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COMPASSION AND COMMANDED LOVE

Dana Radcliffe

Biblical evidence suggests that, commanded to love one's neighbor as oneself, a Christian is required to develop the *disposition* to feel compassion for others and to be motivated by it to caring action. But, should the "Love Commandment" also be seen to oblige a Christian to *feel* compassion as the requisite motive to helping behavior in certain specific situations of human need? Addressing the familiar Kantian objection that emotions cannot be meaningfully commanded because they are not under one's direct voluntary control, I draw on recent work by Roberts and Blum and analyze compassion as a kind of concern-based construal of a neighbor in distress—a construal subject (to some extent) to one's will and therefore a possible object of an imperative. I then point out how, on this analysis, "agapeic" compassion differs somewhat from other compassion by the Christian's use of "faith-based" concepts and beliefs in her construals of neighbors in need. Finally, I respond to potential questions about the applicability of the Love Commandment to people with limited construal repertoires and about my position's fit with the history of the interpretation of Christian love.

I

The parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke's Gospel teaches that love of neighbor means caring in concrete, practical ways about others in need, even strangers one encounters, regardless of differences from oneself.¹ This story, which the evangelist attributes to Jesus, is represented as an illustration of the love prescribed by the "second great commandment": "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (which I will call the "Love Commandment").² Although prior to the nineteenth century this story, like every other Gospel parable, was generally interpreted allegorically, it has since come to occupy a central place in Christian moral teaching, the Samaritan's active concern for the man robbers left for dead being seen as exemplary of *agape*, the virtue commonly referred to as Christian love.³

This parable, as Luke recounts it, appears to imply that possessing the virtue of *agape* includes being disposed to feel compassion for others in distress and to be motivated by it to help. The Greek word used to describe the Samaritan's reaction upon seeing the injured man (*esplagchnisthe*) makes it clear that his "compassion" was a sympathetic emotional response to the other man's condition, a response which immediately led to action.⁴ Further evidence that the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as one of the dispositions, or character traits, that constitute *agape* is the fact that the

Synoptic Gospels often portray Jesus himself as moved by compassion to minister to people in need.⁵ The word translated as “had compassion” in these texts is the same word used by Luke in the parable of the Good Samaritan; again, the term refers to a commiserative emotional reaction to human pain and suffering.⁶ Other New Testament passages, as well, could be cited in support of the claim that having the virtue of *agape* entails being compassionate, where the compassion called for is an affective sensitivity to human need that, in appropriate circumstances, gives rise to benevolent acts.⁷

Discussions of compassion usually distinguish between compassion as (a) a character trait, the disposition to “feel for” others perceived to be in distress and to be motivated by that emotional response to try to provide relief, and (b) the emotional response itself, the “feeling for” others in need which (typically) results in helping actions. In other words, “compassion” can refer to a disposition to feel and be motivated by a certain kind of emotion, or it can refer to the emotion itself, occurrences of which motivate characteristically “compassionate” acts. Given this distinction, a natural question is the following: If the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as a character trait, then does it also, on specific occasions, prescribe compassion as the fitting emotional response to another person’s condition of urgent need?

We are inclined here, I think, to say that the answer must be: “Yes, of course.” For it seems absurd to think that the Love Commandment would require Christians to develop a certain disposition and yet not demand that they realize (or actuate) it in particular cases. Consider, for example, the attribute of peace, or peaceableness, which is another constituent of the virtue *agape*, in that possessing and acting from neighbor-love entails being disposed to deal peaceably with others, even in confrontational situations.⁸ What sense could there be in the thought that the Love Commandment requires one to be disposed to peaceable dealings with others but does not prescribe, in specific cases, that one realize that disposition in one’s actual behavior? We are thus drawn to infer that the Love Commandment obliges Christians not only to acquire compassion as a character trait but also, in certain particular situations, to feel compassion for others in need and to act on it to help them.

There is, however, a well-known objection to allowing that the mandated love of neighbor may include an emotional response to him or his condition, an objection posed most notably by Kant in *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*.⁹ He argues that what is prescribed must involve solely a “determination of the will” and not “inclinations,” among which he counts compassion and other emotions.¹⁰ This is how

...we should understand those passages of Scripture which command us to love our neighbor and even our enemy, for love as an inclination cannot be commanded. But beneficence from duty, when no inclination implies it and even when it is opposed by a natural and unconquerable aversion, is practical

love, not pathological love; it resides in the will and not in propensities of feeling, in particular principles of action and not in tender sympathy; and it alone can be commanded.¹¹

The same basic point is made by other writers, including some noted biblical scholars. Rudolf Bultmann, for example, asserts:

The command is, you must love; the will is called to action, that is, the man is addressed, with the implication that he is placed by God under the necessity of decision and must decide through his free act. Only if love is thought of as an emotion is it meaningless to command love; the *command* of love shows that love is understood as an attitude of the will.¹²

Thus, emotions are logically excluded from the love which is the object of the Love Commandment: Emotional responses are not the kinds of things imperatives can meaningfully require. And the reason why this is so is clear from the explicit contrast with the will: A logically appropriate object of an imperative must be the sort of thing that is under one's voluntary control, and emotions (it seems) are not.

For Kant and many other thinkers influenced by his views, *agape* is essentially an attitude of unconditional, duty-based respect for each person as a human being, apart from his individual qualities.¹³ Thus, in his book *Agape: An Ethical Analysis*,¹⁴ Gene Outka reviews influential contributions to the contemporary literature on Christian love and finds *agape* generally conceived of as something very similar to what Kantians refer to as "respect for persons":¹⁵

The normative content most often accorded to *agape* as neighbor-love may be stated in summary fashion as follows. *Agape* is a regard for the neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable. To these features there is a corollary: the regard is for every person qua human existent, to be distinguished from special traits, actions, etc., which distinguish particular personalities from each other.¹⁶

To describe *agape* as "independent" regard for another means that it is a concern that is unaffected by "changes in the particular state of the other."¹⁷ To characterize it as "unalterable" is to say, in part, that the concern does not vary with one's personal reactions to the neighbor or his circumstances.¹⁸ Rather, through repeated and sustained choices, one commits oneself to "equal regard" for every person in virtue of our shared humanity.¹⁹

But, does this analysis of *agape* entail that the Love Commandment does not prescribe compassion, even as a character trait? For what would be the point of requiring the disposition but not its realization in particular cases of a neighbor in need? Interestingly, Kant maintains that everyone does have a duty to acquire the disposition to experience sympathetic feelings for people in distress. In *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, he writes:

But though it is not in itself a duty to feel pity and so likewise to rejoice with others, active sympathizing with their lot is a duty. To this end it accordingly is an indirect duty to cultivate our natural (sensitive) feelings for others, and

to make use of them as so many means for sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them.²⁰

If one does have an "indirect duty" to produce in oneself a disposition for "active sympathizing" with the plight of others in need, how is one supposed to bring this about? According to Kant, one must intentionally expose oneself to situations of human privation and suffering.

Thus it is a duty not to avoid places where the poor, who lack the most necessary things, are to be found; instead, it is a duty to seek them out. It is a duty not to shun sickrooms and prisons and so on in order to avoid the pain of compassion, which one may not be able to resist. For this feeling, though painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses placed in us by nature for effecting what the representation of duty might not accomplish by itself.²¹

Hence, as Kant sees it, every person has a duty to develop one's natural "capacity and will to share another's feelings" and to use those sympathetic feelings for "furthering an active and rational benevolence"—i.e., fostering one's doing beneficent acts motivated by duty.²²

If we extract Kant's claims from the language of eighteenth-century moral psychology, we find him making more or less the following argument. On occasion one's duty-based regard for others, together with the recognition that a certain type of benevolent action is required by duty, is somehow insufficient to motivate one to do the prescribed action. In those cases, the duty-based regard needs help (so to speak) in the form of other incentives to action—particularly emotions, such as compassion—which will combine with it to motivate one to do the action duty calls for. However, since emotions are not directly under one's voluntary control, they cannot be summoned up at will to give one the additional incentive needed when one's moral regard for persons is not enough to motivate the helping action required. Consequently, one has a duty to "cultivate" the dispositions to feel compassion and similar emotions so that one *will* feel them and act on them as the situation warrants. In a word, one must train oneself to feel compassion for people in need, so that this emotional response will occur spontaneously and, if necessary, combine with one's abstract respect for persons to motivate whatever actions duty demands.

Given that the Love Commandment expresses the fundamental duty of Christians in their relations with other human beings, the preceding arguments are readily applied to the case of *agape* and compassion. Our original question was whether the Love Commandment, along with prescribing compassion as a character trait, also demands in certain situations that Christians feel the emotion of compassion and act on it to render aid to others in need. The Kantian answer is 'no,' because emotions, not being under one's voluntary control, logically cannot be commanded. Rather, the prescribed neighbor-love is, in the view of many commentators, a voluntary attitude of respect

for persons as human beings—an abstract, unconditional regard which does not include one's emotional responses to particular individuals. However, since no one's will is completely governed by *agape*, in some situations of neighbor need this duty-based respect is not a strong enough incentive to motivate one to do what Christian love requires. On those occasions, the emotion of compassion for the neighbor in distress may provide the additional incentive necessary to motivate the benevolent acts prescribed. But, because compassion is not under one's voluntary control, it cannot be summoned up as needed as a motive in such cases. What one can do, though, is work to make oneself disposed to feel compassion for people in need, so that the requisite emotion will be aroused merely by the sight of another's distress and thereby give one an added incentive to do what neighbor-love calls for. Consequently, it can be argued that, because of compassion's motivational efficacy, the Love Commandment should be seen as obligating one to foster this disposition to feel compassion and to act on it as *agape* directs. Hence, although it is not strictly accurate to say that the character trait of compassion is a "constituent" of *agape* if the latter is essentially a general regard for persons, the Love Commandment can still be taken to prescribe compassion as a character trait which disposes one to experience emotional responses that help motivate "agapeic" acts.

A critical assumption in this line of argument is that compassion, as an emotion, is not under one's voluntary control and is therefore not such that one can, on a certain occasion, intentionally evoke it in oneself, no matter how apt it may be in the situation. But, what if compassion is, to some extent, subject to one's will and can, in some instances, be summoned up as an incentive to benevolent action? In the first place, Kant's objection that an emotion cannot logically be commanded could then be set aside—or, at the least, it would have to be substantially modified. Secondly, presumptive cogency would return to our initial argument that it would be nonsense for the Love Commandment to prescribe a disposition but not its occurrent realization in relevant particular cases. In that event, it could reasonably be inferred that, to the extent that the emotion of compassion is under one's voluntary control, the Love Commandment does in specific situations require one to call up that emotion to motivate one to help the neighbor who would be the object of the compassion. On the other side, to the extent that compassion is not subject to one's will, the Love Commandment is logically blocked from prescribing one to feel and act on that emotion in particular situations. The key questions, then, are these: (1) Do we have reason to believe that compassion is sometimes under one's voluntary control? (2) If one does have partial or limited control over this emotion, how does one exercise it? (3) What determines the extent of such control?

II

Robert C. Roberts has recently proposed a theory of the nature of emotions that enables us to answer (1) in the affirmative and to offer explanations that plausibly answer (2) and (3).²³ On Roberts' account, emotions are "serious concern-based construals"—a construal being "a mental event in which one thing is grasped in terms of something else."²⁴ Construing, he says, "seems to mean bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or thought, *to bear*."²⁵ As a simple example, Roberts considers the visual experience of viewing the "duck-rabbit" figure discussed by Wittgenstein.²⁶ When one looks at the drawing, one attends to or dwells on one aspect of it, seeing it as a duck (or rather, a duck likeness) or as a rabbit. Thus, in seeing it as a duck, say, one brings a concept or an image of a duck to bear (experientially) in one's perception of the figure: In short, one construes it as a duck. This construal is a characterization of the object itself, the way it appears to the viewer, and not an interpretation of a neutral perception: "When I see the duck-rabbit as a duck, the figure itself takes on a ducky look."²⁷

Emotions, however, are much more complicated than simple construals like seeing an ambiguous drawing as the semblance of a duck. They are construals that are "imbued, flavored, colored, drenched, suffused, laden, informed, or permeated with concern."²⁸ The word "concern" here refers to "desires and aversions, and the attachments and interests from which many of our desires and aversions derive."²⁹ Accordingly,

To be angry is not just to see a person as having culpably offended; it requires a concern about some dimension of the offense, and possibly a concern about some dimension of the offender. To be afraid of heights is not just to see them as a danger to something-or-other; it requires that something I hold dear seem threatened.³⁰

Moreover, emotions are *serious* construals, which is to say that they are "compelling" or "verisimilar"—that, for the construers, they have "the appearance of truth," whether or not they are accepted as true.³¹ Thus, one may be angry at a small child for smearing catsup on her dress, construing her as having culpably offended, even though one does not in fact believe she is responsible for her behavior.³² Furthermore, regarding emotions as serious concern-based construals explains how envy, anger, and the like can result in characteristic actions. On Roberts' theory, "The concern or concerns on which the emotion is 'based' are shaped and focused by the construal into a desire for a certain kind of action."³³ One who is angry at another construes that person as having blamably offended on a point of some concern to oneself. This construal naturally generates a desire to do something to assure that he receives the punishment one sees him as deserving—a desire which may motivate one to try to achieve that end.

Most important for our purposes, Roberts' construal theory explains how

the subject of an emotion is sometimes able to exercise voluntary control over it, and sometimes not. The voluntariness of (some) construals is illustrated by perceptions of the duck-rabbit figure. A viewer may initially discern only one of the aspects, but after seeing both the duck and the rabbit, she can shift at will from one construal to the other.³⁴

Similarly, a person at whom I am tempted to be angry may be regarded, quite at will, in various ways: As the scoundrel who did such-and-such to me, as the son of my dear friend so-and-so, as a person who, after all, has had a pretty rough time of it in life, and so forth. If these construals are all in my repertoire, and in addition are not too implausible with respect to the present object, then the emotions which correspond to them, of anger, benevolence, and pity towards the boy, are also more or less subject to my will.³⁵

Conversely, one may be "blind" to some aspects of the object which are easily perceived by others. For a person who is capable of construing the object or situation in only one way, that construal will be experienced as involuntary. On the other hand, sometimes one can, with effort, come to "see" an aspect one was unable to perceive at first, this new construal now striking one as compelling.³⁶

Consequently, one's voluntary control over an emotion consists in one's ability to bring to bear different concepts, paradigms, thoughts, or images in one's serious concern-based construals of a certain object or situation. The extent of such control depends on the richness of one's repertoire of concepts, thoughts, etc., potentially applicable to such cases.³⁷ It seems, for example, "that the virtue of courage, which can be thought of as a skill of fear-management, can be prospered by increasing one's construal repertoire for fear-some situations. The courageous person has construal options, and thus emotional flexibility, that the coward lacks."³⁸ A variety of factors determine whether a construal and, hence, the emotion it would yield are in one's repertoire. Included among these myriad factors are, Roberts notes, one's "habits of attention" and one's "skills at conceptualization and visualization"—dispositions one can intentionally enhance, over time, through numerous conscious choices, thereby enlarging one's emotional repertoire.³⁹ And, as the courage example implies, the larger this repertoire, the more voluntary control one has over one's emotional responses in particular situations.

Before the construal theory can be employed in answering questions (1)-(3), it has to be applied to the case of compassion, an emotion Roberts describes as "a form of love," which itself is not an emotion but "a disposition to a range of emotions."⁴⁰ To this end, it will be helpful to draw on Lawrence Blum's insightful analysis of compassion and other "altruistic emotions," in an article entitled "Compassion"⁴¹ and in his book, *Friendship, Altruism, and Morality*.⁴² In general, the sympathetic or compassionate person, he says, is distinguished from other people in two ways: (A) He tends to apprehend

situations as involving others' weal and woe, and (B) he is disposed to respond to that apprehending with altruistic acts.⁴³ Elaborating on the former, Blum writes:

The kind, compassionate, sympathetic, or concerned person perceives people differently from someone lacking these qualities. The latter, for example, is more likely to perceive them in terms of categories relating to their effect on his own pleasure or advantage—e.g., as boring, fascinating, obnoxious. While the sympathetic person is by no means immune to such categories, they will generally play a less central or anyway less exclusive role in his 'take' on people.⁴⁴

Blum gives the point added emphasis by commenting that "[o]ne can say, in a Wittgenstein spirit, 'The world of the kind person is different from the world of the unkind.'"⁴⁵ As for (B), Blum observes that being thus disposed to altruistic acts is simply part of what it means to be sympathetic or compassionate.⁴⁶

In his article, Blum focuses on compassion, which he describes as "not a simple feeling-state but a complex emotional attitude toward another, characteristically involving imaginative dwelling on the condition of the other person, an active regard for his good, a view of him as a fellow human being, and emotional responses of a certain degree of intensity."⁴⁷ Blum's discussion takes up in turn each of the four characteristics mentioned in this description. (a) One who has compassion "imaginatively reconstructs" the situation of the person in distress, trying to represent to herself the experience of the other and imagine what it must be like for him in his condition of need.⁴⁸ (b) Compassion includes a genuine concern for the welfare of the one who is suffering, a concern which is expressed in an array of caring thoughts, feelings, hopes, and desires directed at his plight.⁴⁹ (c) To be compassionate entails "a sense of shared humanity," such that one attends to the other's similarity to oneself as a human being and thinks of his affliction as the sort of thing that could happen to anyone.⁵⁰ (d) Compassion involves emotional strength sufficient to engender the imaginative reconstruction, the level of concern, and the disposition to beneficent action characteristic of this altruistic response.⁵¹

III

With Blum's conceptual points in hand, we can now make use of Roberts' theory of emotions and analyze compassion as a kind of serious concern-based construal. On the most general level, it may be remarked that to feel compassion for another is, in part, to construe his situation in terms of his weal and woe—particularly his pressing needs. The emotion of compassion, as a construal, is thus an apprehension of the other's circumstances using concepts relating to his personal welfare and, especially, threats to it or

detractions from it. Moreover, while compassion is a construal of the needy condition of a certain person as an individual, it is also a construal of him as a fellow human being, one who has the same fundamental needs and desires as oneself. To have compassion for him is, in part, to see him as suffering an evil to which one is similarly vulnerable as an existing human being.

The construal that constitutes compassion on a particular occasion is concern-based in that it is "imbued" (suffused, permeated, etc.) with an altruistic concern for the good of the person for whom one feels compassion. Upon perceiving his need, one experiences various concerned reactions, such as fear for his safety, sadness at his loss, hope for relief of his distress, and a desire to help if possible. These responses may be partially explained by one's general regard for the other as a human being, the basic moral respect most people have (at least to some degree) for others as persons. One *would* thus feel fearful, anxious, etc., for any fellow human being perceived to be in acute distress—a man seriously injured in a car accident one happens upon, for example. But, the experiences that manifest concern for the object of compassion are also partly explainable by one's attending to and imaginatively dwelling on the specific features of the other person's condition of need. That is, one's active concern for the other not only issues from one's basic respect for persons but is also in part the result of one's focusing on the particulars of his distressful situation and imagining what his suffering must be like. It should be added that for such construal-informing concern to be an element of compassion in a certain instance, it must be of sufficient intensity to motivate one to try to help in some way, given the opportunity. The concern that characterizes compassion is not exhausted in mere well-wishing or passing feelings of sympathetic discomfort but rather is strong enough to galvanize one into caring action.

What makes compassion in a specific situation a *serious* construal is that it is a fairly accurate apprehension of the other person's condition of need: The construal is compelling, since the suffering appears to be real—and generally, one has no reason to doubt that it is. In fact, the construal becomes increasingly compelling the more closely one attends to the situation and exercises one's "skills at conceptualization and visualization" in reflecting on it. Thus, compassion may be described as "self-sharpening": The emotion motivates one to pay even greater attention to the other's condition, and as one does so both the fact of the other's suffering and its nature become still clearer and more vivid.

As a serious concern-based construal, compassion in a certain case of need is under one's voluntary control to the extent one possesses a repertoire of concepts, thoughts, etc., relating to the "weal and woe" of others in general, to the humanity they share with oneself, and to the specific kinds of human needs presented in this situation. The compassionate person who at first does

not happen to feel compassion on a particular occasion when it is warranted may be able to summon up the fitting emotional response by using apposite concepts, thoughts, etc., in construing the situation and imaginatively dwelling on different aspects of it. Thus, when an emotionally troubled acquaintance verbally abuses me over a minor disagreement, I may be able to overcome my initial anger and resentment by reminding myself that he is a fellow human being and that any of us could fall victim to this sort of problem. As I consider his situation, I may well be able to bring myself to feel compassion for him as I direct my attention to the anguished state of mind that produced the outburst and try to imagine what he is experiencing. I may thus succeed in assuaging my anger and replacing it with compassion by drawing on my repertoire of construals applicable to such cases as I think about his behavior and its possible causes. At the same time, it must be noted that one's ability to call up compassion in a certain type of case is also limited by one's repertoire of construals potentially applicable to situations of that type. A person with a very restricted repertoire of "human need" construals consequently has a similarly restricted ability to stir compassion in himself for others in need. Indeed, it is conceivable that someone resembling Ebenezer Scrooge (prior to his Christmas visitations) might have a repertoire of other-regarding construals so meager that he was incapable of feeling compassion for another human being, even if in a certain moment he wanted to experience that emotion.

We are now in a position to address questions (1)-(3) explicitly. Regarding (1), the preceding discussion shows that there is in fact good reason to think compassion is sometimes under one's voluntary control: A strong case can be made for conceiving of compassion (in a particular instance) as a serious concern-based construal, and such construals are—to some degree—subject to one's will. As for question (2), on the construal theory, one exercises one's voluntary control over compassion in a certain kind of situation by bringing to bear relevant concepts, thoughts, paradigms, and images relating to people's general weal and woe, their common humanity, and specific human needs. One applies these concepts, etc., in one's construal of the other person's situation of need, as one attends to various aspects of his situation and imaginatively reconstructs his experience. By such means, one is sometimes able to summon up compassion which then motivates one to perform helping actions one would not otherwise have had sufficient incentive to do. The answer to question (3) is that the extent of one's voluntary control over compassion in a given case is determined by the size of one's repertoire of other-regarding or human-welfare concepts, thoughts, etc., which could be used in serious construals of situations of that sort. The magnitude of this repertoire is in turn influenced by many factors, over some of which one has a measure of voluntary control, such as habits of attention (which can be

improved over time) and general knowledge of other people's conditions of life (which can be expanded over time). The larger one's repertoire of pertinent concepts, etc.—in effect, one's repertoire of pertinent construals—the greater one's capacity to call up compassion as a motive to benevolent action in particular situations of human need.

If this analysis of compassion as a kind of construal is correct, then an affirmative answer can be given to the question raised early in the paper: If the Love Commandment prescribes compassion as a character trait, does it also in some instances require compassion as an emotional response to another person in need? For it seems that the only circumstance that would bar the inference from compassion's being commanded as a character trait to its being commanded as an emotion (in some cases) is a lack of voluntary control over this emotion. If one *can* summon up compassion as needed to motivate—or help motivate—beneficent acts prescribed by the Love Commandment, it follows that one is obliged (by the Commandment) to do so on the necessary occasions—i.e., those occasions where the emotion is needed as an incentive to appropriately caring action.⁵²

IV

This conclusion prompts a further question that cannot be adequately treated here but which deserves at least the sketch of an answer: Is the emotion of compassion prescribed by the Love Commandment the same as that of a compassionate person whose values and moral principles are not grounded in a religious commitment? Analyzing instances of compassion as serious concern-based construals suggests that "agapeic" compassion may in fact be somewhat different from "secular" compassion. The reason for this is that the compassion required of Christians in some cases of a neighbor in need will be shaped by the faith that makes the Love Commandment authoritative in their lives. Their repertoires of concepts, thoughts, paradigms, and images potentially applicable to diverse situations of people in distress will be significantly influenced by their religious beliefs and practices. Thus, while their concepts relating to human weal and woe will include many of those contained in the repertoires of compassionate nonbelievers, they will also include ones that concern people's spiritual welfare—concepts derived from a view of man as "created in God's image" and intended for an eternal relationship with Him. Agapeic compassion, then, may be occasioned not only by perceptions of physical or emotional need but also by recognition of another's condition of spiritual need, such as might be felt by one who has come to see life as no more than a pointless race toward death. It is just this sort of need to which the Gospel of Matthew seems to be referring when it describes Jesus' reaction to the multitude pressing around him, trying to hear his preaching and obtain his healing of their afflictions: "When he saw the crowds, he had

compassion for them, because they were harassed and helpless, like sheep without a shepherd.”⁵³

Furthermore, one who is often motivated to altruistic acts by agapeic compassion does conceive of every person as a “fellow human being,” a sharer in our common humanity. However, his repertoire also includes a number of faith-based concepts that he is to use in his construals of others, especially in their situations of need—e.g., “child of God,” “one loved equally by God,” “fellow sinner,” and “brother for whom Christ died.” For a Christian, human beings are bound to each other by more than their membership in the same species: They are united by the purposes of a loving God, who wills that they be reconciled with each other and, ultimately, with Himself. Hence, the duty to feel and be motivated by agapeic compassion for others is actually an obligation “toward the will of God”—toward “a more transcendent source of unity than any discoverable in the natural world.”⁵⁴

The concern that imbues agapeic compassion is thus generated by sources putatively richer and deeper than the anthropocentric beliefs and concepts that give rise to the concern pervading secular compassion. The Christian who feels compassion for her neighbor construes him as a fellow creature whom God loves and for whom the atoning sacrifice of Christ was made. But, apparently this is only the beginning, for it seems that the more one’s perceptions of others and reactions to them are informed by Christian love, the more compelling one’s appreciation of them becomes, the ideal being a God-like caring love for others for their own sakes. Robert M. Adams implies that creating a capacity for such love is one of the chief aims of the Love Commandment when he writes,

[God] commands us not only to do good to other people, but to *want* to do it. He commands us to *love them*. And if (as seems clear) it is *they* who are to be the object of this love, the devotion that is demanded is more than obedience. God seeks a response from us that is inspired not only by respect for his commands, but by love for what he loves—specifically including our neighbours. Inviting us to participate as friends in his projects, he wants us to see not only what is important to him, but also to care about it, as he does, for its own sake.⁵⁵

The conception of compassion I have advanced in this paper shows how agapeic compassion, as an emotion sometimes prescribed by the Love Commandment, may function both to motivate particular acts of Christian love and to move one toward such caring about one’s neighbors purely for their own sakes.

V

This general account of agapeic compassion no doubt invites a host of other questions and possible objections. I want now to address what seem to be two of the most serious issues.

First, on the view set out here the Love Commandment does not obligate a person to feel and be motivated by compassion in a situation of neighbor-need unless she possesses a sufficiently large repertoire of applicable construals relating to others' welfare and their similarity to herself. But what about the person whose other-regarding construal repertoire is *not* rich enough for him to summon up compassion for the neighbor in need? Does the Love Commandment thus require *less* of him than of one who *can* call up compassion in a like situation? If so, then why would anyone want to acquire a "sufficiently large" repertoire of such construals? Ostensibly, one would have good reason to avoid increasing one's repertoire—and even to diminish it, if possible—through willful inattention to others' needs and cultivating the habit of "looking out for number one." The smaller the repertoire, the less onerous the weight of the Love Commandment—at least with regard to its demanding compassion for imperiled or suffering neighbors. Indeed, doesn't my account entail that the Ebenezer Scrooges of the world, precisely *because* of their callousness, are less liable to sin, in the sense of failing to fulfill the Love Commandment, than are those who are more sensitive and caring of others? Such an implication is hardly compatible with the traditional Christian doctrines of sin and sanctification.

My reply is that, while the Love Commandment cannot require a person to feel compassion in a particular situation where he is incapable of evoking it in himself, it does not follow that *agape* demands less of such a person than of one who can feel compassion in similar instances of neighbor-need. It is a basic tenet of the Christian faith that "the two great commandments" apply to everyone who embraces that faith, but exactly what the commandments require depends on the specific circumstances and the believer's individual capabilities.⁵⁶ As I pointed out at the beginning of the paper, biblical evidence indicates that the Love Commandment directs Christians to *become* compassionate, to develop a disposition to feel compassion and be moved by it to help others in distress. Thus, assume a set of possible situations of a neighbor in need $S_1 \dots S_n$, and two Christians: Theophilus, who is able to feel compassion sufficient to motivate appropriately beneficent action in $S_1 \dots S_n$, and Narcissus, who lacks that ability due to the poverty of his repertoire of other-regarding construals. It seems right to say that the Love Commandment requires different things of Theophilus and Narcissus relative to $S_1 \dots S_n$, with the former obligated to feel and act out of compassion in those cases⁵⁷ and the latter obligated to acquire the capacity for *agapeic* compassion Theophilus already possesses. In an important sense, the Love Commandment requires *more* of Narcissus, rather than less, because he, unlike Theophilus, is obligated to change his character, to become a different sort of person than he is now.⁵⁸

But, it might be argued, can't a similar objection be raised about the Love Commandment's requiring people who are unable now to feel compassion to

develop that capacity in the future? Such development would entail one's significantly increasing one's repertoire of relevant construals, but don't individuals vary considerably in their ability to expand their repertoires? Perhaps some people are just not able to enlarge their repertoires enough to become capable of feeling and being motivated by compassion. If so, the Love Commandment cannot demand that they acquire that capacity.

I would respond, however, that obtaining a suitably ample repertoire of other-regarding construals is surely within the power—over time—of nearly all adults, excepting only the most emotionally dysfunctional. In the first place, each person's experience will have produced numerous "human need" construals she frequently applies to herself at least. Second, almost all of us are capable, with effort, of applying those construals to other people as well. For a Scrooge or a Narcissus, it will be necessary for him intentionally to effect constructive changes in some of the factors that determine the size of his other-regarding construal repertoire: habits of attention, skills at conceptualization and visualization, general knowledge of other people's conditions, etc. More specifically, then, it seems indisputable that developing a repertoire of construals that can be used in summoning up agapeic compassion is within the power of virtually every Christian serious about trying to fulfill the Love Commandment in his life. In fact, growing as a Christian necessarily involves enlarging one's store of other-regarding—and especially, faith-based—construals. Both through her reflection on Christian teaching (including teaching about God's own compassion for the lost) and through her relationships with other Christians, the committed disciple gains an increasing appreciation of others as her "neighbors" and a heightened sensitivity to their needs.⁵⁹ And it is clear from the history and current life of Christian communities that even the "simple believer" (to use Kierkegaard's term) can experience such growth and become deeply compassionate in obedience to the Love Commandment.

A second important issue facing my proposed conception of agapeic compassion is this: In claiming that Christians may sometimes be required to feel (motivating) compassion for others, am I discounting nearly two thousand years of interpretation of *agape* and the Love Commandment?⁶⁰ If so, I owe readers an explanation of how centuries of exegesis could have been mistaken.

As Outka's survey makes evident, the Kantian view that Christian love of neighbor involves the will alone, and not emotions, is common in the twentieth-century literature on *agape*.⁶¹ However, although it has been widely accepted and has had a number of prominent defenders, this account is by no means a consensus interpretation, either historically or among contemporary biblical scholars and theologians. In the first place, most commentators now recognize that a conceptual polarity between will and emotions is almost entirely absent from the Bible itself.⁶² "Biblical language with reference to

man is functional and practical," and both the Old and New Testaments tend to "treat personality as an unanalyzed unity, with no interest along philosophical lines."⁶³ Thus, from the concrete, prephilosophical perspective of the biblical texts, God's commands are addressed to the whole of a man's personality, the unitary source of both obedience and disobedience to His will.⁶⁴

It was Augustine who eventually "invented" the abstract notion of the will as the human capacity for free choice—"in order to clarify which part of the human personality is concerned with freedom, sin, and divine grace."⁶⁵ For Augustine, the will is moved by various emotions, including compassion ("a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can"⁶⁶), but the will alone is the subject of moral praise or blame, and so, of moral imperatives.⁶⁷ While the emotions to which a person is "subject" can, to some extent, be deliberately cultivated (or "educated"), in any particular situation they are "simply 'there,' given, and what matters morally speaking is not what they are, but what a man decides to do: to yield to them, restrain them, encourage them, which to select to follow in action."⁶⁸ Hence, while a Christian confronting a neighbor in need may well feel compassion for him—especially if her emotions have been properly cultivated—the Love Commandment can require no more than a voluntary movement of the will leading to benevolent action, where such movement may involve merely allowing herself to be motivated by compassion she happens to feel on that occasion.⁶⁹

Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, affirmed that mercy ("heartfelt compassion for another's misery") is sometimes commanded as a motivating "effect" of charity (*caritas*)—love of God and love of one's neighbor for God's sake—but that such compassion is not an emotion.⁷⁰ On his view, every virtue aims at some good as its object or end, and the object of charity is divine good, i.e., one's enjoyment of God, a good grasped only through the intellect; accordingly, the seat of charity is the intellectual appetite, which, for Aquinas, is also the will.⁷¹ However, charity for a neighbor, even an enemy, is more than simply good will for him, including as well an "affective union" with him based on one's imaginatively identifying with him in his distress.⁷² Such is the case when, in a certain situation, what the Love Commandment requires, and charity (as the efficient cause) produces, is mercy—"a movement of the intellectual appetite when one grieves at the sight of another's misfortune."⁷³ Although this obligatory mercy, or compassion, is a kind of sadness or pain over another person's plight, it is nevertheless not an emotion, since it is a movement of the intellectual—rather than the sensitive—appetite.⁷⁴

For John Calvin, "duties of charity," such as almsgiving, "are not fulfilled by the mere discharge of them, though none be omitted, unless it is done from a pure feeling of love."⁷⁵ "Christians," he said, "should put themselves in the place of him whom they see in need of their assistance, and pity his misfor-

tune as if they felt and bore it, so that a feeling of pity and humanity should incline them to assist him just as they would themselves.”⁷⁶ Thus, Calvin, like Aquinas, held that Christian love of neighbor in some instances demands that one identify with the neighbor in need and thereby be moved with affective concern to come to his aid. But, unlike Aquinas, Calvin gave no indication that he thought this requisite “feeling of pity and humanity” is not an emotion—or even that it is a special kind of emotion in being subject (at least partially) to voluntary control. Rather, he seems to have regarded it as an ordinary emotional response intentionally induced by what Blum calls an “imaginative reconstruction” of the other person’s condition of need.

Kant, of course, ruled out altogether the possibility that the Love Commandment ever requires compassion or pity in a particular situation—precisely because he believed such a response to a neighbor in need is in fact an emotion. To be sure, Kant’s view has been influential down to the present, serving as a point of reference for most of the best-known treatments of neighbor-love as a motive to beneficent action. A number of these discussions, however, have included a rejection of Kant’s position. Thus, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr, among others, have argued that Kant’s notion of Christian love is unduly narrow and that excluding emotional elements from *agape* misrepresents it as detached and bloodless.⁷⁷ According to Brunner, for example, just as God’s caring for us is not merely *respect*, but *love*, “[w]hoever through faith has a share in His will does not merely respect his neighbour, he loves him, and the characteristic sign of love, compared with the rational attitude of respect is...sympathy, the purified form of the experience of feeling the other person as a ‘bit of myself.’”⁷⁸ No more a passive quality than is faith itself, such love “through faith and with faith, is at the same time always a demand. But when Kant emphasizes—and from his rational premisses perfectly rightly—that it is ridiculous to demand a feeling, so also from the premisses of faith it is equally natural to *demand this feeling*....”⁷⁹ Unfortunately, none of these theologians has been able to go beyond repudiating Kant’s account of commanded neighbor-love to explain, apart from appealing to the mystery of faith, how an emotional reaction to a person in need can be voluntary and thus a possible object of the Love Commandment.

It should be apparent from these observations that the history of Christian thought has yielded no standard interpretation of *agape* relative to the question of whether the Love Commandment may obligate one to feel compassion as a motive to helping one’s neighbor. What we do find is a longstanding tension between two opposed and stubbornly persistent intuitions: that *agape* sometimes requires Christians to be moved by compassion to care for neighbors in need, and that emotions, including compassion, cannot logically be commanded. My analysis of *agapeic* compassion offers a coherent and plau-

sible way of resolving this tension. It provides a credible theoretical basis for the view of Aquinas, Calvin, and Brunner that Christian love may on occasion demand that one act out of compassion for another person—without endorsing Aquinas' paradoxical claim that such compassion is not an emotion. Yet, it also answers the concern of Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant that emotions cannot be commanded, by showing how compassion, as a serious concern-based construal, is to some extent under one's voluntary control. Moreover, the account I have defended does not entail imposing on New Testament discussions of *agape* and compassion a textually unsupportable dichotomy between the will and emotions. Rather, it makes a case for the intelligibility of thinking of the Love Commandment, as the earliest Christians did, as being addressed to one's personality as a whole.⁸⁰

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NOTES

1. Luke 10:25-37. See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Anchor Bible: The Gospel According to Luke (xx-xxiv)* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1985), p. 884.

2. Leviticus 19:17-18; Matthew 22:34-40; Mark 12:28-31; Romans 13:8-10.

3. See Warren S. Kissinger, *The Parables of Jesus: A History of Interpretation and Bibliography* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1979). Luther and Calvin, however, departed from the tradition of allegorical interpretation (dating back to the patristic period), finding in the Good Samaritan an example of the neighborliness required by the Love Commandment (*ibid.*, pp. xiii, 45, 48).

4. The subject of the verb *esplagchnisthe* is thus said to have experienced "an emotion which moves a man to the very depths of his being" [William Barclay, *New Testament Words* (London: SCM Press, 1964), p. 276]. See note 6 below.

5. Matthew 9:35-38; 14:13-14; 15:32; 20:29-34; Mark 1:40-45; 6:34; Luke 7:11-17. James Gustafson writes that the caring acts and words of Jesus described in the Gospels "appear to be grounds for claiming that not only did Jesus follow the command to do acts of love, but there was an affective sensibility which made him identify with the needy, the immoral person, the victim of prejudice. There was a coherence between his affections and his belief that it is fitting to speak of the ultimate power bearing down on man as having the quality of love" [*Can Ethics Be Christian?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 72].

It might be objected here that the person of Christ depicted in the Gospels is an ideal, so that, while Christians should strive to be similarly compassionate, their failure in that respect should not necessarily be seen as a violation of the Love Commandment and therefore sinful or immoral. I would reply that loving one's neighbor as oneself is part of what it is to "follow" Christ, to be his disciple, and for the followers of Christ there is no distinction between command and ideal. What is commanded is to strive to be *like* Christ, including in his loving compassion for people in need. As James Gustafson observes

elsewhere, "Christ is the norm for illumination of what the Christian ought to be and do in his actions; Christ is the central obligatory norm for those who would order their lives in discipleship to him" [*Christ and the Moral Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 265]. Commenting on the rendering of Christ in Matthew's Gospel, W. D. Davies finds that "coincident with the demands expressed in the words of Jesus is another demand, which is not another, that the disciple should be conformed to the person whose are the words. The demand for *imitatio Dei*, expressed in v. 48 ["You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (RSV)], becomes that for *imitatio Christi*" [*The Setting of the Sermon on the Mount* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 95]. Since no one fully realizes the ideal of Christ in his or her life, everyone does in fact fall short of fulfilling the Love Commandment, and such failure is sin, in that for Christians to sin is to "miss the mark" revealed in the acts, words, and character of Jesus.

6. To be precise, all the Gospel passages listed at the beginning of note 5 use a form of the same verb, *splagchnizomai*, whose literal meaning is, in the words of Elizabeth Achtmeier, "to be moved in one's bowels." As Achtmeier explains, "[T]he Hebrews regarded [the bowels] as the center of the tenderer affections, specially of kindness, benevolence, and pity. The bowels were for them equivalent to our heart as the seat of compassion. When Jesus was confronted with human need, the New Testament therefore says he was moved in his bowels—i.e., he had pity and compassion..." ["Mercy, Merciful; Compassion; Pity," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), Volume K-Q, pp. 352-354]. For a different exposition of *splagchnizomai*, see Helmut Köster, "Splagchnon, Splagchnizomai, etc.," in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Volume VII*, ed. by Gerhard Kittel, ed. and tr. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1971), pp. 548-59. Köster contends that the term's application to Jesus is meant to characterize him as "the Messiah in whom divine mercy is present" (p. 554). It is not clear, however, that these two interpretations are incompatible.

7. Ephesians 4:31-32; Philippians 2:1-4; I Peter 3:8-9; I John 3:17-18.

8. This point is implicit in a number of New Testament passages, including Matthew 5:38-41; Romans 12:9-21; Galatians 5:13-25; 6:9-10; Ephesians 2:13-18; 4:25-5:2; Colossians 3:5-15; I Timothy 2:1-4; 6:11.

9. Tr. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959).

10. Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17. See also Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, tr. by James Ellington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. 121.

11. Kant, *Foundations*, pp. 15-16.

12. *Jesus and the Word*, tr. by Louise Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress Lantero (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 118. Other examples are Victor Paul Furnish, *The Love Command in the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), p. 202, and C. E. B. Cranfield, "Love," in *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*, ed. by Alan Richardson (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 133-34.

13. See especially Kant, *Foundations*, pp. 14-22, 42-49. Actually, for Kant, the respect is for persons as *rational* beings, not as *human* beings, but this distinction is unimportant here.

14. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.

15. The phrase enjoys common usage in the literature on Kantian ethics. See, for

instance, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., *Autonomy and Self-Respect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 12-13, 29-37. Kant himself prefers to speak of "respect for the law," of which respect for a person is merely an example (*Foundations*, p. 18n.).

16. Outka, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Compare Kant's remark, in *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, that "the altruistic maxim of beneficence toward those in need is a universal duty of men; this is so because they are to be regarded as fellow men, i.e., as needy rational beings, united by nature in one dwelling place for mutual aid" (p. 117). See also Furnish, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

17. Outka, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

20. Kant, *Metaphysical Principles*, p. 122.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

23. Robert C. Roberts, "What An Emotion Is: A Sketch," *Philosophical Review*, XCVII, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 183-209.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 184, 190.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-88. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 193ff.

27. Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-92.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, p. 201.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-05.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-94.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 199n.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

41. In *Explaining Emotions*, ed. by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 507-17.

42. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

43. Blum, *Friendship*, p. 133.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

47. Blum, "Compassion," p. 509.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 509-10.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 511.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 511-12.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 512-13.

52. It should be clear that I am not suggesting that compassion is commanded in every situation in which it would be an appropriate response: Sometimes it is not necessary to feel compassion in order to be motivated to help a neighbor in dire need. Rather, as I see it, the Love Commandment requires that one summon up compassion in a situation where (a) compassion is a suitable emotional reaction, (b) one's construal repertoire is such that one is capable of feeling compassion sufficient to motivate the loving action called for, and (c) it is unlikely—or simply not the case—that one *would* be motivated to do that caring action in the absence of one's feeling compassion for the person in need. I leave aside the question of whether the Love Commandment might prescribe feeling compassion in some cases when one would be motivated to neighborly action without it: Perhaps there are times the Commandment should be seen as demanding one feel compassion as something valuable apart from its motivational efficacy. In that case, (c) would not be not a necessary condition for the Love Commandment's requiring that one muster up compassion for a neighbor in need. My claim, however, is only that the conjunction of (a)-(c) is a sufficient condition for the Commandment's prescribing compassion as a motive to beneficent action. Still, this is not an insignificant result, since, given the facts of human psychology, for any particular person committed to the authority of the Love Commandment, the set of situations to which (a)-(c) apply will be very large indeed.

53. Matthew 9:36 (RSV).

54. Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 69.

55. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Christian Liberty," in *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, ed. by Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 167.

56. Obviously, sometimes it is difficult to decide just what obedience to the commandments entails—a fact emphasized (often, overemphasized) by "situation ethicists." But, for a Christian, what gives any moral choice situation its urgency is her belief in the applicability of the commandments to that case, however problematic it may be.

57. Assume here that conditions (a)-(c) listed in footnote 52 above hold for Sl...Sn.

58. The Love Commandment thus obligates Narcissus to do things which will bring him under the same sort of obligation the Commandment lays on Theophilus with respect to Sl...Sn. The notion of an obligation to place oneself under another obligation may strike some readers as peculiar, but the phenomenon is fairly commonplace. When I promise a friend I will sell him my car, I then become obligated to execute a transaction that will obligate me to deliver the car to him.

59. See Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 135: "Our heart goes out to our fellow-man, when seen through the eyes of faith, not only because we see him thus under a transcendental

perspective but because we see ourselves under it and know that we are sinners just as he is. Awed by the majesty and goodness of God, something of the pretence of our pretentious self is destroyed and the natural cruelty of our self-righteousness is mitigated by emotions of pity and forgiveness."

60. The story of the Good Samaritan has its own, largely distinct, interpretive history. From the patristic period to the end of the nineteenth century, with few exceptions (see note 3 above) most expositions of the parables of Jesus were allegorical and extrinsic. Beginning with the publication of Adolf Jülicher's *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu* in 1888 and 1899, the prevailing approach to the parable of the Good Samaritan has been to treat it as an "exemplary story" (*Beispielergählung*), a narrative lesson about neighborliness, giving an example of conduct to be imitated. Particular interpretations have tended to focus either on the overt caring behavior of the Samaritan or on the "existential implications" of the parable, where the point is taken to be the confrontation of the hearer with "the necessity of decision" in his own life. Recently, several biblical scholars (notably John D. Crossan and Robert W. Funk) have sought to shift attention to the literary forms of the Gospel parables, arguing that the Good Samaritan story is not a moral example at all but a "language-event" whose meaning depends on specific features of the parable's linguistic structure and original historical setting. In general, then, the interests of interpreters of the parable of the Good Samaritan, even those who accept the standard example-story reading, have simply not been directed to the psychological dimensions of the parable—including whether or not it suggests that compassion is (sometimes) commanded as a motive. See Fitzmyer, *op. cit.*, p. 885; Kissinger, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii-xiv, 73-74, 204, 206-207; Norman Perrin, *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 164; Furnish, *op. cit.*, p. 43; John Dominic Crossan, *In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 57, 62-66.

61. In addition to the biblical scholars cited in note 12 above, examples of Christian moralists who accept Kant's notion of neighbor-love include C. S. Lewis, *Mere Christianity* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 115-16; Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Christian Ethics* (David McKay Co., 1953), pp. 318-20; Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 100; and Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 106.

62. See S. V. McCasland, "Will of God," *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), Volume R-Z, pp. 844-48; Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 75, 86.

63. McCasland, *op. cit.*, p. 844.

64. Dihle, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 86, 142; Köster, *op. cit.*, pp. 553-57.

65. Dihle, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 127, 194-95.

66. Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, tr. by Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 285 [IX. 5].

67. R. A. Markus, "Augustine—Human Action: Will and Virtue," in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 383-86; Dihle, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

68. Markus, *op. cit.*, p. 385. See also Saint Augustine, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85 [IX. 5].

69. Markus, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-85.

70. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae, Volume 34: Charity (2a2ae. 23-33)*, ed. and tr. by R. J. Batten, O.P. (London: Blackfriars, 1975), pp. 209 [Q. 30, art. 1]; 185 [Intro. to QQ. 28-33]; 83 [Q. 25, art. 1]; 105, 107 [Q. 25, art. 8]; 217 [Q. 30, art. 3]; 221 [Q. 30, art. 4]. *Caritas* is the word used by Latin versions of the New Testament to translate *agape*.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 33 [Q. 23, art. 8]; 35, 37 [Q. 24, art. 1].

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 165, 167 [Q. 27, art. 2]; 105, 107 [Q. 25, art. 8].

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 33 [Q. 23, art. 8]; 217 [Q. 30, art. 3].

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 215 [Q. 30, art. 2]; 217 [Q. 30, art. 3].

75. John Calvin, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Vol. II, tr. by Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1962), p. 12 [3.7.7].

76. *Ibid.*

77. Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, tr. by Olive Wyon (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 322-23; Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 40; Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, pp. 124, 129, 132; Hans Küng, *On Being a Christian*, tr. by Edward Quinn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976), pp. 256-62.

78. Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

80. I wish to thank Paul Meyer and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.