Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 6

1-1-2006

Grace and Freedom: Examining Stump's View of the Quiescent Will

Ian DeWeese-Boyd

GRACE AND FREEDOM: EXAMINING STUMP'S VIEW OF THE QUIESCENT WILL

Ian DeWeese-Boyd

In her recent book, *Aquinas*,[1] Eleonore Stump proposes a way of understanding God's operative grace that both preserves human free will and avoids Pelagianism. Stump's proposal, drawn from Aquinas's treatment of grace and free will, relies on the notion that the will has three positions, not two: assent, rejection, or quiescence, a state in which the will neither assents nor rejects but is, as it were, turned off. Because a person has control over her will's movement from rejection to quiescence, Stump contends that God can operate on her will, moving it to accept grace without destroying her freedom. In this essay, I examine Stump's proposal, arguing that a person whose will is quiescent may nevertheless have her freedom destroyed if God operates directly on her will in certain instances. I, then, offer a friendly modification of Stump's account that rules out such cases and still avoids Pelagianism.

Eleonore Stump has taken up the relation of grace and free will in the context of Augustine and Aquinas's treatment of these issues, most recently devoting an entire chapter of her book, *Aquinas*, to it.[2] Stump proposes a way of understanding God's operative grace that both preserves human free will and avoids Pelagianism. Stump's proposal, drawn from Aquinas's treatment of grace and free will, relies on the notion that the will has three positions, not two: it can assent to something, it can reject something, or it can simply be turned off with regard to something, a state that she refers to as *quiescence*. When the will is quiescent with regard to grace, it neither wills grace nor rejects it. Stump's claim is that when the will is turned off in this way, God can operate on it, moving it to accept grace without destroying the individual's freedom. The will to accept grace, then, is not produced by the person without grace, a form of the Pelagian heresy. Whether grace operates is ultimately up to the person, because whether her will becomes quiescent—whether she ceases to reject grace or not—is up to her. In this essay, I argue that a person whose will is quiescent in the way Stump describes may nevertheless have her freedom destroyed if God, or anyone else, operates directly on that will (section III). I, then, offer a friendly modification of Stump's account that rules out such cases and still avoids Pelagianism (section IV). I begin with a examination of Stump's proposal in sections I and II.

I

In her essay, "Augustine on Free Will," Eleonore Stump draws on the three-position understanding of the will, found in Aquinas, to show how

Augustine's various claims about grace and free will might be understood to cohere. Considering this account helps to clarify Stump's proposal for reconciling God's operative grace with human free will.

Augustine held both that grace is the sole source of the will of faith and that human beings are free in a libertarian sense, although he was ultimately unable to articulate the compatibility of these things in Stump's view. The problem Augustine faced was this: if grace is not the sole source of the will of faith, then human beings are capable of turning to God on their own, rendering grace unnecessary and Pelagianism true.[3] If human beings are not responsible for having the will of faith—if it isn't up to them whether they have it—then among other things God seems responsible for the fact that some do not have the will of faith and seems unjust for punishing such people. Stump contends that

> Augustine's difficulties would be solved if he could find a way to hold that human beings are able, on their own, to reject grace, without God's being ultimately responsible for their doing so. Suppose that God offers to every person the grace that produces the will of faith, but that it is open to a person to refuse that grace. Then faith would be a gift of God, but it would be up to a human person whether he had such a will or not.[4]

Augustine doesn't accept such a solution according to Stump, because in his view it implies that human persons have the ability to assent to grace—the Pelagian heresy he wishes to reject. Augustine believes that failing to reject grace implies assent to it, because he thinks rejection and assent are the only possible volitional positions. Here the possibility of a third volitional position allows for a resolution of Augustine's dilemma. Stump proposes the notion of a quiescent will as a "friendly suggestion" to help Augustine:

> When it [the will] is quiescent, it doesn't refuse grace, but it doesn't accept it either. It is thus possible to hold that a human person has it in her power to refuse grace or to fail to refuse grace without also holding that she has it in her power to form the good act of will which is the assent to grace.[5]

Stump goes on to clarify how the possibility of a quiescent will resolves Augustine's dilemma. Accordingly, she lays out the following theological assumptions:

> (1) God is constantly offering grace to every human being in such a way that if a person doesn't refuse that grace, she receives it and it produces in her the will of faith. (2) Normal adult human beings in a post-Fall condition who are not converted or in the process of being converted refuse grace continually, even if they are not aware of doing so. (3) Ceasing to refuse grace is accompanied by an understanding that grace will follow and that grace would not follow if the refusal of grace were continued. (4) It is solely up to a human person whether or not she refuses grace.[6]

When a person's will becomes quiescent with respect to rejecting grace, she ceases actively to refuse grace. Her will has moved from rejection to quiescence, stopping short of acceptance. Such a person, then, does not accept grace even though she no longer rejects it. In view of Stump's assumptions, people whose wills have become quiescent in this way receive the grace God is constantly offering. Specifically, Stump says, "once their wills are quiescent, God acts on their will in such a way as to move them to the acceptance of grace, which is the will of faith."[7] The will of faith, then, is God's free gift, and yet the individual is ultimately in control of whether she receives this gift. Since it is ultimately up to the individual whether or not to cease to refuse grace, God's operation depends upon the movement of the agent's will from rejection to quiescence. Thus, while it is true that God's grace is the sole source of the good will of faith, human beings are nevertheless free in a libertarian sense[8] with regard to the operation of this grace. More precisely, Stump's claim is that "a person can have libertarian freedom even if God determines her will at both the first- and second-order level, *provided only that it is up to her whether or not God acts on her will, so that her own intellect and will are the first and ultimate determiner of the final state of her will*."[9] Stump doesn't claim that this story is true or that Augustine would have accepted it. She is also careful to point out that this solution isn't problem free.[10] Her only aim is to demonstrate that if such a story were true, Augustine's views on grace and human freedom would be coherent. Her argument is that this view of quiescence allows one to hold that the will of faith is caused by God, that human beings are free in a libertarian sense with respect to having the will of faith, and that human beings nevertheless do no good thing in the process of coming to faith.

To determine whether this solution succeeds in showing that Augustine is right to hold that the will of faith is solely the work of God and that human beings are free in a libertarian sense regarding the will of faith, we must examine the details of Stump's account of the movement of the will from rejection to quiescence.

II

The view that the will has three positions rather than two is one that Stump finds in Aquinas's treatment of grace and free will. Her discussion of Aquinas's position, therefore, yields details essential for determining whether the account sketched out above resolves the problem of grace and free will in the way Stump suggests. My concern here is not whether Stump's interpretations of Augustine or Aquinas are right, rather my concern is whether the solution Stump offers succeeds in resolving the dilemma set by Augustine and discussed by Aquinas. Accordingly, I focus on those elements of Stump's treatment of Aquinas's understanding of faith, grace and free will directly relevant to the notion of quiescence.

There are a variety of paths that lead to the will's quiescence. One's will might be quiescent with regard to some action as a result of one's failure to attend intellectually to whether the action should be done or not. One might fail to attend intentionally, directing one's attention elsewhere; or unintentionally, as when one's attention is gripped by something else or simply has never been directed toward considering the act in question.[11]

In Stump's view, God's operating on a person's will is permissible in that it does not violate her freedom, only in the case that the agent attends to the act in question but fails to form a will regarding it as a result of deep intellectual division. She refers to this variety of quiescence as *abstention*. Since Stump's account of quiescence in general and this form of it in particular is based on Aquinas's view of the will and intellect, a brief overview of this aspect of Aquinas's psychology is needed before turning to Stump's account.

On Aquinas's view of the will, a person wills to do some action or bring about some state of affairs when her intellect represents that action or state of affairs as a good to be pursued (good here is not restricted to moral good but ranges over all positive value). Aquinas's understanding is that the will is an inclination or appetite for goodness (in the unrestricted sense just mentioned). The intellect moves the will by presenting it with an understanding of the best thing to do, or state of affairs to bring about, in a particular set of circumstances. The will, when it is moved by the intellect in this way, is moved with final causality in Aquinas's view. The will, however, also moves the intellect by means of efficient causality—as when it turns intellect's gaze away from or toward consideration of some action.[12] When the will moves the intellect in this way, however, it does so only because the intellect presents such movement as the good to be pursued in those circumstances.[13]

With the rudiments of Aquinas's understanding of will and intellect in view, we are now in a position to consider in greater detail the form of quiescence that Stump contends allows God to operate on the will without violating its freedom, namely, *abstention*. When the will is in this state, it is quiescent with regard to some action because the intellect is deeply divided over whether to assent or reject that action and so *abstains* from making a judgment either way. In these cases, the will falls slack—becomes quiescent regarding the action in question—because the intellect cannot reach a single conclusion regarding the action. The will moves from rejecting the action to quiescence in this instance, because the intellect recognizes reasons for assenting to the action that counter-balance the reasons it recognizes for rejecting it. The intellect's recognition of these countervailing reasons results in the intellect's inability to resolve itself regarding what should be done. And this failure leads to the will's quiescence.[14] Stump offers the following illustration involving a person with a deep phobia of needles who needs a shot to prevent his allergic reaction to a bee sting from having fatal consequences but who, because of this phobia, cannot bring himself to assent to having the shot.

> In the grip of a terror of needles, the intellect of the phobic person in the bee sting case is vehemently opposed to the idea of letting the doctor give the needed injection, and so the phobic's will rejects yielding to the doctor. But there is a side of his intellect that also understands the importance of the injection. It is a side that has been ineffective in the face of the phobic's passionate fear of needles. But the doctor's importunities and exhortations may strengthen it significantly, by calling to the forefront of the phobic's mind something he had suppressed, by actualizing beliefs the phobic was antecedently

> disposed to believe but didn't attend to, and/or by trying to build some passion on the other side of the issue. By these means on the part of the doctor, the phobic's intellect may come to find much more significant and weighty the considerations for letting the doctor give him the shot.[15]

In this example, the phobic never assents to the doctor's giving him the injection—the doctor's persuasion hasn't accomplished this much. Persuasion has merely got the phobic person to cease actively resisting the doctor's giving him the injection; the phobic's will has moved from rejection to quiescence. Because of the doctor's persuasion, the reasons for assenting to the injection are roughly equal in weight to those for rejecting the injection. The result is that the phobic is double-minded about what he should do. As Stump explains, since his "intellect becomes locked in indecision, unable to resolve the conflict within itself into a single, integrated judgment," the phobic's will becomes quiescent.[16] The will becomes inactive in such a case, *because* the intellect is divided and hence unable to present the will with a single thing to do in the circumstances. In other words, the intellect's division is instrumental in the will's becoming quiescent.[17] The movement to quiescence in such a case counts as driving out rejection because the will's falling silent with regard to rejecting the injection marks the end of the person's active resistance to the injection. While he maintains his phobia of needles, the phobic recognizes that the reasons for accepting the rejection are weighty enough to warrant his ceasing to resist the injection.

Let us now return to the original dilemma with which Augustine struggled to see how quiescence resolves it. A normal post-fall person's will rejects the grace on offer by God, until her intellect comes to appreciate reasons for accepting grace that are weighty enough to counter-balance her reasons for rejecting grace but not weighty enough for her intellect to judge acceptance to be the good she should pursue in the circumstances. This division in her intellect results in its inability to issue a judgment for rejection or assent to the will with the consequence that her will becomes quiescent—she ceases to refuse grace. In Stump's view, when the will becomes quiescent in this way, God can operate on the will in such a way that he directly causes the will to accept grace thereby causing the person to form a second-order volition for a righteous will (what Stump refers to as simply "the will of faith"). Accordingly, in Stump's view, while God alone is the cause of a person's assent to grace, the person is free in a libertarian sense because it is up to her whether she fails to refuse grace or not.

A number of questions can be raised regarding the details of Stump's solution. I want to focus on just one: Is it the case that God's moving an agent's will from the sort of quiescence Stump specifies to assent compatible with that agent's libertarian freedom? By considering the entire volitional configuration an agent might have—specifically the higher-order desires—I argue we are able to discern cases in which God's operating on a person's quiescent will would violate that person's freedom. With these cases in mind, I suggest a friendly modification of Stump's proposal, which I think preserves the agent's freedom without veering into Pelagianism.

III

A person whose will has become quiescent in the way Stump specifies may have a variety of attitudes toward her quiescent will and toward the prospect of its being moved one direction or the other. For example, a reforming alcoholic, who desires that he wills to resist taking a drink, clearly would not want his will, should it become quiescent during a moment of temptation, to be moved to will to take a drink. Similarly, a person who is trying to overcome his disposition not to drink, a disposition he has inherited from his teetotalling parents perhaps, might be glad to see his quiescent will moved to assent to taking a drink, because he wants a will to drink. The higher-order attitudes one holds toward one's quiescent will, accordingly, seem to require our attention if we are to determine the conditions under which operating on a person's quiescent will is violent or not. Considering the higher-order attitudes one can take towards one's will—i.e., considering what sort of will one wants—is thus crucial for understanding the conditions under which God can operate on one's will without violating one's freedom. Such a consideration also sheds light on why a person would allow God to operate on her will, when previously she had resisted such operation.

In the following paragraphs I explore the various attitudes a person can have toward her quiescent will, focusing on four possibilities. First, a person might be deeply divided about what will she wants to have. Second, she might want to have a quiescent will. Lastly, she might want her quiescent will to be moved, in the case of grace, either to reject grace or to accept it.[18] I will argue that while the first and last of these attitudes do not represent obstacles to God's operation, the second and third cases do.

Deep-Division:

A person may be deeply-divided at the higher-order level regarding whether she wants a will to reject or assent to something. Such a person can't be described as someone who doesn't care what will she has, despite her having no resolved higher-order desires regarding her will. She cares about her will, but is double-minded about what will she wants to have.

In a case of this sort, it might appear that someone's acting to move this person's quiescent will to assent to something would destroy her freedom. In the case of grace, the person in question is divided at the first-order level about whether to will to refuse grace or accept it. She is also divided at the second-order level about whether she wants a will that refuses grace or one that accepts it. Because she is so divided, her will is quiescent with respect to refusing grace with the consequence that she ceases actively refusing grace. If God operates on her quiescent will at this point, moving it to assent to grace, it seems as if he has acted in violation of that part of the agent that wants a will to refuse grace. Since it is unresolved in her own mind what will she wants, God's moving her will gives her a will that she does not *wholeheartedly* wish to have. The only state of will that adequately matches this higher-order level division would seem to be a quiescent will. Accordingly, God's operating on this quiescent will would seem to violate the person's freedom.

Despite the worries just noted, several considerations suggest that a person who is deeply divided in this way would remain free even if God operated on her will. First, since this person has no volitions, at either the first-order or higher-order level, God can't be said to be acting against any of the person's volitions.[19] Secondly, insofar as she is divided at the second-order level, such a person isn't even resolved about whether she wants a will to reject grace or not. Consequently, God doesn't act against an ineffective, but resolved desire for a will other than one accepting grace. The reasons for wanting a will to accept grace are strong enough in such a person's mind to render her unable even to want a will that resists grace. In this sense, there is no resistance to God's operation at either the first or higher-order levels. Deep division, then, seems compatible with the agent's libertarian freedom, since it is ultimately up to the agent whether God acts on her will. Her will falls quiet, because her own intellect finds the reasons for refusing grace no longer outweigh those in favor of accepting it. Furthermore, at the higher-order level, her intellect finds the reasons for wanting a will that refuses grace no longer outweigh those in favor of wanting a will accepting it. Since the movement of the agent's will from active resistance to quiescence is under her control and she harbors no higher-order volitions or even resolved desires opposing God's operation, the agent is, to use Stump's words, "the first and ultimate determiner of the final state of her will."[20]

Resolved Quiescence:

Another attitude one might have toward one's quiescent will is to want to have such a will. Such a person might recognize that her will is quiescent and simultaneously form a higher-order level judgment that having, as it were, no will with respect to grace is the best state for her will to be in. Let us call this state resolved quiescence.

Imagine a Quaker meeting where the members are discussing whether they should do some action as a body. They will only act in case there is a consensus, but it is open to any member to stand aside and not vote. Take a member who stands aside because her will is quiescent with respect to the action; she neither wants to vote for it, nor to oppose it. By standing aside, she marks this quiescence. If her name were later to appear in the minutes among those voting for the action, she would rightly wish the record to be changed to reflect her actual position—quiescence. She not only is quiescent, but she is, decidedly quiescent. If a person had this sort of attitude toward her will with respect to accepting grace, it would appear that God's moving her quiescent will would violate her freedom. The reason that such action would violate her freedom is that such a person, despite being divided at the first-order level, is resolved at the higher-order level. She has a volition at the higher-order for a will that remains quiescent, because she does not want a will either to refuse grace or to accept it—she does not want her will moved from its quiescent state. Her higher-order volition, not her simple double-mindedness, is the primary cause of her having a quiescent will in this case. Acting on this quiescent will, then, would violate this volition on the part of the agent by externally causing her to have a will other than the one she wills to have. Consequently, she would not be the source of such a will, nor would it be up

to her in the relevant sense whether God acted on her will or not, since his acting would be in direct conflict with her will to have a quiescent will.

It is essential to see here that merely having a will one doesn't want to have doesn't necessarily render one unfree, as such a will might be caused by an agent's own intellect and will. In such a case, her intellect determines that doing the thing in question in these circumstances is the best thing to do and so she wills it, despite the fact that she doesn't want to have such a will. Anytime we fail in our resolve to break an old habit, we are in this sort of situation. While we don't have complete freedom of the will, which Harry Frankfurt describes as having the will we want to have, we have enough freedom to render us responsible for what we do in these sorts of circumstances.

The case we are considering here is different, however, because the person in question ends up having a will that is not determined by her own intellect and will, but by something external to her.[21] Her desire not to have this will, but a quiescent one, marks her opposition to having her will moved in any way. So, in this case, she isn't responsible for having the will she does, because it is not caused by her own intellect and will, but by something external to her. Whether the external agency operates on her is not up to her, because in such a case it would be operating despite her volition. Consequently, the freedom of a person who wants her will to be quiescent would be violated if someone were to move her quiescent will either to assent to or reject the thing about which she is quiescent.

One might think that since to cease refusing grace just is to receive it, it isn't actually possible for an agent be in the state of resolved quiescence. Not every state of quiescence, however, results in the infusion of grace. For example, if a person merely failed to think about whether to resist grace or just went to sleep, even though her will is quiescent with respect to refusing grace, God's operating on her will might well violate her freedom. The reason for this is that such a person might refuse grace when she is awake and attentive to whether to refuse or accept grace. In other words, the quiescence here doesn't represent the agent's actual attitudes toward the reception of grace. So, it is not the case that every failure to refuse results in reception.

Furthermore, even though the person is attentive and her will to refuse has been driven out by her quiescence, the agent still tilts toward resistance insofar as she does not want a will to accept grace. In willing to maintain a quiescent will, the agent signifies both that she wants neither a will to refuse grace, nor, crucially, a will to accept it. It is this latter attitude that is an obstacle to God's action, since any operation on God's part on this person's will would violate her freedom by overriding her volition to have a quiescent will—giving her a will that she does not want to have.

Wanting a Will to Reject:

A person who wants a will to reject grace—i.e., has a second-order desire for a will to reject grace—would likely take actions to avoid intellectual confusion that might result in her having a will to assent to grace. But, if she somehow did become quiescent regarding rejecting grace and continued to want a will to reject God's grace, God's causing her to have a will assenting to grace clearly destroys her freedom of will, since in this case

God gives her a will she does not want to have. Consider a reforming alcoholic who wants a will that refuses to accept drinks. If such a person in a moment of temptation found her will quiescent, she would be dismayed if some external intervener moved her will from quiescence to acceptance of the drink on offer. This is because she is not divided at the higher-order level about what sort of will she wants to have. So, while such a person's higher-order desire is ineffective when her will is quiescent, it is nevertheless a violation of her will to move her quiescent will in a direction that does not accord with her higher-order desire. Only if her will is moved by her own intellect and will would such a movement be compatible with the agent's libertarian free will. In such a case, what will she finally has is up to her and is caused ultimately by her own intellect and will.

Wanting a Will to Accept:

Finally, one might want one's will to be moved to assent. Stump addresses such a state and describes it as follows:

> [I]t is possible that a person S with a quiescent will is in this sort of condition. After originally having a will in a configuration of rejection as regards some act A, S's intellect moves into a double-minded state with regard to A, so that S's will moves from rejection to quiescence. But S's intellect simultaneously forms the judgment that it would be good if one side of the internal division were to win the struggle; and S consequently forms the higher-order desire for a will that wills to assent—without, however, actually forming the will to assent.[22]

It's not hard to see that a person's freedom of will is actually *enhanced* when someone or something operates on her quiescent will to bring it into conformity with her second-order desire. If Sharon wants a will not to smoke, but because of her lifelong smoking habit she instead has a powerful, even irresistible, desire to smoke, then Sharon's enlisting the help of a doctor who administers a drug to weaken Sharon's desire to smoke would *enhance*, not destroy, her freedom. Her freedom is enhanced, because she would be aided in having the sort of will she wants to have. If Sharon's will were quiescent, then the doctor wouldn't even be operating against her first-order will in administering the will-altering drug.

So, it seems that God's operating on a person's quiescent will to move it to assent to grace when that person has a higher-order desire for a will that assents to grace leaves that person free with respect to having such a will. Accordingly, Stump writes: "And so we can even suppose that the person whose will is quiescent both knows and also desires that his quiescence of will will be followed by an infusion of grace."[23] In Stump's view, then, God's operating on a person's quiescent will who has such a higher-order desire doesn't violate but enhances her freedom, while at the same time steering clear of Pelagianism.[24]

IV

Stump's account of the quiescence involved in justification might be revised to rule out the sorts of cases I've mentioned. Requiring that the

person on whose quiescent will God operates wants her quiescent will to be moved by God to accept grace seems to preserve the person's freedom with respect to God's operation. A person's wanting her will to be operated on by God might also explain why she takes no action to avoid her intellect's becoming divided and her will quiescent. Accordingly, the person with the serious allergic reaction to the bee sting goes to the doctor in the first place because he wants to be saved from the lethal consequences of his allergic reaction. He doesn't leave the room while the doctors, nurses, and his family offer arguments for his ceasing to reject the injection, because he recognizes that getting the injection will save him. The doctor, therefore, doesn't violate his will when he takes the lapse in this person's resistance as an opportunity to give the injection, because this person wants to want to have the injection, albeit ineffectively.

While this modified version of Stump's solution guarantees the person's freedom, it might be argued that it does so at the cost of being Pelagian. By *requiring*, instead of merely allowing, a person to have a higher-order desire for God's grace to operate on her quiescent will, this higher-order desire becomes the initiating cause of God's grace. When quiescence itself is considered the cause of God's operation on the quiescent will, the person in question literally does nothing to prompt God's operation; it is her lack of will, her failure to reject, that prompts God to act on her will.

In view of this sort of worry, we might instead require that a person have no higher-order desires *opposing* a will accepting grace. Such a requirement would rule out both having a higher-order desire for a will refusing grace and having a higher-order desire for a will that is quiescent with respect to grace without requiring that one have a higher-order desire for a will assenting to grace. Because a person might be deeply-divided at the higher-order level and still meet this condition, this modification avoids Pelagianism, since no volition on the part of the agent is required to prompt the infusion on grace only the cessation of refusal that results from the will's quiescence.

The worry that God subverts a person's decision making process and violates her freedom when he operates on her will while she is yet locked in indecision stems in part, at least, from the worry that the person in question doesn't really, deep down, want God to operate on her will. The examination of the variety of attitudes one can have toward one's quiescent will has shown that this worry has some grounding; there are cases in which a person's will is quiescent and that person nevertheless does not want her will to be moved. We are able to answer this worry, however, by specifying that a person not have any resolute desire against her will being operated on. While this modification answers this and similar concerns regarding Stump's account, the operation of God's grace and the subtle and complex psychological changes involved remain, in great part, a mystery still.[25]

Gordon College

NOTES

1. *Aquinas*, (New York: Routledge, 2003).
2. Ibid.
3. Every form of Pelagianism shares the claim that human beings are capable of some good act of will without God's grace.
4. "Augustine and Free Will," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 140.
5. "Augustine and Free Will," p. 141.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. There is a complication raised by Stump's phrase, "God acts on their will in such a way as to move them to the acceptance of grace, which is the will of faith". This phrase seems to say that a person's assenting to the operation of grace just is the will of faith. The will of faith, however, is a second-order desire for a will that wills righteousness. According to Stump, Augustine "describes this second-order volition variously as an acceptance of grace, a desire for a righteous will, a desire that God make his will good, a will to believe, or even just as faith" (ibid., p. 136). This desire for a will that wills righteousness is effective in producing such a will only because of God's grace. So, when the will becomes quiescent God acts on the will by producing a second-order volition that he makes effective. I will refer to God's acting on a person's quiescent will to move it to assent in what follows. This locution should be understood to mean that God operates on a person's quiescent will to move it to assent by causing her will to want a righteous will, which just is to want God's grace to make her will what is good. Stump sometimes refers to this will of faith as being the person's consent to have grace operate on her will (Cf. "Atonement and Justification," in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement*, ed. R. Feenstra and C. Plantinga, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 205). In a case that doesn't involve changing the sort of will one wants to have, as the case of grace does, the movement of a quiescent will to consent is constituted by the creation of a will that assents to what the person formerly was quiescent toward—a first-order volition not a second-order volition as in the case of faith. In what follows, I assume that since Stump treats these sorts of cases as analogous, it is legitimate to infer from cases that involve action to create a first-order volition to assent to something as equivalent in the relevant sense to the action of grace that causes second-order volition that is the will or faith or acceptance of grace.
8. Stump notes that there isn't just one alternative to compatibilism with respect to the question of free will. She distinguishes two distinct non-compatibilist positions. The first, which she calls "common libertarianism," holds:

> (L1) an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, only if the act is not ultimately causally determined by anything outside the agent.
>
> (L2) an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, only if he could have done otherwise.

Noting the work of Harry Frankfurt and the continuing debate over his examples that purport to show that a person can be free in the sense necessary for moral responsibility without being able to do otherwise, Stump points out that (L2) is not entailed by (L1) and that those rejecting compatibilism need not maintain (L2). She dubs this second non-compatibilist position "modified

libertarianism." In her view this position is characterized by (L1), the rejection of (L2) and the following condition:

> (L3) an agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an act, only if her own intellect and will are the sole ultimate source or first cause of her act.

Stump's view is that the solution to the problem of free will and grace she offers as a "friendly suggestion" to Augustine is able to meet the conditions for both sorts of libertarianism.

9. Ibid., 142 (my emphasis).
10. Ibid., 147 note 69.
11. Cf. *Aquinas*, pp. 396–97.
12. The will, since it is only an inclination toward the good, cannot act without a prior act of intellect presenting an understanding of the good to be pursued in a particular set of circumstances.
13. In Aquinas's view, every act of will must be preceded by an act of intellect, since the will has no particular object but that supplied by the intellect's judgment (Cf. *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae.10.1, see also Ia.82.1).
14. Stump, following Aquinas, also describes the intellect's, or God's, movement of the will in terms of formal causality. On this understanding, the intellect informs or configures the will. When the intellect is unable to resolve itself, the will is deprived of its form or configuration—a state of privation and quiescence. In the case of a will configured to reject grace, when the intellect no longer is resolved that this is the best configuration for the will, the will loses this configuration, falling silent. When God infuses grace, on Aquinas's account, He is configuring a will that is deprived of configuration. Cf., *Aquinas*, 391ff.
15. *Aquinas*, p. 398.
16. Ibid., p. 399.
17. Ibid., p. 398. It is essential, according to Stump, to see that the will's quiescence doesn't merely succeed its active resistance, since such succession may not effectively remove the person's will to resist. So, for example, if the phobic in Stump's example is distracted for some reason and consequently quits resisting the injection, then while his will has become quiescent it hasn't become quiescent because he no longer has a desire to resist. If his intellect turns again to whether he should resist or not, it will still judge that resistance is the best thing to do in the circumstances. In the sort of case Stump describes, however, the intellect isn't distracted—it is fully focused on whether it should resist, and yet it cannot reach a conclusive judgment. Thus, the will's quiescence reflects the intellect's division. The intellect no longer judges that resistance is best; it cannot reach any judgment.
18. There are other possibilities, but for my purposes considering these suffices for determining the conditions under which God's operating grace is permissible in the sense of not violating the agent's libertarian free will. For example, a person might have no higher-order desires regarding her divided first-order will. To be indifferent in this way about whether to will grace or resist it implies in Stump's view that one does not care whether she cares about the good or cares about evil. For, on Aquinas's account, the consequence of God's operating grace is that a person desires God's goodness and hates her own sin. In correspondence, Stump suggests that such a person would be a moral monster, so sunk in evil desires as to be incapable of being so divided at the first-order level. Such a state, accordingly, doesn't represent a real possibility and consequently needn't be considered here.

19. A volition is an effective desire. A first-order volition is an effective first-order desire, a second-order volition is an effective second-order desires. A person has the first-order volition she has because of the second-order volition she has. A deeply divided person lacks a single, integrated second-order desire, *a fortiori*, she lacks an *effective* second-order desire.

20. "Augustine and Free Will," p. 142.

21. Such an action would violate (L1) and (L3) of Stump's definition of libertarian freedom (see footnote 5 above), because the act would be ultimately caused by something external to the agent since the agent's own intellect and will stand against any operation moving the agent's will from its quiescent state.

22. *Aquinas*, p. 400.

23. Ibid., p. 401.

24. One might wonder whether we've veered into Pelagiansim. Stump insists that we've not crossed over into Pelagian territory here because an ineffective second-order desire isn't an act of will and because one who merely wishes ineffectively for a will she doesn't have isn't thereby willing something good. She's better off than she would be if she lacked such a second-order desire, but as Stump reminds us "comparative do not suppose positives"—"one thing can be better than another and yet not be good" (*Aquinas*, p. 402).

25. I want to thank Eleonore Stump for comments that helped me to improve this paper and avoid many errors. Any errors that remain are of course my own. I am also grateful for comments from participants in the Eastern Division meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Messiah College, where I read an earlier version of this paper.