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Jack Zupko

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to, accepting that inevitability (116–29). What is notable is that he simply takes for granted the truth of Feurebach's assumption that death is the end, that there is no conscious survival beyond death. Having a religious belief is in this case, reduced to having a certain attitude to the agreed-on facts as they are stated in a naturalistic metaphysics such as Feuerbach's. I suspect that Phillips' ideal of neutrality is not really a coherent one; and this suspicion is somewhat encouraged by the fact that Phillips himself, rather than simply contemplating the differences between religious and naturalistic perspectives, ends up reducing the former so that they offer no challenge to the truth of the latter.

NOTES

1. For a detailed argument in favour of this view of philosophy, see Phillips' *Philosophy's Cool Place* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999).

2. There are actually circumstances in which I would be willing to say that music *does* make truth-claims. But I don't think Phillips is intending the analogy to be taken in this sense.

On Augustine, by Sharon M. Kaye and Paul Thomson. Wadsworth, 2001. Pp 83. Paper \$15.95; *On Ockham*, by Sharon M. Kaye and Robert M. Martin. Wadsworth, 2001. Pp. 97. Paper \$15.95.

JACK ZUPKO, Emory University

These two very short books offer basic introductions to the thought of Augustine and William of Ockham. They are part of the Wadsworth Philosophers Series under the general editorship of Daniel Kolak, a collection now comprising some forty volumes aimed at providing "a brief and accessible insight into the ideas of major philosophers throughout history ... empowering the reader to better understand the original works of these influential figures" (from the back cover). Although these books are intended as stand-alone texts, the publisher suggests that they would also be "excellent companions to, and may be bundled with, Daniel Kolak's *The Philosophy Source*, a CD-ROM that provides ready access to over 100 classic, primary readings." I have not examined the latter text for this review.

I mention this because the most important thing to know about these books is that they are written for students as opposed to specialist scholars or professional philosophers or even academics in other fields, a fact not immediately clear from the books themselves. The prose is spartan and reads like a revised set of lecture notes, complete with the sort of hip, off-the-wall allusions undergraduate students find appealing: "the [Pyrrhonian] skeptic would ask what color the book would appear to a Venusian equipped with infra-red vision, or to Superman with x-ray eyes, or when viewed under ultra-violet light" (*On Augustine*: 28); "Ockham's view [on freedom] resonates well with that of the twentieth-century libertarian, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). We are what we make ourselves to be" (*On Ockham*: 70). At a certain level, it is hard to know what to make of such remarks. But anyone

who is familiar with the classroom knows that a little distortion in the direction of simplification is sometimes necessary if one is to be an effective teacher. I am reminded of J. L. Austin's great example, 'France is hexagonal' – is this statement true or false? "It is just rough," Austin says, "and that is the right and final answer to the question of the relation of 'France is hexagonal' to France" (*How to Do Things with Words*, Lecture XI). And that is what we have here: a pair of rough guides designed to help students as they read Augustine and Ockham for the first time.

I believe the books are largely successful in this aim. They hit most of the points that should be hit in the Augustine and Ockham units of a typical undergraduate course on medieval philosophy. The organization is thematic, though somewhat piecemeal. The Augustine volume, for example, moves briskly through Augustine's life and times, theodicy (including the doctrines of grace and original sin), knowledge, view of 'the inner man', ethics, and political theory, all in a mere eighty pages. Most of the discussion involves saying what Augustine's view is and explaining it by means of quotations, analogies, examples, and other pedagogical devices. There is little in the way of critical discussion or argumentation that might engage someone who already knows a bit about Augustine, let alone someone who knows his way around the texts. Readers in these categories would be better served by some of the excellent encyclopedia articles on Augustine – e.g., in *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* or *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* – or by collections of recent scholarship, e.g., *The Augustinian Tradition*, ed. Gareth Matthews (California 1999), or *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge 2003). Likewise, if one is looking for a brief, synoptic overview which captures the general flavor of Augustine's thought, it is hard to do better than Henry Chadwick's *Augustine* (Oxford 1986).

To its credit, *On Augustine* does not try to duplicate any of these approaches, but focuses resolutely on its student audience. For example, on the topic of sense perception, the authors describe Augustine's view in relation to three traditional models of the mind-body relation – interactionism, parallelism, and epiphenomenalism – each of which is briefly explained. After showing that none of these is compatible with Augustine's Neoplatonic conception of causality, a fourth alternative is introduced, which they dub 'reverse-epiphenomenalism,' according to which the soul can exercise causal power over the body, but not vice versa (38-39). Augustine's conception of the metaphysical status of the human soul is thus brought into conversation with a range of other positions which students can easily understand and probably will have heard of elsewhere.

Some illustrations, however, struck me as more likely to mislead than edify. Although it is true that both Augustine and David Hume take seriously the role of the emotions in human life, it is not helpful to be told that Hume champions the Augustinian idea that "reason is the slave of the passions" (69). This is the natural condition of the psyche for Hume; it goes hand in hand with his skepticism and atheism. For Augustine, however, the intellect is *supposed* to be in charge of the soul; we find ourselves enslaved by passion precisely because we are being punished for our misdeeds in the Garden. These are very different explanations that just hap-

pen to arrive at the same conclusion.

The authors could also have been more generous in revealing the scriptural allusions running through so much of what Augustine says. In a passage from *De Doctrina Christiana*, the phrase "the invisible attributes of God, which are understood through what has been made," is placed in quotation marks, but its source is not identified as Romans 1:20, an absolutely crucial passage as far as Augustine's vision of Christian philosophy is concerned. Conversely, names are dropped from out of nowhere. The empiricist problem of self-justification is duly noted, and then capped by the gratuitous observation that finding a non-empiricist proof of empiricism "is precisely the project that occupies a prominent contemporary empiricist, Bas C. van Fraassen (1941-)," about whom nothing more is said (31). This belongs in a footnote. Elsewhere, the discussion of Augustine on time is interrupted by what looks to be nothing less than a plug for another book: "A reader interested in a comparative study should consult Eva Brann's *What, Then, is Time?*, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. This book contains a comparative discussion of Augustine and Husserl, and covers many other major theorists about time, including Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Newton, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Einstein, and Heidegger" (56). Again, if this must be mentioned, better to do it in a footnote rather than breaking so obtrusively into the text.

On Ockham exhibits many of the same virtues and shortcomings as *On Augustine*, though it is more successful at giving the reader a sense of the philosophical style of its subject. The authors correctly present Ockham's nominalism as a way of doing philosophy built on a new way of doing logic as opposed to a cluster of doctrines denying the existence of real universals or a quasi-moral commitment to avoid multiplying entities. The latter are properly *consequences* of nominalism rather than its defining characteristics. The authors are exactly right to point out that "Ockham became convinced that a great number of hopeless confusions arise when philosophers fail to understand how language works," though this is followed by the remark, "so he elaborated a whole system of logic that supports the thesis that universals do not exist outside the mind" (36), which gets it backwards. Universals are superfluous for Ockham because he thinks his theory of supposition can account for the reference of common terms and concepts using only particular substances and qualities, not because he has an antecedent commitment to eliminating them.

As with *On Augustine*, there are places where helpful and I would have thought obvious allusions are inexplicably missed. Ockham's illustrious Franciscan predecessor Duns Scotus should have been mentioned instead of Thomas Aquinas in connection with infinite regress proofs for the existence of God, especially since it is Scotus's famous Parisian Proof to which Ockham is responding (51). (By the way, members of itinerant orders like the Franciscans are friars, not "monks" (2); monks live in monasteries.) Equally worrisome is the statement that "Ockham is virtually alone among medieval philosophers in rejecting compatibilism" (66). Didn't Scotus (inspired by Anselm) provide the archetypal model of free voluntary action in terms of the will's twofold inclination to justice and its own advantage? There are also oversimplifications that, given the nature of the

book, seem somewhat churlish to mention here, such as the way sensory cognition is likened to "what a camera is capable of," and then immediately ascribed to brute animals. For an Aristotelian such as Ockham, there would be all the difference in the world between an animal's power of sensory cognition and a camera's power to record images. A camera is not alive, nor do the images it receives cause it to move from place to place.

On the whole these are useful books, admirable in the fact that they are written with a student audience in mind. For the reasons sketched above, however, and also because of differences in teaching style, instructors will want to use them judiciously.

The books could have benefited from more careful copyediting. There are an unusually high number of typographical errors, and the referencing system is awkward and inconsistent, perhaps because of an editorial decision to avoid footnotes.