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# ON AUGUSTINE'S WAY OUT

David P. Hunt

This paper seeks to rehabilitate St. Augustine's widely dismissed response to the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. This requires taking a fresh look at his analysis in *On Free Choice of the Will*, and arguing its relevance to the current debate. Along the way, mistaken interpretations of Augustine are rebutted, his real solution is developed and defended, a reason for his not anticipating Boethius's atemporalist solution is suggested, a favorable comparison with Ockham is made, rival solutions are rejected, and the aporetic nature of the problem is explained.

On the traditional understanding of divine omniscience, God is both infallible and also cognizant of future contingents. But a prediction is infallible only if, once made, it cannot turn out false. Since nothing escapes divine foresight, no part of the future can happen in any way other than it will actually happen. But if no alternative to the actual future is so much as possible, a standard condition for free and morally responsible agency can never be satisfied. It follows that divine omniscience and free agency, as traditionally understood, are not compossible.

This is the ancient problem of "theological fatalism," which received its first clear expression in St. Augustine's *On Free Choice of the Will*. Renewed interest in this problem during the last thirty years has pushed the ideas of William Ockham to the center of discussion, with "Ockham's way out" (the title of a notable defense of this approach by Alvin Plantinga) attracting more defenders than any rival solution to the problem.<sup>1</sup> But while Ockham's star has risen, Augustine's own solution to the problem has suffered from relative neglect. The purpose of this paper is to redress the imbalance.

My primary objective in rehabilitating Augustine is to make a contribution toward the current debate over theological fatalism, not to advance the frontiers of Augustine scholarship. At the same time, an important reason that Augustine's analysis has not been taken more seriously is that it has been widely misunderstood. This makes it necessary to provide a corrected account of Augustine's position before arguing its rightful place in contemporary discussions of theological fatalism. The plan of the paper, then, is this: section I warns against mistaken approaches to Augustine's position, while section II presents Augustine's actual solution; section III then compares Augustine's way out with Ockham's, and section IV sums



up the case for Augustine's relevance to the current debate. While it is always profitable for Christian philosophers to spend time in Augustine's company, readers uncorrupted by the standard interpretation of his position or endowed with little interest in Augustinian exegesis might wish to skip the bulk of section I.<sup>2</sup>

## I

The most widely cited sources for Augustine's treatment of theological fatalism are *On Free Choice of the Will* and *The City of God*. Neither is transparent in its teaching; but the latter is especially untidy, owing in large measure to Augustine's polemical engagement with Roman history, which leads him in Book V to introduce the topic of fatalism as a problem in Roman Stoicism, an approach which results in his importing into the argument various Stoic concerns (such as an "order of causes" mediating between divine knowledge and human actions) which play no essential role in recent formulations of the problem. For this reason, the search for a single strategy to put forward under the rubric of "Augustine's way out" will be better served by a focus on the more direct form that the argument takes in *On Free Choice of the Will*.

The problem of theological fatalism is raised in this dialogue at the beginning of Book III, in response to Evodius's worry that the doctrine of divine foreknowledge may thwart Augustine's attempt to trace the origin of evil to free choice of the will. Augustine summarizes the problem as follows:

Surely this is the question that troubles and perplexes you: how can the following two propositions, that God has foreknowledge of all future events, and that we do not sin by necessity but by free will, be made consistent with each other? "If God foreknows that man will sin," you say, "it is necessary that man sin." If man must sin, his sin is not a result of the will's choice, but is instead a fixed and inevitable necessity. You fear now that this reasoning results either in the blasphemous denial of God's foreknowledge or, if we deny this, the admission that we sin by necessity, not by will. (III.3)

If we let 'W' stand for any sinful movement of the will, the argument Augustine is called upon to counter can be formulated as follows:

- (1) W is foreknown (by God)  $\rightarrow$  W is necessary
- (2) W is necessary  $\rightarrow \sim$ (W is free)
- $\therefore$  W is foreknown (by God)  $\rightarrow \sim$ (W is free)

This conclusion, if accepted, leaves the theist with the unpalatable option of affirming the antecedent (and losing free will) or denying the consequent (and losing divine foreknowledge). Since the argument is clearly valid, its conclusion can be resisted only if one of its premises is false.

The argument above, though highly schematic, is nevertheless congruent with modern formulations. (The latter tend to pay more attention to the derivation of step (1).) So Augustine is at least addressing the same prob-

lem as modern commentators. It is his solution to the problem that has been thought to be of questionable relevance to the contemporary debate. In coming to a just appreciation of Augustine's position, however, there are at least two red herrings that must be avoided.

The first of these is a mistaken assimilation of the problem of theological fatalism, addressed in chs. 2-4, to a related problem taken up in ch. 1. In that chapter Evodius is concerned with the threat to free will posed by what might be called "natural necessity": "if free will has been given in such a way that this movement [of the will] is natural to it, then it is turned to lesser goods by necessity. There is no blame to be found where nature and necessity rule." Augustine concurs: "If this movement exists naturally and necessarily, it cannot be blameworthy at all." It can thus appear that Augustine is endorsing the following conditional:

(2') W is necessary  $\rightarrow \sim$ (W is blameworthy).

But since he also avers that "this movement by which the will is turned from immutable to transitory goods . . . is voluntary and therefore blameworthy," the following conditional also comes into play:

(2\*) W is free  $\rightarrow$  W is blameworthy.

And (2') together with (2\*) entails (2). This suggests that Augustine has already granted (2) when he comes to formulate the argument for theological fatalism in chs. 2 and 3, so that his response to this argument (whatever it turns out to be) must involve a denial of (1).

This suggestion, however, is in error. Augustine in fact never asserts in ch. 1 that necessity *simpliciter* is incompatible with moral blame or free agency; instead, he resolutely restricts his claims to the narrower notion of *natural* necessity (whatever that might be). But there is no reason to think that the freedom-annihilating necessity which governs the movement of a falling stone (Augustine's example of natural necessity from ch. 1) is relevantly similar to the kind of necessity with which divine foreknowledge threatens future actions. Nor does Augustine do anything to encourage a conflation between the two cases: the word *natura* and its cognates, which bulk so large in ch. 1, are nowhere to be found in chs. 2-4, where the problem posed by divine foreknowledge is being raised and addressed. The discussion of natural necessity in ch. 1 therefore leaves it an open question whether the (possibly quite different) kind of necessity supposedly implied by divine foreknowledge is also incompatible with free agency. This means that the truth-value of premise (2), contrary appearances notwithstanding, remains to be settled as Augustine undertakes the assessment of theological fatalism in chs. 2-4.

The other red herring consists of various indications in ch. 3 that this is where Augustine provides his principal response to the argument for theological fatalism. This herring is a bit slipperier than the first, but it is nevertheless worth pinning down. It certainly seems, on a first reading (and perhaps even a second and a third), that Augustine raises the problem of theological fatalism in ch. 2, then restates and solves it (to his satisfaction) in ch.

3. There is enough evidence for this reading that most commentators have accepted some version of it.<sup>3</sup> The evidence that Augustine's solution is to be found in ch. 3 is threefold. First, Augustine brings various conditions for free will into play in ch. 3, and endeavors to show that these conditions are unaffected by divine foreknowledge—just the sort of move one would expect him to make when presenting a solution to the problem. Second, Augustine concludes his examination of these conditions with what sounds like a declaration of victory over theological fatalism: "So it follows that we do not deny that God has foreknowledge of all things to be, and yet that we will what we will." Finally, the chapter ends with Evodius's apparent capitulation: "I no longer deny that whatever God foreknows must come to be, and that he foreknows our sins in such a way that our will still remains free in us and lies in our power."

A strong indication that something must be wrong with this interpretation, despite the evidence in its favor, comes at the beginning of the next chapter, where we find Evodius's doubts still unresolved:

Of course I do not dare deny any of these points. Yet I still cannot see how God's foreknowledge of our sins can be reconciled with our free choice in sinning. God must, we admit, be just and have foreknowledge. But I would like to know by what justice God punishes sins which must be; or how it is that they do not have to be, when He foreknows that they will be; or why anything which is necessarily done in His creation is not to be attributed to the Creator. (III.4)

Either Evodius has already forgotten what was just accomplished in ch. 3, or the accomplishments of that chapter (despite initial appearances) leave the problem of theological fatalism still in place. There can be little doubt that the latter possibility is the correct one, given the reply Augustine makes to Evodius's renewed query in ch. 4 (to which we will soon turn). Rereading Evodius's apparent capitulation at the end of ch. 3 in light of the continuing discussion in ch. 4 makes it clear that Evodius is not thereby declaring the problem solved, but simply admitting its "aporetic" nature: the two poles of the dilemma (divine foreknowledge and free will) *are* compatible with each other after all, but *how* they can be compatible is another matter altogether. This latter is the problem remaining for ch. 4, as Evodius explicitly announces at its outset.

It's a good thing that Augustine cannot have regarded the discussion in ch. 3 as complete, since it is clearly inadequate as it stands. The three conditions for free will that he deploys in this chapter are: (i) that *W* be possessed by the subject in the right way ("God's foreknowledge . . . does not take from you the will to be happy when you begin to be happy"); (ii) that *W* be approved by the subject ("When we will, if the will itself is lacking in us, we surely do not will"); and (iii) that *W* lie within the subject's power ("Nor can it be a will if it is not in our power"). While these three conditions are plausibly thought to be *necessary* for free will, they are clearly not *sufficient* in any robustly incompatibilist sense. This can be brought out by noting how all three tests could be satisfied even when *W* is causally determined by events or states obtaining prior to the subject's birth. Nothing about causal deter-

minism is incompatible with the first two tests: there are no grounds for denying that *W* belongs to the subject, so long as the causal chain eventuating in *W* passes through the subject for a sufficient length of time and in a sufficiently intimate manner; nor are there any grounds for doubting that the subject genuinely approves of *W* (and approves his approval, etc.), since any level of approval may itself be causally determined. The same is true of the third test, since Augustine offers a "conditional" analysis of power very much like that of 20th-century philosophers whose goal is to render human freedom compatible with causal determinism: "we cannot deny that we have the power, unless we cannot obtain what we will through an act of will or unless the will is absent." But of course the incompatibilist will maintain that there is yet another ground for ascribing powerlessness to someone, beyond the inability to obtain what one wills, namely, the inability to control one's will, i.e., to will otherwise than one actually wills. Even taken jointly, then, the three conditions from ch. 3 are insufficient to show that *W* can remain free in the incompatibilist sense which is at issue in the argument for theological fatalism.

Of course, the fact that a 20th-century incompatibilist would be disappointed by the analysis of free will in ch. 3 does not by itself show that Augustine would find it similarly inadequate. This is, after all, a man who could say at the end of his life, "I tried hard to maintain the free decision of the human will, but the grace of God was victorious."<sup>4</sup> Even in *On Free Choice of the Will*, written while he was still struggling to maintain freedom of the will, it is no easy matter to locate Augustine with any precision along the compatibilist-incompatibilist continuum.<sup>5</sup> But all this is beside the point: the evidence for Augustine's attitude toward the three conditions of ch. 3 is to be found, not in speculation on how he *would* have responded to those conditions had he been an incompatibilist, but in the place those conditions actually occupy in the text. It is the text which reveals how unlikely it is that Augustine could have regarded the three conditions of ch. 3 as jointly sufficient for free will, and in revealing this, incidentally preserves the incompatibilist credentials of Augustine's solution, whether or not he was himself an incompatibilist. The suspicion that this second herring (like the first) is indeed red finds confirmation once we turn to the solution Augustine actually puts forward.

## II

We have seen that Augustine's analysis in ch. 3 is incomplete and that he recognizes it as such. How then does it fit into his larger solution to the problem of theological fatalism?

An important clue to Augustine's understanding of the three conditions from ch. 3 is the fact that the discussion of natural necessity in ch. 1 makes use of the same three conditions: (i) the "possession" condition ("it belongs to the spirit alone"); (ii) the "approval" condition ("we accuse a spirit of sin when we prove that it has preferred to enjoy lower goods"); and (iii) the "power" condition ("the stone does not have it in its power to check its downward motion"). But another condition is also mooted in ch. 1, alongside these three, when Augustine reminds Evodius of the conclusion,

reached in Bk. I, that “the mind . . . cannot be forced (*cogi*) to serve lust by something superior, or by an equal, . . . [or] by something inferior.” This “compulsion” condition is not brought into play at all in the analysis of ch. 3; indeed, the word *cogo* and its cognates are completely absent from chs. 2-3. This is itself good reason to think that the resources Augustine was at pains to develop in ch. 1 are not yet fully deployed by the end of ch. 3; the problem’s persistence into ch. 4 should not then be surprising.

*Cogo* does, however, reappear with a vengeance in ch. 4, which begins with Augustine asking, “Will you deny that we sin by will and not under compulsion (*cogente*) from anyone, either higher, lower, or equal?” The key passage in ch. 4 is saturated with compulsion-talk:

unless I am mistaken, your foreknowledge that a man will sin does not of itself necessitate (*cogeres*) the sin. Your foreknowledge did not force (*cogeret*) him to sin even though he was, without doubt, going to sin; otherwise you would not foreknow that which was to be. Thus these two things are not contradictories. As you, by your foreknowledge, know what someone else is going to do of his own will, so God forces (*cogens*) no one to sin; yet He foreknows those who will sin by their own will.

Why cannot He justly punish what He does not force (*cogit*) to be done, even though He foreknows it? Your recollection of events in the past does not compel (*cogis*) them to occur. In the same way God’s foreknowledge of future events does not compel (*cogit*) them to take place. As you remember certain things that you have done and yet have not done all the things that you remember, so God foreknows all the things of which He Himself is the Cause, and yet He is not the Cause of all that He foreknows.

Augustine admits elsewhere in ch. 4 that foreknowledge entails necessity in the sense that what is foreknown *must* happen and is *certain* to happen; but in the quoted passage he denies that it entails necessity by *compelling* or *causing* what is foreknown, and claims that this is enough to defuse the conflict between divine foreknowledge and voluntary agency. Lack of causal compulsion provides the final necessary condition for free will, one which in conjunction with the other three conditions is finally sufficient as well.

What becomes clear in ch. 4, once the red herrings discussed in the preceding section of this paper have been identified and the proper significance of this chapter has been appreciated, is that Augustine’s real objection to the argument for theological fatalism is directed against premise (2). He is perfectly willing, on the other hand, to grant the fatalistic case for premise (1). To understand what is distinctive about Augustine’s position, it is necessary to elaborate on this adjudication of the argument’s two premises.

In one sense, at least, practically everyone would acknowledge that (1) can be true while (2) is false. For suppose, in saying that W is necessary when foreknown (by God), (1) is asserting only that W *follows necessarily* from its being foreknown (by God); that is,

(1’) Necessarily [W is foreknown (by God) → W].

Then (1) is clearly true, because (1') is true; but (2) would then be just as clearly false. If  $W$  were necessary only in the sense that it follows necessarily from something or other (e.g., from divine knowledge of  $W$ , or—why not eliminate the middleman?—from  $W$  itself), this would go no distance at all toward showing that  $W$  is unfree.

For (2) to stand a chance of being true, it is  $W$  itself that must be necessary, and this requires that the first premise be parsable in the form

(1\*)  $W$  is foreknown (by God)  $\rightarrow$  necessarily ( $W$ ).

Call this "absolute necessity," as opposed to the "hypothetical necessity" displayed by (1'). But is (1\*) remotely plausible as a non-question-begging premise in an argument designed to *demonstrate* (and not just assert) theological fatalism? Sure it is, and anyone at all familiar with debates over fatalism (particularly as they have developed during the last thirty years) knows how the moves go at this point. Since God has *always* foreknown  $W$ , He foreknew  $W$  prior to any time (before the occurrence of  $W$ ) that one cares to specify. Let ' $t$ ' designate such a time. Relative to  $t$ , God already possesses foreknowledge of  $W$ . But what is already the case cannot be made *not* to be the case. The fact that God foreknew  $W$  is therefore *necessary* in the sense that it is no longer possible (relative to  $t$ ) for God not to have foreknown  $W$ . This is a very strong form of necessity, much stronger than natural necessity. (Presumably God can countermand natural necessity, but not even God, Augustine notes in *Against Faustus* 25.5, can undo the past.) Since such necessity is relative to time (what is unavoidably necessary when past might not have been unavoidably necessary when future), let us call it "temporal necessity." Because  $W$  was foreknown (by God) prior to  $t$ , its being foreknown (by God) is temporally necessary at  $t$ . But God's cognizing  $W$  entails  $W$  (since He can't be mistaken in anything He believes). It therefore follows that  $W$  is also temporally necessary at  $t$  (on the grounds that, if something is unavoidably necessary, whatever it entails is also unavoidably necessary.) Thus there is a defensible (1\*)-like reading of premise (1). And this reading, unlike the hypothetically necessary (1'), is at least relevant to the claim being made in premise (2). Since  $t$  can be set as early as one pleases, let it be a time prior to the birth of our erring agent. Then  $W$  is necessary in virtue of the fact that, before the agent even comes into existence, it is already too late for  $W$  to be avoided. This is just the sense of necessity in which it might plausibly be thought that (2) is true.

This is theological fatalism in its most credible form. Is this the form in which Augustine is engaging it? That's hard to say. Augustine nowhere distinguishes between hypothetical and absolute necessity, as Boethius would later do.<sup>6</sup> This ambiguity in Augustine's analysis cuts two ways: on the one hand, it's doubtful that his endorsement of (1) reflects a full appreciation of the case that can be made on behalf of absolute necessity (as formulated in the preceding paragraph); on the other hand, there is little reason to suppose that his acceptance of (1) is based on nothing more than hypothetical necessity, and that he simply overlooks the fallacy of equivocation that arises when (1') is combined with (2).<sup>7</sup> In the absence of a clear Augustinian account of the necessity at work in the fatalist's argument, the best one can



do when looking to Augustine for insight into the current debate is to examine his denial of (2) and see whether it addresses the argument in its strongest (1\*)-like form.

Given his suspect credentials on the free will issue, it is noteworthy that Augustine does *not* deny premise (2) because he's a soft determinist who believes free agency to be compatible with causal determinism. *On Free Choice of the Will* admittedly presents a compromised picture of creaturely freedom, and the "ignorance and difficulty" which Augustine ascribes to the post-lapsarian human condition undoubtedly leaves us vulnerable to causal forces; but none of the threats to human agency canvassed in this work derives from God's foreknowledge of our deeds. Far from presupposing soft determinism, Augustine insists that the reason divine foreknowledge does not jeopardize free agency is precisely that it does *not* cause our actions. Augustine can happily grant the fatalist everything he wants in premise (1) because temporal necessity (as implied by divine foreknowledge) does not entail causal necessity, and only the latter conflicts with free will. Temporal necessity is determined by the temporal order; but what is relevant to free agency, Augustine maintains, is the *causal/explanatory* order. The two orders normally coincide: what is prior in the one order is prior in the other. In cases of divine foreknowledge, however, the two orders diverge, and what is temporally closed (because infallibly foreknown) may remain causally/explanatorily open; as Augustine notes in *The City of God*, "a man does not therefore sin *because* God foreknew that he would sin" (V.10). This is enough for Augustine to regard W as free despite the fact that God's foreknowledge of W renders it unavoidably necessary.<sup>8</sup>

I will say more about this view of free will at the end of section III. What I want to pursue in the remainder of this section is the conception of foreknowledge which makes such freedom possible. Augustine's account in chapter 4 begins with a comparison between divine and *human* foreknowledge. In cases where one human being knows what another is going to do, the foreknowledge of the first person does not stand in a cause-effect relationship with the future action of the second person. If the second person's action is in fact causally compelled, it isn't the foreknowledge of the first person that accounts for the compulsion; nor is there any special reason to think that divine foreknowledge *per se* has a coercive force lacked by human foreknowledge. Unfortunately, foreknowledge might still entail compulsion, despite its causal inefficacy, if the causal unavoidability of future events is a *condition* for their being known with certainty. Augustine indeed holds that this is the only condition under which *human beings* can know the future: "when we speak of seeing the future, obviously what is seen is not the things which are not yet because they are still to come, but their causes and signs do exist here and now."<sup>9</sup> But *God* is not similarly limited to knowing the future only insofar as it is determined by present causes. It is for this reason that the comparison with human foreknowledge cannot take Augustine as far as he needs to go, and we find him switching in mid-argument to human *memory* as his model for divine foreknowledge.

Memory is more favorable to Augustine's purposes than is ordinary human foreknowledge. Not only is memory (like foreknowledge) not the cause of its object, but it is also (*unlike* human foreknowledge) indepen-

dent of present causes determining its object. Indeed, the relationship between memory and remembered event goes in the other direction: it is the past event that causes, explains, or accounts for the remembrance of that event. Likewise, Augustine wants to understand God's foreknowledge in such a way that it is the foreknown event that causes, explains, or accounts for His knowledge, not the other way around. In this respect, at least, divine foreknowledge is more like human memory than it is like human foreknowledge.<sup>10</sup>

One puzzle regarding Augustine's use of the "reverse memory" model in *On Free Choice of the Will* is why he fails to invoke the doctrine of "timeless eternity" which he endorses elsewhere<sup>11</sup> and which Boethius later draws on in developing his own solution to the problem of theological fatalism in Book V of *The Consolation of Philosophy*. The "reverse memory" model is thoroughly temporal. God's anticipation of future events, like our remembrance of past events, involves two temporal relata, so that even though the explanatory arrow moves *with* the temporal arrow in cases of human memory and *against* it in cases of divine foreknowledge, God's knowledge (so understood) is nevertheless situated in the temporal order. Augustine's failure to correct the temporalist presuppositions underlying the argument for theological fatalism, along with his adoption of a model which reinforces those presuppositions, does admittedly look initially puzzling.

It is nevertheless arguable that the account in *On Free Choice of the Will* fits quite well with the "timeless eternity" theory, and may even be essential to it. Though the ascription to God of an eternal existence outside time blocks any straightforward appeal to temporal necessity, this is insufficient by itself to dispel the fatalistic threat posed by divine omniscience. If God's knowing 100 years ago what I will do tomorrow is enough to make tomorrow's actions unavoidable, it's far from obvious that those actions are less inevitable just because God knows them "from eternity."

The most common brief on behalf of the "Boethian" solution goes something like this. God's atemporal perspective on events is like (timelessly) observing things *while* they are happening; but simultaneous observation of someone else's actions does not render them unavoidably necessary (the fact that I happen to be watching while you roll down a hill has no implications for the contingency or inevitability of your behavior); by analogy, then, God's timeless observation of events should have no effect on *their* contingency.<sup>12</sup>

One problem with the analogy is that, strictly speaking, the observation (e.g., of your hillside antics) occurs *later* than the observed event (information from the event can't reach the observer faster than the speed of light), so that there is no ground for any inference regarding the benignancy of truly simultaneous observation. But suppose we ignore this nicety and prescind from the scientific details ("it's only a thought-experiment, after all"), imagining that observation and observed event are strictly simultaneous; and let us grant that the observation, in this counterfactual scenario, would have no more effect on the agency of the observed than would observations which obeyed the laws of physics. How would this suggest, even by analogy, that the assumption of a Boethian relationship between God and history is a condition (either necessary or sufficient) for the defeat of fatalism? Consider another analogy, that of a driver's hands on the steering wheel of a car.

Hands and wheel move together, though strictly speaking the hands move first and their motion is then communicated to the wheel (as the flesh stretches and tautens in the direction of the hands' motion). Disregard this slight temporal lapse, as we did in the first case, and imagine that the two motions are strictly simultaneous. The assumption of simultaneity does nothing to save the wheel from control by the driver or salvage for it any vestige of "freedom." What make the difference between the observation and steering cases, when both are assumed to operate under conditions of fictional simultaneity, are the different relations of causal/explanatory dependence which tie observer to observed in the first case and manipulator to manipulated in the second. The temporal status of the relata in the two cases is irrelevant.

The same is true in the divine case. Augustine's fundamental insight in chapter 4 is that free choice must be uncompelled, and that it is the explanatory/causal order which is therefore relevant in determining whether foreknowledge implies fatalism. This insight, inasmuch as it makes the temporal order (and temporal necessity with it) irrelevant, applies equally well to *atemporal* knowledge of the future. Augustine can't be bothered with correcting the temporalist bias which underlies the fatalist's argument for the simple reason that his solution to the problem is indifferent to the question whether God's knowledge of *W* can be located in time.<sup>13</sup> It is "reverse memory" rather than "simultaneous observation" which best models the relevant relations. More exactly, while "observation" models the relevant relations just fine, "simultaneity" has nothing to do with it. Since "simultaneity" appears to be the whole point of appealing to divine eternity in response to the problem of theological fatalism, Augustine would regard the appeal as irrelevant.<sup>14</sup> Because Augustine sees the threat to free will as arising from (narrowly) causal necessity rather than (broadly) temporal necessity, the Boethian move, which arguably succeeds against temporal necessity, cannot defuse the threat. This makes any Augustinian anticipation of Boethius's solution otiose, despite Augustine's adherence to a "Boethian" conception of God on other (largely Neoplatonic) grounds.<sup>15</sup>

Augustine's way out, then, comes to this. Divine foreknowledge does indeed imply a kind of necessity; it even implies a kind of *absolute* necessity, namely, "temporal necessity." *W* is temporally necessary inasmuch as the future (given what God has already believed about it) is unavoidable. So premise (1) is true, and it is true in just as strong a form as the fatalist claims. But premise (2) is not true. Not every form of unavoidability is incompatible with free will. This premise would be true only if *W*'s necessity derived from its being causally determined, or if *W* were in some other way explanatorily dependent on those factors that make it unavoidable. But divine foreknowledge makes the future unavoidable without causing or explaining it; whether or not God exists in time, the causal/explanatory arrow runs in the wrong direction for omniscience to undermine agency.<sup>16</sup>

### III

Is Augustine's real solution from ch. 4 any better than the supposed solution commentators have claimed to discover in ch. 3? In assessing the merits of Augustine's position, it is helpful to compare it with its leading challenger,

the solution first proposed by William Ockham. There are many points of agreement between the two. Consider the following assumptions which bear on the fatalist's argument: (a) that divine omniscience encompasses the future as well as the past and present; (b) that God may be said to know future contingents *before* they take place; (c) that God knows something at a time only if He believes it at that time; (d) that God's beliefs are not just inerrant but infallible; (e) that what is genuinely past is temporally necessary (i.e., no longer avoidable); and (f) that temporal necessity is closed under entailment (i.e., that if P is temporally necessary and P entails Q, then Q is temporally necessary as well). On each of these points Augustine and Ockham either accept the assumption (if only for the sake of argument) or fail to challenge it (perhaps by overlooking it altogether).

The difference between Augustine and Ockham concerns two further premises. Ockham's approach is to deny (g) that God's past beliefs about future contingents are genuinely past. Ockham noted that, in the case of "propositions [which] are about the present as regards both their wording and their subject matter . . . it is universally true that every true proposition about the present has [corresponding to it] a necessary one about the past."<sup>17</sup> In the year 428 A.D., for example, the true proposition

(1) Augustine writes *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* in 428 A.D.

is about the present in subject matter as well as wording; consequently the corresponding proposition about the past,

(2) Augustine wrote *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* in 428 A.D.,

is necessary at all later times, in the sense that its truth is then a *fait accompli* which cannot be altered. Past-tense versions of propositions like (1), in virtue of their temporal necessity, have come to be called "hard" facts about the past. But Ockham denied that what is true for (1) and propositions like it is true for all propositions: "that proposition that is about the present in such a way that it is nevertheless equivalent to one about the future does not have [corresponding to it] a necessary proposition about the past." Taking 428 A.D. once again as the present, consider

(3) Augustine writes *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* in 428 A.D., nine hundred years before Ockham will flee Avignon.

This is equivalent to the future-tense proposition

(4) Ockham will flee Avignon nine hundred years after Augustine writes *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* in 428 A.D.

Because (3) is not simply about the present but is equally about the future, the past-tense proposition corresponding to it, namely,

(5) Augustine wrote *De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum* in 428 A.D., nine hundred years before Ockham would flee Avignon,

need not set forth a fact that is necessary or unavoidable simply in virtue of its being past. Relative to the year 1000 A.D., for example, (5) is only a "soft" fact about the past: its truth is not yet a *fait accompli*. It is only when there is no longer an equivalent proposition about the future, i.e., after 1328, that (5) becomes a "hard" fact about the past.

Given the notion of a soft fact about the past, Ockham further claimed that "[a]ll propositions having to do with predestination and reprobation are of this sort . . . , since they all are equivalently about the future even when they are verbally about the present or about the past."<sup>18</sup> In the contemporary discussion this position has been extended to God's past beliefs about future events. Just as (5) is a soft fact relative to 1000 A.D., so

- (6) God believed in 428 A.D. that Ockham would flee Avignon in 1328 A.D.

is also a soft fact relative to 1000 A.D., since both refer to and depend upon events subsequent to the year 1000. Only when Ockham actually flees does it become a hard fact that God believed that he would do so. In general, until X actually A's at t, God's prior belief that X will A at t is not available as a hard fact about the past which can then mandate that the future unfold in line with it. Thus divine foreknowledge provides no basis for inferring that future events are temporally necessary, and acts of will like W emerge with their freedom intact.

This is a sufficient characterization of Ockham's solution for present purposes. An important question is whether Ockham's denial of (g) is supposed to be *demonstrable*, or whether it is simply proposed as a plausible "for-all-we-know" defense against the argument for theological fatalism. The former is not, I think, very promising. For it even to get off the ground, there would have to be some agreed-upon account of what it is for a fact to be soft rather than hard. Attempts to provide such an account have yielded increasingly baroque results whose complexities bear little evident relation to the simple idea they are meant to capture.<sup>19</sup> Most accounts friendly to Ockhamism are elaborations on an "entailment criterion" according to which the past-tense statement, *God believed in 428 that Ockham would flee in 1328*, comes out as soft (relative, say, to 1000 A.D.) in virtue of the fact that it entails the future-tense statement, *Ockham will flee in 1328*. But this is not a neutral account of soft facthood, in that it takes the very entailment by which temporal necessity is transferred from God's past belief to the future event and cites it as grounds for denying that God's belief is temporally necessary in the first place. For the anti-Ockhamist, the fact that God's antecedent beliefs metaphysically entail subsequent events shows, not that the antecedent beliefs are soft facts about the past, but that metaphysical entailment can link hard features of the past with distinct facts about the future.<sup>20</sup>

If the basic problem with Ockhamistic proofs is that their accounts of the hard/soft distinction beg the question, it is worth considering an argument presented by Alvin Plantinga and recently revived by Ted A. Warfield which is formulable without any reference to this problematic distinction.<sup>21</sup> The argument assumes that *logical* fatalism rests on a fallacy, and then goes on to show that theological fatalism is in the same boat. "Logical fatalism"

is the position that fatalistic consequences can be derived directly from future-tense truths, whether or not there is a God who infallibly believes those truths. A logical fatalist would hold, for example, that the argument Augustine considers in *On Free Choice of the Will* would be sound even if premise (1) were replaced by

(1#)  $W$  will occur  $\rightarrow$   $W$  is necessary.

Now Plantinga and Warfield are surely right about logical fatalism: there is absolutely no reason to think that (1#), if true, involves anything stronger than hypothetical necessity, and this poses no threat at all to free will.<sup>22</sup> The Plantinga-Warfield argument then proceeds as follows. *W* is foreknown (by God) both entails and is entailed by *W* will occur; given that God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient, the two are logically equivalent. But if *W* will occur is consistent with *W*'s freedom (as it must be if logical fatalism is rejected), then *W* is foreknown (by God) must also be consistent with *W*'s freedom. (Warfield cites the principle, "If *p* and *q* are logically consistent, then *p* is consistent with any proposition that is logically equivalent to *q*."<sup>23</sup>) So theological fatalism must suffer the same fate as logical fatalism, and Ockhamism is triumphant.<sup>24</sup>

The main problem with this approach is that there is no obvious notion of consistency under which the argument is as apodeictic as its supporters take it to be. Warfield, for example, understands the consistency of *p* and *q* as simply the logical possibility that the conjunction of *p* and *q* is true.<sup>25</sup> But even if this qualifies as a sense of "consistency", it is not the sense that is relevant to the argument. In rejecting the case for logical fatalism, we grant that there is nothing in the mere fact that *W* will occur which entails that *W* must occur; it is in this sense that the former is consistent with the negation of the latter. But in granting this we are not thereby committing ourselves to the proposition that there is a possible world in which *W* occurs without having to occur, for there may be other facts which rule out this possibility. So in asserting the consistency of *p* and *q*, we can't be asserting the logical possibility of (*p* & *q*), as Warfield supposes. Furthermore, something which is consistent with the fact of *W*'s occurrence may be inconsistent with some other fact even when the second fact is logically equivalent to the first. This can be shown through the following story. A puckish paper appears in a philosophy journal purporting to demonstrate that, on the assumption that  $3+4=7$ , it follows that existence is a good overall. The most brilliant minds of the profession dissect the argument and discover the inevitable flaw. A notorious atheologian named Waringa then takes advantage of the situation to formulate his own argument, the gist of which is this: "The idea that  $3+4=7$  entails the overall goodness of existence has been demolished, as everyone will agree. The fact that 3 added to 4 equals 7, just by itself, is quite consistent with existence not being a good overall. But  $3+4=7$  is logically equivalent to *God exists*, since both propositions are true in all possible worlds. Given that the overall badness of existence is consistent with the fact that  $3+4=7$ , it must also be consistent with the existence of God, since these are logically equivalent. So God isn't the paragon of virtue theists take Him to be." I trust that no one is swept away by this argument, and

that the moral of the story is clear. For the consistency of divine foreknowledge with human freedom to follow from the consistency of future-tense truth with human freedom, it is not enough that divine foreknowledge of  $W$  entails and is entailed by  $W$ ; the conclusion requires that there be *nothing more* to God's foreknowledge of  $W$  than there is to  $W$  itself. But this can't be right. Theism surely adds *something* to the data-set for fatalism, even if what it adds (assuming theism to be true) goes hand-in-hand with the non-theistic data across all possible worlds. At the very least, if  $W$  and God's knowing  $W$  were just the same fact, this would be an astonishing property of divine omniscience requiring considerable independent justification—hardly the sort of thing one could blithely presuppose in a proof of the Ockhamist position.<sup>26</sup>

In the absence of a convincing demonstration, we are left to judge Ockhamism on grounds of general plausibility. Unfortunately, Ockham's solution is highly counterintuitive. I have nothing new to add here to the many critiques of Ockhamism that have already been offered in the literature, so let me simply sum up what I take the fundamental difficulty to be. It is very hard to see how the beliefs God holds at a time could be soft at a later time just because the content of those beliefs concerns an even later time. Consider the following propositions, treating them as factual:

- ( $\alpha$ ) God believed in 1895 that Hunt would attend the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1995.
- ( $\beta$ ) Mahler's Second Symphony premiered in Berlin 100 years before Hunt would attend the 1995 Pacific APA.
- ( $\gamma$ ) Mahler's Second Symphony premiered in Berlin in 1895.
- ( $\delta$ ) Mahler hoped Richard Strauss would attend the premiere.
- ( $\epsilon$ ) Mahler believed his Second Symphony would ensure his fame.
- ( $\zeta$ ) Zeldon Prime [a time-traveller from 43rd-century Greenland] attended the premiere of Mahler's Second in 1895.

The problem is that ( $\alpha$ ) seems more like ( $\gamma$ ) than like ( $\beta$ ), in that something already in place at, e.g., 1900 settles the question whether ( $\alpha$ ) and ( $\gamma$ ) are true but does not settle the question whether ( $\beta$ ) is true. ( $\alpha$ ) seems even more like ( $\delta$ )-( $\zeta$ ): like ( $\delta$ ) and ( $\epsilon$ ), it reports a propositional attitude held by the subject at an earlier time; and like ( $\zeta$ ), the state of affairs it sets forth depends on a later state of affairs (my attending the Pacific APA in 1995, Zeldon Prime's entering a time machine in the 43rd century). But ( $\delta$ )-( $\zeta$ ) are no less hard facts relative to 1900 than is ( $\gamma$ ): given that they are true, nothing can happen in, e.g., 1900, to bring it about that Mahler did not so hope and believe, or that Zeldon Prime did not so act, any more than one could bring it about in 1900 that the premiere did not take place. And it's just not clear how ( $\alpha$ ) is relevantly different from these hard facts about the past.

Of course the difference, according to Ockhamism, is that ( $\alpha$ ), like ( $\beta$ ), entails a future event. (Perhaps ( $\zeta$ ) also qualifies by this criterion.) But it's unclear why this difference should make a difference; it does nothing to shake one's intuition that a complete cosmic record of everything that has transpired up to 1000 A.D. will include the fact that *God believed in 428 that Ockham would flee in 1328* but will not include the fact that *Ockham will flee in*

1328, though it can be *inferred* that the record *will* include the latter fact in 1328. It is very hard to see what a divine belief could *be* if it is to behave in the ways required by Ockham's solution.<sup>27</sup>

Much more could be (and has been) said about the counterintuitive baggage accompanying Ockham's rejection of (g), but this is enough for present purposes, which call for nothing more than a comparison with Augustine. In lieu of a proof that God's forebeliefs are soft (requiring that the baggage be borne *faute de mieux*) or some way of reconceiving the problematic scenarios or correcting the contrary intuitions (making the baggage disappear), these difficulties must count against Ockhamism in any cost-benefit analysis.<sup>28</sup>

Let us return, then, to Augustine's way out, which is to deny (h) that temporal necessity is incompatible with free will. This premise may seem hardly less negotiable than (g). If the actual past leaves no accessible futures in which the agent refrains from performing W, how can the agent be regarded as genuinely free and morally responsible in performing W? Harry Frankfurt, discussing the related "principle of alternate possibilities," or

PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise,

noted that it "has generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it as an *a priori* truth."<sup>29</sup> As most readers are doubtless aware, however, Frankfurt went on to challenge this "overwhelmingly plausible" principle. In denying (h), Augustine can be said to anticipate Frankfurt and others who reject PAP as a requirement for morally responsible agency.

An important advantage of looking to (h) rather than (g) for a response to theological fatalism is that there are good reasons to question this assumption, quite apart from any theistic motive to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge. What Frankfurt *et al.* have tried to show is that conditions rendering an action unavoidable negate the agent's moral responsibility only if these same conditions also enter into the "actual sequence" leading up to the action; otherwise they are irrelevant. For example, if I murder someone, and in so doing satisfy the most exacting conditions for free will, except that an irresistible power (a demon, crazed neurophysiologist, etc.) *would have* forced me to murder the person if I hadn't done so on my own, this last factor does not appear to mitigate my responsibility in the least. Here no alternative to murder is available to me (so PAP is unsatisfied), but I am nevertheless free and responsible in what I do, since the factor excluding alternatives makes no causal contribution to my actions, and indeed makes no difference at all to what actually happens. The same can be said in cases involving divine foreknowledge. God's foreknowing the murder may make it unavoidable, but it does so without making any causal contribution to the murder, which would have occurred just as it did in the absence of divine foreknowledge. We appear to have the same reasons in this case for affirming my freedom and responsibility, despite the unavoidability of my action, as we have in the first (nontheological) case. Indeed, divine foreknowledge provides *superior* counterexamples to PAP, since it induces unavoidability without invoking the counterfactual



intervener whose presence in the typical Frankfurt-style counterexample is at the root of most objections to the anti-PAP argument.<sup>30</sup>

It would be a serious liability for the Augustinian denial of (h) if this move were unavailable to a libertarian. Fortunately this is not the case. One can consistently maintain that *W*'s freedom is compatible with temporal necessity while denying that it is compatible with causal necessity. John Martin Fischer has dubbed this position "hyper-incompatibilism," presumably because the hyper-incompatibilist is *so excessively* committed to the incompatibility of free agency and causal determinism that she is willing to persist in this commitment regardless of PAP's fate.<sup>31</sup> (In this respect, at least, it is the hyper-incompatibilist rather than the PAPist who might lay claim to the title of "more-incompatibilist-than-thou!")

Of course, the fact that the position is consistent doesn't mean that it is also attractive or even plausible. If one regards PAP (combined with a robust understanding of "could have done otherwise") as the main *reason* for endorsing the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral agency, there may seem little point to insisting on incompatibilism once PAP is withdrawn. The principal critics of PAP, like Frankfurt and Fischer, are compatibilists, while its main defenders, like William Rowe and Peter Van Inwagen, are incompatibilists.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, "hyper-incompatibilism" is not without worthy proponents, such as Eleonore Stump and Linda Zagzebski.<sup>33</sup> There *are* reasons other than PAP that one could appeal to in making causal indeterminism a requirement of free agency. Consider, for example, Augustine's paradigm case of a causally undetermined will from *The City of God*:

The bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient cause of the bad will. . . . For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? . . . The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. (XII.6)

One thing we can say about this agent, which we might not be able to say if his will were causally determined, is that he is the autonomous initiator of his actions, a little "first cause," so that in tracking moral responsibility we can point to him and say with a fair degree of truth, "the buck stops here." If this is what is important to the libertarian about causal indeterminism, she should not be concerned about any form of determinism which leaves these features of agency intact. If Augustine's analysis of theological fatalism is correct, the unavoidability which characterizes actions in virtue of their being foreknown by God is just such a form of determinism.

Whether divine beliefs can be soft features of the past, and whether anyone can be free in the libertarian sense despite an absence of alternative possibilities, are complex issues which the brief discussion in this section leaves

far from resolved. Nothing said here *shows* Ockhamism to be false or Augustinism to be true; I have simply engaged in an intuitive eyeballing of the two accounts for purposes of handicapping the race. In so doing, it is fair to say that I have given Augustine an easier time than Ockham. My assessment of the latter is, I believe, reasonably objective, in the sense that the defender of Ockham's solution would probably allow that it is counter-intuitive in the ways I have suggested (while presumably insisting that the overall case for Ockhamism is nevertheless strong and that intuitions sometimes mislead). But the brief glance at Augustine's rejection of (h) has emphasized the positive without drawing attention to potential difficulties, like the proper analysis of the *because*-relation and the best way to formulate libertarian freedom in terms of causal/explanatory openness rather than temporal openness. Certainly much about Augustine's position requires further development and defense; but this would be out of place in the present paper, whose aim is simply to make Augustine a "player" in a game currently dominated by Ockham. While my own judgment is that Augustine's approach shows high promise while Ockham's is a virtual non-starter, it is enough for the purposes of this essay if the reader is persuaded by the considerations set forth in this section that Augustine's way out is at least *no less plausible* than Ockham's.

#### IV

This minimalist conclusion could amount to damning with faint praise, depending on how one assesses the Ockhamist position. Some readers may be tempted to pronounce a pox on both houses, demoting Ockham's solution rather than promoting Augustine's. To avoid this outcome, I want now to persuade the reader of a further conclusion: that Augustine and Ockham represent the main options for anyone seeking a solution to the problem of theological fatalism.

In response to an argument purporting to show that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian agency, there are only two strategies available: accept the argument and deny one of the allegedly incompatible terms, or assert their compatibility and reject the argument. The main rivals to Ockham and Augustine follow the first strategy, most by denying divine foreknowledge of future contingents. Some of these (e.g., Richard Swinburne, William Hasker, and Peter Geach) place future contingents off-limits to God's knowledge, either by excluding them from the stock of truths or by frankly denying divine omniscience; others (e.g., Boethius and Aquinas) include them in divine knowledge but deny that God knows them as future. Call this a *theological* response to the problem, since it alleges an error in the fatalist's assumptions about God. Fewer theists deny libertarian agency, at least on grounds of divine omniscience (as opposed to, e.g., considerations of divine sovereignty). Jonathan Edwards, for example, denies it on both grounds. Call this an *anthropological* response to the problem, inasmuch as it addresses the human side of the alleged incompatibility. In contrast to those who accept the argument but deny its application to reality on theological or anthropological grounds, Ockham and Augustine pursue the second strategy, rejecting the argument and affirming

the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge.

They are right to do so. If the argument is indeed sound, an action which is in every other respect an ideal candidate for free agency can be deprived of this status merely by adding infallible foreknowledge to the mix. But this is preposterous on its face. How could a third-party's knowledge of my future action, just by itself (and without special assumptions about the conditions under which such knowledge is possible), have any effect at all on the action, let alone transform it to such an extent that it no longer qualifies as free? List everything that could possibly be relevant to whether an action A is an instance of free agency: that A is done willingly; that the will to do A doesn't flout any of the agent's second-order desires; that the agent can abstain from A should he choose to do so; that the agent is not acting under coercion or duress; that A is not causally determined by events prior to the agent's birth; that the agent is not acting in ignorance of relevant circumstances; and so on. Now assume that God has infallible foreknowledge of A. This assumption should leave A completely unchanged with respect to every item on the list. As Augustine rightly observes in *On Free Choice of the Will*, "his foreknowledge does not take away my power; in fact, it is all the more certain that I will have that power, since he whose foreknowledge never errs foreknows that I will have it" (III.3). The "aporetic" character of the problem in this text reflects not only Augustine's theological commitments—his policy of believing first and understanding later (I.2)—but the inherent implausibility of what the argument for theological fatalism is trying to demonstrate.

The appropriate response to such an argument is aptly stated by William Lane Craig: "Fatalism posits a constraint on human freedom which is entirely unintelligible. Therefore, it must be false. Somewhere there is a fallacy in the argument, and we need only examine it carefully to find the error."<sup>34</sup> Fatalism presents us with a conceptual puzzle, not a serious proposal for how the world is arranged; its seductiveness reflects our uncertain grip on the underlying concepts rather than testifying to the truth about reality. The value of the fatalist's argument, like that of most philosophical puzzles, is that it invites us to reexamine basic assumptions and put our conceptual house in order. What mistakes in our thinking on such topics as knowledge, time, agency, modality, and so on, need to be rectified if we are not to be taken in by the argument? Theological and anthropological revisionism avoid this question rather than engaging it. There may, of course, be good independent reasons for rejecting divine foreknowledge or libertarian freedom; Augustine himself, to one degree or another, was a revisionist on both scores. But the argument for theological fatalism is too dubious to serve as a reason in its own right, while those who embrace revisionism on other grounds can (and should) still treat the fatalist's argument as a thought-experiment whose philosophical interest lies in the *aporia* it raises. In either case, complaining that God is not in fact omnipresent or that humans are not in fact libertarianly free is as little to the point as dismissing Zeno's "Achilles" paradox with the observation that Achilles was perhaps not as fast as legend makes him out to be. Should anyone so misconstrue this problem as to imagine that a challenge to Achilles' credentials would undermine the force of the paradox, it may be necessary simply to *stipulate*

Achilles' celerity and leave the "facts" (such as they are) to one side. The same is true for theological fatalism, if one agrees with Craig (and me) that the supposed incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom lacks all *prima facie* credibility. In response to the revisionist who imagines that denying one of these puzzle conditions does anything to undermine the force of the problem, one should simply *stipulate* God's infallible omniscience and man's libertarian freedom and leave the truth on these matters (whatever it might be) to one side.<sup>35</sup>

If we approach the problem aporetically, there are basically two tacks that can be taken, corresponding to the two premises in Augustine's formulation of the argument. The list of two paragraphs back rather obviously omits the very condition for free agency to which the fatalist's argument is supposed to make a difference: that the action be avoidable, i.e., that the agent have access to alternative futures (given the actual past). Unlike the other conditions on the list, which concern (in whole or in part) what is or is not the case in the actual world, this one prescribes how things must be in *other* possible worlds. Omitting it from the list was not entirely disingenuous, if one suspects that any modal requirement for free agency must supervene on properties that the action and agent possess in the actual world; for then the difference infallible foreknowledge is supposed to make to free agency should register as a difference in one or more of these other properties. But ignore this possibility. Avoidability is the only feature of free agency which fatalism directly contests. So there are just two aporetic responses to the fatalist's argument: show how infallible foreknowledge is in fact compatible with avoidability; or explain why even a libertarian can deny that avoidability is a condition of free agency. Ockham and his modern followers have provided by far the most thorough and interesting case for the former, while Augustine and the anti-PAPists have made the most powerful case for the latter. These are the main options for anyone who eschews the easy out provided by theological and anthropological revisionism.<sup>36</sup>

Of the two, Augustine's has been widely dismissed out of hand, leaving Ockham's as the only viable option. I hope that my explication and defense of Augustine's position in *On Free Choice of the Will* have gone some way toward correcting the bad press that he has received over the years. Augustine's is not a solution that will satisfy only a compatibilist, as those who fail to read past ch. 3 might suppose; nor is its "reverse memory" model of divine foreknowledge more problematic in any obvious way than Ockham's counterintuitive claims regarding the soft facthood of God's past forebeliefs; nor does his "Frankfurtian" line on free will disqualify his solution from serious consideration. Given the quantities of ink that have been spilled on Ockham's way out, there is little doubt that Augustine's is deserving of more attention than it has received.<sup>37</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. Alvin Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," *Faith and Philosophy* 3 (July

1986), pp. 235-69. The contemporary debate was initiated by Nelson Pike in his "Divine Foreknowledge and Voluntary Action," *Philosophical Review* 74 (January 1965), pp. 27-46. The first published response to Pike, John Turk Saunders' "Of God and Freedom," *Philosophical Review* 75 (April 1966), pp. 219-25, challenged the idea that all past-tense propositions are temporally necessary, thus anticipating the explicitly Ockhamist strategy of Marilyn McCord Adams in "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?" *Philosophical Review* 76 (October 1967), pp. 492-503. Others who have defended a more or less Ockhamist line on the problem include Alfred J. Freddoso, "Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (1983), pp. 257-78; Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, "Hard and Soft Facts," *Philosophical Review* 93 (July 1984), 419-34; Jonathan Kvanvig, *The Possibility of an All-Knowing God*, Library of Philosophy and Religion (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1986); Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker, "Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge," *Religious Studies* 23 (March 1987), pp. 19-28; Bruce Reichenbach, "Fatalism and Freedom," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (September 1988), pp. 271-85; Edward Wierenga, *The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes*, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1989); William Lane Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 19 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991); and Thomas Talbot, "Theological Fatalism and Modal Confusion," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 33 (April 1993), pp. 65-88.

2. Readers who are uncommonly corrupted or endowed with even more exegetical curiosity than section I can satisfy might wish to consult my "Augustine on Theological Fatalism: The Argument of *De Libero Arbitrio* III.1-4," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-30.

3. See, e.g., William Rowe, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," *Review of Metaphysics* 18 (December 1964), pp. 356-63; William Lane Craig, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," *Augustinian Studies* 15 (1984), pp. 41-63; and Christopher Kirwan, *Augustine, The Arguments of the Philosophers* (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), ch. 5. This scholarly neglect is then reflected in anthologies like Louis Pojman's widely used *Philosophy of Religion*, 3d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), where the excerpt from *On Free Choice of the Will* stops short at the end of Bk. III, ch. 3. A juster appreciation of Augustine's argument and the critical role of ch. 4 may be found in David De Celles, "Divine Prescience and Human Freedom in Augustine," *Augustinian Studies* 8 (1977), pp. 151-60.

4. *Retractationes* 2.1.

5. For a recent study of Augustine's evolution during this critical period, see Gregory E. Ganssle, "The Development of Augustine's View of the Freedom of the Will (386-397)," *The Modern Schoolman* 74 (November 1996), pp. 1-18.

6. See *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Bk. V, Prose 6.

7. This is the way Plantinga understands him in "On Ockham's Way Out," pp. 235-37. But this interpretation fails to motivate the solution Augustine actually offers, and is in any case the least charitable of the available readings. Textual reasons favoring (1\*) are reviewed by Jasper Hopkins in "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 8 (1977), pp. 116-17.

8. An anonymous referee wondered whether the independence of temporal and causal orders I am imputing to Augustine isn't incompatible with the best contemporary theories of time and inconsistent with Augustine's own account of time in the *Confessions* Bk. XI. I'm inclined to answer in the negative to both questions. Even if the direction of "time's arrow" is determined by the order of causation, there are at least a couple of possibilities which are consistent with my account of Augustine. One is that an overall order of causation

may be set by the *preponderance* of causal relations, or the most *important* causal relations, even if there are local exceptions (e.g., divine foreknowledge). The other is that the order of causation determines the direction of *physical* time, implying nothing about the relationship between the temporal and causal orders within the Divine Mind. The latter suggests a way to handle the question about *Confessions* XI. The worry here is that Augustine's account of time appears to make it parasitical on such causal processes as memory and perception. But Augustine's psychological analysis of temporal experience may make empirical time thoroughly causal without this having any implications for the way *God* experiences time and relations of causal/explanatory dependence.

9. *Confessions* XI.18.

10. This may appear to conflict with things that Augustine says elsewhere, e.g., at *De Trinitate* XV.13.22:

God is not acquainted with any of his creatures, whether spiritual or corporeal, because they are, but they are because he is acquainted with them. For he did not lack knowledge of the things he was to create; he created, therefore, because he knew, not knew because he created.

This is the passage cited by Thomas Aquinas in the *sed contra* of *Summa Theologiae* Ia. q14. a8, where he is defending the thesis that God's knowledge is the cause of things. But we cannot read Thomas's elaborate theory of divine omniscience back into the passage from Augustine, which is concerned solely with the *existence* of creatures, not the particular facts about what they freely do. (It should be noted that Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, in a recent paper on Aquinas—"God's Knowledge and Its Causal Efficacy," in Thomas D. Senior, ed., *The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 94-124—argue that even St. Thomas is concerned primarily with creatures' existence rather than states when he maintains the causal efficacy of divine knowledge.) In any case, we know that for Augustine God cannot be causative for *everything* He knows if only because some of what He knows is evil: "he can foreknow even those things which he himself does not do, such as whatever sins there may be" (*De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* 10.19). All in all, there is no reason to doubt Augustine's seriousness in proposing that future acts of will escape freedom-annihilating compulsion because divine foreknowledge operates like "reverse memory."

This position is perfectly compatible with God's creative and providential endeavors requiring a complex interplay between foreknowledge and agency in which much of the future is also available to Him through knowledge of His own intentions. Against the common objection that complete foreknowledge stultifies rather than abets providential agency, see my "Omniprescent Agency," *Religious Studies* 28 (September 1992), pp. 351-69; "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," *Faith and Philosophy* 10 (July 1993), pp. 394-414; "Prescience and Providence: A Reply to My Critics," *Faith and Philosophy* 10 (July 1993), pp. 430-40; and "The Compatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to Tomis Kapitan," *Religious Studies* 32 (March 1996), pp. 49-60.

11. E.g., *Confessions* Bk. XI, *De Trinitate* Bk. XV, *Ad Simplicianum de Diversis Questionibus* Bk. II.2.2.

12. Boethius himself employs this reasoning in Prose 6 of Bk. V.

13. This is equally the reason why Boethius *does* feel it essential to correct this bias in *The Consolation of Philosophy*. In Prose 3 of Book V, while setting up the problem of theological fatalism for Lady Philosophy to solve, Boethius urges the *irrelevance* of causal/explanatory relations when W is temporally necessary on other grounds: "I cannot agree with the argument by which some people

believe that they can solve this problem. They say that things do not happen because Providence foresees that they will happen, but, on the contrary, that Providence foresees what is to come because it will happen . . ." His elaboration in the passage that follows certainly looks like an explicit rejection of Augustine's way out.

14. Among recent accounts of eternal-temporal "simultaneity," the most prominent is that of Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann in "Eternity," *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (August 1981), pp. 429-58.

15. Augustine's solution may, however, favor a Boethian move *indirectly*. If God's knowledge of *W* precedes *W* in time, the causal/explanatory dependence of the former on the latter raises the specter of retrocausation. Insofar as this is metaphysically abhorrent, it provides some reason for holding that God's knowledge of *W* does *not* precede *W* in time (because it is instead "ET-simultaneous" with it.)

16. If the Augustinian line is correct, the implications may extend beyond theological fatalism to another problem: foreknowledge is alleged to generate for agency, based on the principle that one cannot deliberate (or even engage in the most minimal decision-making required by intentional agency) with respect to what one already knows is going to happen. For previously unnoticed connections between these two foreknowledge problems, see my "Two Problems with Knowing the Future," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (April 1997), pp. 273-85.

17. William Ockham, *Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*, trans. with intro., notes, and appendices by Marilyn McCord Adams & Norman Kretzmann (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 46.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

19. Linda Zagzebski does a fine job of explaining why the complexity of these results is worrisome in her excellent *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 74-76.

20. William Hasker distinguishes between metaphysical and conceptual entailment, and argues that only the latter is relevant to "entailment criteria" for soft facthood, in his "Hard Facts and Theological Fatalism," *Nous* 22 (September 1988), pp. 419-36.

21. Plantinga's version of the argument is contained in "On Ockham's Way Out," pp. 247-51; while the hard/soft fact distinction permeates this article, there are two sentences at the top of p. 250 which contain the entire argument in a nutshell without invoking the distinction either explicitly or implicitly. Warfield's argument may be found in "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible," *Nous* 31 (March 1997), pp. 80-86.

22. One way to explain this, though it's not essential to the argument, is in terms of the hard/soft distinction. While it's true that, for any time *t* prior to the occurrence of *W*, it *was* the case (relative to *t*) that *W* will occur, this fact about the past is a paradigmatically soft fact about the past, on anyone's account of soft facthood. So logical fatalism cannot secure for premise (1) a temporally necessary antecedent, and therefore lacks anything inimical to free agency which it can then transfer to (1)'s consequent.

23. "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible," p. 81.

24. It might be wondered why Warfield's version of the argument is Ockhamistic, despite his eschewing any appeal to the hard fact/soft fact distinction. The answer to this question is quite simple. The heart of Warfield's defense against fatalism is the logical equivalence of *W is foreknown (by God)* with *W will occur*. But *W is foreknown (by God)*, since it is equivalent to *W will occur*, is "equivalently about the future." This is the essential Ockhamist move.

The fact that Warfield finesses the hard-soft distinction is irrelevant, since Ockham did so as well—it was Nelson Pike who introduced the terms “hard fact” and “soft fact” in his “Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder,” *Philosophical Review* 75 (July 1966), pp. 369-79, in order to address a counterexample proposed by John Turk Saunders.

25. “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible,” p. 81.

26. This critique of Warfield arrives at much the same destination as Dale Eric Brant’s critique of Plantinga in his “On Plantinga’s Way Out,” *Faith and Philosophy* 14 (July 1997), pp. 334-52. Brant formulates the key assumption in Plantinga’s argument as

*The Equivalence Principle*

If two propositions are equivalent, then one of them is strictly about a given time period *just in case* the other is also strictly about that time period. (p. 339)

Brant raises some questions for this principle and argues that it should be replaced by

*The Reassertion Principle*

If asserting one proposition is a roundabout way of asserting another, then the one is strictly about a given time period just in case the other is also. (p. 349)

Brant’s article was not yet in print when I was writing this paper, but my requirement that divine foreknowledge of *W* be the same fact as *W* (and not just logically equivalent to *W*) if Warfield’s consistency argument is to succeed is virtually identical to Brant’s requirement that the one be a roundabout way of asserting the other if Plantinga’s earlier argument is to go through.

27. Perhaps it could behave this way if it were understood as *dispositional* rather than *occurrent* belief. I explore this question and give it a qualifiedly favorable answer in my “Does Theological Fatalism Rest on an Equivocation?” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (April 1995), pp. 153-65; I also develop and motivate the requisite concept of divine knowledge in my “Dispositional Omniscience,” *Philosophical Studies* 80 (December 1995), pp. 243-78. But this is at best a *theological* solution to the problem. (See section IV for the distinction between a theological, an anthropological, and a metaphysical solution to the problem, and reasons why we should aim for the latter.)

28. The following are especially good at bringing out what is mind-boggling about Ockhamism while also treating the position with great care: John Martin Fischer, “Freedom and Foreknowledge,” *Philosophical Review* 92 (January 1983), pp. 67-79; William Hasker, “Foreknowledge and Necessity,” *Faith and Philosophy* 2 (April 1985), pp. 121-57; David Widerker, “Troubles with Ockhamism,” *Journal of Philosophy* (1990), pp. 462-80; Linda Zagzebski, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, *op. cit.*, ch. 3, §3; and Nelson Pike, “A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 33 (June 1993), pp. 129-64.

29. Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” *Journal of Philosophy* 46 (1969), p. 829.

30. Or so I argue in my “Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate,” *Faith and Philosophy* 13 (July 1996), pp. 395-401.

31. Fischer introduces the term on p. 180 of *The Metaphysics of Free Will* (Oxford, UK, & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994).

32. Frankfurt discusses implications for compatibilism at the end of



"Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," and Fischer in ch. 7 of *The Metaphysics of Free Will*, *opp. cit.* For Rowe and Van Inwagen, see (respectively) their "Two Concepts of Freedom," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 61 (1987), pp. 43-64, and "Ability and Responsibility," *Philosophical Review* 87 (April 1978), pp. 201-24.

33. For Stump, see "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," *Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy*, ed. Michael Beatty (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1990), pp. 254-85; and for Zagzebski, see *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, ch. 6, §2.1. I weigh in on the hyper-incompatibilist side in my "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action," *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming).

34. *The Only Wise God* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987), p. 69.

35. In "What Is the Problem of Theological Fatalism?" *International Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (March 1998), pp. 17-30, I develop in considerably more detail the idea that the problem of theological fatalism should be regarded less as a theological challenge than as a metaphysical puzzle which is best approached aporetically.

36. Of course there are other options as well. *Scotism and Molinism*, for example, both deny the transfer of necessity from God's past forebeliefs to the future objects of those beliefs, as required by premise (1) of the fatalist's argument. But neither of these alternatives comes close to challenging Ockhamism's front-runner status. For the Scotist approach, see Anthony Kenny, *The God of the Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 55-58; for a critique of this approach, see John Martin Fischer, "Scotism," *Mind* 94 (April 1985), pp. 231-43. For Molinism, see Alfred J. Freddoso, "Introduction," Luis de Molina's *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 53-62. Linda Zagzebski devotes an entire chapter of *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* to the Molinist "solution," but admits that "It is not perfectly clear to me from Freddoso's account just how middle knowledge is connected with the denial of the TNPs [Transfer of Necessity Principles]" (p. 132).

37. For useful responses to the paper, I would like to thank Bob Kane, Bill Wainwright, Linda Zagzebski, and an anonymous referee for this journal.