Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers

Volume 23 | Issue 1

Article 2

1-1-2006

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Recommended Citation

Shrader, Warren (2006) "The Unity of Consciousness: Trouble For The Materialist Or The Emergent Dualist?," *Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers*: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil20062317
Available at: <https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol23/iss1/2>

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THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: TROUBLE FOR THE MATERIALIST OR THE EMERGENT DUALIST?

Warren Shrader

As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a *unity-of-consciousness* (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to fear from Hasker's argument, for a separate premise detailing the explanatory relationship that must hold between physical and mental states is false, or at least unmotivated by Hasker's reasoning. I then turn the tables on Hasker, showing how the unity theses discussed open the way to an argument against emergent dualism. My conclusion is that the unity of consciousness actually poses a greater problem for the emergent dualist than for the materialist.

Recently, in the pages of this journal¹ as well as in his latest book,² William Hasker revives and defends the idea, discussed by Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, among others, that the unity of conscious experience implies that the mind is not a material object. This *unity-of-consciousness* (UOC) argument functions as Hasker's main argument against materialism as he builds his case for his preferred theory of the mind, emergent dualism, according to which not only are there emergent mental *properties* (causally efficacious properties dependent on, yet irreducible to, physical properties) but emergent mental *substances* (minds) as well.

Despite the central role this UOC argument plays in his project, it is not entirely clear what Hasker means in saying that conscious experience is unified, nor is it obvious how his thoughts on unity support the premises of the argument. A thorough analysis of his argument thus requires an investigation into what unity theses Hasker endorses. Before embarking on such an investigation, however, it will be helpful to review the general contours of Hasker's argument and construct a formalized version of it. With a solid understanding of the argument secured, I hope to show that Hasker requires two distinct unity theses to lend credence to two distinct premises of his UOC argument. Though these unity theses are plausible, I think Hasker's argument ultimately fails in that a separate premise is false, or at least highly dubious given the rationale Hasker offers for believing it.

1. Hasker's Argument Formalized

The fullest presentation of Hasker's argument appears in his book *The Emergent Self*, wherein he asks us to consider as a premier example of a

unified conscious experience his awareness of his entire visual field at a time (p. 125). Having such an awareness, claims Hasker, is just being in a particular mental state, call it ' S_Q ' and presumably being in this state corresponds to the mind's instantiating a certain qualitative property, call it ' Q .' Hasker thinks the existence of S_Q poses a significant problem for the materialist, whose view Hasker characterizes as entailing that the mind is a composite material object consisting of distinct subunits (proper parts), some of which are responsible for modeling or representing distinct portions of information about the external world.³ Since it does not seem possible that any of these proper parts of the brain exemplify Q , for each represents only part of the information from Hasker's visual field, it must be the brain itself, or a large part thereof, that exemplifies Q . (Let us assume, for ease of discussion, that the materialist identifies the mind with the entire brain—the argument will apply equally well to the mind as any other composite physical object). The materialist's problem is accounting for the brain's exemplifying Q , for if the brain is a system of its subunits, reasons Hasker, then the brain's exemplification of Q must consist in its parts having the properties and relations they do. This follows from a more general principle Hasker endorses, the **Principle of Reducibility**, which he adopts from Wilfrid Sellars:

If an object is *in a strict sense* a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations, or roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and relations between, its constituents.⁴

Hasker thinks Sellars intends and that we should interpret the locution "consist in" to mean "logically or conceptually necessitated by." But conscious properties do not so consist in properties of the brain's parts, reasons Hasker. First, it is a clear truism that one's brain being aware of one's visual field cannot consist in its subunits being *aware* of the information they model, for proper parts of persons are not conscious and, even if they were, a conjunction of partial awarenesses does not imply the existence of a "total awareness," which is exactly what state S is supposed to be (p. 128). And if the subunits are not aware of the information they model, then they exemplify only non-qualitative properties, the instantiation of which do not logically imply the instantiation of a qualitative property.⁵ Ergo, materialism is false.

We can formalize **Hasker's UOC Argument** as follows. Let ' m ' denote the mind, ' p ' the brain, and ' $p_1, p_2 \dots p_n$ ' the subunits of the brain that model information. Let ' Q_x ' denote the qualitative property of p_x and ' T_x ' denote p_x 's "total intrinsic property," a conjunctive property whose instantiation entails the instantiation of all the intrinsic properties exemplified by p_x . ' R ' denotes the complex relational property whose instantiation entails the instantiation of all the relations instantiated by the members of $p_1 \dots p_n$. And let S_Q stand for the mind's exemplifying Q , S_{Q_x} for the state that is p_x -exemplifying- Q_x and S_{T_x} for the state that is p_x -exemplifying- T_x . Finally, let expressions in *italics* represent states of affairs, e.g., Qp is the state of affairs that is the brain's exemplifying Q . The argument proceeds as follows:

- (1) S_Q exists (i.e. Q is exemplified by m)
- (2) If Q is exemplified by p , then either:
 - a. S_Q must consist in $S_{Q1} \& S_{Q2} \& \dots \& S_{Qn}$ or
 - b. S_Q must consist in $S_{T1} \& S_{T2} \& \dots \& S_{Tn} \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)^6$
- (3) S_Q consists in $S_{T1} \& S_{T2} \& \dots \& S_{Tn} \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)$ only if S_Q is logically or conceptually necessitated by $S_{T1} \& S_{T2} \& \dots \& S_{Tn} \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)$
- (4) $\sim [S_Q \text{ consists in } S_{Q1} \& S_{Q2} \& \dots \& S_{Qn}]$
- (5) $\sim [S_Q \text{ is logically or conceptually necessitated by } S_{T1} \& S_{T2} \& \dots \& S_{Tn} \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)]$
- (6) Q is not exemplified by p [2, 3, 4, 5]
- (7) p is not m [1, 6, Indiscernibility of Identicals]

From here on I will refer to $S_{T1} \& S_{T2} \& \dots \& S_{Tn} \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)$, the conjunction of the property instantiations of and relations between the parts of the brain, as P_{parts} . Since this is a UOC argument, we would expect at least one premise to express a substantive thesis about the unity of consciousness or at least to receive its warrant from such a thesis. With that in mind, I turn to an examination of Hasker's thoughts on the unity of consciousness to determine if anything he says can be interpreted as an endorsement of a unity thesis supporting premises of his argument.

II. Hasker on the Unity of Consciousness

Hasker offers many examples of the unity of consciousness but never an explicit characterization of it. In addition to the example already introduced (one's entire visual field at a time), Hasker suggests that we could "consider also as a datum the 'unified' experience of simultaneously feeling a tickle, hearing a twig snap, and smelling gasoline." (p. 126, f. 40). The trouble is that none of these examples is very instructive, as each is consistent with a variety of unity theses discussed in the literature, some of which are fairly trivial and of no relevance to **Hasker's UOC Argument**.⁷ However, Hasker at least implicitly endorses one substantive unity thesis, one that serves as a key premise in an argument he claims as a predecessor to his own, the argument Kant critiques in his second paralogism. This argument proceeds from the premise that the action of any aggregate consists in the actions of its proper parts to the conclusion that thinking is only possible of a substance which, "not being an aggregate . . . is absolutely simple."⁸ The intermediate premise is a thesis about the unity of consciousness, which can be stated as follows:

Mental State Unity Thesis (MSUT): A thought (mental state) is unified in that it cannot consist in different representations distributed among different beings.

I think we can best make sense of **MSUT** if thoughts are understood as events or states that can be composed by other events or states (consider how a baseball game is composed of many distinct, simultaneous events—the first pitch, the last out, etc.). Kant appears to dismiss the argument of the second paralogism by rejecting **MSUT**, claiming that since **MSUT**

is not a conceptual truth, we cannot rule out *a priori* thoughts consisting in other events acting together. But Hasker clearly favors **MSUT**. If we assume, as Hasker does, that states involving awarenesses are types of representational states, then premise (4) of the UOC argument is simply a direct consequence of **MSUT**.

But premise (4) is not the only premise of **Hasker's UOC Argument** contingent on a unity claim. It seems to me that Hasker requires an additional unity thesis in support of premise (1), for the existence of S_Q is a substantive claim in need of support. In saying this, I am not suggesting that there is any question as to whether Hasker experiences a unified visual field (though I disagree with him about the unity of consciousness, I do not deny him the experience of it!); rather, I am questioning why his experience should be construed as his being in *one* mental state. Perhaps Hasker's awareness of his visual field amounts to his being in *numerically diverse states*, all simultaneous, and all standing in the relation of "being co-conscious." Barry Dainton has defended such an account of the unity of consciousness. According to Dainton, "being co-conscious" is a fundamental, non-reducible relation that binds all of a subject's simultaneous conscious states together.⁹ To illustrate this, suppose Hasker's visual field consists of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a blue diamond. His being aware of his entire visual field would simply entail his being in the three distinct states, being aware of a yellow moon (call this Y), being aware of an orange star (O), and being aware of a blue diamond (B), each involving its own constitutive qualitative property, all standing in the co-conscious relation. One who holds this view need not concede that Hasker's total awareness is "a specific conscious state," and is not compelled to accept the existence of S or the truth of (1). Advocating (1) thus amounts to taking up a position on the structure of unified consciousness and thus requires a principle to support it. But **MSUT** is not up to the task. Though **MSUT** implies that S_Q has a certain property (not consisting in representations distributed among different beings) if it exists, **MSUT** (along with Hasker's being in states Y, O, and B) fails to imply that S_Q exists. So armed only with **MSUT**, Hasker's argument is in trouble at (1).

Fortunately for Hasker there is a further unity thesis that has been discussed in the literature that does imply the existence of S, one not explicitly endorsed by Hasker but nonetheless consistent with his expressed views on the unity of consciousness. Hasker hints at this additional thesis in his description of S as "my awareness of my present visual field" (p. 125), suggesting that this state possesses its own phenomenology requiring us to countenance it as a separate state. What Hasker appears to have in mind, then, is that when he is in conscious states Y, O, and B, he is concurrently in conscious state Z (being aware of a yellow moon, an orange star, and a blue diamond), a state with its own phenomenology and its own constitutive qualitative property. This type of unity has been described by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, who refer to it as *phenomenal unity*:

Two conscious states are subsumptively phenomenally unified (or simply *phenomenally unified*) if there is something it is like for a subject to be in both states simultaneously... When A and B are phenomenally conscious states, there is something it is like for a subject to

have A, and there is something it is like for a subject to have B. When A and B are phenomenally unified, there is not just something it is like to have each state individually: there is something it is like to have A and B together.¹⁰

Bayne and Chalmers further elaborate on this passage by saying that, in essence, consciousness exhibits phenomenal unity when there is a set of phenomenal states such that the phenomenology of each member is subsumed by a further state.¹¹ We can thus cash out phenomenal unity more succinctly as follows:

Phenomenal states $X_1 \dots X_n$ (comprising set P) are *phenomenally unified* iff there is some state Y that subsumes the phenomenology of all the members of P.

This basic idea can be extended to all of an individual's conscious states, resulting in the **Phenomenal Unity Thesis (PUT)**:

PUT: For any set of phenomenally conscious states of a subject at a given time, all the members of that set are phenomenally unified.¹²

PUT entails that if Hasker has any visual states at all, then S_Q exists. **PUT** seems crucial to the success of **Hasker's UOC argument**—it provides the warrant for (1) and thereby allows the argument to get off the ground. The question is, once the argument is off the ground, does it have any legs? Though I take no issue with premises (3), (4), and (5), and (1) seems solid given **PUT**, I do think (2) is dubious, especially given Hasker's reasons for accepting it.¹³ The remainder of my analysis will consist in a detailed discussion of premise (2).

III. Hasker on the Explanatory Relation between S_Q and P_{parts}

Premises (2) and (3) jointly imply that if p exemplifies Q, then S_Q must be logically or conceptually necessitated by P_{parts} . But should the materialist accept (2)? Only if compelled to believe that qualitative properties are governed by the **Principle of Reducibility**. But I don't see why she should believe this. There is a related principle that the materialist would surely accept:

Explain: all intrinsic properties of p are explainable in terms of P_{parts}

Explain entails that S_Q is explainable in terms of P_{parts} . But why think explaining the mental properties of p requires a *logical or conceptual* link to P_{parts} ? Very few materialists would champion such a requirement—most would endorse the view that conscious properties of the mind are “epistemically emergent,” that they are caused or realized by physical properties of the brain or its parts, but not logically or conceptually necessitated by them. I would venture that such a position is near orthodoxy within contemporary philosophy of mind. That alone is no reason to think (2) is false, but it does suggest we should look at alternative interpretations of **Explain** and see why Hasker rejects them. Here are the three primary interpretations I see:

- (i) all intrinsic properties of p are logically or conceptually necessitated by P_{parts}

- (ii) all intrinsic properties of p are metaphysically necessitated by P_{parts}
- (iii) all intrinsic properties of p are causally or nomologically necessitated by P_{parts} .

The only materialists who would endorse (i) are the more extreme materialists: *a priori* identity theorists, analytical functionalists, or eliminativists. Options (ii) and (iii) express the preferred modes of explanation for most materialists, the former being embraced by *a posteriori* identity theorists and those who hold that the physical realizes the mental, the latter by those who advocate a causal emergence theory (CET), according to which mental property instances are distinct from, yet caused by, physical property instances.¹⁴ Hasker's emergent dualism is a version of CET (albeit an anti-materialist one) since it entails that the mind's states are caused by the states of p 's parts. In principle then Hasker is not opposed to causal or nomological necessitation between physical and mental states. Why does he deny the materialist this option?

The reason Hasker thinks the materialist cannot embrace (iii) is that p , as a composite material object, is strictly speaking a system of objects, and this implies that there can be no causal process connecting P_{parts} with S_Q . Hasker's defense of (2) ultimately boils down to an additional argument he presents for this conclusion, which I shall call **Defense** (from p. 139 of *The Emergent Self*. I have changed some of Hasker's notation to match my own).

- (D1) Suppose S_Q is not logically or conceptually deducible from P_{parts}
- (D2) P_{parts} causally necessitates S_Q (Provisional Assumption)
- (D3) There is a causal process (CP) connecting P_{parts} with S_Q [from D2]
- (D4) CP consists of events involving concrete individuals
- (D5) The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$ and p
- (D6) p is not a concrete individual distinct from $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$
- (D7) The concrete individuals involved in CP include at most $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$ [D5, D6]
- (D8) All the events involving $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$ are already included in P_{parts} ,
- (D9) CP is not a causal process that connects P_{parts} with S_Q [D1, D6, D7, D8]

- (D10) It is not the case that P_{parts} causally necessitates S_Q [D3, D9 indirect proof]

Though Hasker does not seem to notice this, or does not mention it, an argument analogous to **Defense** could be mounted against the materialisms that entail (ii). Simply replace the word ‘causally’ with ‘metaphysically’ in (D2), and replace reference to causal processes with reference to supervenience relations. A little reflection will show that one would arrive at the conclusion that it is not the case that P_{parts} metaphysically necessitates S_Q . So if **Defense** and its analogous argument are sound then this does eliminate all interpretations of **Explain** other than (i) and provides us with good grounds for accepting premise (2) of Hasker’s UOC Argument.

Unfortunately for Hasker, **Defense** is not sound. The rub comes in premise (D6). The most natural reading of this premise seems to be as follows:

- (D6)* If $\exists x (x = p)$, then $x = p_1$, or $x = p_2$, or . . . or $x = p_n$

Recall that p is the brain and $p_1, p_2 \dots p_n$ are its proper parts. If the antecedent of (D6)* is true, then the consequent is false, for no object can be identical to one of its proper parts. So (D6)* is true only if $\sim \exists x (x=p)$, i.e. only if there is no object picked out by ‘ p .’ But premises (D1), (D2), and (D3) all imply that ‘ p ’ does pick out a concrete individual, for all of those premises imply that p exemplifies a property (remember that S_Q just is the state of the mind’s—in this case p —exemplifying Q). So if (D6) is read as (D6)*, it is either false, or renders several other premises in the argument nonsensical.

However, there is perhaps a more charitable reading of (D6). Hasker suggests that when an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then the whole “is nothing but a system of objects . . . there is no such thing as a whole ‘over and above’ the sum of the parts” (p. 130). Another philosopher who speaks this way is D.M. Armstrong, who in discussing the part/whole relationship writes: “whatever supervenes or . . . is entailed or necessitated . . . is not something ontologically additional to the subvenient, or necessitating, entity or entities. What supervenes is no addition of being.”¹⁵ Perhaps then we should take Hasker’s (D6) to be expressing a supervenience relation between the properties of p and the properties of $p_1, p_2 \dots p_n$. I suppose this is a type of strong supervenience, with the operative modality being at least metaphysical necessity. This understanding of (D6) can now be expressed as follows:

- (D6)** The properties of p strongly supervene (with metaphysical necessity) on P_{parts}

However, even given this interpretation of (D6), (D7) does not follow. The truth of (D6)** does not exclude p from being an individual involved in a causal process. Hasker might argue that since p ’s existence and its properties are entailed by the existence and properties of p ’s parts, there is no room for S to be caused by the properties of p ’s parts, as (D2) stipulates. But this doesn’t follow—supervenience is a synchronic, noncausal explanation; it does not “compete” with causal explanations. As a matter of fact, it may very well be that the causal relationship between P_{parts} and S_Q that Hasker finds so problematic *partially explains* the supervenience relationship. Suppose one held that properties were individuated by their causal

powers, and that the causal powers of properties were essential to them, thus making the laws of nature metaphysically necessary.¹⁶ Then, if there is a causal law (synchronic though it be) linking the properties involved in P_{parts} to Q , S_Q follows from P_{parts} with metaphysical necessity. If one were to add the assumption that Q 's causal profile is such that it can only be caused by the properties involved in P_{parts} , then Q strongly supervenes on these properties, and the fact that P_{parts} causes S_Q is an explanation (or a partial one at least) of this supervenience.

However, if one is not comfortable with synchronic causation, or the idea that the causal powers of properties are essential to them, one can still sketch a picture representing the denial of (D7) as consistent with (D6)**. Suppose S_Q occurs at a time t_2 later than t_1 , and that parts of the brain instantiate slightly different properties at those times (so that, for example, p_1 instantiates T_1 at t_1 and T_1^* at t_2). Here are two explanations of p 's exemplifying Q :

- (I) p exemplifies Q at t_2 because Q supervenes on $T_1^*p_1 \& T_2^*p_2 \& \dots \& T_n^*p_n \& R^*(p_1 \dots p_n)$ at t_2 .
- (II) p exemplifies Q at t_2 because S_Q is causally necessitated by $T_1p_1 \& T_2p_2 \& \dots \& T_np_n \& R(p_1 \dots p_n)$ at t_1 .

I see nothing inconsistent in these explanations. But if there is nothing inconsistent in them, then (D7) does not follow from (D6)**. I suppose one might try to advance an argument for the inconsistency of (I) and (II), but there is no such argument to be found in Hasker.

Given all this, I think we should conclude that **Defense** is unsound. Either (D6) is false, or (D7) does not follow from (D5) and (D6). Thus, I think that Hasker has not given us any reason to think that (i) is a better interpretation of **Explain** than (ii) or (iii). But the warrant one has for accepting (2) of the UOC Argument accrues from the warrant one has for denying (ii) and (iii) as viable interpretations of **Explain**. So I think we have little warrant for accepting (2), and thus the materialist should not feel at all threatened by **Hasker's UOC Argument**.

IV. A UOC Argument against Emergent Dualism

Given that **Hasker's UOC Argument** fails, Hasker has given us no convincing reason to think the unity of consciousness poses a problem for materialism. However, I believe there may be excellent reason to think the unity of consciousness poses a problem for Hasker's emergent dualism; in fact, I think it poses a problem for *all* varieties of CET, as I will argue presently. It is at least true, I will contend, that this argument against CET based on **PUT** is stronger than **Hasker's UOC Argument**, for the former relies on assumptions that are less contentious than the claim that (i) is the only viable interpretation of **Explain**. My argument, which I will call the **UOC Argument against CET** actually requires an extension of **PUT**, what I will call the **Modally-charged Phenomenal Unity Thesis**, or **McPUT**:

McPUT: Necessarily (in all metaphysically possible worlds), for any set of simultaneous phenomenally conscious states of a subject, all members of that set are phenomenally unified.

Once one accepts **PUT**, making the move to **McPUT** does not seem much of a stretch—it is hard to imagine how if **PUT** is true it is not true at all possible worlds. Still, I admit my upcoming argument is most vulnerable at **McPUT** itself, inasmuch as **PUT** is vulnerable. However, since **PUT** is a sword that Hasker seems to wield in his own argument against materialism, I take it as a reasonable starting point in constructing an argument against his view.¹⁷

Allow me then to briefly sketch the **UOC Argument against CET** and offer some points in its favor.¹⁸ Suppose M_1 and M_2 are distinct, simultaneous phenomenal states of a subject and M_T is the state subsuming the phenomenology of M_1 and M_2 . Also suppose that C_1 , C_2 and C_T are states that are the causes of M_1 , M_2 and M_T respectively. CET implies that C_1 , C_2 and C_T all involve at least one physical state. But on the supposition that all causal laws involving at least one physical state are contingent, it is possible that even though C_1 , C_2 and C_T all occur, M_T could fail to occur while M_1 and M_2 do occur. But **McPUT** implies that this is not possible. So **McPUT** implies the denial of CET.¹⁹

Reaching this conclusion obviously depends upon, one, accepting that causal laws involving physical states are contingent and, two, accepting that this contingency implies that M_T is metaphysically independent from (i.e. does not follow with metaphysical necessity from) M_1 and M_2 . Now while I think it is reasonable to consent to both of these suppositions, denying one or the other is certainly a way for the advocate of CET to sidestep the troublesome (to her) conclusion of my argument. I want to briefly comment on each of these potential ways out, suggesting that they may not be as promising as one might initially think. Denying that the laws of nature are contingent as a rule involves accepting that the causal powers of properties are essential to them. But accepting such a thesis about properties should not sit well with the proponent of CET. One of the principal motivations for embracing CET is to countenance the novel causal powers of conscious states. But if emergent properties follow with metaphysical necessity from physical properties, it seems we lose motivation to include emergent properties in our ontology. If the instantiation of some physical property P' metaphysically necessitates the instantiation of an emergent property E at some later time, and if the instantiation of a distinct physical property P^* at a still later time necessarily follows from the instantiation of E and a third physical property P , it seems simpler to attribute E 's causal powers to P and either eliminate E or identify E with P . Another way to state this concern is that it seems more ontologically parsimonious to suppose that physical entities have latent causal powers "activated" only in certain contexts and that such causal powers belong to the entity's physical properties.²⁰ So, it is not clear that embracing the metaphysical necessity of laws involving physical states is the panacea the proponent of CET might hope it to be.²¹

With respect to the second way out for the defender of CET, the most natural reason for denying that the contingency of laws involving physical states implies M_1 and M_2 could occur without M_T is to say that the laws involving M_T supervene on the laws involving M_1 and M_2 . Even so, my argument for the incompatibility of CET and **McPUT** would still go through if there were a nomologically possible world in which M_1 and M_2

are instantiated but none of the potential causes of M_T are instantiated. And that sure *seems* possible, enough so that the proponent of CET owes us an explanation why it is not possible. Perhaps the most promising explanation would be that M_T just is the conjunction of M_1 and M_2 . But if there is such a thing as the conjunction M_1 and M_2 , it is not at all clear that it is a mental state. One can be in the state of believing A and the state of believing B without being in the state of believing A and B. This would not be possible were this latter belief state the conjunction of the former states. So the advocate of CET must provide a good reason for supposing that phenomenal states differ from belief states in this regard for this response to carry much weight.

V. Conclusion

In sum, I think there is a sound basis for thinking the CET-theorist faces a formidable challenge in accommodating the unity of consciousness. By my lights, **UOC Argument against CET** is stronger than **Hasker's UOC argument** in that the former relies on less controversial supporting premises. Thus, I believe it is emergent dualism, not materialism, that confronts the greater challenge from the unity of consciousness. Admittedly though, I have only scratched the surface of a satisfactory defense of **PUT**, and I have given only the tersest response to some potential objections to the other crucial premises of the **UOC Argument against CET**. Only a more detailed exploration of **PUT**, as well as potential rejoinders to the reasons I have proffered for thinking **PUT** incompatible with CET, will decide whether the challenge the unity of consciousness poses to CET is or is not insuperable.²²

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NOTES

1. "Concerning the Unity of Consciousness," *Faith and Philosophy* 12:4, pp. 532–547.

2. *The Emergent Self* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). All page number references in the text are to this book.

3. The term 'materialism' as I use it should be understood as a thesis only about the mind, and not the more ambitious thesis that *everything* is material. As I've defined materialism, one way for the materialist to skirt the conclusion of the UOC argument is to hold that the mind is a material simple, a view that seems implausible to me, but is immune from Hasker's argument.

4. Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 27, quoted in *The Emergent Self*, p. 130. I assume that when Sellars and Hasker speak of one property "consisting in" another, this is useful shorthand for saying that certain facts or states of affairs consist in other facts or states of affairs. Throughout the paper, I will often employ this useful shorthand as well.

5. Again, to say that instantiations of non-qualitative properties do not logically or conceptually necessitate the instantiation of qualitative ones is shorthand for saying that *the facts* describing such instantiations do not bear such a relation to each other. In endorsing this thesis, Hasker is siding with those who defend an explanatory gap between physical facts and mental facts.

6. This premise assumes that it could not be the case that *p* and *m* are distinct and yet both exemplify *Q*. But I assume that is an assumption both materialists and dualists would agree upon—it would seem metaphysically extravagant to have two distinct entities instantiating qualitative properties responsible for consciousness.

7. For lists and discussion of various unity theses, see Barry Dainton, *Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience* (London: Routledge, 2000) and Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, "What is the Unity of Consciousness?" in A. Cleeremans (ed.), *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation* (Oxford, 2003), pp. 23–58. Hasker explicitly endorses one trivial type of unity, what Bayne and Chalmers call subject unity or **SUT**. Two conscious states are subject unified if they belong to the same subject at the same time. This comports with what Hasker says in footnote 40 on p. 126 of *The Emergent Self*, that the only "unity" he has in view "is the mere fact of being experienced simultaneously by a single subject." But **SUT** really has no role to play in Hasker's UOC argument, for there is no premise whose truth depends on **SUT**. So Hasker is incorrect in saying that this type of unity is all his argument requires.

8. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 335 (A352).

9. For his development of the unity of consciousness in terms of co-consciousness, see Dainton, *Stream of Consciousness*.

10. Bayne and Chalmers, in "What is the Unity of Consciousness?" p. 32.

11. Roughly, we can say that if phenomenal state *P*1 subsumes phenomenal state *P*2, then "what it's like to be" in *P*2 is included in "what it's like to be" in *P*1.

12. Mike Rea raised to me the objection that **PUT** faces a serious problem, for it appears that if it is true, an implausible regress ensues. Suppose a subject is in distinct phenomenal states *P*1 and *P*2. According to **PUT**, the subject must also be in *P*3, a state subsuming the phenomenology of *P*1 and *P*2. But since *P*3 is also a phenomenal state, **PUT** implies there must be a state *P*4 subsuming the phenomenology of *P*1–*P*3, and then a state *P*5, *P*6, and so on. So it appears that if one a subject is in even one phenomenal state, she is in an infinite number. The way out of this regress, it seems to me, is to recognize that the subsumption relation is reflexive. So, if one is in distinct phenomenal states *P*1 and *P*2 subsumed by *P*3, *P*3 subsumes not only *P*1 and *P*2, but also itself, obviating the need for the further states *P*4, *P*5, etc. This is the response Bayne and Chalmers give to a similar objection. See "What is the Unity of Consciousness?" p. 40.

13. Some may question why I do not object to (3). Premise (3) doesn't trouble me in that it seems a reasonable way to interpret the locution "consists in." Clearly some properties of objects bear this relation to the properties of their parts—'having mass of 5 kg' is probably a prime example of a property of a whole that "consists in" the properties and relations of the parts of the whole.

14. One prominent defender of CET (other than Hasker) is Timothy O'Connor. See his "Causality, Mind, and Free Will," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 14 (2000), pp. 105–117.

15. D.M. Armstrong, *A World of States of Affairs* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 12.

16. See, e.g., Sydney Shoemaker "Causality and Properties," in *Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor*, Peter van Inwagen (ed.), (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), pp. 109–36. Later I offer a reason for thinking that the proponent of CET should not adopt this view, but I raise the possibility here merely as a way for her to respond to Hasker.

17. Hasker has objected to me that **PUT** is not necessary to premise (1), for a separate case could be mounted (independent of **PUT**) for the existence of S_Q . In other words, all his argument requires is a particular truth, that S_Q exists, and not a universal generalization like **PUT**. But it's hard to see what a defense of S_Q divorced from **PUT** would look like. I have already suggested that the experiential evidence we have for a unified consciousness can be accommodated by a view like Dainton's which entails that S_Q does not exist. It just seems to me that any suggestion that **PUT** is false, but that S_Q still exists would be ad hoc. But I leave it to the reader to decide.

18. I present a fuller exposition and defense of the premises of this argument in my dissertation, which is entitled "The Metaphysics of Ontological Emergence"

19. The reader might wonder, given that my rejection of Hasker's UOC argument was ultimately based on my rejection of **Defense**, Hasker's argument against CET, whether the soundness of this new argument against CET would vindicate Hasker's UOC argument. The answer is no. Though the soundness of my argument would eliminate (i) as a viable interpretation of **Explain**, it would not eliminate (ii). Thus a materialist would still have a principled reason for denying (2) of Hasker's argument, namely, that (ii) is a better interpretation of **Explain** than (i).

20. Also, another way to look at this, the metaphysical necessity of the laws and the fact that properties are individuated by their causal powers implies that E and P are always co-instantiated when the antecedent and consequent circumstances are the same. This seems strong motivation to at least identify the instance of E with the instance of P. Does this imply the reduction of the E type? I think it does, but this is a complex issue that I can't discuss here. I should note that Hasker endorses the view that the causal powers of properties (property instantiations, actually) are essential to them, and thus that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary (see, for example, *The Emergent Self*, p. 71), but he does not discuss the objection I have raised. Timothy O'Connor, however, in an unpublished paper co-authored with Hong Yu Wong entitled "The Metaphysics of Emergence," does discuss this objection in some detail. These authors suggest it is actually more reasonable and ontologically parsimonious to posit emergent properties rather than "hidden" physical dispositions. I disagree with them, but clearly the issues surrounding this point are complex and require much more investigation into the nature of ontological reduction and ontological parsimony before anything decisive can be said.

21. The proponent of CET might be tempted to respond that the laws of nature, though necessary, are probabilistic, thus allowing her to say that E does possess novel causal powers, in that the laws relating (E and P') to P* are distinct from laws relating P' to P*, because the "chances" involved in such laws are different. But "going chancy" backfires. Admitting that laws of nature are only probabilistic implies that, even though the law relating C_T to M_T obtains, C_T still might occur without M_T occurring, and this seems to suggest that M_1 and M_2 might occur without M_T .

22. I would like to thank David Chalmers, Alvin Plantinga, Mike Rea, Fritz Warfield, and most especially William Hasker for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The paper also benefited from the helpful suggestions of two anonymous referees.