4-1-2002

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ON A THEOLOGICAL COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES

David P. Hunt

In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument for theological fatalism provides a counterexample to one of its own premises, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. David Widerker has recently urged in these pages three objections to my suggestion. I here argue that only the third of these objections raises a serious difficulty for my position, though even this difficulty is far from decisive.

The classic argument for the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom proceeds by showing that infallible foreknowledge precludes alternative possibilities, while “Frankfurt-style” counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (or “PAP”) are supposed to show that an agent can be free (in the sense required for moral responsibility) even when alternative possibilities are unavailable. When juxtaposed in this way, it is clear that the latter has the potential to undermine the former. Call this challenge to the argument for theological fatalism the “Frankfurt Objection,” to distinguish it from other critiques of theological fatalism (based on the “Boethian” appeal to God’s timeless eternity, the “Ockhamist” distinction between “hard” and “soft” facts about the past, and so on). What is less clear, but nevertheless compelling once it is noticed (or so it seems to me), is that divine foreknowledge provides its own counterexample to PAP, making the Frankfurt Objection to a considerable degree independent from current controversies surrounding standard Frankfurt-style counterexamples.

I offered an initial argument for this position in an article in this journal. A recent reply by David Widerker makes this an apt occasion for elaborating on my argument, especially since Widerker puts his finger on the very points at which other readers (at least those unpersuaded by my argument!) are most likely to balk.

I

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities is perhaps best thought of as a family of principles all of which make alternatives of some sort a requirement for moral agency. Frankfurt formulated the principle he aimed to refute in this way:
PAP A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.¹

The debate over PAP has led some to suggest that other formulations are more perspicuous, and Widerker specifically cites

PAD An agent is morally responsible for his decision (choice, undertaking) to perform an act A only if he could have avoided making it as the relevant principle in his reply to my paper. Given our interest in the implications of such principles for the argument for theological fatalism, which has traditionally been couched in terms of free agency rather than moral responsibility, an even more relevant formulation would be something like

PAF A person is (libertarianly) free in his decision (choice, undertaking) to perform an act A only if he could have avoided making it.

Since differences between these formulations, important and even critical in some contexts, do not figure in Widerker's critique of my position, let's refer to all of them indifferently as 'PAP'.

Frankfurt's argument against PAP, like the argument for theological fatalism, is concerned with the implications for moral agency of a situation in which a putative agent does something that is inevitable (given the circumstances). This allows for parallel formulations of the two arguments, something I presupposed but did not work out in any detail in my original article. Let me begin by remedying that lack, not only because the parallel is of independent interest, but also because an explicit comparison of the two arguments should make it easier to understand my thesis and Widerker's objections to it.

Let's consider first the argument for theological fatalism. One standard way to construct the argument is this. First, posit an action, preferably one that looks initially like an uncontroversial instance of free agency. (If it doesn't look like a very good candidate for free action in the first place, the argument's contrarian conclusion won't hold much interest.) Second, appeal to the classic theistic concept of God (in its temporalist version), according to which the posited action was foreknown by God as long ago as one pleases, without any possibility of His being mistaken. Third, infer from God's infallible prior knowledge of this action that no alternatives to it were available to the agent. Fourth, introduce a principle like PAP which makes the availability of alternatives a requirement of free agency. Finally, conclude that the action is not free after all, despite the eleutheric virtues that made it look initially like such an attractive candidate.

Following this recipe should result in an argument something like this:

(J) Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.
(G) Before Jones was born, God knew infallibly that he would decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.
(I) It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.
PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES

(P) An agent X does an action \( A \) freely only if it was sometime possible for X not to do A.

(N) Jones does not freely decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.

Call this 'The God Argument,' or TGA. There are, of course, many other ways that the argument for theological fatalism can be formulated; but the foregoing does the job, and does it in a way that makes the argument particularly amenable to comparisons with Frankfurt's argument.

There are two respects in which TGA must be modified if it is to be transformed into a typical Frankfurt-style argument against PAP. In the first place, the two arguments appeal to different sources of unavoidability. In a Frankfurt-style argument, (G) is replaced with something like

\[(F) \text{ Before Jones was born, a Frankfurt-device was programmed to ensure that Jones decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \]

A "Frankfurt-device" is a mechanism capable of monitoring and/or controlling a person's mental processes to any required degree of precision. In the case premised in (F), the device is set to intervene in Jones's mental processes to bring about his deciding to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000 if a certain triggering-event occurs, where this event is one that occurs if Jones (absent intervention by the device) is not going to decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.

Given this set-up, either Jones decides on his own to mow his lawn on August 15, or the device forces him to decide to mow his lawn on August 15; there is no alternative available to Jones in which he does not decide to mow on August 15. So (F), no less than (G), implies (I). Let's call this argument, in which TGA is modified by replacing (G) with (F), 'The Frankfurt Argument,' or TFA.

Of course TFA is not Frankfurt's argument—quite the contrary. To reach the argument that Frankfurt thought warranted by premises (J)-(I), one more modification is needed, this time in the argument's endgame. The point of positing a situation like the one set out in (F) is that we have at least some inclination here not to endorse the conclusion (P)-(N) when it comes at the end of TFA. While the argument's opening moves (if sound) do guarantee that Jones will decide to mow, one way he might decide to mow is by deciding to do so on his own, without the ministrations of the Frankfurt-device. If that is indeed how the scenario unfolds, and nothing happens to trigger the device's intervention, we may even have a pretty strong inclination to endorse a very different ending to TFA, modifying the argument as follows:

\[(J) \text{ Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \]

\[(F) \text{ Before Jones was born, a Frankfurt-device was programmed to ensure that Jones decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \]

\[(I) \text{ It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \]

\[(N^{*}) \text{ Jones freely decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \]

\[(P^{*}) \text{ It's not the case that an agent X does an action \( A \) freely only if it was sometime possible for X not to do A.} \]
When unavoidability comes about through something like (F), Frankfurt maintained, our original confidence in the agent's freedom is unshaken. But then PAP must be false. Call this Frankfurtian argument, which ends with (N*)-(P*) rather than (P)-(N), 'TFA*'.

Insofar as TFA* comes closer to our considered judgments than TFA, (F) qualifies as a (possible) counterexample to PAP; and insofar as (F)'s qualifications for this role survive the inevitable criticisms from PAP's defenders, thereby earning it promotion from possible to actual counterexample, PAP is no longer available as a reliable principle for use in TGA and similar arguments. In sum, acceptance of TFA* implies acceptance of P*; but this implies nonacceptance of TGA, which contains (P)—the contradictory of (P*)—as a premise. That's the obvious way to run the Frankfurt Objection to theological fatalism.

The thesis of my earlier paper was that there is another, more direct way that this objection can go. Just as TFA* is more appealing than TFA, so the following argument (I suggested) is more appealing than TGA:

\begin{align*}
(I) & \text{Jones decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \\
(G) & \text{Before Jones was born, God knew infallibly that he would decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \\
(I) & \text{It was never possible for Jones not to decide to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \\
(N*) & \text{Jones freely decides to mow his lawn on August 15, 2000.} \\
(P*) & \text{It's not the case that an agent X does an action A freely only if it was sometime possible for X not to do A.}
\end{align*}

This argument—call it 'TGA*’—is just like TGA except that it ends with (N*)-(P*) instead of (P)-(N) (and just like TFA* except that it contains (G) instead of (F)). Frankfurt explained his (and what he assumed would be his readers') preference for TFA* over TFA as follows: the fact that the device stripped Jones of alternative courses of action "played no role at all in leading him to act as he did;" indeed, this fact "could have been subtracted from the situation without affecting what happened or why it happened in any way;" so this fact is "irrelevant to the problem of accounting for [Jones's] action" and "does not help in any way to understand either what made him act as he did or what, in other circumstances, he might have done." But what is true of the device in (F) is equally true of God's foreknowledge in (G). (As Augustine puts it in The City of God, "a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin." ) If this is correct—and I don't see how it can be denied—then (G) is itself a counterexample to PAP.

If (F) is also a counterexample, well and good—the more the merrier. But perhaps (F) is deficient in some respect, as its many critics have urged. Then it's important that the Frankfurt Objection to theological fatalism does not depend on (F) or some scenario in the neighborhood of (F), but can appeal directly to (G), which differs from (F) at just those points where critics have found (F) most vulnerable as a counterexample to PAP.
Despite the evident advantages of basing the Frankfurt Objection to theological fatalism on a direct appeal to TGA* rather than a refutation of PAP via TFA*, Widerker believes that three serious objections can be raised against my proposal.

(1) He notes in the first place that a proposed counterexample to PAP can succeed only if “Jones acts on his own and yet his decision to do A is unavoidable,” and he claims that it is doubtful whether this requirement is really met when unavoidability results from divine foreknowledge. Perhaps so; at least I found it doubtful, before being persuaded otherwise. But why exactly does Widerker find it doubtful? His reason is that Jones’s decision is “metaphysically necessitated” by God’s prior belief, in the sense that (a) God’s belief “is distinct from, and temporally prior to,” Jones’s decision, and (b) the former entails the latter; but necessitation of this sort “is incompatible with libertarian freedom.” Certainly the libertarian would never concede Jones’s decision to be a case of free agency if it were “nomically necessitated” by a temporally prior fact.” So why suppose, Widerker asks, that he would treat a case of metaphysical necessitation any differently?9

It seems to me that this first objection is best understood as setting the stage for Widerker’s second objection, since the first objection by itself does little to undermine the force of TGA*. The objection involves two crucial claims: (i) God’s prior belief metaphysically necessitates Jones’s subsequent decision; and (ii) metaphysical necessitation, like nomic necessitation, violates libertarian strictures on free agency. Neither claim, I believe, succeeds in blunting (G)’s efficacy as a counterexample to PAP.

The first of these claims is surely true, given the understanding of ‘metaphysical necessitation’ found in (a) and (b) above. (What makes the necessity metaphysical is presumably its connection with metaphysically necessary facts about God’s knowledge, existence, and relation to time.) At least claim (i) had better be true if divine foreknowledge is to play its role as counterexample. As Widerker notes, one requirement for an effective counterexample to PAP is that it render the action in question unavoidable. But the only reason for thinking that divine foreknowledge renders its objects unavoidable—for thinking, in the case at hand, that (I) follows from (G) in TGA—is that once God forms the belief that Jones will decide to mow on August 15, there are no longer any metaphysically possible worlds in which Jones does not decide to mow on August 15.10 So if I want divine foreknowledge to render Jones’s decision unavoidable, as it must do if it is to generate an effective counterexample to PAP, I need to insist on claim (i) rather than challenging it. It is worth noting further that one important weakness that critics (including Widerker) have urged against TFA* is that a counterfactual device like the one employed in (F) cannot effectively preclude all alternatives to the actual sequence of mental events leading up to a particular action, leaving open the possibility of “flickers of freedom” that might be enough to satisfy PAP. But then it should be a virtue, not a vice, of (G) that divine omniscience precludes all alternatives to the actual future, and so precludes a fortiori all morally relevant alternatives. In sum,
the fact that God's belief necessitates Jones's decision, far from constituting an objection, instead certifies that (G) satisfies a critical desideratum of any good counterexample to PAP.

But what about claim (ii)? There are two principal reasons why a libertarian might think that nomic necessitation is incompatible with free agency. The first reason is simply that it rules out alternate possibilities. In this respect nomic and metaphysical necessitation are indeed on a par: if the one is incompatible with libertarianism just in virtue of precluding alternative futures, so is the other. But this ground for claim (ii) is dialectically inappropriate, since it amounts to nothing more than a reassertion of PAP, the very principle that is in question. My thesis, after all, is that (G), like (F), is a case in which we have (or on reflection ought to have) an intuition that PAP yields the wrong result. Obviously this thesis is not refuted simply by pointing out that Jones's decision to mow, given (G), does not satisfy PAP—it's not supposed to satisfy it. The thesis can be refuted only by undermining the force of the counterexample, and nothing in Widerker's first objection is equipped to do this.

The second reason the libertarian might think that nomic necessitation is incompatible with free agency is that it locates a causally sufficient explanation for the agent's behavior in conditions external to the agent (namely, natural laws and states of the universe prior to the agent's birth). This means that the agent is not the original source of the action; when tracing moral responsibility, the agent cannot serve as a little "first mover" to which we can point and declare, "the buck stops here!" But this reason provides no support for claim (ii), since nomic and metaphysical necessitation (at least the sort of metaphysical necessitation entailed by infallible foreknowledge) are not on a par in this respect. The fall of a stone and the Fall of Adam are quite different, Augustine argued in On Free Choice of the Will, though both are necessary (given prior conditions). The former comes about when the stone's nature is subjected to external forces, while nothing about divine foreknowledge suggests that the foreknown action originates anywhere but in the agent.

Just as your memory does not force the past to have happened, God's foreknowledge does not force the future to happen. And just as you remember some things that you have done but did not do everything that you remember, God foreknows everything that he causes but does not cause everything that he foreknows. Of such things he is not the evil cause, but the just avenger.11

While foreknowledge does precede its objects in the temporal order, it succeeds them in the logical or explanatory order. So this second libertarian complaint about nomic necessitation, a complaint which (unlike the first one) does not simply presuppose PAP, has no purchase on (G).

The problem with Widerker's first objection, then, is that his first claim—that God's prior belief metaphysically necessitates Jones's subsequent decision—is consistent with (and even required by) the position he is critiquing, while his second claim—that metaphysical necessitation, like nomic necessitation, violates libertarian strictures on free agency—appears to rest
on little more than a prior commitment to PAP, the very principle that is at issue. But if Widerker's first objection fails to engage my argument, his second objection addresses it head-on.

(2) The legitimacy of using TGA* to trump the theological fatalist's TGA clearly rests on whether one can apply to (G) the same judgments Frankfurt made about (F). This means, by way of review, that God's foreknowledge of Jones's decision "played no role at all in leading him to act as he did," "could have been subtracted . . . without affecting what happened," "does not help in any way to understand . . . what made him act as he did," and so on. Widerker sums up the essential idea this way:

Jones would have decided in the same way and for the same reasons even if the factor that made it impossible for him to decide otherwise were absent.¹²

Widerker claims, however, that this is not the case in a divine foreknowledge scenario. Given (G), what is the closest possible world in which the factor that made it impossible for Jones to decide otherwise is absent? It's not a world in which God is absent, since God's existence is metaphysically necessary. Nor is it a world in which God fails to know what Jones will do, since omniscience is one of God's metaphysically necessary properties. Instead, it is a world in which God exists and knows what Jones will do, but what He knows is different than what He knows in the original scenario, because Jones decides differently. But if this is how the modal facts lie, then it is false in (G) that "Jones would have decided in the same way and for the same reasons even if the factor that made it impossible for him to decide otherwise were absent."

What should be said about this objection? Note first that Widerker's summary overlooks some of the other features of (F) that make us reluctant to count the unavoidability of Jones's decision against its freedom, namely, that the factor entailing unavoidability "played no role at all in leading him to act as he did" and "does not help in any way to understand . . . what made him act as he did." These both seem true in (G) as well, even if we are persuaded by Widerker to withdraw the judgment that God's foreknowledge of Jones's decision to mow "could have been subtracted . . . without affecting what happened." But it seems to me that the latter still captures something about (G) that is intuitively right. Even if God's nonexistence or nonomniscience is metaphysically impossible, I can at least imagine these states of affairs, and this may be all that is needed. Perhaps what is relevant when applying the "subtraction test" to a putative counterexample to PAP is that it be epistemically rather than alethically possible to subtract the factor in question. Even theists can (and sometimes, during a "dark night of the soul," do) entertain the possibility that God does not exist; less drastically, some theists not only entertain but actually hold the belief that God lacks infallible knowledge of future contingencies like Jones's decision to mow, and theists like myself who do accept infallible omniprescience can nevertheless allow for the possibility (however small!) that our judgment has been corrupted by a perfect-being theology which reflects pagan neoplatonism rather than the authentic
teaching of Scripture. So it seems to me that I can perform a thought-experiment in which God's foreknowledge of Jones's decision is subtracted from the situation, and that the result of mentally excising this item of knowledge (which after all plays no causal or explanatory role vis-à-vis Jones's decision) is that Jones's decision is completely unaffected. The fact that this is not the result mandated by the standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals is not as troubling as it might otherwise be, since the Lewis-Stalnaker interpretation of conditionals with impossible antecedents is widely regarded as unsatisfactory (or at least counterintuitive) in any case.

Widerker's first two objections are natural ones to raise, and doubtless give expression to worries shared by other readers. I hope I have shown that they do not raise any serious difficulties for my position. Unfortunately, I cannot show this in the case of Widerker's third objection, since this one does point to a very real cost of endorsing TGA*, providing what is probably the strongest reason why an anti-PAPist like myself can never get entirely free from the allure of PAP.

(3) Widerker points out that there is an independent argument for PAP which poses an embarrassing challenge for anyone who thinks that moral responsibility is compatible with infallible omniscience. Suppose, with Augustine, that Adam ate of the Tree of Knowledge "on his own," despite God's foreknowledge having rendered it necessary that he would do so. That he did it "on his own" rebuts one kind of challenge to Adam's moral responsibility; but the fact that Adam's action violates PAP leaves it open to another challenge. The following question can now be asked on Adam's behalf: what should he have done in the situation in question, so as to be able to escape moral blame? Given God's infallible foreknowledge, there is nothing else he could have done—but then it's hard to see how there could be something else he should have done. Widerker calls this the "What-should-he-have-done? defense" or "W-defense" for short.13

This is admittedly a very powerful consideration on the side of PAP; moreover, it does not appear to make any difference to the W-defense whether (I) is derived from (G), or from some other alternative-eliminator like (F) (or the assumption of universal causal determinism, for that matter). In my paper I drew attention to intuitions favoring TGA* over TGA; Widerker here draws attention to a central intuition favoring TGA over TGA*. Given this clash of intuitions, what should one do?

I don't find myself capable of simply denying one set of intuitions. I don't think that the defenders of PAP should do so either. In another recent paper I observed that most PAPists, including Widerker, appear to accept (or at least leave unchallenged) the key moral claim underlying the Frankfurtian case against PAP. I called this the 'Master Intuition' and formulated it thus:

(MI) Were S to A at t as part of a Frankfurt scenario—i.e., in circumstances such that S's A-ing at t satisfies PAP, there are conditions C_N making S's A-ing at t unavoidable, and C_N is not included in C_α—S would be morally responsible for A-ing at t.14

(Here 'PAP' designates all the necessary conditions for moral responsibility other
than PAP and Con comprises all the conditions which actually contribute toward S’s A-ing at t.) What critics tend to challenge instead is the factual claim that (F) and similar stories really do constitute “Frankfurt scenarios” as this term is used in (MI); that is, they argue that every Frankfurt story that has, and indeed can, be told is such that either (i) some requirement for moral responsibility other than PAP is also violated, or (ii) the putatively unavoidable action is not really unavoidable, or (iii) the conditions which were effective in bringing about the action are not disjoint from but are instead among the conditions which made the action unavoidable. But whatever success these criticisms might meet when it comes to (F), they are quite implausible in the case of (G). Because divine foreknowledge leaves all the nonmodal facts about the foreknown action alone, it’s hard to see what the other requirement cited in (i) might be. And while (ii) might be pushed on “Ockhamist” grounds, this is not a move that is available to a theological fatalist (whose position is overturned if the agent can somehow avoid the foreknown action), nor is it available to Widerker, a nonfatalist who is responsible for one of the most trenchant critiques of Ockhamism in the literature.15 Finally, (iii) is a nonstarter for reasons stressed earlier in this paper: there is absolutely no reason to think that the divine foreknowledge that renders the action unavoidable makes any contribution at all to bringing about the action. So it seems to me that the supporter of PAP should have just as much trouble denying the intuition that an action rendered unavoidable by divine foreknowledge may nevertheless be (libertarianly) free as I have denying the intuition that this agent is entitled to make use of Widerker’s “W-defense.”

If I can’t simply deny the pro-PAP intuitions fueling the W-defense, there are nevertheless a couple of things I can do to try neutralizing them. (I leave it to Widerker and friends to say how the intuitions favoring my position can be neutralized.) One is to insist that the W-defense, despite its superficial appeal, rests on an outmoded notion of moral responsibility. If Frankfurt’s critique of PAP is really cogent, then the question “what should I have done to avoid blame?” is a piece of misdirection: an agent is responsible for what she originates (in some fairly robust and possibly complex sense), even if alternative courses of action are not available to her. “Passing the buck” is therefore a legitimate exculpatory strategy in a Frankfurtian ethics, inasmuch as it corrects a faulty assumption about the agent’s originative role. But the W-defense is irrelevant (except insofar as the agent’s inability to do otherwise is traceable to outside interference—in which case the agent is entitled to pass the buck, making the W-defense unnecessary.) This first response to the W-defense, however, strikes me as excessively revisionist. If it were the only strategy available to me, I would be sorely tempted to jettison TGA* in favor of TGA. Fortunately there is another strategy, which does not require abandoning the hoary maxim that “ought implies can.”

This second response to the W-defense rests on doubts about how well standard possible-worlds models succeed in capturing what it is that a person can or could or has the power to do. These doubts are not ad hoc, driven simply by the adoption of a position on the problem of divine foreknowledge v. human freedom. When I find that I can’t “bring myself” to do something—e.g., douse my daughter with lighter fluid and set her on fire—it’s not quite right to say that I lack the power to do so. There are, to be sure, logically, metaphysically, and even nomically possible worlds in
which I perform this horrendous deed; but the availability of such worlds isn’t why it’s inappropriate to attribute to me a lack of power. One way to see this is to consider a parallel case having to do with God, where there are no alternative possibilities at all that might legitimate the ascription of power. Given God’s essential goodness, for example, it may be that there is no possible world in which He personally undertakes to torture an innocent child. (Add essential omniscience so that He doesn’t just fail to know what He is doing). But it’s odd to conclude that He lacks the power to do something of which even finite human agents are capable.

Interestingly, a recent paper in this journal on the vexed question of how best to analyze divine omnipotence points in this direction as well. Erik Wielenberg considers an unexcellably strong individual named ‘Hercules’ who demonstrates his strength by lifting incredibly heavy stones, only to fail when asked to lift a 10-lb. stone coated with grease. This is no evidence against Hercules’ strength, Wielenberg observes, since it’s the slipperiness of the stone rather than a lack of strength that accounts for Hercules’ failure. Taking the case further,

Imagine that we have somehow acquired a ten pound stone that is essentially slippery. It is so slippery that no human can grip it, and so no human can lift it. Let’s assume that Hercules is essentially human. It follows that there is no possible world in which Hercules lifts this stone. Yet it seems clear that Hercules is strong enough to lift the stone—even though it is metaphysically impossible that he do so.

The moral Wielenberg draws is that the following supposition, which underlies most analyses of power, is in fact mistaken:

If x cannot bring about p then x lacks the power to bring about p.

Perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of such challenges to conventional wisdom lies an explanation of how it can be true both that Adam’s eating of the Tree of Knowledge was metaphysically necessary (given God’s prior knowledge of what he would do) and that Adam should (and could) have done otherwise.

My sense, for what it’s worth, is that the availability of alternative futures is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility and free agency, though it is (under ordinary conditions) a highly reliable marker for some deeper factor (having to do with the initiation of action) which is a necessary condition for moral agency. (G) offers an extraordinary context in which the availability of alternatives is not a reliable marker, making TGA* a better argument than TGA; and there may be F-devices such that the same is true of (F). But I do not have a rich and intuitively satisfying account of this deeper factor, and without such an account I cannot show that the intuitions behind the W-defense must play second fiddle to those expressed in (MI). There is much that remains deeply baffling about moral agency, as Prof. Widerker would doubtless agree.

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NOTES


5. (F) is somewhat extreme as a Frankfurt counterexample to PAP, inasmuch as such counterexamples do not typically stipulate that the Frankfurt-device is in place prior to the victim’s birth. What is necessary to a successful counterexample is that the device be operational early enough to squelch any alternative that the PAPist might plausibly suppose relevant to Jones’s freedom, and (F)’s introduction of the device prior to Jones’s birth is certainly overkill so far as this requirement is concerned. But there’s no harm in overkill, particularly when this underscores the parallel between (F) and (G).


8. I mention one of these points on the next page of this paper. For further discussion of this and other points at which the Frankfurtian argument against PAP is vulnerable, see my “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action,” *Philosophical Studies* 97 (January (II) 2000), pp. 195-227.


10. One could of course reject this inference on Ockhamist grounds.


13. Ibid., p. 252.


17. Ibid., p. 37.

18. Ibid., p. 38.