Augustine's Grief

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The paper begins by describing two episodes of personal grief recounted by Augustine in the Confessions, that at the death of an unnamed friend and that at the death of his mother, Monica. It is argued that Augustine intended to show that the earlier friend, and an early phase of his grief for his mother, were sinful. However, contrary to a recent account of Augustine’s grief, it is argued (by an examination of the later phase of his grief for his mother) that Augustine does not hold that it is wrong to grieve at the death of a loved one, provided that one grieves for the right reason.

I

In his Confessions Augustine provides what seems at first inspection to be two contrasting accounts of grief. One of these, grief at the death of an unnamed friend, occurred before he became a Christian; the other, the death of his mother, after. In this short paper I shall attempt to give an account of these griefs, using this account to defend Augustine against the charge that he thought that it was a Christian’s duty to be like God by seeking the elimination of all griefs.

The griefs

During the period when he was a Manichee Augustine recounts the devastating sense of loss that the death of a friend caused him. He tells us that he had grown up with this person, though he was not yet then his friend, for they had been friends for scarcely a year when he died. And even though friends ‘it was less than true friendship which is not possible unless you bond together those who cleave to one another by the love which “is poured into our heart by the Holy Spirit who is given to us”’. 1 The paradigm of friendship is Christian friendship, and this was not a case of such. Augustine tells us that when they were younger he had turned the man away from Christianity, and, following his death, ‘my soul could not endure to be without him’.2 These are some of the words that he used to express his grief at the loss.

‘Grief darkened my heart’ (Lam.5: 17). Everything on which I set my gaze was death. My home town became a torture to me; my father’s
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house a strange world of unhappiness; all that I had shared with him was without him transformed into a cruel torment. My eyes looked for him everywhere, and he was not there. I hated everything because they did not have him, nor could they now tell me ‘look, he is on the way’, as used to be the case when he was alive and absent from me. I had become to myself a vast problem, and I questioned my soul ‘Why are you sad, and why are you very distressed?’ But my soul did not know what reply to give.

By the time he wrote the Confessions Augustine had clearly become disgusted with the grief he expressed then and which he so movingly recounts. In a manner that is characteristic of the autobiographical parts of the Confessions Augustine weaves together an original account with later reflections on it; in this case the account of the death of his friend with later reflections on the character and value of the friendship. We might ask legitimate questions about the accuracy of Augustine’s memory, and about how much he is reading back into the past. Since we have no means of knowing, and, as our interest lies in the idea of grief itself and in Augustine’s attitude to it, rather than in its historical accuracy, we may treat it as if it were accurate.

He tells us why he grieved; chiefly for two reasons. One was that he believed that at the time he was unduly attached to his friend, that he had pinned all hopes upon him, so that when the friend died his grief hardly new any bounds.

It was a very sweet experience, welded by the fervour of our identical interests. For I had turned him away from the true faith, to which, being only young, he had no strong or profound allegiance, towards those superstitions and pernicious mythologies which were the reason for my mother’s tears over me. So under my influence this man’s mind was wandering astray, and my soul could not endure to be without him.

This for Augustine, that is for the later Augustine, was a classical case of loving the creature more than the Creator.

For wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is fixed upon beautiful things external to you and external to itself, which would nevertheless be nothing if they did not have their being from you.

More than this, it was evidence to Augustine of the fact that failure to love the Creator distorts and overbalances human love for the creature. In loving the creature rather than the Creator, Augustine had imputed to the creature properties which only the Creator can have. Thus he loved his friend as if he believed that the friend would never die.

I had felt that my soul and his soul were “one soul in two bodies”. So my life was to me a horror. I did not wish to live with only one half of
myself, and perhaps the reason why I so feared death was that then the whole of my much loved friend would have died.  

I was surprised that any other mortals were alive, since he whom I had loved as if he would never die was dead.  

The reason why that grief penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured out my soul on to the sand by loving a person as if he would never die.  

So his love for his friend was accompanied by self-deception. The second reason why Augustine reckoned that his grief was inordinate was because of his state of unbelief at the time. Some of his words may also indicate disbelief in the persistence of the soul after death, or they may signal some feature of Manicheeism of which I am ignorant, or they may simply signal Augustine’s belief that his friend would not return to him. However that may be, his belief that he had lost the companionship of his dead friend intensified his grief; he loved the creature and not the Creator, and when the creature died his tears for his friend took the friend’s place.  

I had no hope that he would come back to life, and my tears did not petition for this. I merely grieved and wept. I was in misery, and had lost the source of my joy... I was in misery, and misery is the state of every soul overcome by friendship with mortal things and lacerated when they are lost.  

So at that period of my life I used to love people on the basis of human judgement, not your judgement, my God, in whom no one is deceived.  

This contrast between human judgement and the judgement of God comes out in the second occasion of grief recounted in the *Confessions*, the death of Augustine’s mother Monica. By this time he had become a Christian and came to view both the character of his mother, also a Christian, and her death, in a different light from that of his friend. But coming to grieve for her in what Augustine regarded as a Christian manner involved him in a somewhat costly process. His grief for her, as he calls it, and as he recounted it, has a greater complexity than that for his earlier friend. It passes through two phases. I shall call these the suppression and the expression phases.  

On the occasion of Monica’s death, Augustine tells us that by an act of determination he suppressed any expression of grief, and discouraged such behaviour in others, for example, in his son Adeodatus. What concerned Augustine, curiously enough, was not that he felt grief at his mother’s death, but that a public display of grief might be misconstrued by others. Augustine is concerned in the first instance not to suppress grief *per se*, but to suppress the expression of grief.
I closed her eyes and an overwhelming grief welled into my heart and was about to flow forth in floods of tears. But at the same time under a powerful act of mental control my eyes held back the flood and dried it up. The inward struggle put me into great agony. Then when she breathed her last, the boy Adeodatus cried out in sorrow and was pressed by all of us to be silent. In this way too something of the child in me, which had slipped towards weeping, was checked and silenced by the youthful voice, the voice of my heart. We did not think it right to celebrate the funeral with tearful dirges and lamentations, since in most cases it is customary to use such mourning to imply sorrow for the miserable state of those who die, or even their complete extinction.

But this is not the whole story, for coupled with this concern over the inappropriate expression of grief was a fear, at first rather undeveloped, that he also might be grieving for her for the wrong reasons. With an almost chilling self-detachment that is a characteristic strand of the Confessions, Augustine analyses the various elements in his grief, the various reasons for it, and the different kinds of grief mingled together in his experience.

Augustine was able to satisfy himself that his tears, his expression of grief, were legitimate provided that they were being shed for the right reason. Or perhaps the wrong way to weep is to have no reason, to weep by reflex, simply to be overcome. And so, while suppressing his own weeping, he grieves over his own grief, not over the fact of the grief but over its sources, and its character. At first it does not seem clear what it was about this grief that caused Augustine further grief. It may seem that it was because it was self-regarding, centring on the loss of his mother's help and support. That may be part of it. And later on he mentions that it was the loss of 'physical kinship' that was a wrong or unworthy or inappropriate reason for grief. It is grief over his own self-regard that on reflection gave him 'such sharp displeasure to see how much power these human frailties had over me, though they are a necessary part of the order we have to endure and are the lot of the human condition' and so Augustine was 'tortured by a twofold sadness', his grief over his grief. Yet through all this he kept a stiff upper lip, and did not weep.

After his bath, and sleep, he discovered that his 'suffering', this double grief, 'had been relieved'. When, instead, he was able to focus on his mother's virtues, her 'devout attitude to you and her holy gentle and considerate treatment of us', then 'I was glad to weep before you about her and for her, about myself and for myself' not himself merely as her son, but as the one who had benefited from her virtue. So there was a refocussing of attention away from mere physical kinship to the Christian virtue of his mother, and now, refocussed and with an opportunity to weep in private, before God alone, Augustine does not restrain himself further. He expresses his grief, legitimate grief as he believed, in private, before God. And so the presence of his tears, shed alone to avoid misunderstanding, took the place of his mother. This is the expressive phase of this episode.
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From then on, little by little, I was brought back to my old feelings about your handmaid, recalling her devout attitude to you and her holy gentle and considerate treatment of us, of which I had suddenly been deprived. I was glad to weep before you about her and for her, about myself and for myself. Now I let flow the tears which I had held back so that they ran as freely as they wished. My heart rested upon them, and it reclined upon them because it was your ears that were there, not those of some human critic who would put a proud interpretation on my weeping.  

Suffering Love

In the midst of being moved oneself by Augustine's accounts one may raise an eyebrow or two over Augustine's treatment of these griefs. Not so much over his retrospective analysis of them, but at what he conveys of the intensity and objectivity of his self-analysis, particularly at the time of Monica's death. This is not emotion recollected in tranquillity but, as it is portrayed in the Confessions at any rate, reflection in the midst of the turmoil of emotion. It seems extraordinary that in grief a person should stop to analyse its particular strands, and motives, and regard grief at certain times, or in certain places, or for certain reasons, as legitimate, while grief at other times and places and for other reasons is declared illegitimate and accordingly suppressed. Or even, if this is not what Augustine actually did, that he should be willing later on to represent himself as having done so. The power that Augustine had to suppress and express his grief at his mother's death also makes a striking contrast with his professions of incontinence, another strand in the Confessions.

Such seem to be legitimate observations. Recently, however, a much more striking and radical criticism has been made about Augustine's grieving. In 'Suffering Love' Nicholas Wolterstorff maintains that Augustine held that 'even to feel grief upon the death of a friend or one's mother is to have been guilty of too much worldly affection.' Wolterstorff goes on to claim that

The mentality expressed (in this attitude to grief) not only shapes Augustine's view of the proper place of sorrow and suffering in human life; it also contributes to his conviction that in God there is no sorrow or suffering. God's life is a life free of sorrow - indeed, a life free of upsetting emotions in general, a life free of passions, a life of apathy, untouched by suffering, characterised only by steady bliss.

By contributing to the conviction that God is impassible Wolterstorff appears to mean that Augustine's mentality about grief provides him with an additional reason for thinking that God is apathetic, not merely that it convinces Augustine further of something that he is already convinced. It helps Augustine to build the case for God's apatheia.

In his paper Wolterstorff contrasts the thought of Augustine with that of the Stoics, concluding that while the Stoics believed that the emotions
were based upon false evaluations, Augustine held that what is wrong with emotions is that they involve being overcome.

and that the pain embedded within such emotions as grief and fear is incompatible with full happiness. Grief and fear are not as such incompatible with reason. They are as such incompatible with eudemonia. Hence the abolition of those passions from our lives will not occur by way of illumination as to the true nature of things. It will occur by way of removal from our existence of that which it is appropriate to fear or grieve over.21

So Wolterstorff maintains that Augustine claims that human beings can only find true fulfilment in what is immutable, impassible and indestructible, in God himself.23 Accordingly the ideal life is one that is free from emotional upset or disturbance of any kind.24 Augustine is alleged to hold this position not on Stoical grounds, but because when we suffer emotional upset or disturbance we are failing to model ourselves on God.

In what follows I do not want to question the thought that for Augustine the goal of all human existence is a life of unalloyed bliss in the presence of God. Rather our question is: for Augustine, is grief over the loss of friends here and now incompatible with the pursuit of that goal? In other words, is it, in Augustine’s view, sinful to grieve over the loss of friends, as Wolterstorff says? Did Augustine think that he ought not to have grieved for the loss of his mother, however he understood this loss? On Wolterstorff’s account of Augustine’s attitude to grief we must grieve for our sins, and for the sins of others,25 and we may grieve on occasion over the innocent misfortunes that come our way, such as hunger and physical pain.25 But it is sinful to grieve over the loss of one’s mother, because one is thereby failing to emulate or imitate the impassible God.

Wolterstorff further maintains that for Augustine the cure of grief ‘is to detach one’s love from such objects and to attach it to something immutable and indestructible’, to God himself.27 The crucial mistake here, I suggest, is to interpret Augustine as holding that his weeping at his mother’s death was wrong because he was ‘guilty of too much worldly affection’. As we have seen there is no evidence for this. Augustine does not say this, nor does he, I believe, imply it. We have already seen that Augustine distinguishes between grief and tears. In the case of his mother’s death

We did not think it right to celebrate the funeral with tearful dirges and lamentations, since in most cases it is customary to use such mourning to imply sorrow for the miserable state of those who die, or even their complete extinction.28

And further, grief, even tears, at the loss of companionship is to be distinguished from grief in the belief that one’s friend is no more. Besides, at least in the Confessions, issues about imitating God’s impassibility are noticeably absent.

As we have noted, Augustine is not concerned with one concept of grief,
with the only question being whether being grieved and showing it is sin­
ful or not, but with at least two concepts of grief, two concepts possessing
two different cognitive structures. Despite what Wolterstorff says, as we
shall see later what Augustine took from the Stoics (as he understood
them) was the need not to suppress grief but to order it by right reason.
There is the grief that arises from the belief in the extinction of one’s friend,
with whom one had identified all one’s hopes, and this is a different kind
of grief, because it has a different kind of intentional object, from that at
the death of a friend or relative whom one believes to be in the presence of
God and with whom one hopes one day to be reunited. His earlier phase of
his grief for his mother, the grief which he later corrected, seems to be
more like his grief for his friend.

So there is nothing in any of this to warrant the following rather black
and white verdict on Augustine’s attitude to grief.

In the presence of all those griefs which ensue from the destruction of
that which we love, Augustine pronounces a “No” to the attach­
ments rather than a “No” to the destruction - not a “No” to death but
a “No” to love of what is subject to death. Thereby he also pro­
nounces a “Not much” concerning the worth of the things loved.
Nothing in this world has worth enough to merit an attachment
which carries the potential of grief - nothing except the religious state
of souls. The state of my child’s soul is worth suffering love; the
child’s company is not. 29

But as we have seen, Augustine believed that attachment to his mother in
her death and grief for it was inappropriate on certain grounds, but legiti­
mate on other grounds, if founded on right reason. Yet he believed that
even this grief ought to be expressed with reserve, lest the tears should be
misinterpreted by the uninformed and the unbelieving.

If this is so then Wolterstorff is wrong in maintaining that

I think there can be absolutely no doubt that Augustine generally meant
by ‘love’, that degree of attachment to something such that the destruc­
tion or change of that object will cast one into grief; and that he meant to
say that, in that sense, God alone is to be loved. Other things are only to
be used, this use including what I have called “enjoyment”. Now natu­
really use and enjoyment is a form of “attachment” to things. Hence it is
not inappropriate for Augustine sometimes to speak of a properly tem­
pered love for these things. But the crux of this issue is this: Our “love”
for such things is not to be such that it can cause us grief. 30

If this is so, how can Augustine say ‘I was glad to weep before you about
her and for her, about myself and for myself’? 31

Two Objections

I wish now, and finally, to consider two objections to this line of argument
against Wolterstorff’s interpretation of Augustine’s grief. The first is
Wolterstorff’s claim, already briefly noted, that what Augustine took to be the failed attempt to suppress the manifestation of his grief at the death of his mother, show that Augustine believed that he was ‘guilty of too much worldly affection’. 32

Wolterstorff is levelling a double charge at Augustine, that he believed that he was guilty of too much worldly affection, and that the evidence for this is his feeling of grief. Grief itself, whatever its reason, and whatever its circumstances, (apart from grief over sin and innocent misfortune) is a sign of too much worldly affection.

There are two reasons to think that the gulf between Augustinian and modern mentality is not anything like as profound as Wolterstorff maintains:

In the first place, Augustine is talking about too much worldly affection, not worldly affection per se. And while Augustine means this in a religious sense, since in his view his grief should have been conditioned by a recognition of God’s love for him, and for his mother, what he says is readily understood in a purely secular context. The idea that someone can grieve too much is a familiar one. It is for this reason that those who grieve are often advised to attempt to divert their focus of attention to other matters. And even if Augustine, in accusing himself, is talking not about grief but about the expression of grief, then the point still holds.

But which is Augustine talking about? As we have seen, in a sense he is talking about neither. He is not talking about grief, nor about the expression of grief, but of a kind of grief giving rise to a kind of expression of it.

Why did Augustine let his tears for his mother flow, after suppressing them earlier? Was it merely that he could not control them (as Wolterstorff implies), and so was guilty of too much worldly affection? It is clear that this is not how Augustine understood the position, for he says that he was ‘glad to weep before you about her and for her, about myself and for myself’. 33 Why was he glad to weep? Partly because this weeping was in private, and so not liable to be misunderstood by others who might believe that he wept simply because he believed that his mother was suffering, or (more significantly for Augustine) because they believed that in dying she had ceased to exist. For Augustine believed neither of these things, and it was important for him not to be misunderstood. And partly because he was also glad to grieve once his attention was taken off the mere fact that he had lost his mother’s support, and was focused instead upon her character. It is surely significant in this regard that his earlier weeping for his mother, that which he suppressed, and which caused him grief, a ‘two fold sadness’, was built upon a description of himself and his mother in similar terms to those in which he earlier described himself and his friend: ‘my life and hers had become a single thing’. 34 ‘I had felt that my soul and his were “one soul in two bodies”’. 35

There is a third aspect to Augustine’s grief which is of some significance in view of Wolterstorff’s critique. This is the contrast that Augustine himself draws between grief that is an expression of being overcome, and grief that is not. It is not true that for Augustine all grief was a case of being overcome. For him, there is a contingent connection both between grief and its expression (Augustine was no behaviourist!) and also between
experiencing grief and being overcome by it. Not surprisingly, of great significance for Augustine is the example of Christ who, though sinless, grieved, but whose grief was never a case of being overcome. As Augustine puts it in the *City of God*

Our Lord Himself, living in the form of a servant (yet without sin), used them (viz. emotions arising from the love of the good) when He thought it requisite; for we may not think that having man’s essential body and soul, He had but seeming affections....But these emotions of man He felt when it pleased Him, as He was made man when it pleased Him. Wherefore we confess that those emotions, in their best kind, are but pertinent to this present life, not unto that which we hope for hereafter; and that we are often overpressed by them. A laudable desire or charity may move us; yet shall we weep whether we will or no. For we have them by our human infirmity, but so had not Christ; for He has His very infirmity itself from His own power. But as long as we live in this infirmity, we shall live worse if we lack those emotions.

The Son of God assumed human nature by an act of his power, and in that assumption were included the emotional dispositions intrinsic to human nature in this life. Augustine here seems to accept the reasonableness of the principle that whatever one voluntarily assumes one is not overcome by. Therefore Christ, though grieving, was never overcome by grief. So it cannot be intrinsic to grief to be overcome by it; being overcome in this way in indicative of a sinful frailty that Christ did not experience.

At the time when Augustine was suppressing the initial expression of grief that he felt at his mother’s death what he was suppressing was what he calls the ‘power of human frailties over me’. Were the frailties the grief? Were they not rather what were for Augustine wrong reasons, or no reasons for grieving? He was grieved to see the power of such frailties over him even though he recognised that ‘they are a necessary part of the order we have to endure and are the lot of the human condition’. Here at least there is some evidence for Wolterstorff’s view that for Augustine the wrongness of that emotion very largely consisted in the fact that he was overcome by it.

However, when, after taking a bath, and sleeping, and recollecting the words of Ambrose’s hymn, he found himself on his own he (consciously and deliberately) recalled his mother’s character and so ‘was glad to weep before you’. That is, a contrast is drawn between grief arising from natural necessity, frail human nature, and grief that results from a (Christlike?) deliberate and voluntary turning of the attention to laudable features of the one who had died. So while Augustine may be said on this later occasion to have grieved, it was grief that was deliberately assumed, and so he was not overcome by it at all.

There is nothing in this account that is incompatible with the love of friends, or of anything else, and thus with grief at their loss. ‘If physical objects give you pleasure, praise God for them and return love to their Maker lest, in the things that please you, you displease him. If souls please
you, they are being loved in God; for they also are mutable and acquire sta­bility by being established in him’. What is crucial for Augustine’s posi­tive appraisal of these is the proviso that all these pleasures are pleasures ‘in God’, conditioned and motivated by the love of God.

A second objection to the account being offered is as follows: but does not Augustine say immediately after this private expression of his grief, that he had sinned? No, not really. What he says is

Let anyone who wishes read and interpret as he pleases. If he finds fault that I wept for my mother for a fraction of an hour, the mother who had died before my eyes who had wept for me that I might live before your eyes, let him not mock me but rather, if a person of much charity, let him weep before you for my sins.

Augustine is always ultra-cautious about saying that anything that he did was free from fault, and what we have here is an expression of that caution. But it is surely misleading for Wolterstorff to comment ‘The sin for which Augustine wants the person of charity to weep, however, is not so much the sin of weeping over the death of his mother as the sin of which that weeping was a sign.’ Augustine does not want the person of charity positively to weep over any sin that he, Augustine, has identified in his weeping, for he implies that he has not found any such sin; only if some fault which Augustine cannot see is identified by another, then to weep for that.

So how has Wolterstorff gone wrong? He argues that for Augustine the human ideal is unalloyed bliss and union with an impassible, immutable God. ‘If it is happiness and rest for your soul that you desire - and who does not? - then fix your love on the eternal immutable God.’ For Wolterstorff this does not mean that according to Augustine one should not grieve in this life, but only that should grieve over what impedes that union, one’s own sins and shortcomings. We should detach ourselves from the objects liable to change and decay and attach ourselves to God in whom there is no shadow of turning. According to Augustine one grieves, or one ought only to grieve, Wolterstorff implies, over the faults of one’s religious character. So grief over the death of another person is not legitimate.

But, as I hope to have shown, there are reasons to doubt this. Wolterstorff misinterprets the *City of God*. Augustine there says that a life free from those emotions which are contrary to reason is obviously a good and a life entirely free of passions is to be desired. But in the present life, because of sin and its effects, chief among which is death, none of us can or should want to be without pathos. Some present fear and sorrow is based on a correct evaluation of our situation, and so such emotions are in this sense subordinated to reason.

By extension - and this is what Wolterstorff misses - according to Augustine we may and should grieve over expressions of the effects of sin. Not only grieve over our own sins and the sins of others, but grieve over what the sin brings with it, death and decay. And so grieve over the dying and the dead. It is grief both over the effects of sin, and over the loss of what is good, and therefore such grief is essentially bound up with the present conditions of our temporality.
Conclusion

Augustine wishes to say that the passions are not per se rebels against reason, but that they have a reason of their own, proceeding from the *voluntas*. In the case of the Christian in this life, passions are due to the conflict between flesh and spirit. But while such a conflict is sufficient for the existence of a passion, it is not necessary - witness the case of Christ, who though he had no sin, nevertheless experienced grief.

Insofar as a person is a follower of Jesus he will not seek the elimination of grief, but the elimination of certain kinds of grief. So Augustine looks not for a life without grief, as Wolterstorff implies, but for its transformation. What does this transformation involve? The Christian still grieves; but he grieves over different things than the non-Christian, and for different reasons. As Wolterstorff points out, the Christian grieves over his sins, and over the effects of sin in his life. But not only this, he grieves over losses of certain kinds, not over the loss as such but over the nature of the loss.

So it is a mistake to think that what Augustine sought was the elimination of all emotions by the control of reason. Rather what he took from Stoicism was the view that there is not a principled conflict between reason and passion, but that the conflict is between different judgements. Affections, including fear and grief, must for Augustine have a *ratio* of their own, otherwise they would never move us.

I began this paper by expressing the view that Augustine offers what seems at first sight to be two contrasting accounts of grief. And so in one sense they are. But what Augustine came to deplore about his earlier grief was that it was based upon a wrong judgement of the case, as was his initial grief for his mother. But once he judged that grief at his mother’s death was soundly based he was prepared for his tears to flow.

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NOTES

4. *Confessions*, IV. iv. 7, p.56
5. *Confessions*, IV. x. 15, p.61
6. *Confessions*, IV. vi. 11, p.59
7. *Confessions*, IV. vi. 11, p.59
8. *Confessions*, IV. viii. 1, p. 60,
9. *Confessions*, IV. vi. 11, p.58
10. *Confessions*, IV. xiv. 21, p.65
11. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 29, p.174
12. *Confessions*, IX. xiii. 34, p.176
13. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 31, p.175
14. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 31, p.175
15. *Confessions*, IX. xii.32, p.176
16. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 33, p.176
17. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 33, p.176
19. 'Suffering Love' p.197
20. 'Suffering Love' pp. 197-8
21. 'Suffering Love' p.209
22. 'Suffering Love' p.209
23. 'Suffering Love' p.199
24. 'Suffering Love' p.204
25. 'Suffering Love' p.208
26. 'Suffering Love' p.208
27. 'Suffering Love' p.199
28. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 29, p.274
29. 'Suffering Love' p.228
30. 'Suffering Love' p.231
31. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 33, p.176
32. Quoted by Wolterstorff p.197
33. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 33, p.176
34. *Confessions*, IX. xii. 30, p.175
35. *Confessions*, IV. vi. 11, p.59
37. *Confessions*, IX. 12.31, p.175
38. *Confessions*, IX. 12.31, p.175
39. *Confessions*, IV. 12.18, p.63. Behind Augustine's remarks lie his distinction (in *On Christian Doctrine* and elsewhere), between *uti* and *frui*. Some have argued that what Augustine says about use of neighbour is incompatible with love of neighbour for his own sake. For a recent defence of Augustine on this point see W.A. Hannam, 'The Metaphysics of St.Augustine's *usus-frui* Distinction in relation to Love of Neighbour', *Studia Patristica* Vol. XXXVIII edd. M.F. Wiles and E.J. Yarnold, (Leeuven, Peeter, 2001). Hannam argues that Augustine is consistent if he is understood as saying that there is a legitimate *frui* of self and neighbour provided that *frui* is grounded in God, and that there are good grounds for so interpreting him. I am indebted to Robert Crouse for the reference to Hannam.
40. *Confessions*, IX. 12.33, p.177
41. 'Suffering Love' p.197
42. 'Suffering Love' p.199 Wolterstorff refers to *Confessions* IV.11.
43. 'Suffering Love' p.201
44. 'Suffering Love' p.200
45. *City of God*, I.4.9
47. *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, p.101
48. The paper has benefitted from the comments of Paul Burns, Robert Crouse, John Stackhouse, and Mark Vessey.