of man both has been and will be
 glorified.
5. See Rom. 8:17–18, I Cor. 2:7, II Cor. 3:18, 4:17, I Thess. 2:12, Heb. 2:10, I
Peter 4:13–14, 5:1, 4, 10.
6. See my Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christen­

8. That energeuméne in this verse is passive and not middle (as taken by the KJV) has been argued by Joseph B. Mayor, The Epistle of St. James: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Comments (London and New York: Macmillan, 1892), pp. 177–79, and J. Armitage Robinson, St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: A Revised Text and Translation with Exposition and Notes (London and New York: Macmillan, 1903), pp. 244–47. I defend and elaborate their position in the above-mentioned paper.

9. For example, Romans 7, II Corinthians 11–12, Galatians 1–2, Philippians 3.

10. See the way that the Spirit departs from Saul and rests upon David at I Samuel 16:13–14. On the other hand, elsewhere in the same book the Spirit seems to be with Saul only intermittently (10:10, 11:6, 19-23).

11. Besides the passages discussed here, see I Cor. 3:9, II Cor. 6:1, Gal. 2:8, Eph. 1:19–20, Phil. 3:21, I Thess. 2:13, 3:2, II Thess. 2:9, 11.

12. See also the similar story at Judges 13:18. (Although the interlocutor in Judges is identified as "the angel of the Lord," v. 22 indicates that he is in some sense God.)


16. Life of Moses II.226. One is reminded of Aristotle's analysis of moral virtue as "habit," although Gregory does not himself mention the connection.

17. But see Exodus 3:14 and John 14:6, respectively.

18. Orations 38.7. Greek text in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857–1866) (= PG), vol. 36, 317B–C; translation in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982 [reprint]) (= NPNF), Series II, vol. 7, pp. 346–47. My quotations from NPNF are freely modified. See also Orations 30.17: "For neither has anyone yet breathed the whole air, nor has any mind entirely comprehended or speech exhaustively contained the essence (ousia) of God. But we sketch the things directly concerning Him from the things around Him, and so obtain a certain faint and feeble and sequential mental image" (PG 36 125B; NPNF II.7, p. 316).


22. Basil, Epistle 234.1 (PG 32 868C–869B; NPNF II.8, p. 274). See also similar statements in Basil, Against Eunomius 1.8 and 14 (PG 29 528B–C, 544B–C).
23. See *Aristotle East and West*, pp. 164–70.
24. Some caution is in order here because much of the Cappadocians’ work was occasioned by controversies (such as that with Eunomius) in which the divine glory was not particularly prominent. Thus one must tease out their view from various incidental allusions such as those I have cited. It is worth noting that when Gregory of Nyssa discusses the divine glory in John 17, he simply identifies it with the Holy Spirit. (See *In illud: Tunc et ipse Filius*, as printed in *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, ed. Werner Jaeger et al. [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960–1996], vol. III.2, pp. 21–22; *In Canticum Canticorum* 15, ibid., vol. 6, p. 467.) Clearly Gregory is here governed by his polemical purpose of defending the divinity of the Holy Spirit.
30. Ibid. (*NPNF* I.3, pp. 44–45).
31. Ibid., II.6.11 (*NPNF* I.3, p. 43). Later he suggests that the burning bush might instead have been an angel “who by special dispensation bore the person of his Lord” (II.13.23).
32. Ibid., II.16.26 (PL 42 863; *NPNF* I.3, p. 50).
33. Ibid., II.17.28–30.
35. *On the Trinity* VII.1.2 (PL 42 936; *NPNF* I.3, p. 106). For other statements on divine simplicity see V.10.11, VI.7.8, XV.5.7–8, 13.22, 17.29.
39. Ibid., XVIII.54.88.
40. Ibid., XVIII.54.91.
41. See *Periphe!eon* I.7–10, III.4, V.23.
42. Ibid., I.3, 8–10.
45. See *De Veritate*, Q. 13, esp. art. 2; *Summa Contra Gentiles* III.47.2–3, 51; *Summa Theologicae* I, Q. 12, II-II, Q. 175. In all of these texts Aquinas cites Augustine as his authority. See also Dominic J. O’Meara, “Eriugena and Aquinas on the Beatific Vision,” *Eriugena Redivivus*, ed. Werner Beierwaltes (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1987), pp. 224–36, for an excellent contrast of these two authors.
91, and the references there cited. The controversy was decided in favor of an immediate vision by Pope Benedict XII in 1336.


51. I would like to thank audiences at the National Faculty Leadership Conference (June, 2004), the Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Division (December, 2004), and the Society for Orthodox Philosophy in America (February, 2005), as well as Lydia McGrew and the anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.