Aquinas, Hell, and the Resurrection of the Damned

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Based on themes in Aquinas, this paper adds to the defense of the doctrine of an eternal hell, focusing on the state of those in hell after the resurrection. I first summarize the Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, showing why existence as a separated soul is truncated and unnatural. Next, I discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which restores an essential aspect of human nature, even for the damned. This reveals the love of God since He gives the damned the best human existence they can possibly have given their disordered wills. Finally, I defend this position against three important objections.

One of the more interesting developments in contemporary philosophy of religion is the revival of interest in the doctrine of hell. It is well known that the notion of the wicked eternally suffering after death is a significant problem for theodicy. If any belief seems incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent God, it is this doctrine. Indeed, some Christian philosophers, such as John Hick, argue that hell is temporary; all people will eventually respond to the love and mercy of God. Others, such as Richard Swinburne, have defended the notion that the wicked will be annihilated after death. These options seem much easier for the Christian to defend than the traditional doctrine. Given this difficulty, it is remarkable that there are a number of contemporary Christian philosophers who defend the traditional doctrine of an eternal hell for the wicked. These include Peter Geach, Jerry L. Walls, and Eleonore Stump. I believe that the approach of Stump, based on Thomistic metaphysics, is one of the more promising approaches to defending the traditional doctrine of hell. To oversimplify, Stump assumes with Aquinas that goodness and being are identical. Since this is the case, God’s keeping the damned in existence is metaphysically better than annihilating them. It also shows love for the damned, for it not only keeps “the damned from doing further evil,” but it also

prevents their further disintegration, their further loss of goodness and being. He [God] cannot increase or fulfill the being of the damned; but by putting restraints on the evil they can do, he can maximize their being by keeping them from additional decay.
God is allowing the damned as much goodness and being as their self-chosen nature allows them to have. In this way, hell shows the love of God, in that God unites Himself with the damned as much as their evil nature permits. Therefore, the existence of hell is compatible with the love and goodness of God.

Like Stump, I believe the traditional doctrine of an eternal hell for the wicked is defensible. In this paper, working from the metaphysics and theology of Thomas Aquinas, I will focus on the state of those in hell after the resurrection. I will argue that the resurrection, even of the damned, reverses the "metaphysical horror" of death: the unnatural separation of soul from body. Although the damned, by turning away from the highest good, God, are in one sense totally removed from the actuality or fullness of human nature, in another sense they have as much human being as is possible for them in their evil state. That is, after the resurrection, the damned will have their soul-body unity restored, and since the soul-body unity is essential to human nature, this is a metaphysical good for the damned. Deliverance from death, even for the damned, is a gift of grace due to the sacrifice of Christ. It is obvious that Aquinas' thought on these matters contains a mixture of philosophical and specifically Christian theological elements, and this mixture will be reflected in my discussion. The first section of the paper will summarize the well-known Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, and why existence as a separated soul (as far as nature is concerned) is a truncated, unnatural state. In the second section I will discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which restores an important aspect of human nature, even for the damned. Hell reveals the love and mercy of God towards the damned since God gives them as much being and goodness as He possibly can given their disordered wills. The final section will defend this position against three important objections.

I.

It is well known that Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that the human person is not the body alone (as the Atomists and contemporary physicalists believe) or the soul alone (as Plato and Descartes believe) but the soul-body composite. As Brian Davies points out, Aquinas "adopts a position midway between the extremes of Dualism and Physicalism." The soul, for Aquinas as well as for Aristotle, is "the form of the body." The words "form" and "of the body" are both important. Form is the principle of being; it is the principle of actuality, as opposed to matter, the principle of potentiality. In living things, the soul is the form which gives them life. In the case of the human being, "the soul is that which gives the human body its act of existing." Aquinas believes that without the soul, a dead body which was once human can no longer properly be called "human," except in an equivocal sense. The soul is therefore what gives otherwise dead matter its life and specific actuality as a particular kind of living thing.

But the soul is not the whole human person; the soul is the form of the body. The soul and body require each other for their mutual completion.
The main reason for this is found in Aquinas’ theory of human knowledge. Following Aristotle, Aquinas believes that all knowledge begins with sense experience. The intellect knows by abstracting the intelligible content from material objects, and in order to do this the intellect requires a “phantasm” or sense image. Even memory, needed for recall of previous knowledge, depends on phantasms. And, as Aquinas says,

since the operation of a sense is performed through a bodily organ, it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its nature, to be united to a body, and to be part of the human species, not having a complete species in itself.

It is therefore natural for the soul to be united to a body, so much so that Aquinas quotes with agreement Aristotle’s statement “that it is unnecessary to ask whether the soul and the body are one, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether the wax and its impression are one.” Aquinas is clearly not a dualist in the Platonic or Cartesian sense; he affirms that the human being is the body-soul composite, and that this is the natural state of the human species. Indeed, this is reflected in the definition of a human being as a “rational animal.” Animality, which includes material bodily existence, is just as necessary for the fullness of the human species as the soul.

Given this strong affirmation of the unity of the human person, it might seem that Aquinas would believe that when a human being dies, he or she is “dead like Rover,” dead all over, at least until the resurrection. But Aquinas does believe that the intellectual soul (i.e., the human soul, since the proper act of the human being is the act of the intellect) is incorruptible; thus, it survives death. Physical organs are oriented to particular things; the sense of sight, for example, sees individual objects. But the intellect understands the universal and therefore cannot be just the act of a physical organ, since understanding the universal transcends the power of physical bodies. Plus, the intellect naturally desires always to be, and a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore, the intellectual soul is incorruptible and survives the corruption of the physical body.

However, given that the complete human being is not the soul, but the soul-body composite, at death the human person does not survive in his or her fullness. Davies again puts it well:

if I die and only my soul survives, then I do not survive. For my soul is the soul of Brian Davies. And Brian Davies is a particular, perishable, bodily individual. Destroy my body, therefore, and Brian Davies ceases to exist.

Again, this is partly related to the human mode of knowing, which is dependent upon sense images. In fact, this is the only way that humans can know individual things. Without the body, the soul can by nature only know individual things it knew while embodied on earth. It can also receive non-sensory infused species from separate substances (i.e., angels), but this knowledge is confused and indistinct. This is the nat-
natural state of the separated soul, (although God can directly infuse knowledge of individual things into the separated souls of the blessed). Death, the separation of body and soul, diminishes the distinctly human activity of rationality, and thereby diminishes the humanity of those who die. It also destroys the ability to feel passions such as “sensory love or hate, sadness or joy, anger, fear, or boldness,” since these contain, according to Aquinas, a necessary bodily component. As such, the ability to control the passions by reason, a necessary component of the moral life, is missing in the separated soul.

It is no surprise, then, that Aquinas considers the state of the separated soul as “unnatural.” In fact, “the human soul...[has] an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.” As such, to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it, and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature.

The separation of the soul from the body at death places the soul in an unnatural state; and inasmuch as it keeps rational creatures from returning to God in the fullness of their natures (since they have diminished cognition), death is a “metaphysical horror,” a disruption “in the very order of the universe.” The embodied human person is more conformed to God than the separated soul:

Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection.

Death marks a diminution in the amount of being in a human being; as I have noted, the separated soul cannot even properly be said to be a human person. Personal identity, properly speaking, is disrupted at death (although enough is preserved to help guarantee identity between death and resurrection). This is the case not only for the souls of the blessed, but also for the souls of the damned. God wills to give people as much being and goodness as possible. Even the damned, while existing as separated souls, lack some being and goodness which they might otherwise have. Their souls have some kind of truncated, albeit miserable, existence. But they lack the fullness of human nature, including the abilities to sense (which is the basis of intellectual knowledge) and to feel passions. The damned do not even properly have the dignity of receiving just punishment for offenses which were committed in the body, since punishment for deeds done in the body must be meted out to the person, body and soul. This is true in spite of Aquinas’ position that human beings, even as disembodied souls, immediately go to heaven or hell after death (with the excep-
tion of those souls who need cleansing in purgatory).  Although the damned, as disembodied souls, are undergoing punishment for sins committed in their earthly existence, their ultimate punishment (and just deserts) awaits their bodily resurrection. As Aquinas puts it, “But in this life men, composed of soul and body, sin or act rightly. Therefore in both the soul and the body men deserve reward or punishment.” His point is that since the soul is not the human being, but the soul-body composite, ultimately the body’s resurrection is required to reward or punish the complete human being, body and soul. The punishment of the damned prior to such resurrection is a temporary measure. Although their souls are suffering the misery which necessarily results from their choice against God, full and adequate punishment awaits the resurrection. For all these reasons, death is a metaphysical horror for all human beings, the saved as well as the damned, even though God by His grace mitigates this horror for the blessed by infusing intellectual species into their souls.

II.

This state of separation of soul and body, by the grace of God, will not last forever. Again, we must remember the fundamental Thomistic principle that grace fulfills nature. If death, due to sin, disrupts not only the order of human nature, but of the universe itself, then it is fitting that God would remedy this situation. As is the case with human death, Aquinas speaks of the resurrection as being in some sense natural, but in another sense, the gracious act of God.

The resurrection is natural in the sense that it restores the proper structure of human nature: human beings are a composite of body and soul. As Aquinas puts it:

the soul is naturally united to the body, for in essence it is the form of the body. It is, then, contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual. Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body. Since, then, it persists perpetually, it must once again be united to the body; and thus to rise again. Therefore, the immortality of the soul seems to demand a future resurrection of bodies.

Humans also have a natural tendency to happiness, which cannot be fulfilled unless they live with the fullness of their nature, as body-soul composites. Of course only the blessed who have chosen the highest end will attain this happiness, but it would not be possible without the resurrection of the body. Also, in order for the proper distribution of rewards and punishments to be made by God, it is necessary that the soul be reunited to the body, since it is the human being, body and soul, which acts rightly or wrongly.

From these considerations it might seem that the resurrection of all human beings is wholly a natural event and not an act of grace. Montague Brown argues that since not all will be saved, the resurrection of all “is not wholly an act of grace.” Indeed, we need “to distinguish two meanings of resurrection—the one of nature for all, and the one of grace for the elect.”
The resurrection of all is an act of grace, Brown claims, in the sense that all beings are products of grace, in so far as they are creations of God that act according to their natures. As Aquinas puts it,

Resurrection is natural if one considers its purpose, for it is natural that the soul be united to the body. But the principle of resurrection is not natural. It is caused by the divine power alone.

However, in addition to the grace of divine power needed to raise a dead person to life, there remains a sense in which the resurrection of all human beings is an effect of the special supernatural grace shown by God through Jesus Christ. Christ came not just to free human beings from sin but also from death; freedom from physical death is a gift which all people shall share, whether they be blessed or damned. Aquinas says:

For the Son of God assumed human nature to restore it. Therefore, what is a defect of nature will be restored in all, and so all will return from death to life. ... For the necessity of dying is a deficiency brought upon human nature by sin. But Christ, by the merit of his passion, repaired the deficiencies of nature which sin had brought upon nature.

One purpose of the resurrection is to restore human nature in its fullness, at least in the sense that the human body-soul composite will be restored. The resurrection restores the "final perfection of the human species" since the human species is incomplete as long as it consists of separated souls. "Therefore, it is necessary for all...to rise again." Christ indeed died for all, and His work applies even to the damned regarding what is needed for the fullness of the human species:

All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life [i.e., the resurrection life], as regards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.

Since it takes an act of grace to restore the proper nature of the human species, nature is fulfilled by the grace of God shown in Christ's incarnation, death, and resurrection. As regards physical death and the bodily defects resulting from the Fall, this is true of the damned as well as the saved. Indeed, Aquinas believes that

whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth), will be entirely done away at the resurrection.

Like the bodies of the saved, the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, restored to the fullness of their body-soul unity. Even the bodies of the
damned will rise at the ideal age of around thirty. The resurrection of the damned restores the good of the human species, and in this way God restores as much good to human nature as possible, even to the damned. The continuance in being of the resurrected damned, therefore, is a metaphysical good, correcting the metaphysical horror of death and restoring the order of nature lost at the Fall. The damned have the fullness of their nature and are capable of knowing in the properly human way, by means of phantasms. They can also feel passions, an important aspect of a distinctively human life. God is graciously giving them the most being that they can possibly have, given the disordered nature of their wills. They conform to Christ as much as they are capable, since they have the full, embodied nature of the human species. Hell, especially after the resurrection, is a gracious gift, reflecting the love of God and His desire for creatures to join with Him as much as possible. It also treats the damned with dignity, for treating a person according to justice is to treat him or her as a free, responsible human being. Since this can only be done to a complete human being, body and soul, it is fitting that the damned be raised with their bodies.

A critic may reply, "All this talk about metaphysical goodness and restoring the goodness of nature sounds good, but it ignores the basic issue: the eternal suffering of the damned. Surely this is still incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent deity. We should remember that for Aquinas, the wicked not only suffer the pain of conscience forever, but also the physical pain of literal fire. Being raised with all the senses intact and an incorruptible body just seems to be a way that a sadistic God can more thoroughly torture the damned for eternity. Having their place in the divine order is no comfort for them."

The first thing to be said in response is that for Aquinas and any traditional thinker on hell, hell is a very bad place. It is a place reserved for those who irrevocably reject, by their own free will, their highest end, God. Much of the harm the damned suffer is due to their own evil wills. There is also a pain of sense. Aquinas believes this to be a literal fire, but Geach has convincingly argued that it can be reinterpreted as the inevitable pain resulting from evil people attempting to exploit and abuse a reconstituted natural world. The torment Geach describes might be physical (e.g., much of our suffering in this life results from our pollution of nature) or psychological, since nature will not yield to the wills of those who are evil. Since nature will obey God and not the damned, nature will torment them as they try to make use of it. As for the eternity of hell, Stump argues that since the damned have made evil their "second" nature, it is reasonable to hold that they will never choose their ultimate end, God. They can, however, live the best life they are capable of living in their twisted state, and this God mercifully allows them to do. As Stump points out, to annihilate the damned would be a waste, eradicating their being, and thus would not be open to a good God.

Yet would the damned themselves see hell as merciful? Would not they themselves prefer annihilation to their miserable existence? I am not convinced that this would be the case. Surely there are many people in this life who are miserable due to their evil way of life, but they still desire to continue living. If we take away Aquinas' notion of hell as a literal fire and reinterpret it, as does C. S. Lewis, as the damned being
"left to themselves," it is not self-evident that the damned would prefer annihilation to hell. Since they are in hell, they have chosen the self against God (or have least tried to), and are therefore narcissistic anyway. In that case, why would they want to choose annihilation of the only thing they have ever loved? And since they will still be rational animals, even in hell, the instinct to survive, which is a part of animal nature, will be intact.

So hell indeed reflects God's goodness, wisdom and love. As the inscription over hell in Dante's *Inferno* reads:

Justice moved my great Maker; God eternal
wrought me; the power and the unsearchably
high wisdom, and the primal love supernal.47

III.

In the concluding section, I will defend this position against three important objections. The first objection is presented by Jonathan Kvanvig, in opposition to Stump's position (and mine), that "being is the fundamental value." Kvanvig argues that this is not necessarily true; perhaps freedom is more fundamental.48 If freedom is more fundamental, then, if the wicked choose to be annihilated, this free decision should be respected by God. Because God is omnipresent, and "there is no place God is not,"49 to choose against being in the presence of God is to *de facto* choose annihilation. If freedom is an essential part of our rational nature (and it is the *rationality* of human nature which is so emphasized in Thomistic philosophy), then to violate freedom violates our rational nature. Thus,

To aim at the well-being of humans, one must aim at the realization of the potential of humanity for rationality. Because freedom is an essential component of rationality, one could not aim at the well-being of humans without honoring their freedom.50

Therefore, preserving the well-being of those who choose to be separated from the presence of God is to allow their annihilation.

One way to respond to Kvanvig's argument is this. The phrase, "choosing against being in the presence of God" is ambiguous. It could mean that the damned wish to continue to exist and act without the sustaining presence of God. In other words, they want to be separated from God in a metaphysical sense—to live totally apart from God's presence. But this desire is self-contradictory since, according to Christian theology, it is impossible for a being to continue to exist without the sustaining presence of God. If God cannot cause contradictory states of affairs to come to be, He cannot grant the damned their wish to live totally apart from His presence. It goes beyond the evidence to say that what the damned have *really* chosen is to be annihilated. The damned may well recognize that God is omnipresent and that they cannot continue to exist without His keeping them in existence; but perhaps what they really
want is for God to leave them alone to fulfill their own selfish desires. Their desire may not be so much to be apart from God in a metaphysical sense as in a moral sense. By choosing the self and lesser goods above God, they may simply be choosing to be left alone in their evil. Both the damned and the saved are in the presence of God in a metaphysical sense, since God must causally sustain them in being. But the damned are separated from the presence of God in the sense that their free choice of the self instead of God does not allow them to experience the Beatific Vision, the vision of the essence of God. Even if the damned were offered the Beatific Vision, they would experience it as painful, while the saved experience it as joyful. Thus there are plausible interpretations of the choice of the damned which do not lead to Kvanvig’s conclusion that they are de facto choosing annihilation.

A second objection begins by reminding us that Aquinas says “nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual.”51 But all people have a natural desire for happiness. If this is so, how can God allow people to eternally exist in hell, where their “natural desire” for happiness will be eternally unfulfilled? Surely, this is a case in which something contrary to nature is perpetual. If God raises people from the dead to fulfill a natural desire out of respect for metaphysical order, why does He not guarantee that all be saved out of respect for the same metaphysical order? This is indeed a difficult problem. It is true that happiness can ultimately be found only in the beatific vision of God. But the damned have separated themselves from the beatific vision, and their “natural desire” for happiness will remain unfulfilled. This state of affairs seems to be impossible on Thomistic grounds. There is a tension here between freedom and nature and between metaphysical order and the wrong choices of the damned, a tension which should not be minimized. Human freedom is what prevents God from fulfilling the natural desire of the damned for happiness. God can raise the dead and fulfill the natural desire to be, for the resurrection of all human beings is not contingent upon free choice. But people who freely choose to reject God cannot live in His presence, since this would violate their freedom. Nevertheless, the damned do attain “happiness” to the degree that they are capable. They return to God, as much as their free choices allow, by being restored to the fullness of their body-soul natures. Unlike Aquinas, I believe that they could freely choose God, and thus ultimate happiness, but, as a matter of fact, they do not.

A final objection asks whether my argument implies that it is more important to God to restore the metaphysical order of the universe than to treat the damned with a just dignity and with love. The difficulty with this objection lies in its separation of love, justice, and metaphysics. But why should these be separated? The resurrection of the damned is a restoration of metaphysical order, and not annihilating them does mean that there is not a metaphysical “waste” of being. This understanding does not imply, however, that it is not in accord with justice to resurrect the damned and allow them to exist in hell. Neither does this imply that it is unloving to do so. That the resurrection is made possible by the work of Christ shows that, for Aquinas, the grace of God is needed to
fulfill nature and restore metaphysical order. It is both the case that the resurrection of all, including the damned, restores metaphysical order and that such resurrection is a loving gift of grace to the damned. To assert without further argumentation that this cannot be the case simply begs the question.

This paper has defended the position that Eleonore Stump's point about hell being good, both metaphysically and for the damned themselves is a fortiori true after the resurrection. The fullness of human nature, as regards the species, is restored to all human beings, including the damned. They live as complete human beings, soul and body, not having to suffer the penalty of original sin, physical death. Human nature is restored, and a breach in the order of the universe is healed by the permanent reunion of human bodies and souls at the resurrection. Thus even the resurrection of the damned contributes to the order of the universe. The damned themselves are treated with all the respect, dignity, and worth they can possibly be given in light of their choice against their ultimate end. This treatment reveals the love of God since He gives the damned the best human existence they can possibly have. Given their disordered wills, the misery they suffer in this eternity is their own making, for they do not recognize the grace and love shown to them. This is the ultimate tragedy in Aquinas' system. At the same time, we should recall that this tragedy reflects, not on the goodness of God, but on those who reject His grace.

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NOTES

2. In Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 182-84, where Swinburne defends the plausibility of the annihilation of the damned, although he is open to other options.
6. Ibid., 197.
Anima, trans. John Patrick Rowan (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Company, 1951), II.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Rousseau, “Thomistic Philosophy of Death,” 583; Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia. 84.
13. Ibid. See also Aquinas, The Soul, XV.
14. Aquinas, The Soul, VII.
15. Ibid., II; the quotation is from Aristotle, De Anima II, 1 (412b6).
17. Summa Theologica Ia. 75. 6.
18. Davies, Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 217.
19. Aquinas, The Soul, XV.
20. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 592.
23. The dependence of the passions upon the body (as well as the soul) is continually emphasized in Summa Theologica I-II. 22-48.
25. Summa Theologica Ia. 76. 1 ad. 6. All quotations from the Summa Theologica are from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1922).
26. Ibid. Ia. 89. 1.
29. Ibid. III (Supplement). 75. 2.
31. Ibid. IV. 79. 10.
32. Ibid., IV. 79. 11.
33. Ibid. IV. 79. 12.
35. Ibid., 186, fn. 46.
37. Ibid. IV. 79. 1.
38. Ibid. IV. 81. 15; IV. 82. 2.
40. Ibid. III (supplement). 75. 2. ad. 3.
41. Ibid. III (supplement). 86. 1.
42. Ibid. See also Summa Contra Gentiles IV. 89. 2.
43. Aquinas would not agree with Geach here, but I am not following Aquinas to the letter.
44. Geach, Providence and Evil, 146.
46. Ibid., 196.
49. Ibid., 128.
50. Ibid.
51. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for the last two objections.