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NEED A CHRISTIAN BE A MIND/BODY DUALIST?

Lynne Rudder Baker

Although prominent Christian theologians and philosophers have assumed the truth of mind/body dualism, I want to raise the question of whether the Christian ought to be a mind/body dualist. First, I sketch a picture of mind, and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism. Then, I argue that the nondualistic picture is compatible with a major traditional Christian doctrine, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Finally, I suggest that if a Christian need not be a mind/body dualist, then she should not be a mind/body dualist.

Dualism of body and soul, or of body and mind, permeates Western thought. Many prominent Christian theologians have assumed the truth of mind/body dualism: Augustine, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, and in a different respect, apparently Thomas Aquinas. So, in addition to its distinguished philosophical lineage—through Plato and Descartes—mind/body dualism has venerable credentials in the history of Christian thought. Nevertheless, even while respecting the tradition, we can go on to ask: Does Christian doctrine entail mind/body dualism? Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist?

The answer partly depends, of course, on what is meant by “mind/body dualism,” and by what is meant by “Christian.” As I am using the terms here, a Christian affirms traditional Christian doctrines—such as the two-natures doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. And mind/body dualism is the thesis that human persons have non-bodily parts—inmaterial souls—that can exist independently of any body. According to mind/body dualism, if Jane is a human person living in Canada, she has a body, but Jane’s existence does not depend on her having the body that she has or on her having any body at all: If mind/body dualism is correct, even though she is now embodied, Jane could exist as a purely immaterial being.

Very tentatively, I shall offer some reasons to deny that a Christian need be, or even should be, a mind/body dualist. I shall sketch a picture of mind, and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism; then, I shall argue not only that the nondualistic picture is consistent with Christian doctrine, but also that it fits quite comfortably within a Christian
outlook and is philosophically superior to mind/body dualism. Finally, I shall conclude with some methodological reflections.

Persons and Their Bodies

Materialism dominates contemporary philosophy. On the standard materialistic view in the philosophy of mind, mental states are brain states. The only alternative, it is assumed, is to construe mental states as states of a nonbodily entity, an immaterial soul, and this is to endorse mind/body dualism—a doctrine now widely regarded as untenable. A little reflection, however, shows the dichotomy—mental states as brain states or mental states as immaterial-soul states—to be a false one. For there is another alternative, which elsewhere I call “Practical Realism,” that stands in contrast to the Standard View: According to Practical Realism, mental states—like beliefs, desires, and intentions—are rather states of the whole person—person-states, as it were, not states of any particular organ or proper part of a person.1

Persons have beliefs; brains have neural states. Having certain neural states is (presumably) a necessary condition for persons to have beliefs; but it does not follow that for each belief that a person has, there is a neural state that is identical to (or that constitutes) that belief. Compare: Beavers build dams; jaws have mandibular states. Having certain jaw states is (presumably) necessary for beavers to build dams; but it does not follow that for each dam a beaver builds, there is a mandibular state that is identical to (or that constitutes) the building of the dam.

What believing is, I am convinced, cannot be described or explained in terms free of reference to intentional states; nonetheless, illuminating things may be said about belief. Whether or not S believes that p depends solely on what S would do, say and think in various circumstances. (Doing and saying cannot be understood by anyone who doesn’t already understand belief.) Although S may not always manifest her belief in behavior, if S believes that p, there must be circumstances in which S’s belief that p would make a difference to what S would do, say or think—where what S does, says or thinks may be specified by ordinary descriptions of actions, such as “answer the letter,” “invite the neighbors,” “buy the blue one,” and so on. Conversely, if relevant counterfactuals are true of S, then S believes that p—whether or not S acknowledges having that belief, or even realizes that she has it. Even if there is no noncircular account of belief in general, a particular person’s having a particular belief is explainable in terms of the counterfactuals relevant to that person’s having that belief. (There are complex issues about identifying the relevant counterfactuals for S’s having a certain belief, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.) A person believes that foxes have tails if and only if relevant (intentionally specified) counterfactuals are true—indpendently of how the brain is organized. Perhaps the relevant counterfactuals are true only of those with certain kind of brain functioning in a certain way, but it does not follow that beliefs are brain states. Since the term “belief” is just a nominalization of “believes that,” we should not think of beliefs as particular internal states of an organ like the brain.
Someone may object that to have the relevant counterfactuals true of one simply is to be in a certain state; and the only candidates for such states are brain states or soul states. I think that the objection is misguided. For the kind of state required for the counterfactuals to be true is not any particular internal state, but a state in an extended sense. My “state” in virtue of which it is true that I would lend you money for lunch if you asked me depends on my being embedded in a certain social and linguistic environment. There is no good reason to identify such a state with a particular state of one’s brain. Similarly for belief states. The reality of belief does not depend on the term “belief”’s denoting a kind of spatiotemporal entity or of a particular internal state. One’s state of believing that p depends on global properties (including relational properties, and properties about what would happen in various counterfactual circumstances) of whole organisms.

The reason, I think, that it is appropriate to construe mental states as global states is that it is the person, the whole person and not just her brain, who is an agent. Having attitudes enables persons to do things that otherwise could not be done. In a world without attitudes, there would be no such thing as befriending, or insulting, or obeying, or paying bills, or having parties, or many of the other things that make up human life. Beliefs and desires are on a par with the actions that they make possible. Just as Joan’s promising to pick up a colleague’s mail is a property of a person, not of a mouth, so too is her believing that she will be able to find the colleague’s mailbox a property of a person, not of a brain. In short, beliefs and desires are not spatiotemporal entities that have causal powers; rather, persons have causal powers in virtue of having beliefs and desires. The relevant entities are person, not attitudes.

If beliefs and desires are not spatiotemporal entities, yet believing and desiring are real properties of persons, then it might seem that I have exchanged substance dualism, as found in Descartes and Plato, for a more up-to-date property dualism. I resist this description, because I think that property dualism is in the same philosophical camp as both substance dualism and mind/brain identity theories. For according to property dualism, there are two fundamental kinds of properties—mental and physical—that in some way determine all other properties. I no more think that there are two kinds of fundamental properties than I think that there is one kind of fundamental property. There are many kinds of properties (social, legal, moral, aesthetic, artifactual, and on and on), and it seems to me highly unlikely that there is a single relation—supervenience, reduction, or anything else—in terms of which all properties are connected to one or two kinds of fundamental property. Hence, I reject property dualism along with substance-dualism and mind/brain identity theories. But my main point in this section is that beliefs and desires are not states of brains or of souls, but of persons. This point makes acute the question: What is a person?

In the first instance, a person (human or not) is a being with a capacity for certain intentional states like believing, desiring, intending, including first-person intentional states. A first-person intentional state requires that one think of oneself in a first-person way—typically, in English, with the
pronouns "I," "me," and "mine." To use an example from Castañeda, who brought this point to the fore, when Castañeda thinks that he (himself) is the Editor of *Soul*, he expresses his thought by "I am the Editor of *Soul*," where this though is distinct from the thought that he would express by "Castañeda is the Editor of *Soul*," or "The author of *Thinking and Doing* is the Editor of *Soul*." (Castañeda may not know that he [himself] is the author of *Thinking and Doing* or even that he [himself] is Castañeda.) First-person intentional states are irreducible to third-personal intentional states. In order to be a person, any being must have first-person intentional states.

A *human* person is (at least for part of its existence) a biological entity—a member of the species *homo sapiens*—with a capacity for first-person intentional states. As a *homo sapiens*, a human person—Smith, say—must have a biological body that she can think of in a first-person way assuming that there is a biological body of which Smith can think in a first-person way, and that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone who is not Smith to think of that body in the first-person way, the capacity to think of that biological body in a first-person way individuates Smith and distinguishes her from every other metaphysically possible person.

Let me elaborate a little on the idea of having the capacity to think of a biological body in the first-person way. Smith thinks of a biological body in the first-person way if she can distinguish that body from all other bodies without aid of a name or description or third-personal pronoun. When Smith thinks of the pain in her head in the first-person way, she needs no name (e.g., "Smith") or description (e.g., "person with the biggest head in the room") or third-person pronoun (e.g., "her") to identify the person whose head is in question. Smith’s wishing that the pain in her head would go away is not the same as wishing that the pain in Smith’s head would go away, or that the pain in the largest head in the room would go away. Although “capacity” is a vague term, in saying that human persons must have the capacity to think of themselves in the first-person way, I mean not to exclude, say a person in an irreversible coma: If one has ever thought of her body in the first-person way (and has not yet died), she has the capacity to think of her body in the first-person way. (If there is no life after death, then the capacity to think of one’s body in the first-person way is forever extinguished at death.) Hereafter, I’ll drop reference to the capacity for intentional states, and say that one “has” a particular intentional state if she has ever had it.

x is a human person in virtue of having intentional states, some of which make first-person reference to a biological body. (I am not claiming that all of a human person’s first-person intentional states make reference to a body. The thoughts that a human expressed by saying, “I’m lonely,” or “I’m in debt,” or “I just cannot stop thinking of you” do not refer to a body; rather, there would be no human to think those thoughts without a body.) x is the particular person she is—Smith, say—in virtue of a whole cluster of properties peculiar to her. Some of these properties are psychological (for example, having certain memories, desires, fears, and other attitudes); some are moral (being generous, refusing to pay taxes); some are—for want of a better word—behavioral (being introverted, being a
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braggart); some are more-or-less physical (having a limp, being allergic to nuts). Many of these properties can be exemplified only by someone in a particular linguistic, social and physical environment. They are manifested in the ways that she behaves in various circumstances, in the ways that she presents herself, in what she takes for granted, in her self-deceptions, her habits, preferences, and attitudes; her nervous tics, gait, gestures, and so on through the motley of features that make her the person she is and allow others to recognize her as Smith. Smith’s features may be construed in a fine-grained way: It is not only that Smith is considerate, but that she consistently remembers Old Lady Jones’s birthday; not only that she wants to project an image of success, but that she buys all her clothes from Eileen Fischer. Of course, Smith’s features can change radically, while Smith remains Smith: Perhaps she starts buying all her clothes at L.L. Bean, or converts to Christianity, or she wins the lottery, or she discovers that she has cancer—and she is deeply altered—but she can never completely escape her past. (As Faulkner said, “The past is not dead. It’s not even past.”)

The features in virtue of which a particular human person is Smith can be instantiated only by a bodily being. Smith’s peculiar smile, for example, depends on Smith’s having a certain kind of body. Moreover, the features in question are, for the most part, intentional and relational. The way that Smith treats her less able students, the way that she responds to appeals from charities, the precautions she takes when she travels abroad—these and many more of Smith’s defining features cannot be exhibited by any being (even a bodily being) in splendid isolation. So, even apart from consideration of first-person reference to her body, there is no question of Smith’s being a disembodied soul. In the absence of a body, there would be no Smith.

It is necessary that Smith have a body, but is not necessary that Smith have the particular body that she actually has. Although the question of personal identity over time is a vexed one, it is clear that a person’s body changes continually. Smith’s body today may have no cells in common with Smith’s body twenty years ago, but Smith remains Smith. Although I cannot say what the relation is between Smith’s body now and Smith’s body twenty years ago, I do think that we allow that Smith can persist through great bodily changes—perhaps even gradual replacement of her organic parts with bionic parts—provided that her intentional states remain intact. To allow for this possibility, let me amend my characterization of a human person: Rather than requiring that some of Smith’s intentional states make first-person reference to a biological body, let me say that Smith’s intentional states make first-person reference to a biological body, or to some body suitably related to a biological body, where I leave it empty just what the suitable relation is. The point of this rather uninformative amendment is to leave open the possibility that Smith could exist without having the body that she now has, without leaving open the possibility that Smith could exist without any body at all.

If a human person is not identical to an immaterial soul, nor is a human person a composite of a material body and an immaterial mind, what, then, is the relation between a human person, Smith, and the biological
(body, b, to which she makes first-person reference? The answer, which I
share with certain so-called nonreductive materialists, is that persons are
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies.

Consider an analogy: In certain respects, Smith is to her biological
body, b, as Michelangelo’s David is to a particular hunk of marble, h. Is the
relation between David and h (or between Smith and b) one of identity?
No. David is not identical to h. h could have existed in a world without art;
in such a world, David would not have existed. For there are no statues or
any other artwork in such a world. David could not exist without having
certain intentional properties; but h could exist without having those
intentional properties. Similarly, Smith could not exist without having cer-
tain intentional properties; but b could exist without having those inten-
tional properties. As already noted, many of the properties that make
Smith the person she is depend on her being embedded in a linguistic,
social and physical environment. So, the relation between Smith and her
body is not one of identity.

Let me contrast this “constituted” view of persons and bodies with
alternative views. The “constituted” view is not a form of mind/body
dualism. A statue is not a hunk of marble plus some other entity. Both
persons and statues are particulars constituted by material objects; but
each is the thing it is (a person, a statue) in virtue of its intentionally-speci-
fied relational properties. Smith is no more a composite of two kinds of
entities than is Michelangelo’s David.

Nor is the relation between Smith and her body one of supervenience.
Supervenience is a relation between (families of) properties. Again, the
example of the statue and the hunk of marble is instructive: What makes
something a statue are not the intrinsic properties of the hunk of marble
that constitutes it, but rather its relations, intentionally specified, to other
things—perhaps to the artist’s intentions, perhaps to an artworld, perhaps
to something else. So, since instantiation of all the intrinsic properties of
the hunk of marble does not guarantee instantiation of the property of
being a statue, the property of being a statue does not supervene on the
(intrinsic) physical properties of the hunk of marble—any more than the
property of being a contract supervenes on the (intrinsic) physical proper-
ties of the paper in which it is written. Similarly, the property of being a
human person does not supervene on the intrinsic physical properties of
the body.

Let me emphasize that this rejection of supervenience does not rest on
any theological considerations. For theism is compatible with metaphysi-
cal theories of supervenience. One could even hold that all properties
supervene on microphysical properties in Jaegwon Kim’s strong sense
and still be a theist. As long as all of God’s interventions in the natural
order remained at the level of microphysical properties—basic properties,
which, according to supervenience views, determine all other property
instantiations—supervenience is not violated. My rejection of
person/body supervenience rather concerns the fact that relational and
intentional properties are required for a person to be a person, but not for
a body to be a body.

Finally, contrast the view that persons are constituted by their bodies to
the view that persons are identical to their bodies. A person/body identity theorist may say, "David is identical to h. Since h could exist in a world without art, and h is David, then David could exist in a world without art. Of course, in a world without art, David would not be a statue, but the very thing that is a statue in our world, h, exists in a world without art." The person/body identity theorist may continue: "Now let b' be Smith's body b after Smith's death; b' could exist in another possible world in which there were no persons at all (nothing in that world had ever had intentional states), and hence in that world, b' had never been a person. So, assuming that Smith is identical to b, in a world without persons, the very thing that in our world is (or was) a person, b', exists but is not a person." Hence, the identity of Smith and her body still holds, and, the person/body identity theorist may claim, the argument that Smith is not identical to her body, but is only constituted by it, should be rejected.

I have several responses to the person/body identity theorist here. First, the argument that I have put into the mouth of the person/body identity theorist should not convince anyone to hold the identity theory since its force depends on having already accepted the identity theory. For "Smith is identical to b' (as well as 'David is identical to h') occurs as a premise in the argument. Second, the person/body identity theorist's argument has, to my ears at least, highly counterintuitive consequences—about the referents of names and about the first-person perspective. In the first place, the person/body identity theory requires that David name the hunk of marble (whether it is a statue or not); for according to the person/body identity theorist's argument, David and Smith both exist in worlds without, respectively, statues and persons. Of course, they would not be called 'David' or 'Smith' in such worlds, but on the identity theory, those very individuals exist in such worlds. It seems to me, on the contrary, that 'David' names a particular statue, not the marble that constitutes it; and 'Smith' names a particular person, not the body that constitutes it—just as 'The Mona Lisa' names a particular painting and not the canvas that constitutes it. Therefore, I do not think we should say that Smith exists in a world without persons, or that David exists in a world without statues. In our world, we need not distinguish between the statue and h as the referent of the name 'David,' or between the person and b as the referent of the name 'Smith.' But, in other possible worlds, I think that the names 'David' and 'Smith' should "track" the statue and the person, respectively—and not the material objects that constitute them in the actual world. So, the first counterintuitive consequence of the person/body identity theorist's argument concerns the referents of names.

The second counterintuitive consequence of the identity theorist's argument can be seen by considering the first-person point of view. If the person/body identity theorist is right, then Smith (or any of us) could truly say, "Being me (this very thing) does not require that I be a person. I could have existed—me, the very individual that I am—without ever having had any intentional states at all. That individual, who never had any intentional states, could have been me." This consequence is hard for me to swallow. I can imagine myself to be otherwise than I am in many ways—I could have been homeless, I could have been a lawyer, I could
have been deaf, and so on—but I cannot imagine myself as having no intentional states at all. I can imagine that my life had been quite different, but I cannot imagine that I existed without having any conscious life at all.

The person/body identity theorist will accept these consequences—that names track bodies (not persons) across worlds, and that you could have existed without ever having been a person—but the rest of us need not. The difference between the person/body identity theorist and me here can be seen as an example of one philosopher’s *modus ponens* being another philosopher’s *modus tollens*. Both the person/body identity theorist and I agree on this conditional:

If the person/body identity theory is correct, then it is *not* the case that persons are essentially persons.

The person/body identity theorist holds that persons are not essentially persons, and accepts the consequences. Since I think that persons are essentially persons (i.e., if \( x \) is a person, then it is impossible that \( x \) exist and not be a person), I conclude that the person/body identity theory is incorrect. In any case, there is no reason to be moved by an argument for rejecting the “constitution” view of persons and bodies in favor of the “identity” view that takes the person/body identity theory to be a premise.

To sum up this nondualistic conception of a human person: if Smith is a human person, then Smith has intentional states, some of which make first-person reference to a biological body, or to a body suitably related to a biological body, where the relation between Smith and the body to which she makes first-person reference is constitution. This nondualistic conception is not a denial that there are souls. ‘Soul’ is the name given to the properties that make someone the person she is. Just as a belief is not an inner state of some organ, so a soul is not an inner entity. To know oneself is to know a human person in her full concreteness in a first-person way; it is not to know a private entity “inside,” inaccessible to others. You know your own mind when you have correct second-order beliefs about your first-order intentional states. To be self-interested is not to care excessively about a private object, but to act on behalf of the interests of a certain person. Of course, I think that you have a soul; otherwise, I wouldn’t think that you are a person. It is just that to say that you have a soul is not to say that your soul is a concrete particular: You—in your full bodily being—are the concrete particular; your soul is that cluster of properties that makes you the person you are.

This conception of a human person is “naturalistic” in a broad sense: it neither invokes nor presupposes the existence of immaterial souls or supernatural beings. The intentional states and the first-person perspective required for something to be a person are just as likely to be products of natural selection as is the organization of human brains. This conception of a human person rests comfortably with materialism about the natural order; and if the natural order is all that there is, then it rests comfortably with materialism tout court. The conception avoids mind/body dualism, but should it be acceptable to a Christian?
It is undeniable that natural human life is bodily existence. We are earthy, of dust. The question is whether Christian belief requires that a human person also have an immaterial part that is detachable from any constituting body. I now want to focus on a traditional Christian doctrine—the doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead—and show that the nondualistic conception of human persons is consistent with several interpretations of the doctrine. I have never swum in theological waters before, and I fear that I am already over my head. But here goes.

Christians who recite the Apostles’ Creed say: “I believe in...the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting.” Explicit Christian doctrine concerns resurrection of the body, not immortality of an immaterial soul. Nevertheless, we may ask whether the doctrine of resurrection of the body entails that human beings have immaterial souls that can exist independently of any body. Matters of entailment are tricky here, because on any interpretation, resurrection can be accomplished only through divine agency. Indeed, Christian doctrine is different from the Greek conception of immortality (e.g., in the Phaedo) on just this point; on the Greek conception, the soul is naturally immortal; on the Christian conception, everlasting life is a gracious gift of God. So, to refer to divine agency in the doctrine of resurrection is not to import a deus ex machina. Rather, divine agency lies at the heart of the doctrine. This is what makes matters of entailment tricky. For the infinite attributes that make possible divine agency cannot be understood in the same way as finite attributes. Since I have little confidence in my ability to understand what is “required” for divine agency, I approach the topic of whether the doctrine of resurrection entails that there be an immaterial soul with great tentativeness.

Before exploring the question of whether the doctrine of resurrection entails mind/body dualism, let me make explicit some assumptions: (i) The doctrine of resurrection does entail that an individual can exist without the biological body that she was born with, and, indeed, without any “fleshy” body at all. (But the flesh/spirit distinction, so prominent in Pauline writings, is decidedly not a mind/body distinction. Sometimes Paul subsumes the whole person under the “flesh” side of the distinction, and other times under the “spirit” side of the distinction.) (ii) The doctrine of resurrection asserts a personal afterlife (not some merging with the infinite, in which one’s individuality is extinguished); if the doctrine is correct, then Smith herself—that very person—lives after death. If Smith’s life after death—a life of that same individual, not a replica—entailed that Smith have an immaterial soul that can exist apart from any body, then Christian doctrine, as I understand it, would require mind/body dualism. And the answer to the question—Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist?—would be “yes.”

Now the question of reidentification of the person is a serious philosophical problem: In virtue of what is a future individual Smith, and not just a replica of Smith? I confess that I cannot say; but let me offer two considerations to mitigate criticism of my ignorance. First, the problem of
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reidentification is a serious general problem about personal identity, apart from theological considerations. Even concerning identity in the here and now, there is no consensus among materialists. Personal identity over time is a problem for everyone, not just for Christians. Second, mind/body dualism offers no illumination on the problem of reidentification. There is a least as much difficulty in coming up with criteria for reidentifying immaterial souls as for reidentifying bodies. So, a dualist would have no advantage over a nondualist with respect to reidentification of Smith. Since my aim is to show that a Christian need not be a mind/body dualist, and since nondualism fares no worse than dualism vis à vis the problem of reidentification, and since there is no consensus on reidentification of persons even in the pre-resurrection world, I shall put aside the issue here.

Finally, let me distinguish two ways that we use the term 'alive.' Restricting the domain of discourse to persons, if we construe 'x is alive' to entail that x has biological properties (e.g., has DNA), then a believer in a personal afterlife can agree that being alive is a contingent property of persons. If we construe 'x is alive' to entail nothing about biological properties per se, but only to entail that x has whatever properties are required for x to enjoy, say, conscious experience, then the believer in a personal afterlife should take being alive to be an essential property of persons—but, since corpses abound, being alive would not be an essential property of human bodies. If we construe 'being alive' in this latter sense of having whatever properties are required for conscious experience, and if there is a personal afterlife, then the property of being alive is realized in two different ways for human beings—in natural properties before death and in supernatural properties after death.

Now I want to try to show that the nondualistic conception of human persons just sketched is compatible with various interpretations of the doctrine of resurrection.

I. First, consider the doctrine that takes a general resurrection to be a temporal event—an historical event that has not yet occurred, but will occur in the future—perhaps as the last temporal event. On this interpretation, what happens to Smith between the time of Smith’s death and the general resurrection when Smith will be raised? There seem to be two possible answers: either Smith exists in the interim in an “intermediate state,” or Smith goes out of existence at death, and then, by God’s grace, is brought back into existence at the general resurrection.

Suppose, as many Christians do, that Smith exists in the interim between death and resurrection in an intermediate state. A number of Christian philosophers take such an intermediate state to be a disembodied state. In that case, presumably, what exists during the interim is an immaterial soul that is Smith. Hence, Christians have supposed that the doctrine of the intermediate state entails mind/body dualism. But there is no reason to suppose that the intermediate state (if there is one) is one of disembodiment: an intermediate body is appropriate as the bearer of the properties that make Smith the person she is. (A person with a post-mortem but pre-resurrection body intuitively could be said to be “asleep in Christ.” It is difficult [for me] to see how an immaterial soul could be
The possibility of an intermediate body shows that the doctrine of the intermediate state does not entail mind/body dualism.

Still considering the general resurrection to be a future historical event, the other apparent alternative is that there is no intermediate state, but that Smith (temporarily) does not exist in the interim. One version of the "temporal gap" view is that at the general resurrection, God reassembles the atoms that constituted Smith and restores the relationships that they bore to one another during Smith's natural life, and thereby "re-creates" Smith. This view is clearly compatible with a nondualistic conception of the human person. During the time that Smith does not exist, some of Smith's atoms still do, and they provide the basis for Smith's resurrection body to be a continuant of Smith's biological body. (We can trust in God's goodness not to make a plethora of bodies spatiotemporally continuous with Smith's biological body.)

Peter van Inwagen has argued powerfully against a "re-assembly" version of the temporal-gap view, on both logical and theological grounds. I can only discuss one example here. Van Inwagen argues that if an original manuscript of Augustine's had burned in 457, then nothing we have today could be that original manuscript by Augustine; God could have made a perfect duplicate of it, but the result of God's handiwork would not, could not, be the original manuscript. By analogy, if Smith's natural body were entirely destroyed, no reconstituted body could be Smith's. I agree about the original manuscript, for the property of having been inscribed by Augustine cannot obtain without the causal intervention of Augustine, but the "re-created" manuscript has its inscriptional properties without the causal intervention of Augustine. What makes it the case that a certain piece of paper is an original manuscript by Augustine is that Augustine inscribed it: it has a particular origin; without that origin (which requires Augustine's causal intervention), a piece of paper is not Augustine's original manuscript. But the case of resurrection is different: Although God could not simply will that a certain manuscript have the property of having been inscribed by Augustine without involving Augustine, He could simply will (it seems to me) there to be a body that has the complexity to "subserve" Smith's characteristic states, and that is suitably related to Smith's biological body, to constitute Smith. (The biological Smith's de re attitudes become the resurrected Smith's memories of de re attitudes. The biological Smith's timidity becomes the resurrected Smith's memory of timidity; the biological Smith's lovingkindness remains the resurrected Smith's lovingkindness, and so on.) If creation of a resurrected body is within the power of God at all, it seems to me equally in His power to produce the conditions necessary for the body to constitute Smith, where what makes Smith the person she is are her characteristic intentional states, including first-person reference to her body. The fact that a certain resurrection body would not exist without the direct intervention of God is irrelevant to whether or not it was Smith's body—just as the fact that a certain bionic body would not exist without the direct intervention of scientists and surgeons is irrelevant to whether or not it is Smith's body.

Another kind of temporal-gap conception can be developed, I think,
from the views of Thomas Aquinas. Suppose, as Aristotle and Aquinas held, that the soul is the form of the body; also suppose, as Aristotle held but Aquinas did not, that the soul cannot exist apart from the body. So when Smith dies, she ceases to be actual. But Smith may still exist potentially: As I understand Aquinas, he thought that Smith's soul could exist apart from Smith's body, but that Smith's soul was not Smith, but a remnant or truncated version of Smith; a disembodied soul is Smith's soul in virtue of the fact that it has the potential to be reunited to a body that would reconstitute Smith.  

If this is Aquinas's view, then it would seem that in the interim between Smith's death and resurrection, Smith's soul actually exists, but Smith herself—the person—exists only potentially. What I am suggesting as a temporal-gap view is that not even a remnant of Smith is actual during the period between Smith's death and resurrection. Smith—body and soul—remains only a potential being, to be reactualized at the resurrection. (This would not violate Locke's dictum that nothing can begin to exist at two different times: the resurrection is not a beginning of Smith's existence but a resumption or restoration of it.) I'm not sure whether such a view is coherent; but if it is, then it too would be compatible with a nondualistic conception of the human person.

Even if the nondualistic conception of human persons is compatible with temporal-gap versions of the doctrine of resurrection, temporal-gap versions may themselves be theologically unacceptable. Temporal-gap versions, according to which there is some interval between Smith's death and resurrection during which Smith herself does not exist, may raise problems for the doctrine of purgatory (this is a difficulty only for those who hold a doctrine of purgatory, of course). The intermediate-state versions, by contrast, make room for purgatory between death and final resurrection. My point here, however, is only this: A nondualistic conception of the human person is compatible with the doctrine of resurrection in either an intermediate-state version or a temporal-gap version.

II. There is yet another way to construe the doctrine of resurrection, and that is to deny that the general resurrection is a temporal event at all. In that case, it would not be a future event—an event that will occur at some future time—but rather it would reside in the realm of eternity. If the general resurrection is eschatological in the sense of being out of the temporal realm altogether, there need be no period of "wait-time" between Smith's death and her resurrection, and hence no intermediate state or temporal gap in a person's existence. At death, perhaps, a person would pass over into eternity. Perhaps supernatural bodies are to natural bodies as eternity is to physical time (whatever that relation is). I take prominent Protestant theologians, like Karl Barth, to have held this view. Although Barth himself may have been a mind/body dualist, his view of resurrection does not compel him to be one.

Suppose that a nondualistic conception of the human person is logically consistent with acceptable interpretations of the doctrine of resurrection. So what? Nonphilosophers, in my experience, don't give a fig for logical possibility. Nonphilosophers, and even some philosophers, want to know what the truth actually is, not just what it could be. And for all that I have said about the doctrine of resurrection, mind/body dualism may
still be true. Right. But there are other, to my mind compelling, reasons not to be a mind/body dualist. So, I think that if a Christian need not be a mind/body dualist, she should not be a mind/body dualist.

Against Mind/Body Dualism

I think that there are both theological and philosophical reasons to oppose mind/body dualism. Since philosophical reasons to reject mind/body dualism are well-known, I shall mention only theological or quasi-theological reasons to affirm nondualism about human persons. It seems to me that a nondualistic conception of human persons best accords with the picture of human persons presented throughout the Jewish and Christian Bibles. If mind/body dualism were Scriptural, I would expect the doctrine to be suggested in accounts of the resurrection of Christ. But the resurrection appearances of Christ are all bodily, with no hint of mind/body (or soul/body) dualism. After death, Christ underwent some kind of bodily transformation—He was not recognized by those closest to him right away; but was recognized eventually—but not loss of body altogether. Although I take ordinary humans to be essentially bodily (created that way by God), and I take it that the Word became flesh, I do not think that God is a material being. I understand Christ’s resurrection appearances to be the model for understanding the resurrection of human person, not for understanding God in His divinity. Hence, for a Christian, the fact that Christ appeared bodily is significant for the conception of human persons. On the whole, the picture of human nature afforded by both the Old and New Testaments, seems to me best understood as nondualistic: a human is a psychosomatic unity. But I am not an authority on the Bible and shall not pursue this matter here.

A second at least quasi-theological reason for rejecting mind/body dualism concerns the character of God’s creation. Nature, as I see it, is a unified whole with its own internal integrity; and human persons are a part of nature. According to Christian belief, human beings (by nature, of dust) are capable of redemption (and in this respect made in the image of God); but redemption comes from outside the realm of nature through God’s grace. Nature may be perfected and fulfilled by grace, but grace is not a component of nature. Mind/body dualism introduces an unneeded bifurcation into the realm of nature. The real dualism—the theologically important dualism—is not internal to nature at all. It is the dualism between nature and grace, between creation and the Creator, between the natural and the supernatural. A Christian who rejects mind/body dualism need not, and should not, reject this larger dualism.

A materialist will note gleefully that I have just endorsed dualism with a vengeance: I have merely traded mind/body dualism for a supernatural/natural dualism. After all, resurrected bodies are as mysterious to us as immaterial souls. So the apparent gain in rejecting mind/body dualism, an atheist may urge, is only a terminological mask. To this objection, I should reply: The philosophically important difference is that resurrected bodies are not part of the natural order; but if mind/body dualism were true, natural phenomena, here and now, would be mysterious: resurrec-
tion may be tolerable as a mystery, but Smith's deciding not to shoplift should not be. Indeed, on mind/body dualism, natural phenomena would become mysterious in ways that most contemporary people think that they are not.

By conceiving of the natural world as an integrated whole, and not as a conjunction of two fundamentally different kinds of things—mind and matter—the nondualist conceives of nature as susceptible to human investigation. Nothing in the natural order, not even mentality, is inherently unsuitable for natural inquiry. Perhaps the natural world is too complex for human beings ultimately to comprehend—perhaps, perhaps not. But we cannot tell a priori. This nondualistic view of nature accords theologically and philosophically with the way that I take the natural order to be. So, a human person is essentially a bodily being. It is in virtue of the instantiation of certain intentional properties that a human person exists—whether instantiation of those properties came about through natural selection or not. A Christian need not claim that these properties are any more supernatural than biochemical properties.

Conclusion

It may seem the height of presumption to go against the dualistic strains in the Christian tradition. Let me plead that I am not simply rejecting the tradition; there are many matters on which the wisdom of ancients—Augustine, say, on moral psychology—is unsurpassed. On the other hand, I do not think that philosophy, even Christian philosophy, should be elevated to a matter of faith. And I think that what we now know about nature renders untenable the idea of a human person as consisting, even in part, of an immaterial soul capable of independent existence.

I would like to conclude with some remarks on method: Although I think that philosophy and theology are extremely difficult, I think that it is relatively easy to have philosophical positions that square with Scripture, because I think that many different philosophical positions are consistent with the scant clues to be found in the Bible. Depending on how one understands sleep, to say that people are “asleep in Christ” is consistent with an intermediate state, with a temporal gap (nonexistence which is thought of as dreamless sleep) and with disembodied existence accompanied by vivid experiences as in dreams. To say that “We shall all be changed” is likewise consistent with a variety of views on the resurrection. Augustine was a great philosopher; Aquinas was a great philosopher, but I do not think that Paul (or Jesus) was a philosopher at all. The Bible can be used by Christian philosophers as a test against which to measure their views, and it can be used to suggest topics for philosophical discussion. But I do not think that there is a unique Christian philosophy that is authoritative for all Christians. Philosophers, perhaps most of all, should not forget that now we only see through a glass darkly.

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NOTES

1. Aquinas’s view is nuanced and not easy to pin down. “Therefore, since the human soul, insofar as it is united to the body as a form, also has its existence raised above the body and does not depend on it, it is clear that the soul is established on the borderline between corporeal and separate [i.e., purely spiritual] substances.” Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul I, quoted by Norman Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 136.


3. See Explaining Attitudes, Chapter Six.

4. The ways in which actions are related to motions of various parts of the body are complicated; and I cannot deal with that topic here, except to say that what is morally, legally, socially important are intentional actions, not bodily motions. For philosophers of mind, bodily motions hold philosophical interest only insofar as they serve action.

5. First-personal states do not require what might be called “Cartesian privacy.” Philosophers such as Dewey, Sartre, and George Herbert Mead construe first-personal states as dependent on social context.


7. Or at least some part of it, in the case of Siamese Twins.


9. This formulation leaves open the possibility of reducing intentional properties to nonintentional properties.

10. This point emerged in a conversation with Richard Boyd.

11. The argument that I am putting in the mouth of the person/body identity theorist has affinities with arguments given by Fred Feldman. Feldman focuses on the property of being alive, which he argues is only a contingent property of the things (bodies) that have it. See his Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).


13. E.g., “For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. For this reason the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God; it does not submit to God’s law— indeed, it cannot, and those who are in the flesh cannot please God.” Romans 8:5-8.

14. I say “Natural” rather than “biological” here to allow for the replacement of Smith’s biological body by a bionic body.

16. I assume that we are imagining that the hypothetical manuscript was actually produced by Augustine, not merely dictated. If it were imagined to have been dictated, then Augustine’s causal role in the first manuscript would not seem all that different from Augustine’s causal role in God’s later re-creation.

17. Identity conditions for different kinds of things are different—and usually vague and unspecifiable. Identity conditions for some things do not include properties about their origin. If a licensed repairman takes my squeaky lawnmower apart, oils all the parts and reassembles them exactly as before, I think that I still have my old lawnmower. (If I asked for a replacement of my mower, the repairman would laugh and remind me that my warranty was still good on the original one that he returned to me.)


23. I say “natural inquiry” rather than “science,” because, for reasons unrelated to this paper, I believe that scientific inquiry is played out against a common-sensical background that is not itself regimentable into scientific theory.

24. I owe a great debt to Katherine Sonderegger and to Gareth B. Matthews for helping me with this work. I was helped by discussions with Edmund Gettier and Fred Feldman. Thanks also are due to Ted Warfield and to Eleonore Stump, who commented on versions of this paper read at the Notre Dame Conference on the Philosophy of Mind, November 4, 1994, and at the meeting of the Society for Christian Philosophers in Boston, December 27, 1994, respectively.