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A CRITIQUE OF EMERGENT DUALISM

Frank B. Dilley

In this paper I examine and critique the "Emergent Dualism" of William Hasker, suggesting that Cartesian dualism provides a more appropriate vehicle for the kind of self Hasker rightly claims is needed to do justice to human consciousness.

Accepting his critique of materialism and of supervenience theories, I argue that Hasker by attributing spatiality and energy to the self undercuts the basic historic arguments for separating mind from body because of the incompatibility of those qualities with the nonphysical ones needed for the kind of self he defends, and because his view leads unacceptably to the possibility of multiple selves.

I further claim by paying proper attention to the structure of the self and the mutual structuring of each other by minds and bodies, some of the difficulties of Cartesian dualism may be reduced.

Materialists have always hoped to solve the problem of consciousness by denying that the data of consciousness have been correctly described, but since the "what it is like" problem will not go away, some philosophers of mind have moved as far as property dualism to accommodate this problem. Many property dualists, though they resigned themselves to giving up free will and responsibility, as well as a unified self which persists through time, hoped at least to be able to retain mental causation without becoming substance dualists, but this attempt has failed.

Recently, there have been some hopeful signs that philosophers are ready to take substance dualism more seriously. To save mental causation, Jaegwon Kim claims, would require substantial dualism.¹ Thomas Nagel now postulates rationality as a basic feature of the universe and of the human mind, though still remaining passionately opposed to theism.² John Searle, though still a materialist, very recently changed his mind on a number of issues, and now defends a non-Humean self with free will and rationality, also endorsing biological indeterminism.³ Also, some prominent scientists have begun to reexamine the physical and psychological evidence which supports mental causation.⁴ Perhaps now is a good time to reassert substance dualism once more.

This paper is a tribute to and critique of the views of William Hasker in *The Emergent Self*. Hasker advocates a mind-brain view which goes beyond materialism and property dualism.⁵ His view is that the self emerges from matter: that it appears when matter reaches an appropriate



level of complexity. Hasker thinks that his view can provide for mental causation and libertarian free will, which property dualists deny, but that it can also provide for a unified self, an advance over Panpsychist and Process views which offer a serial self, not a persisting and unitary self.

He calls his view "emergent dualism," rejecting traditional dualism but claiming that his view can do the things that traditional dualism attempted to do, namely support mental causation, rationality, free will, the unity of the self, and survival of physical death, while avoiding what he takes to be the difficulties with more familiar forms of substance dualism. According to Hasker, traditional substance dualisms fail to integrate well with evolutionary theory and with recent discoveries about the dependence of mind on brain. He is, of course, correct on these matters but dualists can say more in response to these problems than he acknowledges.

HASKER'S EMERGENT DUALISM

The positive exposition of Hasker's view, emergent dualism, alas, is given only the briefest of presentations — fifteen pages, nine in his chapter on Emergent Dualism and five in his chapter on Survival — so it is no wonder that questions about his view might arise. Presumably Hasker will have much more to say about his positive views, but some grave problems arise from what he has written. I applaud his critique of materialism and property dualism, but regret his decision to stop short of Cartesian dualism, and claim that the latter view is needed to support the basic features of the mental self that Hasker wishes to preserve.

Hasker claims that in the course of evolutionary development, an individual mind, not just a set of mental properties, has emerged from the brain, a mind with properties different from those in the physical brain and world but which acts on that material world. He refers to the mind as an emergent individual, likening it to a magnetic field in its qualitative difference from the physical properties that generate it and also in its ability to act on the brain that generates it. Although property dualists would share his view that mental states are something over and above the brain states that produce them, they would reject his view that the mind is an individual thing, acts causally on the brain, and is libertarianly free.

Other substance dualists maintain that the mind exists independently of the body, but Hasker disagrees. His view is that mind is generated by physical matter *and* is kept in existence by that matter. He does allow that mind might possibly continue to exist once it has been produced, but chooses to defend the view that survival of death depends upon God's supporting mind directly or producing another body to sustain it.

He differs from those theistic dualists who think that God creates souls separately and binds them to bodies. For Hasker, souls come from matter, though of course it is God who gives matter the potentiality for producing souls. Cartesian dualists can accommodate to the idea that God endows matter with the power to produce souls, but unfortunately Hasker proposes other revisions to the concept of mind which cause serious problems, as I will show.

Hasker himself realizes that his analogy of physical fields has limita-

tions, chief among them that the properties of a magnetic field or other fields identified by physics are not "emergent in the strong sense required for the properties of the mind. Nor does it seem that these fields possess the kind of unity that is required for the mind.... And there is no reason to suppose that the fields of physics are endowed with inherent teleology, much less libertarian freedom" (p 192). It seems to me that Hasker owes us something in the way of providing some guidance on how he hopes to overcome these deficiencies in his model, since those three features of mind, its qualitative difference from the brain, its unity, and its ability to act teleologically are all central to the nature of the self that he advocates. Moreover he makes matters worse by extending some of the features of physical fields, namely spatial location and energy, to mind itself, raising serious questions about the coherence of his view.

Since I accept his reasons for rejecting materialism and property dualism, I will restrict myself to topics relevant to my exposition and critique of his position, and will then argue that Cartesian dualism is needed to sustain the properties that he deems essential. If my claims about his views are correct, he has attributed contradictory properties to the emergent self. If so, his view fails to do what he wants it to do. Also I think that Cartesian dualism is capable of giving more adequate answers to the criticisms that he raises than he recognizes.

THE INADEQUACY OF MATERIALISM

Hasker argues that materialism is implausible because the data of consciousness, including qualia, mental content and intentionality, cannot be reduced to physical properties. This is what has been called "the explanatory gap" or "the qualitative gap" between the qualities of matter and mind. Analytical behaviorism, he says, is almost dead, and he does not think that functionalism adequately handles qualia, mental content and intentionality. Supervenience theories are more promising, but cannot provide for real mental causation. As I have noted, Kim has reached the same conclusion about supervenience theories and mental causation.

Besides mental causation, the unity of consciousness must be provided for, both the unity of consciousness *at* a time and the unity of consciousness *over* time. Simply stated, Hasker argues that "a person's being aware of a complex object cannot consist of parts of the person being aware of parts of the object" (p 146). Since there is no place in the brain where all my states of awareness are brought together (the so-called binding problem), many philosophers, including property dualists, have adopted Hume's position that the unity of consciousness is a fiction. Since Hasker admits that his field analogy also does not provide the kind of unity needed, he has a problem. I question whether a field *can* provide a home for the subject of consciousness, the subject which unifies its experiences of the various objects of which it is aware.

Hasker explores reasons for thinking that the physical causal order is not closed, one of which he calls the argument from reason. He repeats the frequently made criticism that if the physical order is closed then "*no one ever accepts a belief because it is supported by good reasons*" (p 68). Rationality and

agency go along with free will and teleology, so for all these reasons Hasker defends the need for an individual soul which has unity of consciousness.

Midway through the book he summarizes his conclusions as to what qualities the self has. He claims that rationality involves teleological considerations and the notion of a whole self "since we cannot reasonably suppose the behavior of elementary particles to be influenced directly by norms and objectives," "that the choices in virtue of which we are agents must also be ascribed to the person in a holistic sense," and "that the self which is the subject of conscious experience must be a unity of a sort that is inconsistent with its being a whole consisting of physical parts" (p 146). He turns to the consideration of what kind of self meets these requirements, supporting an emergent self and rejecting Cartesian and Thomistic dualism. My argument will be that the self he proposes cannot provide either the kind of unity he requires or accommodate qualia, intentions, rationality and free will.

Considering survival, he offers three possibilities consistent with his view that the self is a product of the material body. It might be, he says, that once the soul emerges it can continue to exist on its own, even though it is produced and sustained by its physical body all during its normal life. The other two options are that God takes over the task of sustaining the field or that God creates a new body to take over that task. He recognizes the timing problem in the third option, lest the new body generate its own field before the old one is attached to it. The self has to be the same old one because "re-creationism is a conceptual absurdity" (p 113). However, since fields can be split, he admits that it is possible on his view that there can be multiple selves, which counters our ordinary intuitions that the self is not capable of multiplicity, objectionable on the logical ground that two centers of consciousness, numerically different, can't possibly be the same self.

HASKER'S VIEW OF THE SELF EXAMINED

The first question is, given his admission about the limitations of his physical field analogy, is Hasker's self sufficiently dualistic to give him what he wants, the kind of self that can support qualia, intentional states, causality, contra-causally free will and unity of consciousness? Just how dualistic is his position? He calls his view "emergent dualism" (pp 121, 196, 201), says it is a form of "substance dualism" (p 147), describes his view as that of "subject-emergence" rather than property-emergence (p 170), and says that interactions between minds and bodies are interactions between two distinct substances (pp 199, 200). Clearly he thinks of himself as a substance dualist, but not as a Cartesian or Thomistic substance dualist.

Cartesian dualism, Hasker says, is defined in terms of two elements, the relation between the qualities of mind and the qualities of the brain, and the origin of mind. As has been made clear already, Hasker rejects the independence of the soul from the body — the brain creates and sustains the soul — but how does he stand on the other element of traditional dualism, the view that human "minds, or souls, are completely nonphysical; they possess no mass, extension, or location" (p 147)? Is Hasker's self "completely" nonphysical? That is not so clear. Consider what he has to say about Haskerian minds.

He has already conceded that one of the defects of his physical field analogy is that it does not allow emergence "in the strong sense required for the properties of the mind" (p 192). For Hasker, the differences between mental and physical qualities are not nearly as strong as Cartesians would make them. But that is not the major problem, the major problem is the qualities Hasker assigns to minds.

In the first place, the mind, for Hasker, is *spatial*, "emergent consciousness is itself a spatial entity," and, "the volume of space within which the emergent mind exists must be *at least* sufficient to encompass those parts of the brain with which the mind interacts" (p 192). In another place, in discussing the possibility of telekinesis, he suggests that mind might interact with other parts of the material world outside the brain and thus include them as well (p 191). If telepathy occurs, the space occupied by mind might be quite vast indeed.

Secondly, in discussing how minds and brains interact, he offers an even more dangerous, suggestion. He suggests that mind-brain interactions involve an "*exchange of energy* between mind and brain" (p 201). He predicts that this suggestion will tempt critics to claim that if this is true then mind becomes physical, but responds that this resolves into a mere matter of names. "If philosophers are prepared to stretch the meaning of 'physical' to encompass everything that has been said here about the field of consciousness, then so be it. What is *not* acceptable, however, is for someone to take the claim, thus arrived at, that 'the mind is physical' and use it as a premise from which to infer characteristics of the conscious mind that are contrary to the ones postulated in this chapter" (p 201). The trouble is that two qualities he included in this chapter were spatial location and energy to exchange with the brain and perhaps other material objects, two properties denied to mind by most philosophers who have made the logical irreducibility argument.

For Hasker, the contents of the mind include qualia and other mental states and processes which are not subject to reduction to brain processes or brain waves, but now he adds that the mind is spatial and has energy. Something seems amiss when elements like spatiality and energy and qualia and rationality are combined. Haskell defends the "logical irreducibility" of mind to brain (pp 125-35), but if mind has energy and also spatial location, Hasker has the same problem as the materialists whom he rejects. Can these qualities of mind be combined with spatiality and with being an energy system? Philosophers of many persuasions have agreed that mind and brain cannot be identical because those qualities cannot be combined.

Historically, one of the major reasons for defending mental properties is that qualia and other states of consciousness cannot be found anywhere in the physical world. Brain waves are not colored but some states of consciousness are. Moreover, mental states cannot be located by external observers and are not publicly accessible. Another reason for adding mind to brain is that mental processes operate differently from brain processes — mental processes are semantic and intensional but brain processes can only be mechanical and syntactic. These arguments are bellwether arguments for mind brain separation and seemingly were accepted by Hasker when he was first making his case for mind, but the properties he *now*

attributes to mind seem to undercut them. Can a mind which is spatial and has energy also contain mental objects and processes? If mind is a field with energy and spatial location, are the qualities of mind Hasker wants to retain any more compatible with *it* than they are with the brain?

Moreover, we must take a close look at what is essential about the *unity* of mind for Hasker. It is not merely that the mind must be an individual, not a bundle, but it is essential that there be a common subject of awareness, some center which is capable of combining all the self's various experiences into one unified whole. If mind is a field, where is the essential *center* of awareness, the point at which all of the separate images and ideas are combined? How do we avoid the criticisms that Hasker made of the brain, namely that there is no place where the various experiences come together in a common center?

In the sections that follow, I will argue that Hasker's view of the self is inadequate because it tries to combine contradictory elements into his concept of mind — mind cannot contain qualia, have unity of awareness, rationality, intensionality, and act freely while at the same time being spatial and an energy system. This incompatibility has been the very basis for mind-brain separation among western philosophers.

1. Most dualists have held that minds are private, that mental states are inaccessible to public view. If minds have spatial location and use energy, does that not imply that they are subject to scrutiny by an external observer, one armed with a mental energy detector? Certainly physical fields and their contents are publicly observable. It would seem that on Hasker's view an external observer could not only know *that* I am seeing green by observing my brain states, but also know *what it is like* for me to see green. Are we to abandon the view that mental states are private and make them publicly accessible?

2. By making mind spatial and attributing energy to it, Hasker makes mind part of the world that is observable in principle by physical science. Cartesians and Hasker may agree that mind is known first of all by introspection, secondly by inference in order to explain certain features of experience such as the unity of experience and mental causation of certain types of behavior of the body, but the Cartesian claims that mind itself lies outside the physical order, therefore cannot be analyzed by physical science and, equally importantly, cannot be located by scientists. By putting mind into the same spatial framework with brain and attributing energy to it, Hasker has made both the existence and nature of mind subject to direct confirmation by physical science. The existence of mind becomes refutable and the absence of any present physical evidence for Haskerian minds becomes a problem for Hasker, but not for Cartesians.

3. Haskerian minds, both spatial and having energy, do not seem to be qualitatively different enough, as he has conceded when he conceded that one of the defects of his analogy is that fields cannot provide for "emergence in the strong sense required for the properties of mind" (p 192). *Can* mental energy be thought to be any more colored or abstract or intensional than physical energy? Are we now to think of mental energy patterns which are yellow or green? The very differences that led philosophers to postulate the separate existence of mind seem to vanish once minds resem-

ble brains this closely.

4. Moreover, to have mind introducing energy to and subtracting energy from the brain reintroduces the conservation of energy problem that Hasker concedes Cartesians have solved.⁶ Hasker notes that Cartesian dualists escape the problem of conservation. "Why can't the soul register what is going on in the brain without absorbing energy from the brain? (What would the soul do with that energy, anyway?)" (p 151), making two points on behalf of Cartesians, that energy is not exchanged *and* the mind has no place for energy. He credits the Cartesian with realizing that psycho-physical causation is not physical causation, but then he strangely makes it out to be like physical causation after all. He requires that energy flow back and forth from mind to brain, and he requires that mind have a place for energy.

Hasker has few options. He can deny that conservation of energy holds for the physical world, or can claim that when energy is presently measured it includes both the energy of mind and the energy of brain, unbeknownst to contemporary scientists, or he can retain conservation for the physical world below the level of mind and claim that additions and subtractions always balance each other, but in that case he has to provide some hidden hand to do the balancing. On this matter, Cartesians seem to be much better off.

5. Hasker rejected brain theories, bundle theories and panpsychism because they break up the mind into pieces, thus are unable to provide for the unity of the self, and he admitted that one of the defects of his analogy is that it cannot provide for the kind of unity required for the self. It is also a problem that personal identity over time seems to be compromised as well. His claim is that the individual *is* continuous over time, "that the very same self now typing these words is the one that several years ago conceived the plan for this book" (p 146). He claimed as an advantage of his view it allows that the field of consciousness is capable of being divided, thus is consistent with commissurotomy (brain-splitting) (p 193). At the very end of his book, he returns to this topic, saying that "emergent dualism opens itself to questions about personal identity to which Cartesian dualism is immune." Complete fission, would result in "two persons who were 'successors' to the original, undivided person life" (p 234).

These problems deserve more than a mere mention. Brain splitting produces two selves, both continuous with the pre-split self, each the author who typed the words and conceived the plan for this book. But can two numerically different people be the same person? And what happens should the fission be reversed? Do the two separate selves, each of which has its own history since duplication, and each of which is a separate center of consciousness, now become one again? And what happens to the differences in the fields that have resulted during the time they have existed separately? Cartesians may have trouble knowing what to say about cases like this, whether the soul continues to operate through only one half of the brain or whether it continues to use both halves. Given the interdependence of souls and bodies for which I will be arguing shortly, I do not think that the suggestion that God could create a new soul for the second body makes much sense, but whatever answer the Cartesian gives, it will

preserve numerical identity.

He has acknowledged that one of the problems with his physical field analogy is that it cannot do justice to the unity of the person at one time but now it turns out that it cannot do justice to the notion of personal identity through time because it leads to the possibility that multiple persons might be the same person so far as personal identity is concerned.

I am not suggesting that Hasker does not realize that some of these problems exist. After all he himself points that his analogy cannot provide for radical emergence, nor for teleology or libertarian freedom or for the subject of consciousness, but he has given us no guidance as to how these defects can be remedied. I have added further limitations, suggesting that when he makes mind spatial and provides energy to mind he undermines privacy, subjects mind to empirical confirmation or falsification, makes mind an unfit place to house qualia and mental properties, raises anew the conservation of energy problem, and undercuts personal identity.

HASKER'S REJECTION OF CARTESIAN DUALISM

Now what are his problems with the Cartesian and Thomistic forms of substance dualism, and can a better case be made for Cartesian dualism than he provides? Hasker does not, like many critics, reject those forms of dualism as unintelligible. Instead, he credits such dualists with having developed satisfactory answers to claims that interaction between Cartesian minds and bodies is unintelligible and impossible. He says of this argument that it "may well hold the all-time record for overrated objections to major philosophical positions (p 150)." He dismisses objections based on violation of conservation of energy, and also on the "pairing problem," which is how to connect up Cartesian souls with bodies so as to enable causal interaction between them (p 151). Hasker allows the Cartesian the option of saying that God is responsible for the pairing. Examining other standard critiques of Cartesian dualism, Hasker says that objections to the intelligibility of disembodied souls and of their identification have also been sufficiently answered and have an archaic flavor about them (p 208). His conclusion is that "once we have accepted epistemological fallibilism and given up our preoccupation with Cartesian demons, reasonable answers are not too difficult to find" (p 210). It seems to me that Hasker is right in crediting Cartesian dualism with answers to those objections.

So the difficulties with Cartesian dualism are not logical, rather they are factual. The difficulties arise from alleged inconsistencies between what science tells us about the world and the Cartesian conception of mind. The major problems he raises are of two types, the first of which is the observable continuity between human beings and other life forms. How are Cartesian souls to be made compatible with modern evolutionary theory? He could also have asked how Cartesian souls are incorporated into the individual's growth from sperm and egg.

The second problem is the failure of Cartesians to explain the results of modern scientific discoveries about the brain and consciousness which, Hasker claims, suggest a much closer relationship that Hasker thinks would be expected if the Cartesian view were correct.

I do have some suggestions for strengthening Cartesian responses to these and other issues, but my comments fall far short of solving the problems he raises. His comments on brain dependence strike Cartesian dualism at its most vulnerable point. I wish I could do better.

1. With regard to the first objection, the point needs to be made that Cartesians cannot, as a matter of principle, take a definite position on when souls first emerge but must guess. Since souls are private they are not subject to observation by third parties, and introspection can tell us only when we first became aware that we exist as selves, i.e. became self-conscious, and we cannot rule out periods of existence prior to the one we now remember, both in our present embodiment and perhaps earlier versions. It would be perfectly appropriate for Cartesians to maintain that we live many times in the course of the soul's progress, born anew at the character level reached in the previous life but with memories of that existence wiped out. The view goes back to Plato, but is not normally adopted by Christian theists.

To the question of when souls emerge in the life of the individual or in the life of the species, Cartesians can only provide best guesses, making inferences from behavior. They are pretty sure that other human beings have minds, and that maybe other advanced animals do, but possibly mind goes all the way down the animate scale, possibly even to inanimate life. Given his views about the self, I am somewhat puzzled that Hasker does not himself take a position on when the soul emerges in the course of evolution or in the life of the individual, since the matter should be one for science to settle. If mind is spatial and has energy and is subject to empirical investigation then surely definite answers to these questions are possible on Hasker's view.

2. The second group of difficulties results from the close dependence of the mind on the brain and what goes on in the brain. Hasker seems to think that Cartesian dualists should be troubled by mounting evidence that mind and brain are closely related, for example when the evidence indicates that the brain does information processing (p 155). He also seems surprised that Cartesians would hold that the body sets limits on what the embodied mind can do. I do not see why either claim would be embarrassing to Cartesians, granting, as Hasker concedes they might, that the Cartesian response might be that the mind has all its powers when disembodied and only has difficulty using them when using the body (pp 156-7). I suspect he really does not give full credit to the Cartesian position on correlation between minds and brains.

That the soul uses the brain to compute or do information processing, or invents machines to do it better, should present no more serious a problem to a Cartesian than that the soul uses bodily habits when it drinks from a cup, or walks without thinking which foot to put forward next. Cartesians are not troubled by the fact that computers can be constructed to perform mechanical tasks like information processing and solving problems of modern logic, saving the mind the task of doing these computations. They do have to draw the line on reasoning and semantic processes, which involve connections of meaning, not syntactical form, but do not have to fear mechanical processes of whatever complexity. Modern dualists should welcome the news that all conscious activities *including thoughts*

and memories have physical correlates in the brain. If this is so, they have a ready explanation for why failures in body function hamper the exercise of the powers of the embodied mind.

It may be that some Cartesians think that there are activities of the embodied mind which are not accompanied by brain processes, but they do not *need* to think so. No Cartesian should be troubled even if the correlations are so tight that a future scientist will be able to know *that* Smith is thinking *x* without asking Smith what he is thinking, since she will still not know *what it is like* for Smith to think *x*, or be able to find that thought in Smith's brain. For the scientist to learn *what it is like* for Smith to see *x*, she would have to *be* Smith. Even Smith could not find his experience of *what it is like* to think *x* by observing his own brain.

Strict correlation should not bother a Cartesian, should the fact that aspects of the mental life are affected by states of the brain cause insurmountable problems? Let us look at that problem. The moves Cartesian dualists have made in response to the dependence (I would call it the correlation) problem are well known, but can be improved. Cartesian dualists need to appreciate more fully the fact that souls have structures which are shaped by their interactions with brains.⁷ A developed soul is not a blank slate but contains a set of characteristic responses, a web of beliefs and desires, all of which have been shaped by its experiences. First person experience tells me that when I choose to act contra-causally or encounter a fact which is inconsistent with my previous beliefs, I encounter mental resistance. I normally do what I most strongly desire to do, however I can, and sometimes do, choose to resist my strongest desire and do my duty instead, but I have to overcome internal opposition to do so. Similarly, when beliefs clash, there is an internal struggle within the soul, and, when memories clash, I have to search my other memories to determine which of the conflicting memories is correct. Dualists sometimes write as though what is involved in searching memories or changing beliefs or resisting strong desires is merely a conflict between soul *and* brain. Yes, the soul does encounter resistance in the brain — the resistance of neural pathways which have been structured by previous actions has to be overcome — but surely I introspect struggle within my soul as well. Since the structure of the developing soul and the structure of its brain are correlated and change as the two aspects of the self interact with each other, a soul should be very dependent on a proper functioning body for the exercise of those capacities which involve the brain, and if we assume one to one correlation between mental activities and brain processes that would mean that the soul depends upon the brain for smooth functioning of all its capacities. That does not mean that the soul *cannot* function without its brain but that its functioning would be impaired by a mal-functioning brain. Just as the soul has to cause the brain to change its typical response when the soul decides to act contra-causally, so it could not give voice to its thoughts if some defect in brain functioning blocked the expression of those thoughts. Wilder Penfield provides an example of a case in which a conscious mind is still functioning fully but is unable to communicate its thoughts as long as the brain is temporarily paralyzed by electrical current, but resumes its ability to speak when the current is removed.⁸

There has been much unjustified talk about body switching in the philosophical literature as though a Cartesian soul could operate just any body, even a tree perhaps, but surely this is not the case. If we think of the soul and brain as structuring each other as their relationship develops, severe restrictions would be imposed upon the kinds of brains a soul could manage and on what it could do with various brains. To be able to operate a brain effectively, a soul would have to use a brain very much like the one which it has structured. A differently structured brain would inevitably cause problems for the soul such as by producing false memories or by producing habitual responses which go counter to what the soul's former body provided.

Not just any body would do, for efficient switches in this life or for resurrection bodies. Think of the problems a Chinese soul would have in trying to communicate through an American body, a body which produces neither the right sounds nor the right tones! Similarly, a damaged brain would very much affect what a soul could accomplish in communicating with others or orienting itself with relation to other bodies and souls. Contrary to Hasker's comment, I do not find it at all surprising that a Cartesian would find embodiment "a burden and limitation on the natural powers of the soul" (p 157). Embodiment is both essential for the soul's communication with other souls and a burden and limitation.

So, once the soul starts interacting with a particular body, they start to affect each other, each modifying the other structurally. If we consider soul-brain interaction to involve two substances, limited by each other and modifying each other so that each acquires a unique shape, we are potentially able to say a great deal about pairing problems and why, when a body has limited capacities or portions of the brain are damaged, or the arteries harden, the soul is hampered in its ability to use its body to act or express itself. I am not claiming that we know what to say about all the cases Hasker introduces.

Since the time of Plato bodies have been thought of as prison houses, but this is not all that Cartesians have to say about the relation of body to soul. That the embodied soul depends upon its structured body to enable it to use that body properly constitutes a burden and limitation, but that the soul has a body to use also gives it the possibility of communicating with other souls. For Cartesians, souls are private and it is impossible for a soul to communicate with another soul except through its body. Also, Cartesians claim that souls need bodies not only for purposes of communication with other souls but also as instruments for soul development. Without bodies a soul would be limited to its own thoughts and desires and could not interact with other souls and so develop its own character. It is not unusual these days for a contemporary theistic dualist to expect that survival involves some kind of re-embodiment. Re-embodiment then will be needed for the same reasons that a soul needs a body now — to enable souls to interact with other souls.

A final point is that the relationships of mind and brain are complex, not just one way, and there are indications that mental processes sometimes affect the physical in ways that Hasker's model would not lead us to expect. The conscious mind is not apparently functioning when the brain goes to sleep, and yet introspection tells us that the mind can wake the brain when suffering from bad dreams or can set the time for awakening

before falling asleep. The conscious mind at times awakens with answer to problems that it had been considering prior to going to sleep, and the conscious mind can remember dreams. Also the mind can dramatically affect brain functioning by going into trance and it is not unusual to encounter claims that the mind of a person or healer can alter the way the brain and body function. Admittedly Cartesians do not have answers to all of the problems Hasker raises about the mind's apparent dependence on bodies, and Hasker is right to ask them to address these problems, but the hard cases are not all on one side.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

I have tried to give a sympathetic reading of William Hasker's *The Emergent Self* endorsing his case for the need to go beyond materialism and property dualism to some theory of consciousness which does justice not only to qualia, mental contents, intentions and rationality, but also to the unity of consciousness (both synchronic and diachronic), contra-causal freedom and the possibility of survival of the death of the physical brain. Hasker is right in what he denies, but I have raised some major questions about what he affirms, claiming that there are disparities between what he wants to affirm and some of the actual implications of his views about the nature of consciousness. I want to suggest that Cartesian dualism, suitably modified, is much more adequate to express what Hasker wants to affirm than the view he offers.

I have also tried to claim that Cartesian dualists can make a stronger case for the dependence of minds on bodies than simply using God to provide the explanation for pairing, and have used the notion of the structured soul to deepen our understanding of the dependence of mind upon its particular brain. While my explanations are not fully satisfactory in dealing with the dependence problems Hasker raises, the concept of the interrelationship between the structures of the soul and body do take us a substantial part of the way.

Jaegwon Kim has ventured the opinion that if contemporary philosophers of mind want to save mental causation they may have to look at substantial dualism, confessing that "for most of us, dualism is uncharted territory, and we have little knowledge of what possibilities and dangers lurk in this dark cavern."⁹ Contemporary philosophers of mind have been too dismissive of Cartesian dualism. I recommend their reading Hasker, but then moving forward to a more substantive dualism, one which can really provide a self with the properties that Hasker recognizes are needed.

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NOTES

1. Jaegwon Kim, *Mind and the Physical World* (MIT Press, 1998), pp 59, 119.
2. Thomas Nagel, *The Last Word* (Oxford, 1997), pp 138-9. He refuses to assign an explanation for this feature. In this book he rejects naturalistic evolutionary accounts and he continues his passionate rejection of theism. In a footnote he does confess that "it is very difficult to imagine any answer to the ques-

tion that is not teleological." The question he was answering was "Why is the natural order such as to make the appearance of rational beings likely?"

3. John Searle, "Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain" *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol 7, #10 (2000), pp 10, 21. Searle's view is explicitly materialist but Hasker says that his own view is a form of substance dualism. In what ways is Hasker's view really different?

4. Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman and Keith Sutherland, *The Volitional Brain* (*Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol 6, #8-9, 1999), p xxi. See also Max Velmans, Ed., *The Science of Consciousness* (Routledge, 1996) p 16.

5. William Hasker, *The Emergent Self* (Cornell, 1999). Page references are inserted in parentheses in the body of the text. A symposium on this book, with contributions by Nancy Murphy, Stewart C. Goetz and Keith E. Yandell, together with Hasker's reply, has recently appeared in *Philosophia Christi*, Series 2, Vol.2, #2, 2000. Some of the criticisms parallel those made in this paper, but for the most part are concerned with different issues that those that arise in this paper, and I did not find that the replies to those criticisms by Hasker affect those made in this present paper. I do note that the latter two commentators also favor Cartesian dualism as a view which better preserves the essential qualities of mind for which Hasker argues.

6. Some scientists now contest the principle that energy is conserved in the physical universe and would allow for losses and gains of physical energy of the sort Hasker advocates. What is still questionable about Hasker's view is whether mind has energy to exchange with the physical universe. Cartesian dualism avoids this problem by denying that the mind contains energy and claiming that what mind does in affecting the physical world is to manipulate the energy that is there, not add and subtract energy from it.

7. For an exploration of the view that the soul has a structure, I recommend Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Clarendon, 1986), Chapter Fourteen.

8. Wilder Penfield, *The Mysteries of the Mind* (Princeton, 1975) pp 51-4. Recently I have encountered a claim which I do not quite believe and which, if true, would mean that the disembodied mind of a person born blind is capable of vision in transcendental experiences such as OBEs and NDEs. This would mean that the mind is not dependent on the brain even for perception of physical objects. The claim is made by Kenneth Ring and Sharon Cooper in *Mindsight; Near-Death and Out-of-Body Experiences* (William James Center for Conscious Experiences, 1999), pp 39, 120, 186. The authors make a case for mindsight, a transcendental awareness, which is not the same as actually physical sight but which is interpreted by their blind reporters in those terms. All of the other sources I consulted deny that the blind can see colors.

9. Kim, *op. cit.*, p 120. For those who wish to save mental causation by plunging into the dark cavern, an especially good guide would be the work of David H. Lund, *Perception, Mind and Personal Identity* (University Press of America, 1994) and *Death and Consciousness* (McFarland, 1985). Better known dualists are Richard Swinburne (*op. cit.*), John Foster, *The Immaterial Self* (Routledge, 1991) (really an idealist who adopts dualism for this project), Geoffrey Madell, *Mind and Materialism* and *The Identity of the Self* (both Edinburgh, 1988 and 1981 respectively) and W. D. Hart, *The Engines of the Soul* (Cambridge, 1988). Not one of these philosophers is mentioned in Kim's bibliography of over 100 items or in his index, though Swinburne, Hart and Foster do get a mention in one footnote, providing confirmation to Kim's claim to have little knowledge of what dangers lie in this dark cavern.