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MORAL MOTIVATION AND CHRISTIAN THEISM

Ryan Nichols

John Hare’s central objections to secular theories of motivation arise via his ‘hateful nephew’ example, which, I argue, obscures important issues of scope:

Who must be motivated (some/all)?
How frequently must they be motivated (most/all of the time)?
What is the extent of their motivation (act/tend to act)?

Hare must adopt the stronger readings of these questions if his case against secular accounts of motivation is to succeed. But holding any account of motivation to such standards is misguided. Furthermore, Hare’s own theistic account of motivation cannot meet the standards he applies to his primary secular interlocutor. This study opens into wider terrain as (i) identify which of myriad moral gaps an account of motivation is alleged to bridge; (ii) explain how the dialectic between Hare and Shelly Kagan depends upon unarticulated assumptions about judgment externalism and judgment internalism; and (iii) criticize appeals to motivational versions of ‘ought implies can’ principles.

Little sophisticated work within the context of Christian philosophical ethics or meta-ethics has been devoted to an analysis of the reasons for which we fail to be motivated to meet our moral obligations, or to a positive analysis of moral motivation. John Hare’s work marks the most extensive foray by a Christian ethicist into these environs.

Hare attempts to refute what he takes to be a plausible secular account of moral motivation, offered by Shelly Kagan, on which vivid beliefs provide us with sufficient motivation. This clears the path for Hare to argue that a Christian account constitutes a plausible solution to the problems of moral motivation and weakness of will. According to Hare’s positive theory, incorporation into the body of Christ provides agents with adequate motivation. I will be presenting what I regard as quite serious criticisms of the argumentative structure of Hare’s case, but I do not want the narrow focus of this essay to mask my enjoyment of The Moral Gap for Hare writes about these issues with a sensitivity and a compelling concern to which I aspire.

I seek to show that Hare’s objections to Kagan fail. To that end, I argue first, that Hare does not make much needed distinctions of scope about the motivation provided by vivid belief. I show that, once we make those dis-
tinctions, Kagan’s theory is able to surmount many of Hare’s objections. As a result, Hare insufficiently motivates the shift from secular accounts to his appeal to the incorporation into Christ. Second, I show Hare’s Christian theory succumbs to the very objections he brings against Kagan’s appeal to vivid belief. I demonstrate that Hare has inflated the effect of incorporation into Christ upon one’s moral motivation. I conclude with some general and critical remarks about the project of developing a Christian account of moral motivation.

1. The Big Picture
There are three philosophical issues that Hare doesn’t explicitly address, which I want to note up front. First, Hare speaks of ‘the’ moral gap, but there are a number of distinct moral gaps. These include the gap

- between what we desire to do and what we do;
- between what we judge to be obligatory and what we desire to do;
- between what we do and what we are obligated to do; and
- between obligations and reasons to fulfill obligations.

So far as I can tell, Hare doesn’t clearly state the alternatives. In Hare’s criticisms of Kagan, it seems to me that he focuses on a motivational gap between what we judge to be obligatory and what we are motivated to do.

Second and related, this particular type of motivational gap can be clarified by explaining it in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. Hare refrains from doing in his *The Moral Gap*, no doubt for good reason: foisting a philosophical apparatus upon one’s audience risks causing reader fatigue. In this case, though, we stand to gain some conceptual clarity that outweighs the costs. So let me situate the present discussion by drawing a pair of distinctions between judgment and existence versions of internalism and externalism.

**Judgment internalism**: If person P judges an action φ to be morally wrong, then P *ipso facto* has motivation not to φ, and if P judges φ to be morally obligatory, then P *ipso facto* has motivation to φ.

On this view there is a conceptual link between moral judgment and motivation. Sincerely judging that φ is wrong conceptually requires having a motivation to avoid φ-ing. Let **judgment externalism** refer to the denial of judgment internalism. In addition, there is

**Existence internalism**: If φ is morally impermissible, then P has a reason not to φ, and if φ is morally obligatory, then P has a reason to φ.

This thesis is different in kind from judgment internalism; existence internalism is not about our judgments, but about obligations themselves. **Existence externalism** refers to the denial of existence internalism. I want to make the argument of this paper as independent of complicated issues about internalism and externalism as possible. Nonetheless, for those who would benefit by an application of this distinction to Hare’s discussion, I
can be understood as arguing (i) that Hare (in *The Moral Gap*) presumes that judgment externalism is correct, but (ii) that he argues against Kagan by leaning heavily upon intuitions dependent upon judgment internalism. Thus, I find a tension between Hare’s arguments against Kagan and his own attempt to solve the problem of moral motivation.

The third larger issue concerns the status of ‘ought implies can’ principles, specifically, the modal aspects of such principles. Here Hare presents us with an exegetical challenge, for it seems that there are several ‘ought implies can’ principles flowing through his book. The most generic form of such a principle might read: ‘In order for P to be obligated to φ, it must be physically possible for P to φ.’ This is plausible so long as we explicate ‘physically possible’ appropriately. This principle might take a motivational form in: ‘In order for P to be obligated to φ, P must want to φ.’ This has little prima facie plausibility given a commonsense understanding of ‘want’. What we should say about the two versions of ‘ought implies can’ having the most currency in Hare’s work is less clear. These take the following forms:

*Meta-motivational form:* In order for P to be obligated to φ, P “must be able to want to do it” (102).

*Divine motivational form:* In order for P to be obligated to φ, P must be able to want to φ, where ‘able to want to φ’ is construed in terms of divine possibility (113-4).

This is Hare’s way of incorporating the notion that ‘all things are possible with God’ into his account of obligation. I’ll argue that neither of these latter two theses is plausible.

2. Moral Motivation and the Failure of Vividness

I mentioned that Hare presupposes a form of judgment externalism, thus denying that there is a conceptual connection between my judging that φ is obligatory and my having motivation to φ. Why think Hare, in *The Moral Gap*, is a judgment externalist? First, his criticisms of Kagan center around his ‘hateful nephew’ counterexample. As will become clear shortly, the success of this example precludes judgment internalism. Hare does not allow Kagan to claim that motivation not to φ is conceptually tied to judging that φ-ing is impermissible. In stating this counterexample, Hare claims that the hateful nephew might judge that φ is obligatory and simply not be motivated to φ. Hare takes such cases, and the phenomenon of *akrasia* generally, much more seriously than any judgment internalist would. Second, Hare’s positive account of moral motivation depends upon appeal to the work of God and the Christian community. On judgment internalism, one’s motivation for fulfilling one’s obligation to φ arises in virtue of one’s judging that one is obligated to φ. Since Hare claims that God’s assistance is required in order to be motivated to meet one’s obligations, he cannot advocate judgment internalism since, on it, God’s assistance would be otiose.

Thus Hare thinks he faces (rather than avoids, as on internalism) the following problem: What must an agent do—what external conditions must an agent meet—to move from merely judging that φ is obligatory to being
sufficiently motivated to $\phi$? (More on the scope of ‘sufficiently’ shortly.) Hare recapitulates some secular answers to this question and argues that they either reduce the moral demand or ‘puff up’ our abilities. Both options are unsatisfactory. Of the two, Hare is more concerned with secular forms of judgment externalism, which he believes exaggerate our motivational capacities to act in accord with the moral demand. So he chooses to examine Kagan’s answer to the above question, which involves an appeal to the motivational powers of vivid belief.

Two forms of vividness

Kagan appeals to the power of vivid belief in generating motivation. Hare says that Kagan “makes the claim that if all our beliefs were vivid, including especially our beliefs about the interests of others, we would tend to conform to the impartial standard that utilitarian morality requires….” Hare says that he “…will argue that this claim is false” (100). I will assume that Hare does not believe this appeal to vividness is merely an empirical claim, but rather that it is an attempt to give a conceptual analysis of the requirements for motivation.\(^3\)

In order to evaluate Hare’s argument for the failure of vivid belief to motivate us to act, we need to clarify (i) the nature of vivid belief and (ii) the scope of the motivational requirement that Hare puts upon his secular interlocutor. As to (i), Kagan does not provide us with a formal analysis of vividness. Hare extrapolates from what Kagan does say to conclude that the appeal to vividness can amount to one of two things, as this passage makes clear:

This is a metaphor which tends to disguise the difference between two different ways in which our belief-holdings vary. One continuum is the degree of clarity and distinctness attending a belief which we hold. The second is the degree of wholeheartedness with which we care about the belief, or the degree of importance we attach to it. (106)

The first construal of vivid belief as clarity and distinctness takes vivid belief to be a propositional attitude. Hare says, “The counter-factual claim about morality is that I will tend towards impartial judgment if my beliefs are vivid,” which indicates that he thinks vividness is alleged to be a sufficient condition for motivation. Hare immediately addresses the first horn of the dilemma, saying, “If we understand this claim in terms of clarity and distinctness, I think it is false. Understood this way, the claim is about cognitive shortcomings” (106-7). We will use the following approximation of Hare’s construal of the requirements on the content of a vivid belief:

Cognitive vividness: Belief $B$ of person $P$ is a vivid belief if the content of $B$ is apprehended clearly and distinctly by $P$.

Hare leaves “clarity and distinctness” undefined, but presumably those terms refer to formal features of beliefs, much as they did in Descartes’s use of them. For Descartes, roughly, if a belief is clear for an agent then all
the sub-propositional contents of the belief are understood by the agent, and if a belief is distinct, then the belief is successfully individuated by the agent from other beliefs.

The second construal of vividness replaces clarity and distinctness with a non-cognitive analysis. Hare also identifies this as a belief, or, to be precise, a “belief-holding.” I hesitate to find fault with any author employing such a term given the challenges present in specifying such a state, but calling these quasi-cognitive states “belief-holdings” seems to be important. By doing so, Hare seems to assume a Humean, belief/desire psychology. I wish to construe this second form of vividness in an as yet unrestricted manner, withholding for now judgment about whether this form of vividness is propositional. The second form is:

Affective vividness: Mental state M of person P is a vivid mental state if M is an affective state that enables P to care about the interests of others.

Though inexact, this corresponds to Hare’s claim that this second form of vividness focuses upon the “degree of importance” we attach to an obligation (107). One plausible way to unpack affective vividness is to describe the emotive or non-cognitive properties of vivid mental states as triggering our imaginative faculty in such a way that we contemplate the import of a certain state of affairs to the subjects in question. When we appreciate the plights of others by forming vivid mental states about the import of a certain state of affairs on their ability to fulfill their interests, it enables us to ascribe morally relevant traits to them, e.g. ‘Mothers in Angola must feel anguish at their inability to provide their children with nourishment.’

The hateful nephew

Hare attempts to show that neither horn of the dilemma will enable the (secular) externalist to analyze motivation adequately. His argument for this conclusion employs his ‘hateful nephew’ example. Hare reasons that, since neither cognitive vividness nor affective vividness is capable of motivating the hateful nephew, vividness is not an adequate external source of motivation. The thought experiment reads as follows:

Take as an example my belief that it is in Aunt Fanny’s overall interest to be given a chocolate éclair. Suppose also that the éclair is the last one on the plate, and Aunt Fanny and I both want it. Perhaps she wants it more than I do, because she has just returned from a long trip to Slobovia, where she could not get any. (106)

The unqualified triviality of the nephew’s obligation seems to me to exhibit a distracting bias against an appeal to affective states as motivational catalysts. Nonetheless, the argument to follow is sufficiently complex without worrying about this point here. If morality is impartial (as Kagan, Hare and I all assume), then the nephew has a moral obligation, albeit a frivolous one, to give the éclair to his aunt.

To show that cognitive vividness is insufficient to motivate the nephew
to meet this obligation, Hare suggests that the nephew may hate his aunt. Though he forms clear and distinct beliefs about his aunt and her desires, those beliefs do not generate motivation to give the aunt the éclair. In fact, the situation is even worse because, Hare suggests, “If I am malignant, or if I hate her in particular, then understanding her potential pleasure more clearly will increase my tendency to take the éclair myself” (107).

To show that affective vividness is insufficient to motivate the nephew to meet this obligation, Hare marshals some intuitions about the relation of obligation to motivation. The motivational capacity of affective vividness, understood in terms of the qualitative importance one attaches to one’s obligations, depends upon whether one is moral in the first place. “It is true that I will tend towards impartiality if I attach a great deal of importance to my beliefs about the interests of others, and I am also committed to being moral...” (109; his emphasis). But, he continues, “...there are various kinds of case in which it is possible to think my beliefs about the interests of others important, and not be committed to acting morally on the basis of those beliefs. It is possible, for example, to think those beliefs important because of their relevance to morality, but still not be committed to morality” (109-10; his emphasis). Either the qualitative importance the nephew attaches to his obligation results from his awareness of the obligation, or from something else. Ex hypothesi (given the insufficiency of judgment internalism), this qualitative importance cannot result from the obligation itself. However, it cannot arise from vividness because the nephew’s hatred for his aunt will foreclose any other sources of motivation.

We can state Hare’s argument up to this point as follows:

1. A promising secular account of moral motivation appeals to vivid belief.
2. The appeal to vivid belief takes either a cognitive or affective form.
3. Cognitive vivid beliefs are insufficient to motivate the hateful nephew.
4. Affective vivid states are insufficient to motivate the hateful nephew.
5. Hence, a heretofore promising secular account of moral motivation fails.

Hare attempts to show that we must turn from a secular account of motivation to a religious alternative.

Now I will argue that Hare’s case against an appeal to vividness is flawed.

3. Three criticisms of Hare’s position

A Dialectical Inequity

Hare facilitates his repudiation of the role of vividness in moral motivation by dividing vividness into cognitive and affective forms. In Hare’s presentation of the argument, these two conditions independently serve as
sufficient conditions for motivation. But Hare gives no argument that the ‘or’ in (2) must be exclusive. In other words, we are not given an argument showing that an ethicist cannot appeal to both cognitive and affective vividness in a unified account of motivation. I mentioned that Hare seems tacitly committed to a Humean belief/desire psychology, and, if that’s correct, then his way of parsing the options available to Kagan makes sense.

Hare probably assumes that since cognitive and affective vividness independently fail to motivate the hateful nephew, they will not collectively motivate the hateful nephew: two wrongs do not make a right. But the situation is not so straightforward.

An interlocutor can argue that the conjunction of the cognitive and affective forms of vividness might catalyze moral motivation in a way neither could alone. Those who do not adopt a belief/desire psychology will reject the reading of (2) with exclusive disjunction. They thus might combine the two forms of vividness to arrive at:

Cognitive/affective vividness: Mental state M of person P is vivid if (i) P clearly and distinctly apprehends the content of M, and (ii) P’s apprehension of the content of M has affective properties that assist in enabling P to appreciate the obligation expressed in M.

Others—those who are often dissatisfied with the current distinctions between externalism and internalism—have laid the groundwork for this type of mental state. John McDowell puts the sort of notion I have in mind in terms of a dispositional state that incorporates cognitive and appetitive aspects, and, later and in metaphor, as “a way of seeing things.” This state of cognitive and affective vividness resembles something like Jonathan Dancy’s concept of “intrinsically” (as opposed to “essentially”) motivating beliefs.

The intuition behind using a joint cognitive/affective state in an account of moral motivation rests on showing that there is an important difference between (i) clearly believing facts concerning one’s obligations with respect to a state of affairs, and (ii) experiencing a phenomenological or emotional appreciation for a state of affairs. One may believe that factory farming is immoral without experiencing any affective state that leads one to care about the relation between that belief and one’s actions. Certain informed adults fit this description. Likewise, one may be excessively sentimental about animals and exhibit a naïve concern for their welfare, but lack any beliefs about the conditions in which animals subsist on factory farms. I suspect this properly describes most children.

I am not denying that there are those who meet the cognitive/affective condition with respect to factory farming—they are informed about the practice, believe it is wrong and experience sympathy for such animals—but who nonetheless fail to possess sufficient motivation. Conjoining cognitive and affective states is not a cure-all and will not imply that everyone meeting the condition will fulfill their obligations, nor do advocates of non-Humean moral psychologies claim otherwise. Rather I am suggesting that by artificially restricting the options available to Kagan, Hare has deprived his interlocutor of an important means to show how people might tend to
fulfill their obligations. Those who meet both conditions, I submit, will be more likely to tend to meet the moral demand than those who meet only one or the other.

In the specific case of the hateful nephew, Hare must argue that the nephew is a person for whom meeting the combined vividness condition would not even produce motivation. I will now show that adopting this response leads to a complex nexus of what I will call, for lack of any better term, problems of ‘scope’.

Scope Problems

The ambiguous scope of alleged sources of motivation—and the further fact that not all kinds of scope problems are identified—creates exegetical problems in the discussions of both Hare and Kagan. This type of problem is specific to judgment externalists since they do not believe that it is conceptually necessary that moral judgments are motivational. (Of course, it is open to the judgment externalist to repudiate any theoretical need to address problems of motivation, but Kagan and Hare, to their credit, both take such problems of motivation seriously.)

Kagan suggests that “were my beliefs more vivid I would find it easier to sacrifice my own interests for the sake of others” (292; my emphasis). Shortly after identifying “making easier” as the extent to which vivid belief motivates agents, he then says that “were all my beliefs vivid, I would tend to act in accordance with the objective standpoint” (293; my emphasis). These are starkly different statements about just what motivational work vivid belief is alleged to do. At least three scope issues, of which this is the first, present themselves.

In this pair of comments Kagan ambiguously describes the extent to which forming vivid beliefs will motivate one to act. Forming vivid beliefs might do any of the following:

- make it easier to act;
- make one find it easier to act;
- make one tend to act; or
- make one tend to act so long as one is in the right circumstances.

This ‘ambiguity of extent’ in Kagan partially exonerates Hare for, since Kagan doesn’t consistently describe the motivation that vivid states are supposed to produce, we can’t expect Hare to interpret Kagan’s theory accurately. But rather than drawing attention to this critical ambiguity in Kagan, or to the issue of scope generally, Hare tacitly adopts Kagan’s ‘tend to act’ language, which perpetuates the problem.

In addition to an ambiguity about the extent of motivation, there is another about the frequency with which meeting an account’s conditions will motivate an agent. Referring to the second comment I’ve drawn from Kagan (about ‘tending to act’), Hare says that “this claim is not merely that my tendency towards impartiality increases with increased vividness of belief. The claim is that with vividness of belief, I will have an overall tendency towards impartiality.” In other words, vividness of belief is alleged
not to “increase my tendency to impartiality from n% to n + 1%. Rather, it is that with vividness of belief my tendency to impartiality will be greater than half” (107). Here Hare interprets Kagan to mean that, by forming the appropriate vivid beliefs, I will tend to act impartially more frequently than not, i.e. >50% of the time. This marks not only Hare’s interpretation of Kagan, but also Hare’s opinion on the success rate that conformity with Kagan’s conditions must achieve in order that his theory be plausible. By specifying his demands on the frequency of success Hare helps matters considerably, but there remains one other scope ambiguity.

Both Kagan and Hare write in the first-person when explaining their theories. This may seem innocuous, but it actually obscures a crucial point. A theory of motivation must plainly address the quantity of people over which it ranges. This ambiguity about people is especially important in assessing Hare’s hateful nephew counterexample. One might think that in tailoring the example around someone who hates the person to whom he owes an obligation, Hare unfairly pins his interlocutor into a corner. Perhaps Hare is correct that the hateful nephew would not be motivated by vivid belief, but that does not show that most others would not be motivated by vivid belief in identical circumstances. Kagan may respond that forming vivid beliefs will not motivate everyone, but that it will motivate most people.

Hare thwarts this reply by clearly setting the scope of people over whom an account of motivation must apply. Surprisingly, Hare asserts that Kagan’s appeal to vivid belief is to be universally quantified over people. Hare says, “The claim is supposed to be universal in the sense that it attributes a counter-factual tendency to everybody” (107; his emphasis). Here he explicitly refers to his assertion (stated in the first-person) on the previous page that “The counter-factual claim about morality is that I will tend towards impartial judgment if my beliefs are vivid” (106). Hare is holding Kagan’s theory to a high standard indeed. Even if the hateful nephew is the one and only person for whom forming vivid beliefs would fail to produce motivation, Kagan nonetheless fails to overcome Hare’s counterexample.

We have explicitly identified three scope ambiguities in this debate:

(i) the extent to which meeting an account’s requirements will enable agents to be motivated by obligations;
(ii) the frequency with which the people who can be motivated by meeting an account’s conditions are in fact motivated; and
(iii) the quantity of people who can be motivated by meeting an account’s conditions.

In order to evaluate Hare’s case against Kagan, we must first determine what is his answer to the following compound multiple-choice question:

Is it a requirement on an account of motivation that it must show that everyone or most people is always or >50% of the time motivated to discharge obligation φ or to more easily discharge φ or to discharge φ in the proper circumstances?
The strongest interpretation would take the first of each choice, while the weakest would take the lattermost options.

Hare claims that a theory of motivation must apply to everyone, and that the frequency of motivation must be greater than 50%. But Hare does not clarify the extent to which meeting a theory’s conditions must motivate all agents at least 50% of the time. This might be problematic in itself, but rather than attempt to clarify Hare and criticize the view I reconstruct, we have enough data from Hare to see why his hateful nephew case falters for a second reason (dialectical inequality being the first).

Hare affirms that the frequency of motivation produced by fulfilling a theory’s conditions must only be >50%. Hare cannot show Kagan’s theory fails to meet this frequency condition on the basis of the hateful nephew example. Kagan may respond by arguing that the hateful nephew actually is motivated >50% of the time by forming vivid beliefs. Kagan might simply grant that, at that particular moment, the nephew succumbed to his base nature and refused to give the éclair to his aunt (though he formed vivid beliefs about her interests). Perhaps if certain facts about his day were otherwise—that he didn’t lose his job that morning, for example—his vivid beliefs would have overcome the hatred he holds for his aunt. For Hare’s case to succeed, Hare cannot set as a frequency requirement merely that (all) agents be motivated only >50% of the time. It seems instead that Hare needs to affirm the strongest versions of all three of our scope theses if his hateful nephew case is to do the work to which he puts it. While Hare’s analysis is subtle in other ways, his lack of attention to the logic of the dispute shows that forming vivid mental states is not universally insufficient for generating motivation.

This raises the more abstract problem of determining just what one is entitled to expect of an account of moral motivation in the first place, specifically an account given by a judgment externalist. When discussing Kagan’s account Hare’s expectations are quite high. I am happy to grant that Kagan’s appeal to vivid mental states as a catalyst for motivation is inadequate. It cannot fulfill the strongest versions of the scope requirements we’ve discussed. But what Hare doesn’t seem to take into account is the fact that judgment externalists set their sights lower than he wants to allow. One way to understand Hare’s motivation for universally quantifying a ‘scope over people’ thesis is that he mistakenly holds the judgment externalist up to the judgment internalist’s demand that obligations are necessarily motivational. If I’m right about this, then Hare’s objection to his secular interlocutor rests on controversial and apparently conflicting assumptions about the expectations he holds of accounts of motivation.

Meta-motivational requirement

The third way Hare’s argument against secular theories stumbles concerns his implementation of a meta-motivational requirement on accounts of motivation. Hare says, “If it is the case that I ought to do something, it must be the case that I can do it. This does not mean merely that I must be able to do it if I want to do it, but that I must be able to want to do it” (102). I mentioned
above that one aspect of Hare’s arguments requiring careful scrutiny is the modal nature of his ‘ought implies can’ principles, and now we see why. As applied to the hateful nephew, in order for the nephew to be obligated to give the éclair to his aunt it must be possible that he want to do so. This marks an interesting though, to my mind, peculiar suggestion: in order for an obligation to be binding on an agent, the agent must have motivation sufficient to imply, necessarily, that it is possible that the agent want to fulfill his obligations. Hare contends that the nephew’s hatred results in his inability to be motivated to fulfill his obligations, i.e. the nephew is unable to be motivated to form vivid beliefs. Thus Hare’s charge is that Kagan’s account of motivation fails to provide agents with the necessary meta-motivational states needed to produce first-order states that result in tendencies to action.

Hare doubts that humans are capable of being motivated, at the second-order, to do their duty regularly. “It is not clear, then, that I am able to want most of all to do my duty; at least, it is not clear that I am able to do so regularly. But then if it is not the case that I can, it is not the case that I ought” (103). Leaving aside other ambiguities, note that the object of “can” is the meta-motivational state of wanting to do my duty. The upshot of Hare’s point is that, even if forming certain cognitive and affective states would motivate someone to act, it does not follow that agents ipso facto are able to be motivated to form first-order motivational states, i.e. able to want to do otherwise. The most plausible statement of this necessary condition reads something like this:

**Meta-motivational requirement:** In order for P to be obligated to \( \phi \), P must be able to want to \( \phi \).

Hare alleges that the secular ethicist cannot provide resources to fulfill this meta-motivational requirement.

I am not, however, persuaded that this meta-motivational requirement is plausibly construed as a necessary condition on accounts of motivation. On the basis of what independent reasons would one assent to this requirement in the first place? One might wonder why Hare stops at the meta-motivational level. If he is warranted in applying this burden upon the secular ethicist, why is the secular ethicist not also faced with the burden of meeting a meta-meta-motivational condition? (And: Isn’t the non-secular, Christian ethicist subject to the same demand? If not, why?) In other words, if a theory is required to show that agents who meet its conditions will want to be moral, it becomes difficult to determine why the theory needn’t also show that agents who meet its conditions want to want to be moral.

While this goes unaddressed, there is a more important point. The meta-motivational requirement is subject to the same scope ambiguities that we’ve identified above. For example, must all agents always want to act morally all the time upon forming vivid beliefs? Hare faces the same multiple choice question—with the same dilemma. If Hare opts for the strongest interpretation, his hateful nephew case is preserved, but this forces him to endorse implausible assumptions about motivation. If Hare does not opt for the strongest interpretation, then the hateful nephew case folds. In fact,
the present problem might be worse than the previous problem about scope ambiguity, for there is one more element that he leaves unquantified: How much must an agent want to act morally?

Hare’s particular version of this meta-motivational requirement is problematic in ways that constitute a third and final reason to think his stated case against an appeal to vivid belief is unpersuasive.

4. Hare’s own theory of motivation

I suspect the origins of Hare’s hasty use of the hateful nephew example lie in his theological anthropology. Hare gestures at the presence of what he calls “radical evil,” according to which we are all powerfully inclined to will in immoral ways. This may lead one to interpret Hare as holding that no naturalistic means can sufficiently motivate us to meet the moral demand. So Hare proposes a religious response to this problem. In this section I will argue that Hare’s own bridge over the moral gap fails to overcome the problems upon which he rejects secular accounts.

“Incorporation into the life of Christ”

Hare’s bridge over the moral gap involves “incorporation into the body of Christ,” which is facilitated by forgiveness, atonement and sanctification. Hare argues that incorporation into the body of Christ brings us “into a common life which we share with him, and the character of this life is itself one of incorporating others. The kind of love we have received from him moves us to give the same kind of love to others” (266). He adds that an agent is more likely to perform generous actions when she views her resources as under a covenant with God. Hare wants to bridge the moral gap by moving, in the terms of a Kantian analogy he favors, from the circle of reason to the circle of historical faith. In so doing, “we can think of [God] as enabling us to accomplish a change of heart” (270).

Hare remarks that “we are called (as in John’s letter) to make a sacrifice of material goods to meet other people’s needs, and also to give of our time and abilities.” Hare adopts Kagan’s terminology—who says that vivid beliefs make it “easier” to act—when Hare says that “generosity of this kind is easier if it comes out of a sense of being ourselves the recipients of God’s generosity, a spirit of repentance rather than self-righteousness, and a recognition of being under covenant to give as God has given to us” (267). Fulfilling obligations to be generous will be easier if we are incorporated in Christ. Partially this is because the covenant Christians make with God generates a desire to reciprocate the goodness God shows.

Hare also indicates that obligations to others are made easier to fulfill because the Christian inhabits a community. He says,

It is also easier if we can feel part of a community which is meeting the needs of others, so that we can identify which helping projects are ours. This way we are not so overwhelmed with the scale and anonymity of the need. It is by being included in such a community that we are given the impulse to extend its reach. (267)
These passages constitute the key implications of Hare’s theory of motivation and his suggested “incorporation in Christ.” Incorporation involves stages of spiritual growth: repentance and forgiveness, Jesus’s atonement for our sins, God’s justification of us to Him and, in the end, our sanctification. I will not pause to explain the process by which one is ‘incorporated’ in any greater detail because I am persuaded that, no matter how it comes about, the connection between incorporation and moral motivation is far too weak to meet Hare’s needs, as I will now argue.

The failure of Hare’s theory to meet Hare’s problems

Since Hare thinks his interlocutor cannot supply an account of motivation that meets the conditions that Hare implicitly claims are necessary, it is incumbent upon Hare’s theory that it meet those conditions. Hare does not undertake to show that his positive proposal, appealing to the incorporation into Christ, meets either the motivational or meta-motivational requirements that he places on his secular interlocutors. I want to argue that Hare’s description of the results of incorporation cannot meet the demands we’ve seen him impose upon Kagan.

If Hare’s view isn’t to violate parity considerations—isn’t to succumb to the same problems he thinks plague Kagan’s views—we need to augment his own description of the results of incorporation. I suggest this as a first approximation:

**Incorporation thesis:** For any person P and obligation φ, if P is incorporated into the body of Christ, then (i) P has the ability to want to φ and (ii) P has (first-order) motivation to φ.

Let’s consider this with two questions. First, is this true, i.e. does incorporation do that kind of work? Second, does implementing this thesis into Hare’s account of motivation enable Hare’s account to avoid the objections he has voiced against an appeal to vividness?

I am persuaded that the answer to both questions is ‘no.’ For our purposes the second question is more important than the first, so I will address the relation between Christian theism and the incorporation thesis briefly and by way of an observation made by Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski asks the following question about the features of incorporation into Christ on which Hare leans—atonement, justification and sanctification: “[D]o they fill the gap between the alleged moral demand to put duty before happiness and the alleged human inability to do so?” Acknowledging that these practices may fill a spiritual gap of some kind, she answers in the negative. Among professing Christians, Zagzebski observes, we have empirical evidence to think that the motivational gap is not bridged in this way, i.e. if Hare is making an empirical claim, her hunch is that it is false. She says, “Faith is one thing; faith against the evidence is another. Of course, there is evidence that some people have the kind of will that closes the gap. But that evidence could be taken either as evidence that God helps those who seek help and some who do not, or as evidence of a lack of a gap in the first place.” I concur: incorporation cannot do this work.
Suppose, though, that incorporation does provide at least some motivation. Does that extricate Hare’s positive views from the problems he poses for Kagan? I have demonstrated that Hare’s central objection to Kagan relies on a worst-case scenario to show that the formation of vivid belief is insufficient to enable the hateful nephew to overcome his psychological condition. We may run a similar counterexample against Hare’s proposed solution. Suppose that the nephew has undergone the transformation Hare discusses—he has become incorporated into Christ. Unlike those from Wesleyan traditions (who may appeal to the doctrine of ‘entire sanctification’), Hare does not claim that such a sanctified transformation would somehow preclude the nephew from directing malevolence at his aunt. Instead, we’ve seen Hare claim that for a transformed nephew, acting benevolently toward his aunt would only be “easier.”

Even if incorporation makes the nephew’s moral obligation “easier” to fulfill, it does not follow that the nephew has sufficient second-order or first-order motivation to meet Hare’s conditions. This is important because Hare raises just this ‘frequency’ objection against Kagan. Recall Hare contends that the appeal to vividness must not merely “increase my tendency to impartiality from n% to n + 1%. Rather, it is that with vividness of belief my tendency to impartiality will be greater than half” (107). Hare must show that the incorporated nephew’s tendency to fulfill his obligations will meet this frequency requirement, but he does not do so. No need to wonder why: setting out such an argument would be exceedingly difficult. But the upshot is that if “easier” isn’t good enough for Kagan, it cannot be good enough for Hare.

But why, in the first place, are we to think that becoming motivated will be made easier by incorporation? Hare shifts from talking about our lack of the capacity to be motivated to act, when criticizing Kagan, to talking about the ease with which an agent can act when expounding his positive theory of motivation. Just how incorporation creates a capacity to be motivated remains unclear.

Suppose that the hateful nephew has a twin who is not incorporated. The twin is identical in every way, mentally and physically, but for dissimilarities implied by the Christian twin’s incorporation. The twins have the same angry temperament and they both hate their aunt. On separate occasions they each find themselves in dilemmas about allowing their aunt to eat their éclairs. What must Hare say of the motivational states of the twins?

Since being a Christian does not imply that one will meet the demand, presumably Hare need not claim that the Christian twin will in fact give the éclair to his aunt. However, Hare must claim that the Christian hateful nephew possesses the (first- and second-order) motivation needed to give the éclair to his aunt. This is because Hare must (and in fact does) universally quantify the motivational requirement in his criticism of Kagan. Claiming that the Christian hateful nephew does not have motivation to give the éclair to his aunt is tantamount to claiming that there are some recalcitrant wills that becoming a Christian does not transform, a consequence which would prevent Hare from attaining his dialectical goals. Hare is thus forced to affirm that, necessarily, if hateful nephews are incorporated into Christ,
they will meet the strong versions of those scope conditions.

It is implausible (to put it mildly) to think that Christians will be motivated all the time and act with a >50% frequency to fulfill their obligations. But let’s suppose for the sake of argument that Christian hateful nephews have the ability to be and in fact are motivated to give their éclairs to their aunts. What about the non-Christian hateful nephew? Let’s suppose, as in Hare’s original case, that the non-Christian twin does not fulfill his obligation and does not give his éclair to his aunt. He ex hypothesi lacks the motivation possessed by his brother and he lacks the ability to want to fulfill his obligations.

A curious result follows. The demand on the Christian is increased vis-à-vis the demand on the non-Christian because the first has a motivational ability the second lacks. This follows from Hare’s allegiance to the incorporation thesis. The mere fact that the moral demand differs from person to person is not itself problematic. While Bill Gates, a multi-billionaire, is morally obligated to give millions of dollars to the poor and starving (happily, an obligation he fulfills), I am not since I currently survive on my graduate student stipend. However, Hare draws the line between those who are and are not obligated to discharge a certain obligation not merely on the basis of their resources, but rather on the basis of whether or not they are Christian. In fact Hare seems compelled to deny what I was taking as an obvious truth, viz. that Bill Gates is obligated to give millions of dollars to needy people. He is compelled to deny this because, if Gates (or someone like him) is a non-Christian, he may lack an ability to be motivated by the naturalistic means available to him to be moral in this way. If so, then Gates is not subject to this obligation, which implies Hare’s theory incorrectly allocates moral obligation.

A response from Hare

Up to this point in my arguments against Hare’s objections to secular accounts and against his positive view, I have withheld a refinement Hare makes that he thinks is important in adjudicating his position (to which he drew my attention in conversation about these matters). When introducing the various approaches to the moral gap, he describes his own by favorably quoting Augustine: “God bids us do what we cannot, that we may know what we ought to seek from him” (26 and 113). Hare believes Augustine preserves an important ‘ought implies can’ thesis. Hare says that, “what is impossible is not our doing what God bids, but our doing it without his help” (26-7 and 113-4; his emphases). What Hare suggests about this Augustinian addition is provocative.

Since performing all manner of good actions is possible with God’s all-powerful assistance, one might think that with the Augustinian addition in place the moral demand becomes daunting and far beyond our ken. Hare quickly steers us from that interpretation, however. He bounds the moral demand by noting that God offers us assistance to do only what God asks us to do. This implies that we are obligated to do only what God asks us to do. (God may, of course, assist us to perform actions he has not asked us to perform.) Suppose there is an action $\phi$ (i) that God asks Christians to do,
and (ii) that Christians cannot do without God’s aid. Christians are thus
obligated to φ since it falls under this specialized ‘ought implies can’ princi-
pile. The key feature of this suggestion lies in identifying ‘can’ with what
we might call ‘divine possibility.’ In this sense the term refers to what is
possible for human beings to do given the availability of God’s assistance. At
least for those actions that God asks us to do, he will enable us to be moti-
vated to do those actions. This leads to what I will call the

**Divine incorporation thesis:** For any person P and obligation φ, if P is
incorporated into the body of Christ and if God has asked P to φ, then
(i) P has the ability to want to φ (because God gives P that ability),
and (ii) P has adequate motivation to φ.

The Augustinian addition augments the conditions under which second-
order motivation is available to agents by modifying the modal operator. It
being possible for P to φ is now a matter of P’s being able to φ given the
possibility of God’s divine assistance.

Does the creation of the ‘divine’ form of the incorporation thesis avoid
the problems plaguing Hare’s appeal to the original incorporation thesis?
One of the central difficulties with the incorporation thesis concerns the
scope of the quantifier, i.e. the range of people over whom it applies. But
the divine incorporation thesis does not adjust the quantity of people over
whom these conditions apply. Hare’s proposal still applies to everyone
who is incorporated in Christ. Instead, the Augustinian addition adjusts
the scope of the moral actions that incorporated people are obligated to
perform.

On one hand, this is beneficial for Hare. Had Hare argued that the
divine incorporation thesis restricts the scope of people who will be moti-
vated as a result of incorporation, his positive view would not be consist-
tent with his criticism of Kagan. The advocate of vividness wanted to
respond to the hateful nephew case by noting that the hateful nephew
might mark an exception to the general rule that vivid beliefs translate into
moral motivation. Hare prevented this move by requiring of Kagan’s theo-
ry that it enable everyone whose relevant beliefs were vivid to generate
adequate motivation. Adding the divine incorporation thesis to Hare’s the-
ory maintains most of these parity considerations.

On the other hand, the divine incorporation thesis does not aid Hare in
evading any of the previous criticisms. Specifically, the criticisms present-
ed in §3 about Hare’s first-order motivational theses are unaffected. Hare,
with or without the divine incorporation thesis, cannot meet the same
explanatory and justificatory demands to which he puts secular accounts
of motivation.

5. Petitionary Prayer and Moral Motivation

The argument of this paper should not be taken to imply that there may
not be instructive aspects of religious traditions, Christian and otherwise,
that we might plunder for help in our struggle to understand aspects of
moral motivation. In this context the practice of petitionary prayer strikes
me as the most relevant aspect of the Christian tradition, even though it has been wholly overlooked in these discussions. This can be used as the basis for an Irenic proposal.

Acts of prayer typically incorporate the use of the passions, which I take to be similar in spirit to the affective condition on vivid belief. The vocabulary for the practice of prayer is imbued with terms of pleading: to call up (Genesis 4:26), to intercede (Job 22:10), to mediate (Isaiah 51:10), to consult (I Kings 28:6), to beseech (Exodus 32:11) and, commonly, to cry out to. Turning to the New Testament, Paul’s desire is that his followers make supplications and intercessions for all men. (1 Timothy 2:1) He tells his readers on several occasions to remember others in prayer. (Colossians 4:12; 2 Timothy 1:3, Philemon 1:22) The notion that prayer, and petitionary prayer specifically, is associated with the outpouring of emotion is not controversial. Scripture often associates weeping and pleas for mercy with prayer. (1 Samuel 1:10; Acts 20:35-37; Psalms 6:8-9) Jesus is said to incorporate an emotional component in prayer as well, e.g. “During the days of Jesus’ life on earth, he offered up prayers and petitions with loud cries and tears to the one who could save him from death, and he was heard because of his reverent submission.” (Hebrews 5:7)

These models of petitionary prayer clearly indicate that prayerful appeals to God are conjoined with certain attitudes, like humility, benevolence and earnestness. The importance of incorporating an attitudinal element in an account of petitionary prayer lies in bridging a methodological chasm between Hare and his secular interlocutor. Hare focuses on the transformation of the human will while Kagan primarily concerns himself with the moral status of actions, rather than persons. A more plausible account would appreciate both dimensions of the ethical life. By continually praying with attitudes of earnestness for the specific needs of herself and of others, an agent will play a role in transforming her own will for the better while she sensitizes and motivates her actions on behalf of others.

In addition to the existential and emotional aspect of prayer highlighted in scripture, there is also an emphasis on the need to think clearly during prayer. This implies that prayer is not merely directing emotional states at God. For example, Peter explicitly asks us to “be clear minded and self-controlled so that you can pray.” (1 Peter 4:7) Paul also sees the necessity of the two components when remarking, “I will pray with my spirit, but I will also pray with my mind; I will sing with my spirit, but I will also sing with my mind.” (1 Corinthians 14: 15) From these scriptural considerations we are entitled to conclude that petitionary prayer incorporates both cognitive and affective vividness.

A brief word from Aquinas, largely from the *Summa Theologica*’s question on prayer (ST, I-II, 83), gives this account more texture. Aquinas takes the cognitive condition on petitionary prayer to be obvious. Within prayer we bring before ourselves information. Aquinas notes John 11:3 as representing a form of prayer that is simply informative: “Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick.” This prayer could be taken to indicate that meeting the cognitive condition alone is sufficient for petitionary prayer. However, Aquinas describes other necessary conditions for genuinely petitionary prayer.

Aquinas claims that though prayer is an act of reason, it is “moved by
the will of charity.” We direct our charity toward both God and those for whom we pray, a group which can include ourselves. Aquinas remarks that it is the petitioner “who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God.” (ST, I-II, 83, 1) In the same Question he adds that asking for “good things” for others “is essential to the love which we owe to our neighbor.” (ST, I-II, 83, 7.) In Q. 31, A. 1, describing acts of beneficence, Aquinas explains that since “the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills” it follows that “the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend.” For Aquinas petitionary prayer is an act of reason moved by a charitable will. This resembles a joint cognitive and affective state. We must not only be cognitively aware of the states of affairs in which people to whom we owe obligations are found, but we must also feel charity toward these people and their plights.

Most important for my proposal is that Aquinas says petitionary prayer, an act of love for one’s fellow human creatures, “will result” in acts of kindness toward others. Aquinas qualifies this comment by remarking that the will causes us to act “if possible.” However, rather than give up and claim that those whose wills are not easily motivated by prayer to act need not act, he may say that this is all the more reason to pray, more frequently and fervently. It seems likely that he would make such a suggestion because not only does charity generate prayer, but prayer also “directs all our affections.” (ST, I-II, 83, 9) By praying we can align our affections with God’s wishes.14

The similarities between Aquinas on petitionary prayer and Kagan on vividness are clear.

6. Conclusion

I have explained Hare’s case against the use of vividness in motivating moral action, and I have attempted to show that his arguments rest on some implausible assumptions. Then I objected to his positive proposal to bridge the moral gap by arguing that there is not nearly as much cross-pollination between the spiritual and moral lives as Hare seems to think. These results assist us in appreciating why Hare’s bridge and gap metaphors lead us astray. First, these metaphors omit recognition that partially improving our moral lives is itself progress. Second, using these metaphors often blithely assumes that there is a single moral gap everyone must traverse, whereas different people will have different obligations and different motivational capacities.

At the outset I mentioned some ways in which our analysis of this debate might assist us in understanding some larger issues in moral psychology and moral philosophy. For one, we are in a good place from which to appreciate the importance of the distinction between judgment internalism and judgment externalism. Whatever one’s position on this issue, attention to the distinction should greatly inform one’s method in evaluating accounts of moral motivation, and aid in determining what one takes such ‘accounts’ to require. What we have called ‘scope problems’ in Hare’s attack on Kagan and in his positive proposal nicely display the importance of this distinction.
A second lesson I would like to draw from this study is cautionary: treat ‘ought implies can’ principles with the utmost care. They have an allure for the ethicist in part because some crude forms of ‘ought implies can’ are obvious and virtually undeniable. But even the most simple-minded ‘ought implies can’ principles are theoretically dangerous when their scope and their modal operators are not carefully identified and explained. So much more in the case of the three unusual variants we find in Hare: the motivational version, the meta-motivational version and the version using a kind of divine possibility to explicate the modal operator.

Despite my brief development of the notion that petitionary prayer constitutes a sequence of states with both cognitive and affective members that should appeal to both Hare and Kagan in different respects, it should come as no surprise that I deny that, were someone to engage in forming vivid states through petitionary prayer, one would thereby have the motivation needed to fulfill one’s obligations. Sincerely forming such mental states may assist in partially meeting our moral demands. Nonetheless, this is not put forth as a sufficient condition for moral motivation. Indeed, I am not at all optimistic that we—whether theists or atheists—can come to necessary and sufficient conditions meeting the scope problems addressed above. In the theistic case, I am left with the impression that an attempt to derive a moral psychology from Christianity is methodologically analogous to using the Bible as a treatise on the physical history of the world on which, e.g., Earth and everything on it was created in six days.15

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NOTES


2. *The Limits of Morality*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter 8. I do not think that Kagan’s main purpose here is to address issues about motivation. Rather it is to develop and defend a consequentialist theory of obligation against what he calls “ordinary morality.” His views about moral motivation enter through the backdoor, and even then enter only briefly. While there are probably more formidable foes to serve as the object of Hare’s attacks, nonetheless I will follow Hare, with the reservation just noted, in attributing an account of motivation to Kagan.

3. Their claims about motivation on behalf of vividness and incorporation, respectively, are often stated as though they are, or could easily be construed as, empirical claims. If their claims about motivation intended to be empirical claims, then the debate must take a different form. If they are making empirical, descriptive claims, then we need psychological and behavioral data about whether subjects in fact are motivated on the basis of the described causes. I believe that they do not intend that these are empirical claims both because of their ways with the issue, and because neither of them makes any reference to empirical studies of these phenomena.

4. I thank Regan Reitsma for suggesting this way of characterizing the affective condition. Note that the ability to use our imaginative faculty will vary in degree even within a person from one time to another.

5. “Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?” *Proceedings of the*


10. From On Grace and Free Will, 16.32.

11. For the sake of completeness I should mention that I do not believe that Hare’s new book, God’s Call (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), addresses the problems I have raised in this paper.


13. Though I draw from Aquinas, there are abundant resources within the Reformed tradition itself on which to draw and to which Hare might wish to appeal. A fine place to begin would be with Religious Affections, in which Jonathan Edwards argues that the religious attitudes becoming of a Christian are manifest in and signaled by moral excellence. (Religious Affections. J.E. Smith, ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.)

14. Aquinas also thought that the more media in which one forms vivid beliefs, the more motivation one will produce. One of the virtues of audible prayer is, he says, that it excites “interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections.” (ST, I-II, 83, 9)

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