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FREEDOM AND GOOD IN THE THOMISTIC TRADITION*

Thomas Loughran

Alasdair MacIntyre has presented an interpretation of the Thomistic tradition according to which moral principles are grounded in tradition-gathered wisdom concerning the good for human beings. In this essay I sketch a route to MacIntyre's conclusions departing from the kind of informed-desire analysis of good to which utilitarian moral philosophers have recently drawn attention. On the way, I identify two relativist challenges regarding the good so conceived—arising respectively from human cognitive limitations and from human freedom—and show how the Thomistic tradition has the resources to overcome them.

I

For more than a decade Alasdair MacIntyre has attempted to revive the Aristotelian tradition of moral inquiry. According to that tradition—advanced by and inherited from Aquinas—universal moral principles are based upon common human requirements for prosperity. These common requirements constitute our common end or *telos*, our good.¹ The good for an individual human being is measured by how that person would exercise practical judgement were he or she both adequately informed and virtuous; the good for all human beings consists in what is common among what is good for each individual human being.² For Aristotle, St. Thomas, and MacIntyre, any objective account of what is good for all human beings and of universal moral principles based upon that account will depend on there being truths about both what sorts of habits count as virtue for each individual, and about what practical judgements each virtuous person would make under adequately informed circumstances. With respect to both of these prerequisites, relativist challenges can be mounted.

Concerning the second prerequisite, it can seem as if there is no useful sense in which how a person would freely choose under even fully informed circumstances is a question of fact. If human beings are free with respect to their choices, it would seem either that there is no fact of the matter about how even well-informed virtuous persons would choose, or that in any case we could not know how such persons would choose until they do choose. A response to this challenge will require an analysis of the nature of human

freedom, and an examination of St. Thomas' teaching on human freedom is the main burden of this essay.

Before taking up that burden, however, it will serve to whet our appetites for a resolution to this second difficulty if we understand how the Thomistic/Aristotelian tradition—as advanced by MacIntyre—has the resources for overcoming the first. Let us consider in overview, then, the place of virtue in an Aristotelian understanding of the good, an argument for relativism with respect to virtue (and thus the good), and how in MacIntyre's work the resources may be found to overcome this first relativist challenge.

II

An understanding of the role which virtue plays in human life emerges from consideration of ordinary practical reasoning. The good, understood as the goal of practical rationality, is clearly related to desire, while it is just as clearly not the same as whatever is actually desired.³ Some objects of desire we judge to be not good, and some goods are not desired. We regret some of the practical judgements we make, and that regret arises from consideration of information about our options (taking information in a very broad sense, including awareness, experience, insight, and the like). Reflection on such familiar features of practical rationality as these have led philosophers from the ancients to contemporary informed-desire theorists to attend to the role of information in the process of the formation of successful practical judgements.⁴

When we consider the amount and kinds of information which influence our practical decision-making, we encounter an important difficulty with attempts to analyze the good along informed-desire lines. If the good of practical rationality is somehow tied to the object of practical judgements made in light of information about our options, then the very range of options and of the amount and kinds of information about those options seem to suggest that each human practical judgement is inescapably underinformed. Human beings have a variety of information-gathering resources: we learn from our own past experiences; we observe the experiences of others; we seek advice. All such information-gathering mechanisms require a measure of time and energy for assessing the experiences observed or described, however. But there are limits to our time and energy for, and the reliability of, such individual assessments. At least some significant experience of rival ways of living seems necessary for an adequate assessment of those rival options. But no human being can have significant experiential knowledge of all of the rival ways of living which are options for him or her.

Suppose we roughly define information as relevant to a given choice for a given person if and only if that information could possibly be assessed by that person and would affect the outcome of that choice if it were assessed.⁵ Suppose further that a person is adequately informed about an option just in

case he or she possesses and can assess all the information relevant to that option. Given these rough accounts of relevance and adequacy, we can state one problem for informed-desire theorists—call it the cognitive limitations problem—in the following way. It would seem that a given human being could possibly gather and assess any relevant information, even while it remains impossible—exceeding human cognitive capacity—for him or her to gather all relevant information for a given choice. Human beings seem inescapably under-informed and hence inadequately informed about their options. Thus, there would seem to be no fact of the matter about how human beings would choose if adequately informed about their options. But if there are no facts about how any person would choose if adequately informed, there are no facts about how any virtuous person would choose if adequately informed. If we attempt to understand the good for human beings as roughly what the adequately informed virtuous person would choose, it seems that there will be no fact of the matter about what is good for human beings.⁶

Informed-desire theorists—Aristotelian, or not—might be tempted to yield to this cognitive limitations problem by defining the good in terms of desires elicited from consideration of some actually available store of information, even if that information is not all the information relevant to the choice of a given option. But that response to the cognitive limitations problem runs us head-long into a variety of relativism, and resourcelessly. For since the particular store of information each person could actually acquire will be different for each of the different sets of life experiences possible for him or her, any choices a person could make will not only be underinformed but also underinformed in a unique way, subject to his or her particular set of actual life experiences. Human beings would be destined to make decisions based on information which is never as much as is relevant to their choices, and is always just some particular limited sample. What promise could there be, then, for identifying some information-conditions as normative, under which the object of such choices would constitute an objective good? The amount and kinds of information relevant to our practical judgements, coupled with what seem like inescapable limitations on human capacity for gathering and assessing that information, would seem to lead to a sort of personal perspectival relativism regarding the objects of our best-informed desires.

Fortunately, the Aristotelian tradition has substantial resources for resolving problems posed by human cognitive limitations, including this problem of personal perspectival relativism. The cognitive limitations of individual human beings can be overcome in community. There are ways in which our choices can be made to respond to the kind of information on which we seek to base our decisions in practical reasoning, without our own time, energy, and expertise being called upon at all. It is possible that our choices can be deliberately influenced by other human beings who are in possession of

information about how we would choose from among rival options under not ideal but actual knowledge conditions. To take but one example, consider parents who know—let us suppose for now that they know, and discuss justification later—that their child would be glad to have been raised as an honest person, were she to experience the advantages which a lifetime's exercise of honest character has over other familiar lifestyles incorporating rival attitudes toward truth-telling. These parents might deliberately construct their child's environment so that the choice of behavior promoting an honest character is experienced by the child as obviously choiceworthy. The child's choices can be influenced by a system of incentives and examples which the parents arrange precisely to mirror what they know to be the consequences of truth-telling behavior in the kinds of actual conditions they know their child is likely to encounter.

Human beings with more information about our options than we ourselves have acquired can lead us to choose in actual conditions what we ourselves would have chosen under better informed conditions. In the formation of language, character, customs, institutions, stories, etc., we can bring information to bear on one another's choices without each individual having to cognitively process all of the information actually contributing to the formation of those choices. In happy circumstances, information which others have gathered is part of the rationale behind the social structures which serve as the context within which the members of a community perceive their options, make their choices, and form their characters. Up to the full store of information which a community has gathered can serve to shape, and thus can come in that sense to be stored in, the character of its members.

The more a community agrees that it knows about the ways in which human beings would choose from among options familiar to it, the more confidence that community will have in structuring the formation of its less mature members in ways promoting the choice of what it has learned are the most choiceworthy of those options. Through such formation, the cognitive limitations of individual human beings can be supplemented. In theory, the longer a community's mechanisms for gathering and communicating practical wisdom are held in place, the greater will be the store of practical wisdom which is embodied in the ideals, institutions and practices by which that community—that tradition—forms its members to maturity. As a tradition develops and its mature members gather and assess an ever-richer store of information about human options, the more plausible become its claims that it is overcoming the cognitive limitations of individual human existence—that it imparts wisdom—and that the habits of thought and character it inculcates are virtues.

Human cognitive limitations are not the same as those of individual human beings, then: humankind can gather information over an in-principle endless

amount of time, whereas no individual human beings can. Yet humankind faces cognitive limitations as well. Human knowledge is gathered by individual human beings and shared through particular acts of communication among individual human beings. Any communal store of information about human options will have begun in a particular place and will have accumulated along a particular route. There will be different human communities, then, begun in different places and incorporating different sets of experiences into different and rival formations. Human communities are diverse, both in number and in standards of maturity, and present at a deeper level new versions of the problems of cognitive limitations and relativism which arose in consideration of individual human existence.

Suppose we ask, in view of the diversity of human communities, "which tradition would it be good for me to be formed in?" If we understand such questions along the lines of informed-desire analyses of good, then the best tradition to be formed in is—roughly—that tradition which we would choose to be formed in, were we to know what it would be like to be formed in all of those traditions which are options for us. Of course, no human being could know what it would be like to be formed in every possible tradition, even if we restrict the domain of the possible to those traditions which have been, are, or ever will be actual. It is clear that the same cognitive limitations problem—with its relativist implications—for which appeal to formation in tradition seemed to afford possible resolution has arisen anew, this time regarding the assessment of traditions.

At this level too, the resources of tradition can serve to supplement the limitations of individual human cognition. One tradition of inquiry might engage its rivals in a systematic manner, its mature members mining the resources and discovering the limitations of rival visions of maturity, and incorporating this wisdom in the formation of the less mature members of their own tradition. But each tradition will form its members to maturity differently; they will have in some measure rival accounts of virtue and rival assessments of other traditions. So whose virtue, which tradition of inquiry, is to play a normative role in an individual's assessment of rival traditions?

There is no meta-tradition outside of all traditions, no "neutral" formation outside of all possible formations from which to assess rival formations. There seems to be no non-question-begging way to argue for the superiority of one tradition's account of the good for human beings, over that of another; rival traditions can be called incommensurable, in this sense. For at best any such argument would be made from the standpoint of a mature inhabitant of some rich tradition of inquiry with its own particular information base serving as background for the character and judgments of its mature members. (The situation for less mature members or for individuals formed in no rich tradition is even worse, since they too have been formed by their own sets of

experiences, but less purposively, and in a way responding to even less information about the range of human options than that communicated in the formation of mature members of rich traditions.) But the mature members of rich rival traditions will have had different formations, and will have different sets of experiences and different accounts of the good to appeal to as premises in assessing the claims of rival traditions. We seem to be stuck. The limitations of human cognition, even when coupled with the resources of tradition, seem to imply that all assessment of practical options—and thus all accounts of the good for human beings—is inescapably tradition-bound.⁷

MacIntyre has argued for the most surprising claim that this sort of tradition-ladenness of rational inquiry does not imply the impossibility of rational consensus about the good life.⁸ To the extent that an inhabitant of one tradition can come to share the formation common to mature members of another tradition, he or she can come to imaginatively participate in the advantages and disadvantages of “the good life” as the inhabitants of a rival tradition conceive of it.⁹ Any two rival traditions might be such that, when a given mature inhabitant of each becomes immersed in the other as what MacIntyre calls a “second first-language speaker,” the inhabitants of both traditions would choose to inhabit the same tradition of the two. Insofar as the members have been formed differently in rival traditions with different views of the good, each would prefer that same chosen tradition for reasons which will not at first be the same. A person might choose to leave her own tradition behind, because of what she sees from the point of view of her original tradition as the superiority of the other. MacIntyre discusses a number of aspects of the process by which rival incommensurable traditions can be compared: a) a given tradition might fail to offer solutions to practical or theoretical problems which, from the perspective of its mature inhabitants, it is committed to solve; b) the mature inhabitants of that first tradition might come to find in some second tradition, once they come to inhabit it as a second first-language speakers, coherent accounts of why those problems arose within the first tradition, of why those problems were destined to remain unsolved, and of how the second tradition has the resources to resolve or avoid those problems; and c) these second-first language speakers of the second tradition might come to find no similarly intractable problems internal to the second tradition, from the perspective of the inhabitants of that second tradition, and no resources from their home tradition capable of generating such problems for those mature inhabitants of this second tradition who come to inhabit the first tradition as second first-language speakers.¹⁰

The crux of MacIntyre’s claim is this: for any two people you pick who have been formed differently in any pair of rival traditions, it is possible that they may come to agree about the superiority of a single of those two rival traditions, and this in spite of the lack of neutral ground from which to assess

them. It is possible that one tradition may emerge as consistently chosen over any other given tradition in such contests, and by persons with a wide range of innate differences inhabiting each of the contesting traditions. By being richly acquainted with the history of such an oft-chosen tradition, its inhabitants—native, and converted—might come to believe that stored in this victorious tradition is practical wisdom about how a wide variety of—perhaps all—human beings would choose, were they to know what it was like to be formed to maturity in both the victorious tradition and in any other. The position taken by the well-meaning parents described above—that their child would prefer to be formed to possess an honest character, if the child knew what was at stake—seems possibly true, and possibly believed with some justification to be true by mature members of some sufficiently rich tradition.

It may be that all human beings would choose the same tradition over any of its possible rivals, were those traditions to be compared in something like the manner just described. It is also possible that some existing tradition may win out in similar comparison with any other existing tradition. One might define human well-being roughly as the satisfaction of the desires any human being would have, were he or she formed to maturity in that ideally victorious tradition;¹¹ maturity in this tradition would require the development of habits of mind and character which would constitute objective human virtue. Perhaps we could never know—abstracting from the possibility of revelation—that any actually existing tradition was this ideal tradition, but in the context of an extended historical discussion among rival traditions we might identify an actual tradition as the leading candidate yet to emerge from human history, and the accounts of well-being and virtue nested in that tradition as superior to any actually existing rival accounts.¹² The network of ideals, practices, and institutional arrangements which are utilized in that best-tradition-so-far to develop in its members mature habits of character would amount to the best moral system which human beings have thus far produced.¹³

Thus, in MacIntyre's development of the Thomistic moral tradition, there is promise for overcoming one source of skepticism about the objectivity of the good life: namely, that arising from the radical dependence of our choices on our prior formation, due to the limited capacity of the human intellect.

III

There is, however, another source of skepticism about there being any objective good for all human beings, at least insofar as human good is understood along the lines of the sort of informed-desire account just discussed. This second source of skepticism is interestingly juxtaposed with the first when it is described as arising from the radical lack of dependence of our choices on our prior formation, due to the unlimited capacity of the human will. This second challenge emerges from consideration of human freedom.

Recall that according to the informed-desire account sketched above, the good for any given human being is a function of how that human being would choose were he virtuous and adequately informed. In order for it to be possible for a tradition to accumulate any knowledge about what is good for all human beings, on informed-desire accounts of good, there must be truth values for some counterfactual conditional propositions about how virtuous human beings would choose. Since we are seeking an account of human good which will serve as a foundation for morality, at least some of the choices in question must be free choices, and thus at least some of truth-valued claims about how individuals would choose must be counterfactual conditional propositions describing how each individual would freely choose under specified circumstances. In order for a tradition to accumulate knowledge about the good for human beings, some of these counterfactuals of freedom must be knowable, and not only by the individual human beings to whose choices these claims refer but also by other human beings who inhabit this tradition. It is with respect to knowledge of these counterfactuals that certain analyses of freedom raise doubts.

Suppose that in the circumstances depicted by some true counterfactual conditional proposition specifying some human being's good, it remained possible for that person to freely not exercise her choice in the way indicated by that proposition. Were such a free refusal possible under those conditions, then it would be possible that the person's good be other than what it in fact is. Now if to have freedom in any libertarian sense with respect to a given choice between contrary options requires the possibility of freely not exercising one's choice for either contrary of the pair, then it follows that no objects of choice with respect to which we are free in any libertarian sense are necessarily good for us, on the account of good we are considering. Whether a given object is good for a given individual is a function of how that person would choose under certain ideal circumstances, and on libertarian analyses of freedom there is more than one possible way for each individual to exercise his or her freedom under such circumstances.

Here, clearly, the problem of knowledge with respect to human good arises. For if under ideal circumstances—where a person is virtuous and adequately informed—it remains possible that she freely choose in a way other than how she would in fact choose, how could anyone know in advance of the exercise of such choices what another's or even one's own good is? For each person's good just is what each would choose under such circumstances.

Perhaps some libertarian account of character could be worked out according to which a virtuous person is knowably more likely to exercise his choice in one way rather than another in fully-informed circumstances, even while remaining free in some libertarian sense with respect to the choice in question. But if we coupled such an account of character with the analysis of good we have been investigating, we would engender the implausible position that

it might be good for a person to do just anything at all which a person is free in a libertarian sense to do—to murder one's friends, say—although it probably isn't. For on the analysis of good we have been considering, the good is a function of what a person actually—not probably—would do were she virtuous and adequately informed.

Another possible direction for harmonizing libertarian accounts of human freedom with our emerging informed-desire account of good is this: libertarian freedom might be viewed as a means to the end of a virtuous character. One might admit that virtuous persons lack libertarian freedom with respect to some pairs of contraries (to murder a friend, or not), but insist that such character-restrained choice scenarios retain their moral character in virtue of the libertarian free choices made in the process of formation of that character. One might define the good for human beings in terms of the outcome of ideal and derivatively free choice scenarios of this type.¹⁴

The problem with this two-tiered libertarian informed-desire analysis, it seems to me, is this: such analyses seem to lack the resources for giving an account of virtue in terms of the good. We have defined virtue, roughly, as those habits of thought and character which would characterize maturity in an ideally victorious tradition. Maturity in such a tradition has claim to being good for its members insofar as formation in that tradition utilizes information about how its less mature members would choose, were they in possession of a richer store of information about their own options than they in fact possess. But on the proposed two-tier libertarian analysis, only probable knowledge (at best) can be had concerning the outcome of those choices of less-than-virtuous persons who are free in a libertarian sense. So maturity in any given tradition, including that ideally-victorious tradition whose account of maturity is to be normative for virtue, would be at best only probably good for a given person, only probably in accord with what he or she would have chosen in light of adequate knowledge of various sets of options. But perhaps the advocate of libertarian analyses of freedom can define the virtues along the lines of habits which are probably good for human beings.

I am in no position to claim that an objective and knowable account of human good cast in terms of an informed-desire analysis is incompatible with every possible libertarian analysis of human freedom. I do mean to suggest that libertarian analyses of human freedom raise difficult obstacles for the development of such an account of human prosperity. For the development of an Aristotelian/Thomistic moral framework grounded on an objective account of human good understood in terms of an informed-desire analysis, we might look elsewhere than to libertarian analyses for an account of freedom. Since the metaphysics of freedom has been addressed rigorously within the tradition which MacIntyre and others seek to revive, I suggest that we would do well to reexamine St. Thomas' account of the nature and causal relations of the human intellect and will.

IV

The capacity for rational apprehension is the capacity to apprehend aspects of reality which are not sensible. Aquinas called the faculty of rational apprehension the Intellect, and the faculty of inclination responding to such apprehension, the Will. "The act of the Will," St. Thomas wrote, "is nothing but an inclination which follows on an apprehended form, just as natural appetite is an inclination which follows on a natural form."¹⁵ Whatever the intellect can apprehend, the will can take as its object. That is, we can incline toward whatever we can apprehend, since there is always something of being in any apprehended object, and thus something desirable (as useful or for its own sake) under some circumstances or other.¹⁶

Though the will can incline toward whatever the intellect can apprehend, all finite being can be apprehended insofar as it lacks being, and thus the will need not incline toward any created apprehended object, since any such object can be apprehended as lacking in being; that is, as lacking some mode of being in virtue of which one might incline toward the apprehended object, were it present instead of lacking.¹⁷ Thus, the ability of the intellect to abstract—to notice certain aspects of apprehended objects—is the ground of the nonnecessary character of the will's inclination toward finite apprehended objects. This is part of what St. Thomas meant by his claim that the root of freedom is in the intellect: given the apprehension of any finite object, no inclination of the will follows with necessity, since the intellect can apprehend that object insofar as it lacks being.¹⁸

Freedom from necessity is one of the three conditions which St. Thomas consistently designated as belonging to creaturely freedom; the other two—self-movement, and control—will be introduced shortly.¹⁹ First, though, we should note that the freedom from necessity on the level at which we have so far considered it is of a passive sort: the will is not moved of necessity by any given apprehended object because of something which can happen to the intellect, namely, its apprehending a given created object as good, or as lacking in being in some respect, due to its ability to abstract. But there is a second dimension of the power of the intellect which transforms the passivity of the will's nonnecessitation. Among the aspects of created being which the intellect can apprehend are its own acts (we can notice that we are thinking, for example), and those of the Will (we can notice that we intend something or other.²⁰) This capacity to apprehend its own acts and those of the will is the intellect's capacity for reflection. The will, in turn, can have inclinations corresponding to these reflective apprehendings, and these inclinations in turn can be apprehended. A fuller description of the interplay between Intellect and Will would reveal even more complexity.

Since human beings can apprehend their own apprehendings and willings, can incline toward these in various ways, and can apprehend the causes of

these of their states, they can incline to change what they apprehend, what they will, whether they apprehend, and whether they will. As rational animals, human beings move themselves, like nonrational animals, in the sense that their principle of motion for each act—the apprehended object—is internal to them. Yet nonrational animals are passive with respect to what that internal principle of motion, that apprehended object, will be. With rational creatures things are otherwise. Because of their capacity for reflection—for apprehending the acts of the intellect and will—the source of the specification of their internal principle of motion is also in a way internal to rational creatures. For the intellect can apprehend its own acts, and the will can incline or not toward any of these apprehended acts of the intellect.

Rational creatures are in this sense active with respect to their internal principle of motion, the apprehended good, and so can be said to move themselves in a richer sense than can nonrational animals. The intellect moves the will, in the primary sense that the will's inclination just is a response to the intellect's apprehension of an object. But the will also moves the intellect to act, because the intellect can apprehend its own acts, and the will can incline accordingly.²¹ The will moves the will, as well, since it is in virtue of its inclination toward an end that the will inclines toward an object apprehended as a means to that end.²² In this way, the will moves itself to act, as well as moving the intellect and, in various ways and to various degrees, the senses, the passions, and the executive powers—like speech—to act.²³

We have seen how the will is both not necessitated by any finite apprehended object, and that it can play a role in specifying which objects it will apprehend, and in what way. Rational creatures have the full range of created being as possible objects of inclination, and they can move themselves to apprehend whichever objects they will in fact incline toward. Nonnecessitation coupled with self-movement amounts to control. Rational creatures not only have control over how they will fulfill their desires (as nonrational animals do), but over what their desires will be, whether or not they will yield to them, and under what conditions. This control which rational creatures have over their own acts is as indefinitely deep as is the intellect's capacity for reflection. The control which rational creatures have over what they incline toward has been called freedom of specification, and their control over whether they will incline toward a given apprehended object, freedom of exercise.²⁴ Aquinas clearly distinguished between these dimensions of nonnecessitation of the will's act, and located the roots of both in the capacity of the intellect to reflect on its own acts, as well as on those of the other faculties, including acts of the will.²⁵

It is particularly the will's control over the judgement of the intellect which marks the choices of rational creatures as free. St. Thomas is explicit in his claim that human free choice comes from our power over our own judgements

in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *De Veritate*, and he cites the intellect's capacity to consider an apprehended object from a different point of view—a capacity over the exercise of which the will has power—as the grounds for the freedom and nonnecessitation of the will's act by its apprehended object in the *Prima Secundae* and the *De Malo*.²⁶

The will, then, is a self-mover, moving itself from willing the end to willing an apprehended means, and because particular acts of the intellect can be among these suitable apprehended means, the will is able to play a role in forming the intellect and the will, the wellsprings of fully human action. According to St. Thomas the will is not only a self-mover, though, but is a moved mover as well. St. Thomas understood being a moved mover and a self-mover as fully compatible.²⁷ Having examined the sense in which the will is a mover, we need next to explore the senses in which it is moved.

There are five important dimensions to the will's being moved which we should briefly consider. First, the intellect moves the will, plainly, in its presentation of apprehended objects. These do not necessitate the will's acts, though, since the intellect can consider any finite apprehended object under different aspects, so that it seems good under one and not good under another. The will can incline toward a wide range of apprehended objects, but none of these move the will with necessity. Hence, all that we can say about the will's nature is that it inclines toward whatever the intellect apprehends as good, which is to say toward the good in general. This is what St. Thomas meant by identifying the universal good as the will's proper object: by its nature, the will inclines toward whatever is apprehended as good.²⁸

Since the intellect can reflectively apprehend its own act of considering any apprehended object, the will can incline toward that apprehended act and can thus move the intellect from considering an object under one aspect to consider it under another. Thus, the will has control over which apprehended object moves the will; this control is freedom of specification.

In a second and related sense, God moves the will in virtue of His providence over the causes of the intellect's apprehending as it does. God exercises this control without in any way necessitating the will's acts, for the nature of the will remains open to being moved or not moved by any particular apprehended object.²⁹ Neither does God's control over the intellect's apprehending as it does obviate the will's control over how the intellect apprehends. Thus, neither the proximate nor ultimate (nor, a fortiori, any intermediate) causes on the side of the object of the will's act are opposed to the will's freedom of specification.

The next two senses in which the will is moved concern the exercise of the will's act. In a third sense, the will moves itself, from willing the end, to inclining toward the means. (The precise form of the will's inclination toward the means can vary: from consent, to choice, to use.) We touched on the way

in which the will moves itself when considering the various sorts of control the will exercises; here we need to focus on the moved side of the will's relationship to itself. The will is moved in virtue of its inclination toward the end to choose the means: it is in virtue of my willing health, that I choose to take the medicine I apprehend as productive of health. But the intellect can apprehend various means to the same end, or apprehend a given means as useful for one end though useless for or even impeding others, i.e., as not suitable. Therefore, even while willing the end, the will is under no necessity to move itself to choose an apprehended means.

The reduction from willing the end to willing the means takes place only insofar as the means is considered as suitable to the end. But that act of consideration can itself be apprehended by the intellect as good, or as not, and the will can accordingly incline or not incline toward that apprehended act of consideration, moving the intellect to continue that consideration or to cease from doing so. Thus, the will has control over whether or not it will reduce itself from willing an end to willing a certain means, even given the apprehension of that means as suitable; this control is freedom of exercise.

The fourth dimension of the will's being moved is related to the third as the second was to the first. In creating the will with the nature that it has and in sustaining that nature in existence, God moves the will to the universal good, that is, in accord with its nature.³⁰ St. Thomas' reasoning runs as follows: since no particular end has been perpetually actually willed by any given human will, the will must have come to will that end. But if the will had moved itself to will that end, that end would have had to have functioned also as a means to some further end: moving itself from willing the end to willing the means is the only kind of self-movement St. Thomas allows for the will, for nothing can reduce itself from potency to act in the same respect. If the will moved itself to will the end, deliberation would have had to have taken place for the will to move itself, from willing some further end to willing what with respect to that act of will is the means, and with respect to our original act is the end. No infinite regress of deliberation is possible, though, and so at some point the will must be moved—in the order of exercise, and not only of specification—by something else.³¹ That something else must be God, Who alone is capable of moving the will by sustaining it in existence with an inclination toward its natural object, which is the universal good, the good-in-general.³² Since God's movement of the will in this fourth sense is toward whatever is good, the will's act of choice is not necessitated by this divine motion, any more than by the divine control over the objects of the intellect's apprehension, the second sense.³³ Nor does God's moving the will to the universal good obviate the will's control over whether it moves itself from willing the end to willing the means. So neither the proximate nor highest (the only) causes moving the will to the exercise of its act are opposed to the will's freedom of exercise.

The fifth and final sense in which the will is moved by another is not only distinct but also different from the others, since those four all apply to every conceivable act of the will. St. Thomas thought, however, that sometimes God moves the will in other ways besides His control on the side of the object through the Providential arrangement of the causes of apprehension, and on the side of the exercise of the act, by sustaining the will in existence with an inclination toward whatever is apprehended as good. God also moves the will through particular acts of grace: only sometimes, St. Thomas says.³⁴ It is true that grace is always available to every human being, but that grace is not always efficacious. While many have held an interpretation of St. Thomas's doctrine of application on which even grace which is nonefficacious in a technical sense is nonetheless effective in applying the will to act, that view of application has been effectively challenged by Bernard Lonergan.³⁵

Through grace God can move a person to apprehend what otherwise would not have been apprehended, thus moving the will in the order of specification. Or, in the order of exercise, God can simply incline a person toward what he or she would otherwise not have been inclined toward (and this, either by instilling a single inclination, or by infusing a virtue which would, if maintained, similarly effect all like acts.)³⁶ As is true concerning the other senses in which the will is moved, God's moving the will to choose by way of such particular movements of grace does not necessitate the will, nor obviate its control over—its proximate causal role in—the production of its acts. God's moving the will is thus opposed neither to the will's freedom of exercise, nor of specification.³⁷

Supposing the account I have sketched of the causes of the Will's acts is a complete one, let us summarize the view of human freedom which emerges from it. According to the interpretation I have presented, the will is moved by any object it apprehends as good—which is to say, by any object which when apprehended does in fact move the will—as by a sufficient cause.³⁸ Such apprehended objects are sufficient in St. Thomas's sense: when the cause is posited, the effect follows always, unless some obstacle impedes the cause.³⁹ Many things can impede the will's being moved by a rationally apprehended good, and the will itself is among these. Because of the indefinitely deep capacity of the intellect to abstract and reflect, the intellect can apprehend just any created object, including its own acts and those of the will, as good, or as not. Thus, even when the intellect apprehends an object which is sufficient to move the will, the will can impede that movement. Because the intellect can apprehend its own acts, the will can move the intellect to consider that sufficient cause of the will's movement as lacking in being in some respect. So considered, that object which is sufficient to move the will under some considerations will not in fact move the will. The cause impeding the sufficient causality of that apprehended object is the will itself, having moved the intellect to consider that sufficient cause differently.

So the will has control over which apprehended objects it will incline toward: this is freedom of specification. Nor need the will act even toward an object which is being considered as good—this is freedom of exercise—since the intellect can apprehend many other goods whose pursuit entails cessation of its act of consideration of such an object, thus moving the will to move the intellect to cease consideration of that object. This wondrous depth of the intellect's capacities for abstraction and reflection is the ground of the substantial control which free creatures can exercise over their own lives.

Yet the will can move the intellect toward or away from any particular apprehended object only in response to some additional act of apprehension.⁴⁰ This additional act of apprehension is either moved by the will, or not. If by the will, then the will is being moved by the intellect's judgement of that additional act of apprehension as good. The causes involved in the production of any such chain of deliberation, however complex, must extend beyond the will, if we are to understand the will as the rational appetite, the faculty of response to rational apprehension. I am suggesting that we can understand St. Thomas as viewing the will as a kind of response to rationally apprehended stimulus.⁴¹ On such a view, the sum of the causal influences on the faculty of rational apprehension which are causally prior to any act of the created will are what we in our day would call sufficient causal conditions for bringing about that particular act of the will.⁴² Given the placement of such a full set of causal antecedents, it is impossible for the will to act otherwise than as it does. We in our day are inclined to view such a set of causal conditions as necessitating those acts of the will which follow inevitably from them, and many would deny that any faculty or being whose acts were governed by any such set of conditions could possibly be called free.

I do not see evidence that the existence of such a set of what we would call sufficient causal conditions for the will's acts is precluded by anything St. Thomas says about the nonnecessitation or freedom of the will. For St. Thomas meant something different than we would in affirming or denying necessity of a created effect, including effects which are acts of the will.

On Aquinas' understanding of causation and modality, the sum of causal conditions operating on the will's act would not necessitate the will's act because effects are called necessary precisely when they are the proper effects of a *per se* cause which cannot be impeded in the production of its proper effect. But the conjunction of causes sufficient for bringing about a particular act of the will form—in the order of created causality—an accidental union. This union constitutes a *per accidens* cause, the union itself having no higher cause: "accidental being has no cause and is not generated."⁴³

It is true that some conjunctions have a certain unity, a certain being, such as intentional unions (like a meeting of servants in the market, planned by the master who sent them) or natural ones (like a family).⁴⁴ When there is a

natural or intentional ordering of the causes of an event, then from the point of view of the orderer (the master, or God) the event is not a product of chance, but of causation. In keeping with this model of the modality of created effects, Aquinas held that insofar as they fall under the order of Providence—the only higher cause governing the conjunction of all of the causes of the will's acts—all created effects are found to be necessary.⁴⁵ Yet effects are called necessary or contingent after their proximate causes, not their higher causes.⁴⁶ And so God determines not only which effects occur, but also their modality (contingent or necessary) in assigning to some effects causes which can, and others causes which cannot fail in the production of their proper effects.⁴⁷

That contingent effects inevitably follow from the Divine placement of the entire order of causation is asserted to be compatible with the contingency of those effects.⁴⁸ God transcends the created order, and He does not remove the will's natural indeterminacy toward any particular finite object even as he efficaciously determines the will's acts through his sustaining it in existence with the active inclination proper to its nature, his placing it toward fulfillment of the plan of Providence in particular causal relationships with other beings whose causality He likewise moves, and His additional activity in the order of grace. Yet it remains true that on this account of the modality of created effects, "the effect of every cause is found to be necessary insofar as it comes under the control of Providence."⁴⁹

The account of freedom sketched here is no received interpretation of St. Thomas on these matters. But it is one which can survive without the Bañezian interpretation of application on which Lonergan has cast doubt, and it is one which can ground the causal certitude of providence, as any interpretation of St. Thomas must. Of course, the claim that God has control over the actions of free creatures is one which raises a range of well-known and difficult problems. These problems can be seen as disadvantages of any view of human freedom which supports such a view of providence, but they are problems which must be left for another occasion.⁵⁰ Yet the view of freedom described above has this advantage: it gives a grounding for facts about how any human being would choose under any full set of circumstances, whether the person is virtuous or not, and whether the circumstances are ideal, or not. So there will be on this interpretation of human freedom a ground for facts about how any virtuous person would choose if adequately informed. These latter are facts of just the sort which specify the good for human beings, on the informed-desire account of good sketched earlier.

V

I have attempted in this essay to indicate the promise which the Thomistic tradition shows for developing an informed-desire account of objective uni-

versal human good. Two important obstacles threatening to impede that development have been identified, and solutions to them sketched. First, their limited cognitive capacity seems to leave human beings inescapably underinformed about their options, and their good relative to their prior formation. But it is possible that due to common underlying tendencies in human beings, practical wisdom about human options can be gathered and stored in certain kinds of traditions, overcoming in principle and possibly in fact the impact of individual cognitive limitations on practical decision-making. It is also possible that the incommensurability of rival traditions can be overcome through the kind of dialectical engagement which MacIntyre has been recovering from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. So it is possible that there is an objective good for all human beings, understood roughly as what every human being would incline toward were he or she formed to maturity in that tradition which would emerge victorious in any adequate engagement with its rivals.

A second obstacle, emerging from consideration of human freedom, casts doubt upon whether we can know either what tradition would emerge as freely chosen by any person over any of its rivals, or how any given person would freely choose were he or she formed to maturity in any given tradition. But the Thomistic tradition shows promise for supporting a rich account of human reason, causality, and modality on which rationally apprehended objects exercise causal power without necessitating the acts of the will nor removing the will's own kind of causal primacy in fully human action. On this view of human freedom, there is a fact of the matter with regard to how any given person would choose under any fully specified set of circumstances, including when formed to maturity in an ideally-victorious tradition.

What I have tried to do in this essay is to utilize resources from the Thomistic tradition to resolve two major difficulties standing in the way of an informed-desire analysis of objective universal human wellbeing. What I have not tried to do is argue that such a grounding squares adequately with what Aquinas himself had to say about the good, nor that such a grounding is superior to the analyses of human good at work in other approaches to moral theory in the Thomistic tradition. But as the paper's title suggests, I am inclined to view the account of good sketched here as both in line with St. Thomas' own teaching and as a credible alternative to rival interpretations.

If the account offered here is both of these, then some direction for future work in Thomistic moral theory is suggested. If morality is to be understood as something like the system of ideals, practices, and institutional arrangements which a tradition uses to form the character of its members to maturity, then a central task of Thomistic moral theory is to articulate that tradition's vision of human maturity, and to expose that vision through dialectical engagement to comparison with the respective visions of rival traditions. To

enable that process, the kinds of social and psychological conditions necessary for forming human character to maturity in the Thomistic tradition need to be identified, a task at once necessary for the moral dimensions of education and for moral philosophy. Also necessary is the conception and construction of the kinds of institutions necessary for enabling mature members of the Thomistic tradition to achieve second first-language competency in rival traditions, as well as for persons outside the Thomistic tradition to achieve a like competency in it. Finally, a range of acceptable fora must be negotiated between members of the Thomistic tradition and rival traditions for dialogue. Of course, all these are tasks to which Alasdair MacIntyre has drawn our attention and toward which he has made early progress. But as the history of the Thomistic tradition reveals, early progress must be solidified by well-conceived institutional arrangements. It is toward the construction of such arrangements that a substantial part of future work in Thomistic moral theory must be directed, an effort on which the recovery of the Thomistic tradition (and indeed of common morality) depends.

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NOTES

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1. See MacIntyre's "Moral Philosophy: What Next?" in MacIntyre and Hauerwas, eds., *Revisions* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) pp. 10, 11.

2. For a discussion of Aristotle's conception of good, see MacIntyre's *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), ch. VII, esp. pp. 106-18; for a discussion of Aquinas' conception, see MacIntyre's *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), Lecture VI.

3. Throughout the first two parts of this paper I will use the terms desire, inclination, choice, and practical judgement loosely. In spite of the clear distinctions made in Thomistic tradition between various components of human action, I think this loose usage is appropriate. All appetite, sensitive and rational, is a kind of inclination. Desire in its colloquial sense seems a working synonym for inclination prompted by some kind of awareness.

4. For contemporary versions of informed-desire analyses of "good," see James Griffin's *Wellbeing* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) and Peter Railton's "Facts and Values," in *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall, 1986). I argue that these contemporary

accounts pose philosophical difficulties which seem to require for their resolution a return to an Aristotelian conception of communal inquiry into the good life in "Tradition and Informed-Desire Accounts of 'Good'," presented to the 1994 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

5. "As finite beings, we may be incapable of being fully informed about ourselves and our world, or of assessing in an appropriate way the relevance of so many considerations. How, then, are we to evaluate counterfactuals about what one would desire if one were fully informed and rational?" Peter Railton, "Facts and Values," p. 19.

6. One might want to argue that to be adequately informed about a given option requires being informed about its rival options, and thus may require having experiential knowledge of what it would be like to choose as a virtuous person would choose with respect to that option; it may be that to have adequate information about certain options, one must have virtue.

7. In the argument so far I have oversimplified the case for relativism regarding judgments about the good; in particular I have ignored the fact that not all information is relevant to any given choice (although I think it is easy to underestimate the amount and kinds of information which is relevant.) But my aim in sketching this argument for relativism is to suggest the resources for overcoming it in MacIntyre's account of the rationality of tradition/craft. For a relatively accessible proper argument setting up the problem of relativism of the kind discussed here, see MacIntyre's "Relativism, Power, and Philosophy" in Kenneth Baynes, et al, eds., *Philosophy: End or Transformation?* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987).

8. "What is needed at this point is to consider first more generally the way in which the incommensurability involved in certain radical disagreements may be both recognized and rationally overcome within the context of a certain kind of tradition." *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, p. 118.

9. For Donald Davidson's objections to the notion of incommensurability at work here, see "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp. 183-98; MacIntyre's replies can be found in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, chapter XIX, and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, Lecture V.

10. See chapter XVIII of MacIntyre's *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*.

11. To develop this rough account further, two points would have to be made. First, some cognitive content—some account of adequate information—must be included in or perhaps added to any analysis of a mature member of an ideal tradition whose desires are to function normatively in specifying his or her good: what is needed is something like an understanding of the virtues, and an acquaintance with those circumstances surrounding a given choice which a mature member of that tradition would deem relevant to that choice. Second, we would need to unite under a single account the various ways of analyzing wellbeing, ways which can seem to diverge under too narrow understandings of human good. On the account suggested here, the good is the object of the inclinations of the adequately informed and virtuous person; these objects of inclination produce enjoyment ("desire satisfaction") when attained; since the most important human inclinations are not toward momentary enjoyment of objects to be acquired and consumed, but toward relationships with ideas and persons, the good is well described as activity in accord with virtue.

12. The following is something like the analysis I have in mind: A state of affairs *S* is good for person *P* (at *t*) iff *S* is actualizable (at *t*) and is such that for any other state of affairs *S'* which is actualizable (at *t*) and noncompossible with *S*, *P* would prefer *S* to *S'* in choice situations where *P* had adequate information (enough experiential knowledge so that no more would affect how *P* would choose) about both *S* and *S'*, were *P* to conceive of both *S* and *S'* from the standpoint of a mature inhabitant of that tradition *T* which is both inhabitable by *P*, and is such that for any rival tradition *T'* where adequate information (first- and second first-language competency) concerning both *T* and *T'* is compossible for *P*, *P* would prefer to inhabit *T* over *T'* in light of that information. MacIntyre's reference in chapter XX of *Whose Justice?* to an "emerging Thomistic conclusion" can be taken as implying a measure of confidence that the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas is that tradition *T*.

13. The complexity of such a network would preclude offering any single unifying characterization of it other than what is needed for the formation to maturity of the members of a tradition. If over time a tradition loses not only its vision of maturity but even its grasp on the very concept of full human maturity, its supporting structures would erode, there being no unifying conception for them other than that full conception of maturity. Attempts to reunify them on other grounds would fail, and the breakdown of these social structures would be the disappearance of the practical wisdom noncognitively stored in them, "a grave cultural loss." Hence, *After Virtue*. (Alasdair MacIntyre—University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 1984; p. 22).

14. Fred Freddoso, Al Howsepian, and Michael Murray all suggested something like this libertarian alternative to me. I am grateful to each of them for their extensive and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

15. *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter, *ST*) I, q. 87, a. 4: "... actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem."

16. *Summa Contra Gentiles* (hereafter, *SCG*) II, 47, (5), and 48, (6).

17. *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 6; *ST* I, q. 105, a. 4 and I-II, q. 10, a. 2;

De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.

18. *ST* I-II, q. 10, a. 2, and q. 17, a. 1, ad 2m; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

19. On nonnecessitation: *De Veritate* q. 22, a. 6; *ST* I, q. 82, a. 1; *In III De Anima*, L. 3, (621); *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1. On self-movement: *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1; *SCG* II, 48 (3); *ST* I, q. 83, a. 1c, ad 3m; *Compendium Theologiae* I, c. 76; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; On control: *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, 2, 4; *SCG* II, 48 (2).

20. *ST* I, q. 87, a. 4; I-II, q. 17, a. 1.

21. *ST* I, q. 82, a. 5.

22. *ST* I-II, q. 9, a. 3.

23. I am leaving aside a good many complexities arising from the distinction between commanded and elicited acts: the will can move itself and other faculties either directly, indirectly, or (for some faculties) both. For a discussion of the complexities of the complete human act, see Alan Donagan's "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action" in Kretzmann et al., eds., *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp. 642-54.

24. The distinction between these dimensions of human freedom is discussed most clearly in *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1; *ST I-II*, q. 9, a. 1, and q. 10, a. 2.

25. Some interpreters (see Joseph J. Sikora, S. J., "Freedom and Nihilation," *The Modern Schoolman*, vol. 43 (1965), p. 23ff.) have identified freedom of exercise as the root of freedom of specification, and thus as the most basic element of freedom. It seems to me that St. Thomas's position was precisely the reverse. It is because the intellect can apprehend its own acts as particular goods—and thus as good or as not good in some respect—that the will is able to incline or not to incline toward the intellect's continuing to consider a given object under the aspect of good and suitable. Hence, particular apprehended objects need not move the will, even if the intellect's assessment of them continues to be that they are both good and suitable, because the intellect can focus on its own continued apprehension under an aspect in which that continued apprehension is not both good and suitable. See *De Malo* q. 6, a. 1; *ST I-II*, q. 10, a. 2.

26. *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, a. 2; *SCG II*, 48; *ST I-II*, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

27. *ST I*, q. 83, a. 1 ad 3m, and *I-II*, q. 9 a. 4 ad 1m, 3m; *Compendium Theologiae I*, 129; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 4m.

28. *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 9; *ST I*, q. 82, a. 4, and *I-II*, q. 9, a. 6; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

29. *ST I-II*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 3m.

30. *De Veritate*, q. 22, a. 9; *ST I*, q. 82, a. 4, and *I-II*, q. 9, a. 6; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

31. *ST I-II*, q. 9, a. 4, and *SCG III*, 89, (8); *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

32. *ST I-II*, q. 9, a. 6, corpus and ad 3m.

33. *ST I*, q. 83, a. 1c, and ad 3m, and q. 105, a. 4, ad 2m; *ST I-II*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3m, and q. 9, a. 4, ad 1m, 3m; *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 4m.

34. *ST I-II*, q. 9, a. 6 ad 3m, and q. 109, a. 2.

35. See *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 1, a. 8 on the universal availability of grace; see Bernard J. Lonergan, S. J., *Grace and Freedom* (New York: Herder and Herder) 1971, ch. 4 on application; see also Fr. David Burrell, C. S. C., "Jacques Maritain and Bernard Lonergan on Divine and Human Freedom" in Deal W. Hudson and Dennis W. Moran, eds., *The Future of Thomism* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).

36. *ST I-II*, q. 111, a. 2.

37. *ST I-II*, q. 10, a. 4 ad 1m.

38. *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 15m.

39. *In VI Libros Metaphysicorum*, L. 3 (1192, 3); *SCG III*, 86 (12); *ST I-II*, q. 75, a. 1, ad 2m.

40. *ST I*, q. 82, a. 5, ad 3m; *SCG III*, 89, (8); *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1.

41. On this view, St. Thomas never abandoned, but only developed the view that the will is always ultimately moved by another. Even when it moves itself, the will in one respect moving itself in another—it is always moved to move itself by another. Freedom is not incompatible with causation simpliciter, just with the kind of causation which would remove the will's radical proximate contingency, rooted in the intellect's radical capacities

for abstraction and reflection. This reading of St. Thomas runs counter to the view that St. Thomas underwent a gradual but deep reversal of position on the question of necessitation and freedom. (See Bernard Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, p. 51 and note 31, and pp. 94-95.) I think that St. Thomas's language regarding necessity and voluntariness underwent development not because his view of the natures and capacities of the intellect and the will changed substantially, but rather because he worked out the implications of their natures and capacities in light of the more complex treatment of the modality of created effects developed in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*.

42. Here as elsewhere I have omitted a discussion of the role of the faculties of sensory apprehension and appetite (the passions). Including mention of these and the causes operating on them would complexify but not substantially alter the overview of the nature of the intellect, will, and their causes offered here. See *ST* I-II, q. 9, a.2; q. 10, a. 3; and then q. 6, a. 1 ad 3m.

43. *In VI Metaphysicorum*, L. 3, 1201: "ens per accidens non habet causam neque generationem;" also, *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 21: "Nor again is it true that everything that is done has a natural cause, for those things which are done per accidens are not done by any active natural cause, since what is per accidens is not being and one." ("Nec iterum verum est quod omne quod fit, habeat causam naturalem; ea enim quae fiunt per accidens, non fiunt ab aliqua causa activa naturali; quia quod est per accidens, non est ens et unum.") See also *SCG*, III, 74 (5).

44. *In I Peri Hermeneias*, L. 14; *In I Ethicorum*, L. 1, l. 5.

45. *In VI Metaphysicorum*, L. 3, 1220.

46. *SCG* III, 72, (2); *In VI Metaphysicorum*, L. 3, (1221).

47. *In VI Metaphysicorum*, L. 3, (1201); *In I Peri Hermeneias*, ch. 14; see also *In VIII Physicorum* (1074).

48. *Compendium Theologiae* I, c. 140: "Much more, then, does the wisdom of the divine economy bring it about that, although contingent causes left to themselves can fail to produce an effect, the effect will inevitably follow when certain supplementary measures are employed, which do not take away the contingency of that effect. Evidently, therefore, contingency in things does not exclude the certainty of divine providence." ("Multo magis hoc ex sapientia divinae dispositionis contingit, ut quamvis causae contingentes deficere possint quantum est de se ab effectu, tamen quibusdam adminiculis adhibitis indeficienter sequatur effectus, quod ejus contingentiam non tollit. Sic ergo patet quod rerum contingentia divinae providentiae certitudinem non excludit.")

49. *In VI Metaphysicorum*, L. 3, (1220): "Invenitur igitur uniuscuiusque effectus secundum quod est sub ordine divinae providentiae necessitatem habere."

50. I have presented the model for interpreting St. Thomas discussed here in relation to some of these problems—notably the problem of evil and predestination—in "Aquinas on Free Choice and Providence: Three Views," unpublished.