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# ANIMALS, BRAINS, AND SPIRITS

Charles Taliaferro

This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the relevance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists.

## *The Perils and Prospects of Dualism*

There are some very good reasons why theists want to explore nondualist theories in the philosophy of mind. Dualism appears to face intractable problems accounting for mind-body interaction, for the individuation of nonphysical beings, and for our knowledge of the mental life of other persons. Dualism seems vulnerable to private language arguments (can dualism account for the meaningfulness of mental discourse?) and dualism is often considered a prime target for Ockham's razor. Moreover, dualism is often considered public enemy number one on religious and ethical grounds. It faces the charge of promoting a life-threatening, body-denigrating asceticism, of encouraging homocentric approaches to the environment, and of favoring an ethic of individualism more generally. It has also been accused of advancing a sexist agenda that privileges a male bias in matters of inquiry and substance.

Within contemporary Christian theology, dualism has often been cast as a Hellenistic import, more Athens than Jerusalem, and many hold that authentic Christianity is holistic, if not materialistic. If Christian theism can be shown to be compatible with theories other than dualism it may be seen as more stable (rejection of dualism need not entail rejection of Christianity) and perhaps slightly less offensive to those drawn to naturalism. In brief, dualism is often considered extravagantly wrongheaded—politically, ethically, scientifically, aesthetically, theologically and philosophically.

Notwithstanding the ghastly legacy of dualism and the promise of more in-vogue alternatives, I think caution is in order, at least from the vantage point of classical theism. Many of the reasons employed to argue against mind-body dualism have been used with equal relish to argue against the traditional theistic understanding of God and the incarnation. So, the objection to dualism that mind-body interaction



involves something altogether unintelligible because causal relations can only be realized between physical entities constitutes an objection to theistic claims about God who, as a nonphysical reality, causally affects the physical world, sustains it in existence, miraculously reveals Godself in human history, and becomes incarnate. Many philosophers and theologians explicitly link their doubts about dualism with their doubts about traditional theism (Paul Edwards, Kai Nielsen, Michael Martin, Anthony Kenny, Jonathan Barnes, Richard Rorty, Grace Jantzen, and others).<sup>1</sup>

These critics are right, I believe, in thinking that dualism and theism enjoy a close conceptual affinity, and there is therefore some reason for theists to defend the coherence of dualism at certain key points even if they do not embrace it as an accurate portrait of how things stand in this world. It may well be that metaphysically less loaded positions in the philosophy of mind like functionalism (which is allegedly quite neutral about the truth of dualism) can be of use to theists in defending the intelligibility of some theistic claims, but these moves alone will not succeed in confronting some important anti-theistic obstacles.<sup>2</sup>

I believe that a fairminded, reasoned case against dualism must take seriously the ways in which a version of dualism may do justice to the unified nature of embodied life. Insofar as one takes a substantive dualist stance that goes beyond property dualism (à la Kripke, Chisholm, others), one may well contend that the person *qua* nonphysical individual can exist apart from his or her body, either altogether disembodied or in a different embodiment. From a substantive, dualist perspective, personal identity is possible notwithstanding such body-switching. This conforms to the Cartesian principle, according to which possible ontological separability (God can preserve 'A' without 'B') is a sufficient condition for individuation.<sup>3</sup> But allowing for this under exotic conditions does not mean that under ordinary, embodied conditions the person should be treated as a bifurcated, split reality. Critics like Ilham Dillman, Anthony Kenny, George Baker, P.M.S. Hacker, Daniel Dennett, Paul Snowdon, and others continue Gilbert Ryle's strategy of harnessing dualists with a fragmented picture of the mind-body relationship. Some caricature dualism as positing a cloudy, marshmallow-like ghost circling the body or as a tiny person, an homunculus, hidden behind a gross material body.<sup>4</sup> These comic pictures do not seem to me to be at all fair. I believe a dualist can understand embodiment in profoundly integrated terms in which the person's affective, sensory, cognitive, and conative life are fully realized materially. According to what may be called integrative dualism, embodiment involves a truly unified life in which (ideally) one's body is felt from within (proprioceptively), and one feels, thinks and acts as a psycho-physical whole. An integrative dualist need not deny that a person sees, thinks, acts and feels as a complete, wholly embodied being. In an integrative understanding of the person-body relation, the relation is not cast as the relation of a pilot in a ship, nor a person in a chariot or in prison or wearing a suit.

If one takes on board this integrative picture of the mind-body relationship, one can see one's way through such ethical objections as the claims that dualism automatically denigrates bodily life, or treats the

body as inconsequential to human welfare, or promotes anti-environmentalism. Indeed, one may embrace dualism along with a more comprehensive, "green" understanding of the ways in which our integrative embodiment is tied in with a whole network of natural relations. As for nonhuman animals, most contemporary dualists adopt a dualist understanding of nonhuman animal life. Dualism need not be Cartesian in its construal of animal mentality. Paradoxically, those most set on denying mental life to nonhuman animals (and thus those most sympathetic to Descartes' anthropocentrism) are hostile to dualism (e.g. R. G. Frey).

Many of the theological objections to dualism are based on isolating a Cartesian or Platonic version of dualism rather than the integrative alternative. Thus, some object to dualism because of its treating the person (soul, mind or self) as innately immortal and hence as something more Platonic than Biblical. But such immortalism is not entailed by a dualist treatment of the person; the metaphysical possibility of surviving death by body-switching or disembodiment does not amount to a guarantee this will occur. It is also due to the prominence of an exaggerated Platonic-Cartesian portrayal of the person-body relation that dualism is thought to be at odds with Christian teaching about the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension. Because we are nonphysical and yet embodied beings, claims about Christ's embodiment are not compromised by Christ's nonphysicality. I believe that a traditional, Chalcedonian understanding of the incarnation requires a profoundly integrated view of embodiment as well as recognition of the pre-existence of Christ, and thus it will require a dualist anthropology.<sup>5</sup>

Let me fill out my proposal of integrative dualism in cognitive terms. I believe the integration of our cognitive faculties should be seen as part of the integrated person-body relation. On this front, an integrative dualist may draw on Alvin Plantinga's recent work on warrant (though other frameworks might also be employed such as Linda Zagzebski's virtue epistemology). For Plantinga, warrant is a matter of true beliefs being acquired by cognitive faculties functioning properly. He resists various forms of internalism, because of their failure to accommodate the many ways in which doing our epistemic duty is compatible with a host of disfunctions, such as being subject to brain lesions, tumors, wayward bursts of cosmic energy, Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists, and Demonic tempering. Any one of these disasters is capable of prompting true beliefs in ways that dramatically undermine claims of warrant.<sup>6</sup> Most of these disfunctions can be read as respects in which a mind-body integrated embodiment is impaired. I do not propose that warranted beliefs (as analyzed by Plantinga) are essential for dualistic embodiment; one can be embodied and yet subject to many cognitive impairments. My thesis is that flagrant cognitive disfunctions can readily be understood as compromising or breaking down an integrated, dualistic embodiment. Warranted embodiment is a feature of a developed integrative psycho-physical life.

This integrative person-body relation is something I have sought to articulate in *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, grounding it in the goodness of God.<sup>7</sup> I shall only briefly note here my strategy, again drawing

on Plantinga's work. Plantinga uses his treatment of warrant in articulating reasons for embracing theism, with proper cognitive functioning analyzed as functioning the way an all-good God intends. This move recalls Descartes' appeal to God's goodness in his account of cognitive reliability and, before that, of Plato, for whom the Good "imparts. . . the power of knower to the known."<sup>8</sup> In my book I have sought to do something similar by combining theories of value, cognition, and some recent work in psycho-analysis. It is the goodness and practical reason of those charged with raising children that is essential for fully realizing integrative embodiment. In the work of Melanie Klein and others, one can see how affective, cognitive, and conative interplay aimed at the child's welfare plays a crucial role in the child's developing identity. Within an integrative picture of person-body embodiment one can, I believe, give pride of place to such intersubjectivity and eschew the narrow individualism and the isolation often thought to dog dualism in all its forms. This sort of upbringing—what a Kleinian may call *a mind within a mind*—can provide a model of what the Creator-creation relation amounts to, thereby reflecting an integrative understanding of God's immanent presence in the world.<sup>9</sup>

While there are various reasons why theists should be hesitant to construe the God-cosmos relation as analogous to the person-body relation (e.g. presumably creaturely autonomy and contingency over against God's will and aseity constitute disanalogies), there are reasons for underscoring some kinship. For those of us who are passibilists, believing God is affectively present to the cosmos, sorrowing over its ills and taking delight in its goods, the ways in which dualism treats person-body dependency is illuminating. William Wainwright introduces a note of caution here.

Mind-body interactionism would seem to provide a more appropriate model of the God-world relationship, but it is objectionable on two counts. According to classical theism, God acts upon the world but the world does not act upon God. Furthermore, by allowing a certain independence of mind and body, the model fails to provide for the radical dependence of the world upon God which is so essential to classical theism.<sup>10</sup>

As for mind-body models, Wainwright thinks the Platonist one with its picture of a remote mind is more congenial to classical theism. This may be, but the very reasons that give pause to Wainwright give sustenance to those who are concerned with emphasizing the immanent, integrative theology of creation, which is certainly a vital strand in the tradition going back to Biblical testimony. In particular, a more integral understanding of God and creation allows us to respond to some feminist concerns. Consider Hilde Hein's complaint about Cartesianism and theism. In dualism, the soul's principle activity of "unmoved, aloof" cognition is without emotion. It is

untouched by the object it cognizes. Pure and dispassionate the-

oretical knowledge is self-contemplative and has no practical ends. Modeled upon a conception of the Divine as pure subject, wholly self-sufficient, omnipotent and omniscient—mind, unencumbered by bodily needs or passions, is wholly free.<sup>11</sup>

By thinking of God as passionate, affected by the cosmos by virtue of God's creative activity and supreme goodness, we can provide an alternative to this more aloof Platonic model.<sup>12</sup>

Why accept dualism? Like the distinction drawn in discussions of the problem of evil between a defense and a theodicy, one might well distinguish between defending the intelligibility of dualism from the more ambitious aim of establishing its truth. Elsewhere I have sought to undertake a defense of dualism, appealing, for example, to *qualia* in reply to eliminativists, to various thought experiments in reply to functionalist and private language arguments, and to the combination of dualism and theism in reply to physicalist appeals to simplicity. There are a variety of more positive arguments that would move us beyond a defense; these include appealing to personal identity over time, mind-body interaction, and the indivisibility of persons as basic subjects.<sup>13</sup> In the rest of this paper I shall put in a plug for my preferred argument for dualism, a Cartesian argument based upon the ostensible metaphysical possibility of disembodiment and body-switching. I shall provide an outline of the argument in the next section, reply to two objections, and conclude with comments on a dispute internal to materialism. The version of the argument I adopt makes use of *de re* attributions of modal properties, the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, and thought experiments.

#### *A Modal Argument for Dualism*

There are reports of out of the body experiences (henceforth OBEs) across many cultures throughout the world. Some reports are of great antiquity while many are contemporary. There are many cases of first person reports in the 20th century from persons of quite dissimilar backgrounds, ages, and religious outlooks, (A. J. Ayer, Somerset Maugham, and Carl Jung all reported undergoing OBEs). Moreover, there are some striking similarities in accounts from various religions of what OBEs will occur after death. Compare, for example, the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, the *Brhad Aranyaka Upanishad*, and the *Apocalypse of Abraham*. Reports of OBEs have been advanced with great vividness and detail in which—to alter the words of T. S. Eliot—people take themselves to have left their bodies on a distant shore (*Four Quartets*).<sup>14</sup>

I believe that such tales do describe something metaphysically possible, even if the occurrences of OBEs are induced by exclusively naturalistic causes (triggered by hypercapnia and hypoxia, vascular or ischemic activity, and the like) and they do not represent cases of veridical perception by subjects that are actually functioning independent of their bodies. We cannot endorse an unqualified Humean precept that conceivability *ipso facto* entails possibility, but we can, I think, claim that careful conceiving of a state of affairs in which one attends to the details

of the case and considers the intelligibility of the state of affairs with respect to one's background knowledge independently secured, gives one *prima facie* warrant in believing that what one takes to be metaphysically possible is indeed so. Conceiving of ostensibly possible states of affairs can go astray on all sorts of grounds; our grasp of the individuals and properties involved may be truncated, we may fail to test our modal intuitions adequately against background information, and so on. But I submit that a presumption of warrant based on focused, critical examination of the state of affairs at issue seems to reflect the standard employment of thought experiments in everyday life (as pointed out by Roy Sorensen in *Thought Experiments*) and that the use of dualist body switching and disembodiment cases seems no worse than the use of many forceful thought experiments in the literature in ethics, epistemology and other areas of metaphysics.<sup>15</sup> Tailoring the appeal to thought experiments to the first person, I believe I can coherently conceive of myself switching bodies, coming to have a very different one, and my present body ceasing to be. I can imagine myself coming to occupy one of the shadowy levels of Dante's purgatory, for example, or switching bodies with a king or pauper without any part of my body switching places. I can also imagine more drastic disembodiment in which I become, in the words of Olaf Stapleton, "a disembodied wandering view point."<sup>16</sup> Such imagining amounts to my attributing to myself certain properties my body does not have. I do not think it is plausible to believe that physical objects—ships and human bodies, say—can become nonphysical or switch places with other ships and bodies without exchanging physical parts. If such limitations and attributions are reasonable, then, assuming the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, it is reasonable to conclude I am not by body.

There are, of course, many objections to this line of reasoning. I use a *de re* version of the argument to get around some of them. Thus I do not put all the weight on an abstract *de dicto* claim like "There is nothing incoherent or self-contradictory in the supposition that a person can exist disembodied." One might well adopt that claim and cheerfully point out that it is quite compatible with particular persons being essentially embodied. It is largely because of its *de dicto* formulation that Richard Swinburne's modal argument comes under attack by Peter Unger, Sydney Shoemaker, William Alston, and Thomas Smythe.<sup>17</sup> I realize that the *de re* dualist argument will strike some as unalterably primitive and anti-scientific, holding philosophy of mind hostage to drug-induced visions, reports by clairvoyants, new age religious propaganda, quixotic story telling about Etheric Projection (Astral Projection), and pseudo-deaths. But, if dualism is not in conflict with what we know scientifically and metaphysically (as I have sought to argue elsewhere), and if we can lucidly and soberly conceive of these out of the body maneuvers, then I do not see why we should resist their force. I would go further and claim that parapsychology gives us reason to believe in the actual survival of some people after biological death for a brief period of time, but for now I only appeal to OBE reports as backing up and filling out what might otherwise be a merely academic thought experiment.<sup>18</sup>

Is the argument question-begging? This is probably the most com-

mon worry. I do not think one already has to be a dualist in order to accept the out of body cases as *bona fide* metaphysical possibilities. Probably many people have OBEs without being dualists; perhaps they have no extant philosophy of mind at all. Of course, thought experiments can be cast as ways of making explicit what one already believes, and herein lies Gilbert Harman's complaint that thought experiments do not inform us about the nature of reality. However, unless we have good reason to be radically skeptical about our beliefs, dualist thought experiments can be understood as sharpening our grasp of our own identity, enabling us to bring ourselves into clearer focus and challenging rival materialist assumptions. Also by way of replying to the objection of question-begging, it is worth pointing out that some non-dualist philosophers have claimed that disembodiment and/or body switching is possible. In these cases the philosophers will use various devices to then avoid embracing the dualist consequences by appealing to a *de dicto* account of self-reference (Armstrong), counterparts in other possible worlds (D. Lewis), a fluid compositional mereology (J. Pollock, R. Boyd, and others). In a sustained case for dualism, I would underscore positively the admission by these philosophers of possible disembodiment and body switching and then argue that their account of the *possibilia* is less plausible than a dualist one.<sup>19</sup> Having breezed by some of the objections and counter-arguments, let me develop in greater detail a reply to what may be called the parity objection and the objection from natural kinds.

### *The Parity Objection*

Can dualist thought experiments be easily undermined because they can be countered with an equally plausible thought experiment to the effect that we are identical with our bodies? Maybe I am nonphysical yet materially embodied, but maybe, too, I am a physical animal with nothing immaterial about me, or maybe I am a part of an animal, namely a brain. Michael Hooker, Richard Boyd, Michael Tye, and Dean Zimmerman have each challenged the dualist modal argument with anti-dualist alternatives.<sup>20</sup> For present purposes, let us refer to this as the parity objection. If this strategy is plausible, then the dualist argument is at a standstill.

Given the holist nature of integrative dualism I am not convinced that person-body identity is as easily imagined as Hooker *et al* maintain. To sharpen my objection, imagine a critic who is somewhat friendly to dualism insofar as she believes that, at least initially, it seems possible that persons to be disembodied, switch bodies and the like, and thus (given some other assumptions noted earlier) it seems possible for persons are nonphysical, and yet she claims it seems equally plausible that persons are the very same things as their animal bodies. Zimmerman's statement of the parity objection is put in response to Swinburne, "It is conceivable...that I be identical with my body, or some part of it—this is a state of affairs which I can imagine easily enough, and with as much clarity as Swinburne's favored alternative."<sup>21</sup> But how easy is it to distinguish two cases, one in which a person is the very same thing as his

physical, animal body and another in which he is integrally embodied, such that his being an animal consists of his dualistic, integral animal embodiment? If one claims to imagine the identity by picturing their conative, affective, cognitive, and sensitive embodiment, this would not suffice, as the integrative dualist would insist on all such features. One may attempt to secure the imagining of person-body identity by envisaging the demise of the body bringing about the demise of the person. But this also does not suffice for, as noted earlier, being a dualist does not require one to believe persons survive bodily death. I propose that to distinguish the states of affairs of being identical with one's body as opposed to being integrally embodied involves a substantial claim, namely, that one is thereby imagining the *impossibility* of the person surviving the demise of their body. Meanwhile the dualist may distinguish the two by relying upon thought experiments in which the person does survive, say, in a different body. This difference, I submit, has some epistemic advantage that throws the parity objection off balance, tipping the scales toward dualism.

If I am right, do all identity claims suffer some kind of disadvantage over against claims to distinguish objects? No, I advance my reply to the parity objection when there is at least a live possibility that dualism is right. There are many instances of identity claims where there are no real competitors in the area. (Is this table this table? This question might gain interest only if we were genuinely worked up about time slices, mereological essentialism and the like.) I should add that my response to the parity objection does not rely on the idea that conceiving of possible states of affairs must involve forming visual imagery. Visual imagery can assist our examination of what is possible, but it is not essential.

Do the standard dualist scenarios also require commitments to strong negative existentials? I imagine having a new body, see nothing metaphysically outrageous about it, and conclude it is possible. Zimmerman has put to me this question: "How do you know that in your imagined state of affairs you have not mistakenly overlooked the fact that your original body still exists, and that you are identical with it and yet have simply failed to notice it?"<sup>22</sup> Richard Boyd once cautioned proponents of the dualist modal argument on the grounds that physical objects can still exist and yet not be detected.<sup>23</sup> Linda Zagzebski has also recorded dissatisfaction with the dualist modal strategy. "It is no harder to hide, or rather ignore, brains in thought experiments about what can happen to me than it is to hide the fact that water has a certain chemical structure in thought experiments about the water in this glass."<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps, if persons or brains are physical points, imagining the absence of a person or brain would be quite difficult. Very few, if any, would embrace such a metaphysical spectacle (even the luz bone had some sort of volume), and bulky, messy brains are, I believe, difficult to hide in thought experiments. In reply to Zimmerman's objection, dualists will, of course, assume that while entertaining the disembodiment thought experiment they are still integrally embodied in the way they have always been and yet they are imagining some alternative configura-

tion. I imagine being in Paris next spring and assume this is metaphysically possible. The fact that I am now in Minnesota does not undercut the epistemic force of imagining the alternative, any more than conceding it is possible that I could be in Paris without realizing it or that I could be in Minnesota high on LSD and be absolutely convinced I am in Paris.<sup>25</sup> As I have advanced a *de re* modal argument without claiming that modal intuitions are infallible, cases in which one can mistakenly suppose something is possible—whether it be water without H<sub>2</sub>O or the trisecting of an angle—do not show the argument is without force.

By way of a further reply to Zagzebski, I note the disanalogy with the water-H<sub>2</sub>O case. Water being H<sub>2</sub>O involves straightforward mereological constitution in which increasingly close inspection of water in mass reveals its structure. There is a seamless procedure of empirical investigation here, whereas most philosophers (including noneliminative materialists) will concede the person-body relation to be on a different footing. To be sure, physicalists charge that empirical inquiry justifies their position, but typically they correctly observe that this is a matter of philosophical argument on the basis of empirical data and not just a matter of empirical data alone. Once we are aware of the empirical foundation for a water-H<sub>2</sub>O identity, it is difficult to hide the H<sub>2</sub>O in aquatic thought experiments. If the parity objector can establish that we are similarly warranted in endorsing person-body identity, a defense of dualism will need to address that claim head on. The dualist modal argument is advanced here on the assumption that empirical inquiry does not definitively either favor or undermine dualism. I believe it is possible to take on board the latest findings of the physical sciences and yet conceive of disembodiment and body-switching with a clarity, detail, and ostensible coherence that is not available in the water-H<sub>2</sub>O case.

Consider a final development of the parity objection to the effect that the dualist is in just as much of a fix as the identity theorist. Assume that physical objects are *essentially* physical and likewise for nonphysical ones. By envisaging the person as nonphysical, am I not committed to the grand metaphysical tour? I do endorse the great negative existential (it is metaphysically impossible for me to be physical), but this conclusion emerges down the line. At the beginning, both dualist and identity theorist can recognize the essentiality of metaphysical identity (if X is physical, X is physical essentially). Let me set up the dualist argument, making explicit its open-ended beginning. At the outset I consider the state of affairs of my being embodied, unsure (let us say) whether this amounts to my being dualistically embodied or being identical with this physical body. I then consider cases in which I exist without this body. These seem perfectly possible, violate no metaphysical precepts I am aware of, and are actually supported by widespread (albeit in principle defeasible) reports. I then, following the argument, conclude I am indeed distinct from my body. It is because of my envisaging what I take to be a *bona fide*, positive state of affairs (my having a different body) that I come to attribute more robust negative existentials to myself, not *vice versa*.

My reply to the parity argument should not be exaggerated. I submit only that, when considering rival accounts of the person-body relation

that are granted initial plausibility, it is not as easy to envisage clearly the identity as opposed to the dualist schema. One can grant this, of course, and then go on to argue that materialism should still be preferred on other grounds.

### *The Natural Kinds Objection*

Linda Zagzebski has objected to my *de re* modal argument based upon a potent account of natural kinds and identity. The problem with my argument is that it employs modal claims quite independent of concern for natural kinds, specifically, for our being animals.

Whatever natural kind I belong to is essential to me. So if I am an animal I am essentially an animal, and if I am a human I am essentially a human. . . . If we accept as an *a priori* truth that the natural kind to which I belong *is* essential to me, then whatever science discovers about the nature of humans or animals would be essential to me. Presumably it is essential to animals to have bodies, and likewise for humans. I conclude that the *de re* argument is threatened with failure provided that there is some such *a priori* truth which connects the discoveries of empirical science with the concept of the natural kind to which I belong . . . Taliaferro says that we are animals, but since he denies that we are essentially embodied, he must think that some animals *are* not essentially embodied. Since other animals presumably are essentially embodied, to deny that we are is analogous to admitting that water is a liquid but denying that chemical constitution is essential to the water in this glass while agreeing that the chemical constitution of other liquids is essential to them.<sup>26</sup>

Has the *de re* modal argument thereby run aground?

An integrative dualist can well maintain that the materially embodied whole of person *and* body is essentially material. My animal body is essentially material and *as a material animal* I am too. But Zagzebski is right that I am calling into question whether it is essential to me (the individual person) that I am embodied as I am and, thus, as this particular animal. Am I forced into a position similar to holding such desperate beliefs about water? Not quite, though, for some, my views here may seem wildly extravagant. It is not obvious to me that all individuals that are nonhuman animals are in fact essentially embodied as they are. Do the vast number of people who believe in reincarnation—in which there is a trans-migration of souls across species—believe in something which is metaphysically impossible? This is not clear, in my view. I will not try to bolster my stance by advancing disembodiment and body-switching cases, such as Socrates becoming an alligator. Rather, I offer the rejoinder of Joseph Butler to a similar objection. While I adopt a dualist reading of both human and nonhuman animal life, Butler's modest position may be more appealing. According to Butler, we simply do not know whether nonhuman animal beings of necessity lose their extant

identity (what he referred to as their living powers) at biological disintegration, the dissolution of their membership in their specific natural kind animal species.<sup>27</sup> Is the failure to see that the individuals can survive equivalent to seeing that they can't? I do not think so. Butler's strategy here is similar to one that is now familiar in the problem of evil literature in which much is made about the difference between not seeing the point of evil and seeing there is no point to evil.<sup>28</sup> I do not believe we are currently justified in believing that reincarnation across species is metaphysically impossible and thus not in a position to hold that individual animals essentially have the bodies they do.

In the absence of overriding, non-question-begging reasons for accepting Zagzebski's view of individuals and animals, I do not think the dualist modal argument is at all threatened. There is currently little consensus on natural kinds among philosophers. The integrative dualist may well agree that the physical sciences can identify essential features of natural kinds (to be an alligator requires instantiating a substantial subset of such and such properties) and yet either deny, as I do, that individual animals are essentially embodied or, more modestly, withhold judgment about the essential embodiment of all nonhuman animals. Should the modal dualist argument warrant believing we are not essentially embodied and there be (as many believe) good reason to think some nonhuman animals are persons, then a case may be made that goes further than Butlerian agnosticism.<sup>29</sup>

#### *Concluding Remarks and Dualist Advice to Some Materialists*

By way of trying to articulate further the resources of integrative dualism, I conclude with comments on an intramural materialist debate between animalists and brain centered materialists. This will, I hope, throw into relief my response to the parity objection and showcase some of the virtues of integrative dualism.

David Wiggins, Bernard Williams, Paul Snowden, and Quassim Cassam are a few of the advocates of animalism, sometimes called neoAristotelianism, which sees human beings as physical animals. They oppose materialists who envisage the human person as principally the brain, and who thereby pinpoint the locus of personal identity as the grey cells. The debate is often focussed on the status of thought experiments, with the brain team (Mark Johnston among others) using revised Robinson-Brown cases to bolster the judgment that the person goes with the brain. In Mark Johnston's view, you go with your brain.<sup>30</sup> This is opposed by animalists on a number of fronts, sometimes by the wholesale rejection of thought experiments but most often by charging that a brain centered approach violates our customary, common sense way of thinking of each other. If I am merely a brain, am I a human organism or merely just a part of one? David Oderberg has recently put pressure on the brain materialists to move toward either full-scale animalism or a Parfitian psychological reductionism which gives pride of place to mental continuity without nonphysical substances. What to do?<sup>31</sup>

I suggest that brain centered materialists can use some of the same

strategies I have in defending integrative dualism. They can, for example, contend that in a properly functioning enbrained life the person may be properly identified as an animal. The claim that we are animals is indeed true in a brain materialist scheme, as it is true also for integrative dualism. Describing oneself as an animal is, I believe, neutral with respect to a host of accounts of what it is that constitutes one's being an animal. Effectively securing this point helps to overturn some of the ordinary language objections. As for thought experiments, I think the brain materialists have the same modal edge over the animalists that I claimed for the dualists, though reports of brain transfers are less prevalent than person-body transfers!

In all, however, I think the present debate can highlight the merits of dualism. Parfitian claims of psychological continuity sustained in body-transferring thought experiments make one suspicious of positing a necessary connection between personal identity and the particular body or brain one has. On the other hand, there is great appeal to the animal and brain advocates' charge that their views have the advantage because of their positing a substantial individual thing doing the thinking, feeling, and acting that comprises personal life. Those of us who are not convinced that Humean bundles and Parfitian complexes can account for personal identity, but are impressed by thought experiments that bring to light the precariousness of brain and animal identity, are in a bind. This is where integrative dualism of the kind defended here can come in. It provides a substantive individual as the one who thinks, acts, and feels, but one that is not essentially embodied as a specific animal or brain, allowing body switching and disembodiment.<sup>32</sup>

So, I submit that dualism has not outlived its usefulness. For theists who resist the Hobbesian urge to think of God as corporeal—however pure, simple and invisible—and who retain belief that God is a nonphysical person-like reality, the debate over dualism can be a focal point for defending key components in a philosophy of God. Dualism can, I believe, be articulated in an integrative form that does not carry with it the ethical and theological encumbrances often affixed to it. Moreover, there is at least one argument for dualism, based on plausible thought experiments, with a force that is commonly underestimated.<sup>33</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. See Michael Martin's *Atheism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) as representative. Doubts about dualism can generate doubts about theism and vice versa. Note Colin McGinn's fanciful dialogue about emergence in "Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated" in *Consciousness*, ed. by M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993). "It therefore seems, on the standard dualist conception, very hard to avoid postulating God as an essential cog in your cosmology," pp. 161, 162.

2. Cf. William Alston's "Functionalism and Theological Language," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 22:3, July 1985, pp. 221-230. Because most

functionalist theories denigrate the appeal to subjective, phenomenal states they are often used to undermine dualist arguments.

3. Descartes' criterion of individuation is defended by W. D. Hart in *The Engine of the Soul* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

4. See P.M.S. Hacker's *Appearance and Reality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) and Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* (London: Allen Lowe, 1991).

5. I hold this contra Adrian Thatcher's "Christian Theism and the Concept of a Person" in *Persons and Personality*, ed. by A. Peacocke and G. Gillet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), David Paulsen's "Must God be Incorporeal?", *Faith and Philosophy*, 6:1, Jan. 1989, pp. 76-87, Stephen Voss' "Understanding Eternal Life," *Faith and Philosophy* 9:1, January, 1992, pp. 3-22, Stephen Priest's *Theories of the Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

6. See Plantinga's two volume work on warrant, especially *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford; Oxford university Press, 1993). Plantinga's work may also be read as mapping out a framework for proper emotions, the l'ordre de coeur of Pascal and the ordo amoris of Augustine.

7. *Consciousness and the Mind of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

8. *The Republic*, Benjamin Jowett's translation, *The Dialogues of Plato* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 770.

9. In the end, I believe a theistic metaphysics provides the best protection from what Michael Williams calls "unnatural doubts." I believe that securing the intelligibility of this intersubjective interplay is important for a number of reasons in philosophical theism, articulating a robust framework for religious experience and making some contribution to the problem of evil literature. I seek to develop a middle path between individualist and holist approaches to the problem of evil, gaining some of the advantages of holism (cf. S. Radhakrishnan and T.L.S. Sprigge) without falling prey to what Kierkegaard called "a dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual," *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, translated by D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 317. For a very provisional sketch, see "The Co-inherence," *Christian Scholars Review*, 18:4, 1989, pp. 333-345.

10. Wainwright, "God's Body," reprinted in *The Concept of God* edited by T. V. Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 84.

11. "Refining Feminist Theory," *Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective* ed. by Hilde Hein and Carolyn Korsmeyer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 11, 12.

12. There seems to me to be a world of difference between Plato's conception of the mind-body relationship, which he likens to the relationship between a person and his clothes (the *Phaedo*), and the soul-body and God-world relations in Biblical literature. As an aside, I note that the case for female imagery of God may receive some support from an immanent integrative theism. Contrary to a suggestion by Stephen Clark, I do not believe that thinking of God as female (or as "Goddess") collapses the God-creation distinction, requiring us to conclude there is "no possibility of standing over against Goddess." *The Mysteries of Religion*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 131.

13. I review these in *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, chapter three. Arguments for dualism can be found in work by W. D. Hart, J. Foster, Daniel Robinson, G. Madell, R. Swinburne, Dewey Ducharme, Steward Goetz, and others. An older generation of dualist philosophers of considerable merit includes H. D. Lewis, A. C. Ewing, C. A. Campbell, and F. R. Tennant.

14. A good annotated bibliography of the literature is Terry Basford's

*Near-Death Experiences* (New York: Garland Publications, 1990).

15. *Thought Experiments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

16. *Last and First Men and Starmaker* (New York: Dover, 1968), p. 268.

17. Shoemaker, *Personal Identity*, co-authored with Swinburne (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), especially pages 142, 143. Unger takes Swinburne to task in "Reply to Reviewers," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. LII, no. 1, March 1992. Unger's rendering of Swinburne's argument in terms of analytic truths allows him to construct an easy reductio that a *de re* version of the argument does not fall prey to. Similar moves can be made in reply to Alston and Smythe in "Swinburne's Argument for Dualism," *Faith and Philosophy* vol. 11, no.1, January 1994, and to Trenton Merricks in "A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 31:1, January 1994. I discuss the importance of a *de re* version in "A Modal Argument for Dualism," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 24:1, Spring 1986, pp. 95-108, and in *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, Chapter Three.

18. See John Beloff's "Dualism: A Parapsychological Perspective" in *The Case for Dualism* ed. by John R. Smythies and John Beloff (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989) as well as Beloff's *Parapsychology* (New York: Martin's Press, 1993), and Pamela Huby's "Paranormal Phenomena" in *The Pursuit of Mind*, ed. by R. Tallis and H. Robinson (Manchester: Carcanet, 1991). I think it is much to his credit that D. M. Armstrong, whose materialist credentials are impeccable, leaves the door open for the legitimate role of parapsychology in the philosophy of mind. See his "The Causal Theory of the Mind," reprinted in *Mind and Cognition*, ed. by William Lycan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 39.

19. I develop a sustained case for dualism over against such objections in *Consciousness and the Mind of God*.

20. Cf. Hooker's "Denial of Mind-Body Identity" in *Descartes, Critical and Interpretive essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), pp. 180, 181; Richard Boyd's "Materialism Without Reductionism," *Readings in Philosophy of Psychology*, ed. by Ned Block (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 84, 85; Michael Tye's "On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 61, no. 3, Sept. 1983, p. 280; Dean Zimmerman's "Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3, July 1991. In "Possibilities in Philosophy of Mind" I discuss this problem at length, developing a more extended defense of using thought experiments in the course of taking issue with Zimmerman's paper, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming.

21. Zimmerman, p. 222.

22. Correspondence, 1994.

23. Richard Boyd, pp. 84, 85.

24. Zagzebski, "Reply to Taliaferro," presented at The University of Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Mind, Fall 1994, p. 6.

25. See W. D. Hart, *The Engine of the Soul*, for additional criticism of modal skepticism.

26. "Reply to Taliaferro," p. 7.

27. *The Analogy of Religion*, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1885), pp. 83-89.

28 As witnessed in some of the contributions to *The Problem of Evil*, ed. by R. M. and M. Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

29. A strong case can be made for recognizing some nonhuman animals as persons. See, for example, Peter Dobra's "Cetaceans: A Litany of Cain," reprinted in *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*, ed. by D. vanDeVeer and C.

Pierce (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1986), pp. 127-134.

30. "Human Beings," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 2, Feb. 1987, pp. 59-83.

31. "Johnston on Human Beings," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXXVI, no. 3, March 1989, pp. 137-141.

32. Alston and Smythe correctly point out that modal dualist arguments can be employed by those who do not think the person is a substantial individual but a Humean bundle or Whiteheadian form. See also Paul Moser and Arnold Vander Nat's "Surviving Souls," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 23:1, March 1993, pp. 101-106. I have doubts about the adequacy of such nonsubstantive views in accounting for personal identity, thus siding with the Reid-Butler camp and, more recently, Chisholm and Swinburne. See *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, chapters two and three.

33. My thanks to Linda Zagzebski, William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, Philip Quinn, Mark Linville, and Ed Langerak for comments on an earlier version of this paper.