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Godfrey Vesey, ed., THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY

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erful piece of philosophy. Rowe lays bare the crucial elements of all the views he attends to, especially Locke's conception of freedom and the libertarian alternative developed by Thomas Reid. And Rowe pinpoints their strengths and weaknesses with uncanny brilliance. Finally, he explores the libertarian conception of freedom with a degree of care, precision, and insight which is both admirable and quite rare in the philosophical literature. Rowe has given us a wonderful book.

NOTE

1. In my paper, "Responsibility and Control," *Journal of Philosophy*, 89 (January 1982), pp. 24-40, I pursue a strategy that is similar to the Reid/Rowe strategy to the extent that they both acknowledge certain implications of the Frankfurt-type examples but insist that these examples do not in themselves entail the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. But there is the following difference: whereas the Rowe/Reid strategy is a flicker-of-freedom approach and is thus an "alternative-sequence" model of moral responsibility, my approach in "Responsibility and Control" is an "actual-sequence" model of moral responsibility.

The Philosophy In Christianity, edited by **Godfrey Vesey**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. pp. xvi and 244. \$16.95 (paper).

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This collection of essays represents an unusually broad-ranging sampler of studies, both because it covers philosophical theology, historical theology, and philosophy of religion and because the essays are by scholars of classical, patristic, medieval, and contemporary thought. Moreover, it has, in a sense, two themes; these are not co-extensive, but overlap and weave together in interesting ways. The general aim stated by Vesey in the introduction—namely, to explore the "debt" of "early" Christian thinkers "to contemporary Platonist philosophy" (p. v)—is adhered to by most, but not all, of the contributors. At one end of the spectrum are essays paradigmatic of that theme, like John Dillon's "Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early Christianity" and A. H. Armstrong's "On Not Knowing Too Much About God," subtitled "The Apophatic Way of the Neoplatonists and other influences from ancient philosophy which have worked against dogmatic assertion in Christian thinking." At the other end are essays, extremely valuable in their own right, but totally innocent of any (explicit, at least) concern with Platonist influence on or relevance to Christianity. Those readers with such a concern will find in those essays (the majority) which do adhere rigidly to Vesey's formulation of the guiding theme a very satisfying development of thought on the subject; they build on each other in interesting ways, in part because of the useful back-and-forth between detail and overview among them.

The 'other' theme is expressed in the title—and it is neither in principle, nor in practice, co-extensive with the first. This theme—the philosophy *in* Christianity—is so phrased as to suggest an intriguing twist on the old standby, philosophical theology, but the promise of that phrasing is not fully played out. The notion of a 'divided mind,' which figures prominently in one of the essays, itself characterizes this formulation of the theme. Under the rubric of 'philosophy in Christianity,' two sorts of enterprise seem to inform the collection in a way which sometimes is experienced as a frustrating vacillation preventing the intriguing potential from being explored more fully. On the other hand, in retrospect, and this is no doubt the intent of the editor, it can be read as a rich plumbing of the possibilities within that theme of 'the philosophy in Christianity.' One enterprise being carried on is an attempt to examine the ways in which philosophy is *in* Christianity through a *meta-level* exploration of the relations between faith and reason, or theology and philosophy. The methodology in these essays varies, with sometimes a more historical emphasis, and sometimes a more philosophical one. The other enterprise being carried on is the attempt to *do* some of the *first-order* philosophical theology that is highlighted as a category in the meta-level discussion. Among these sorts of essays are those which focus on issues of God's foreknowledge and human free will, God's perfection and vulnerability, and the intelligibility of talk about two natures in Christ: e.g., "Predestination and Freedom in Augustine's Ethics" (Gerard O'Daly), "Foreknowledge and the Vulnerability of God" (J. R. Lucas), "Augustine's Philosophy of Being" (Christopher Stead), and "Could God Become Man" (Richard Swinburne). Indeed, Keith Ward's "God as Creator" is a paradigmatic essay in philosophical theology which deals with puzzles raised by the doctrine of creation (using, among other things, a ten-step modal logic argument, involving "the Divine sense of logical possibility" [p. 116]).

This second enterprise may well in itself make the book worthwhile reading for many, but I find these examples of relatively straight-forward exercises in philosophical theology to be, for the most part, excellent, but very traditional, discussions which could be found in many a standard anthology. What I find more distinctive is the execution of the first enterprise—that is, the variety of second-order perspectives on the 'philosophy *in* Christianity.' We find explorations of the ways philosophy is incorporated into or underlies developing theological elaborations, as well as of the ways philosophy is *contained* in Christian theology (i.e., constrained by it), as well as of the dialectical way in which particular concepts (like piety and salvation) are philosophically informed and then exercise constraints on further philosophical influence. Some of these essays, as I indicated earlier, have a strong emphasis on Platonist relevance or influence. Others are more explicit treatments of the relation between faith and reason, but what distinguishes them

is that they consider that relation in *developing* Christianity, focusing on patristic and medieval sources. Some, finally, make no attempt to retrieve historical resources in their consideration of the relation between philosophy and theology (or religion).

Stuart Brown's "Christian Averroism, Fideism, and the 'Two-fold Truth'" is a good example of the striking combination of historical detail and conceptual analysis found in many of these essays. He shows the complexity in the Averroist position on theology and philosophy as discrete forms of knowledge as well as the limits of the anti-Averroist response and its relation to current debates on the status of religious belief. Indeed, the focus on the notion of 'two-fold truth' (along with notions of the singleness of truth, and the modes, sources, and levels of truth) actually underlies many of these essays, though less explicitly than in Brown's case. Eleonore Stump's "Faith and Goodness" offers an intriguing variation on the theme by considering the relation between faith and reason through the prism of the concept of 'will' (about which O'Daly [pp. 91ff] also says some interesting things) in Aquinas. She directs our attention away from 'purely' intellectual evidential considerations in the discussion of belief, to questions of moral goals and import. (Stewart Sutherland's essay on "Hope" makes a similar contrast between hope as involving "moral vision" and redirection as opposed to considerations of empirical outcomes, whether judged in terms of probability or possibility). While I have some reservations about the various ways in which she phrases the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological claims offered in answer to the objection that there is "some sort of argument" for the propositions of faith (pp. 183-85), I should say that it is precisely the most challenging and rich essays which are worth raising the most questions about.

Other essays, equally welcome, are less expected within such a collection. Grace Jantzen's "'Where Two are to Become One': Mysticism and Monism" is such an essay—an exploration of the philosophical commitments of some classical mysticism, challenging standard monistic interpretations, is a refreshing way to consider the philosophy in Christianity. The essay, moreover, is so sensible and enlightening one wonders, with her, why it had not been written before. Maurice Wiles' contribution, "The Philosophy in Christianity: Arius and Athanasius," is non-traditional in considering both how the philosophy in Christianity is *in* its heresies, as well as how the way it is in its heresies differs from the ways it is in its orthodoxy. The startling suggestion that there was no difference of "philosophical approach" between Arius and Athanasius is made plausible by examining the difference in "emphasis" contained in varying conceptions of piety and salvation and will (which are themselves "not wholly independent of philosophical considerations") (pp. 50-51). Wiles's essay is illustrative of the first, meta-level, enterprise, high-

lighting the different (and dialectical) ways in which philosophy can figure in the development of theology.

Although Norman Kretzmann, in "Reason In Mystery," makes the claim that philosophical theology is the "*only* theology of more than historical interest" (p. 15), his essay is nonetheless not an exercise in first-order philosophical theology, but rather a second-order discussion of the implications of the contrast between natural theology and philosophical theology, and the canons of credibility at work in the latter. His entire discussion focuses on questions of 'rational justification' in the narrow sense which Stump's essay attempts to enlarge, but his warning is pertinent and salutary—it would be tragic to allow the influential critique of foundationalism found in what has come to be known as 'Reformed epistemology' to so focus on the 'natural theology' tradition in medieval theology as to obscure the very valuable resources for philosophical theology also to be found there. Kretzmann attempts to clarify the task of philosophical theology (which task is itself "clarification based on posited doctrinal propositions" [p. 27])—more precisely, he takes on the daring job of addressing philosophy's objections to an enterprise whose starting-points are mysteries. Kretzmann's essay relates to the others in some interesting ways. Although he has the aim of "furthering philosophical theology" (p. 19), his analysis of Aquinas's position on the mystery of the Trinity, illustrating "the way in which medieval philosophical theology operates on mystery without running afoul of the Church's position or philosophy's objection" (p. 26), is clearly very different from attempts to construct plausible theological positions on, say, the Trinity or God's foreknowledge. Philosophy in Christianity is read here as "reason in mystery" (rather than "reason against mystery") (p. 26); nevertheless, the heart of the essay is the second-order consideration of "some of the most formidable objections against philosophical theology as carried out in the Middle Ages, and some of the ways in which those objections were dealt with" (p. 19). Moreover, his stark dichotomy between the "inert [but secure] philosophical skeleton" of Greek metaphysics in Christianity and what is "incomparably the most interesting and important philosophy in Christianity," namely, the active enterprise of philosophical theology (p. 15), tends to obscure the fact (brought out so well in several other essays in this volume) that often the Greek skeleton is the subject of philosophical theology, what is being theologized about—as when one is doing philosophical theology about the nature of God, the relation between Father and Son, or the relations among the Trinity.

The collection closes with another (less explicit) variation on the theme of reason and faith, or philosophy in Christianity—in "Does Philosophy 'Leave Everything as it is'? Even Theology?" (which could as easily have served as an introduction to the collection), Renford Bambrough offers, in Wittgenste-

inian fashion, a useful set of reminders, reflections, musings, and questions about what it is to 'leave everything as it is.' Exploring the senses in which photography, for example, leaves everything as it is, and provocatively asking whether theology leaves everything as it is, Bambrough makes us think again about the philosophical status of 'description' and the ways in which philosophical accounts can contour religious responses.

Anthologies are particularly frustrating objects for review, for one can never even begin to do justice to the individual essays. Acknowledging that, let me commend this collection for its richness: it addresses a perennial question with remarkable detail across a wide historical range, and the pages are full of intriguing suggestions; it is frustrating only in its great diversity, not in its quality.

Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations, by **David Ray Griffin**. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. xiv and 277.

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In 1976, David Griffin published *God, Freedom, and Evil*, a book in which he argued that the solution to the problem of evil proposed by process theism is superior to those solutions available within traditional (classical) theism. *Evil Revisited* consists largely of responses to critiques of his earlier book. But it is not simply a collection of independent counter-responses to specific criticisms. It is a coherent, self-contained restatement of Griffin's belief that only process theists can offer an adequate theistic response to the scope and intensity of the evil we encounter.

Griffin begins by outlining the three theodicies with which the book is concerned. Proponents of traditional all-determining theism, we are told, believe that "God in fact totally determines every event, including all human decisions and actions, and therefore all 'sinful' acts" (p. 13). And thus, to preserve God's goodness, they must ultimately deny that there *is* any genuine evil—any evil that is not necessary for bringing about some greater good or avoiding some greater evil—and acknowledge instead that each instance of evil is a necessary component in God's perfect creative plan.

Proponents of traditional free-will theism, Griffin continues, agree with proponents of traditional all-determining theism that "God *essentially* has all the power in the universe" (p. 14). They agree, for instance, that God could unilaterally have created a world with no genuine evil. But free-will theists also hold that "God has *voluntarily* delegated power to creatures" (p. 14). Specifically, they hold that God has given us significant freedom—the freedom to bring about good or evil—because he desires that we develop "moral and spiritual qualities through free decisions" and "because pain and suffering