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Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the incompatibilist to reject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclusion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection requires the the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which the fatalist's premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then incompatibilism must be rejected. I criticize this reasoning on the ground that one can reject a bad argument from true premises without countenancing a possible world in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion false.

One position on the problem of free will is that there is no possible world in which some human acts freely. One might hold this, for example, in virtue of thinking that both determinism and indeterminism rule out freedom. Call that view $\sim\Diamond F$. Surely a proponent of $\sim\Diamond F$ can recognize the weakness of a certain fatalistic argument against freedom. The premise that it was true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD tells us nothing about whether the ascent is done freely.[1] Of course, the $\sim\Diamond F$ theorist will hold that the climb in question is not an example of free human action, for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that the proposition that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD is always true.

The $\sim\Diamond F$ theorist might incautiously express his rejection of the fatalistic argument in question by holding that these two propositions are *consistent*:

(A)   Plantinga freely climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD.

(B)   It is true in 50 AD that Plantinga climbs Mt. Rushmore in 2000 AD.

If he expresses his rejection in that way, then Ted A. Warfield will be quick to say that the $\sim\Diamond F$ theorist holds an overall position that is self-contradictory.[2] If A and B are consistent, Warfield will say, then there is a possible world in which both propositions are true. But in that world, some human acts freely, contrary to $\sim\Diamond F$.

But surely the $\sim\Diamond F$ theorist should be "free" to reject some unpersuasive argument from acceptable premises to the conclusion that no human acts freely *without* having to agree that there is a possible world in which the premises are true and the conclusion *false*! His view is that there is *no* possi-

ble world in which the conclusion is false (i.e., in which A is true).

Bearing these points in mind, suppose that we encounter a philosopher, Divinco, who shares the ~◊F theorist's disdain for the fatalistic argument. Divinco believes that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom, and he believes that God is omniscient and foreknowing *in every possible world*. So Divinco shares the ~◊F theorist's opinion that there is no possible world in which humans act freely.

Warfield seeks to parlay Divinco's rejection of the fatalistic argument into a commitment to the *compatibility* of freedom and foreknowledge.[3] His strategy is to claim that in order to reject the reasoning from the eternal truth of propositions to human unfreedom, one must hold that there is a possible world in which A and B are both true. But that will be a world in which, according to a philosopher like Divinco, God exists and foreknows every human action, including Plantinga's 2000 AD ascent. And it will be a world in which A is true—in which Plantinga freely climbs.[4] Thus, Warfield says, divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. That is, they areshown to be compatible, Warfield says, relative to Divinco's assumption that a foreknowing, omniscient God exists in all possible worlds. Warfield points out (section VI) that this sort of argument cannot be used against an incompatibilist who holds that some possible worlds lack an omniscient God. He also maintains that the argument cannot be used to show that *determinism* is compatible with human freedom. This limitation depends upon there being possible worlds in which some events are not causally determined. Thus, a (putative) world in which A and B are both true need not be a world in which Plantinga's climb is causally determined. It is worth noting, however, that if determinism holds in all possible worlds (as might be maintained by someone who holds a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason), then Warfield's reasoning, if cogent, could be used to show the compatibility of determinism and freedom.

Warfield's attempt to show that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible is unsuccessful. The moral of the foregoing story of the ~◊F theorist is that rejecting the fatalistic argument does *not* force one to hold that there is a possible world in which the argument's premise is true and its conclusion false (i.e., a world in which A and B are both true). On Divinco's view, there is no possible world in which its conclusion is false (i.e., in which A is true).

Philosophers often argue about the truth value of propositions which, if true, are necessarily true. A philosopher may find himself in the position of thinking that P is true and necessary, while wondering whether a certain argument from acceptable premises provides good reasons for believing that P. If such a philosopher finds the considered argument wanting, then this need not depend upon his thinking that there is a possible world in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion—P—is false. Even though he finds the argument in question wanting, he still believes (maybe for other good reasons) that P is true and necessary. Similarly, I might well reject a purported proof (from acceptable assumptions) of a mathematical proposition M which I believe, even though I do not for a moment hold that there is some possible world in which the "proof's" assumptions are true and yet M is false.

So now we can see that it was not, after all, crucial to Warfield's reasoning that he consider the fatalistic argument from the eternal truth of propositions. He could equally well have considered any other bad argument from acceptable premises to the conclusion that Plantinga does not freely climb. By Warfield's reasoning, if Divinco rejects the bad argument, then this commits him to there being a possible world in which A and the bad argument's premises are true. But then Divinco must accede to the compatibility claim, since, on his view, God foreknows Plantinga's climb in the world in question.

I conclude that compatibilism about freedom and foreknowledge cannot be as easily conjured as Warfield would have us believe.[5]

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NOTES

1.   See, e.g., Peter van Inwagen's *An Essay on Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), chapter two, for a critical discussion of the fatalistic argument.

2.   See his "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible", *Nous* 31:1 (1997), pp. 80-6.

3.   See "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible".

4.   I have simplified Warfield's reasoning a bit. See his section IV.

5.   I would like to thank C. Anthony Anderson for a helpful discussion of these issues.