An Attack on C. S. Lewis

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Beversluis' book is the first full-length philosophical assessment of C. S. Lewis's defence of Christianity. It argues that Lewis's arguments from desire, morality and reason all fail. This article concedes that the argument from desire fails, and that the argument from morality does not show what Lewis appears to have thought. But it is maintained that the argument from reason is sound, and given that it is so, that morality and unsatisfied desire may be regarded as signs of the existence and nature of God, even if they are not bases of proofs strictly speaking of divine existence.

The popular literature on C. S. Lewis, from the first, has tended to run to excessive adulation; yet his Christian apologetics have usually been dismissed out of hand by serious philosophers and theologians. Neither attitude, as it seems to me, properly takes Lewis's measure; Professor John Beversluis' book, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, has the great merit that it does so. For better or for worse, Lewis's influence as a Christian apologist has been very great, and it was high time that his arguments on this matter were given a sustained and serious look.

I do not wish to give much attention to the common claim that, for a Christian, apologetics is an unnecessary as well as a fruitless enterprise. All the ingenuity of writers like Sören Kierkegaard and Karl Barth notwithstanding, I agree with Lewis and many atheists that, unless a rational case can be made for theism or Christianity, which does not assume what it has to prove, then one ought not to be a theist or a Christian.

Of the arguments for Christianity advanced by Lewis and attacked by Beversluis, I want in what follows to give pride of place to two, that from the alleged "objectivity" of morality and that from the place of reason in the universe, to the existence of God.

As Lewis sees it, it is only as a result of inconsistency that people can regard their moral conscience as both reducible to a "subjective" feeling or attitude, and binding upon them in the kind of way that they have to do if they are to be morally responsible beings. If moral conscience were merely a matter of "subjective" feeling or attitude, why should it not be quite appropriate to overcome or to act against this feeling when it interferes with our convenience, our pleasure, or our peace of mind, as of course notoriously it often does? That the "subjective" feeling or attitude may be shared with many
other people is not to the point; why should such feelings and attitudes in others impose moral obligation on me, any more than my own?

It might well be pointed out, on Lewis's behalf, that we are apt to assume that the "subjectivist" position in morality is a coherent one, just because so many admirable and influential persons have maintained it. Why have they done so? Very simply and crudely, the train of thought seems to run something like this. Scientific verification is the hallmark of objectivity; moral and other value-judgments are not subject to scientific verification; therefore moral and other value-judgments are not objective. And yet to take morality seriously is surely, as Lewis says (and Beversluis does not deny) to set some kind of constraint on how it is appropriate for us to act, just as to take truth seriously does on what it is appropriate for us to believe. How could a merely "subjective" feeling set such a constraint? Beversluis is quite correct that, on moral matters, we take our feelings more seriously, and expect others to do so, than we do in the case of our liking or disliking of some kind of food, and he accordingly resents Lewis drawing the parallel. But why should this make them any more binding, on ourselves or anyone else? When there is a collision between these feelings and our other inclinations, why should we follow these feelings, let alone expect others to come to share the feelings when they do not already do so? I cannot help concluding that for all Beversluis' arguments on this issue, and for all his reproaches of Lewis for arguing unsoundly, he has missed Lewis's basic point, or at least failed to realize its force. That we tend to feel more strongly about moral matters than we do about mere matters of taste is certainly true; but this does not appear to be to the point.

Beversluis is quite correct in maintaining that, even if "subjective" views of morality are held to be unsatisfactory, there are many "objective" views. But Lewis's claim is that belief in the objectivity of morality itself provides some kind of grounds for theism; in this case, the objection that there are many kinds of moral objectivism is not to the point. What Beversluis has to show is that, according to some "objectivist" understandings of the essence of morality, the objectivity of morality does not provide grounds for theism in the manner that Lewis suggests. Lewis himself is just as hostile as Beversluis to the notion that the only proper basis for morality is revealed divine command; on the contrary, he maintains that we have to have a notion of what is good and bad already, if we are to have a rational basis for assessing any candidate for the status of divine revelation.

Beversluis charges Lewis with tendentiousness in speaking of subjective views of morality as "merely" subjective. Yet I cannot see that it is really misleading of Lewis to speak in this way. A moral system which was partly a matter of "subjective" feeling, but which also depended to some extent on more "objective" criteria, would be more properly referred to as a mixture of "subjective" and objective, than as subjective sans phrase. An account of
morality which is merely referred to as subjective, without qualification, surely is properly to be taken as merely subjective.

What of the connection alleged by Lewis between an “objective” view of morality and theism? If there were a Creator God, Lewis maintains, an objective moral law whose demand we feel within us, which we cannot with full consistency treat at once with appropriate seriousness, and merely as a matter of subjective feeling, would be *par excellence* the suitable way for him to make his existence known to us. Beversluis accuses Lewis of inconsistency at this point; he cannot say *both* that an objective moral law which we apprehend within ourselves is the only way in which a Creator could reveal himself within his own creation, and, in accordance with orthodox Christianity, that God has revealed himself in history. But the contradiction, granted that Lewis commits himself to it in his writings, is not a serious one. It is an important part of Lewis’s overall position that a divine revelation could properly commend itself to humankind only by confirming what they themselves knew to be their best moral intuitions. Once the moral law has established, so to say, a bridgehead for theism, a historical revelation might follow upon its heels.

If Lewis thought that our need, if we were both thoroughly consistent and fully moral beings, to take for granted that the moral law is in a sense “objective,” established its objectivity in this sense, then I believe he was wrong. The moral law might not after all be objective; even if it were the case that, if we were to be both fully consistent and fully moral, we had to believe that it was so. Again, the move to theism seems rather suggestive than compelling. One may grant that, if there were a Creator who wished to reveal his will to us, an objective moral law inscribed within our consciences would be an appropriate way for him to do so. The existence of such a thing might thus be a pointer to the existence of such a Creator, without itself constituting any more than a rather weak argument for his existence. One might think of the way in which a particular action by someone might be a pointer to her character, without being a proof that she had such a character; the actual failure to constitute a proof would not imply that it was totally irrelevant to the matter. As Beversluis says, it is not quite clear from Lewis’s writings what kind of status he wished this argument to have; I am inclined to say that, taken in the kind of way that I have suggested, Lewis’s argument has some force, though it certainly needs supplementation if an adequate case for theism is to be made. Such a supplementary argument is in fact supplied by Lewis, in his claim that the place of reason in the universe can only be accounted for properly if the universe is due to an intelligent will such as we call God. To this argument we now turn.

The scientific world-view is often supposed to entail that reason, as we find it operative in human beings, is a chance by-product of a system of causes which themselves have nothing to do with reason. According to Lewis, this conclu-
sion cannot be true. The scientific world-view itself, after all, depends on scientists speaking and writing as they do for good reasons; and on the world having an overall nature and structure which enables it to be known as a result of such reasoning. As Lewis says, “Unless we can be sure that reality in the remotest nebula...obeys the thought-laws of the human scientist here and now in his laboratory—in other words, unless Reason is an absolute—all (sc. of the scientific world picture) is in ruins.” I have argued at length elsewhere, and do not wish to repeat myself here, that a universe which can in principle be grasped by the concepts of intelligent beings such as ourselves is ultimately best to be accounted for as due to the fiat of an intelligent will; and the intelligent will supposed to account for the universe is of course what people commonly mean when they speak of God. It does not seem satisfactory in the long run either to deny that the universe has such an intelligible nature or structure; or to say that it is a mere “brute fact” which does not need to be accounted for; or to hold, as Kant seems to have done, that the intelligible nature and structure do not really belong to things in themselves, but are imposed upon them by human intelligence in the course of coming to know them. Lewis develops this argument, from an intelligible universe to an intelligent Creator, in various writings, but especially in Miracles; I believe it is his most powerful argument for the existence of God.

However, he usually blends it with another argument, which I take to be distinct from this, to the effect that reason in human beings, if it is to be an effective tool for knowing the universe, must be independent of the causal nexus. It was at this point, as Beversluis says, that his argument was attacked by Elizabeth Anscombe. Miss Anscombe maintained that Lewis’s argument depended on a confusion between what was nonrational and what was irrational. A train of thought is irrational to the degree that it breaks the rules of logic, omits due consideration of relevant evidence, and so on; to say that it is determined by nonrational causes is not to say that it is irrational in this sense. Lewis was sufficiently affected by Miss Anscombe’s argument to rewrite the chapter in Miracles to which it mainly applied. In his revised argument, he concedes that Miss Anscombe was right to draw a distinction between the irrational and the nonrational; but insists all the same that a fully nonrational explanation of our thoughts and actions at the causal level would be incompatible with their being rational.

Beversluis insists that the causal determination of thought has nothing to do with its rationality, unless it can be shown that there is a correlation between the particular kind of causal determination involved and irrationality. But I do not think that Beversluis quite does justice to Lewis’s revised argument. One is inclined to say, if human thought, speech and action are to be genuinely rational, then they must really take place in accordance with reasons. But if they, or the physical events which underlie or are identical...
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with them, are wholly determined by events which are utterly distinct from
reasons, then it is hard to see how they can really take place for reasons.
Perhaps it is misleading to express the point by saying that in some instances
at least human thought and action must really be caused by reasons. But at
least, it seems reasonable at first sight to maintain, persons acting for reasons
must be causes, and it would appear to follow from this that such thought
and action, or the physical events underlying or identical with it, cannot be
totally determined by causes which are other than reasons.

To make the point more sharply, one may ask how, if thoroughgoing de­
termination of a thought or an action, or of its physical analogue, is compat­
ible with its rationality, the reasons are supposed to be related to the causes.
The relationship can hardly be one of logical identity; since it is one thing to
say that a person acted as she did because her neurons fired in a certain way,
another to say that it was in order to convince her hearers of some scientific
or philosophical thesis. But to say that the two patterns of explanation, in
terms of causes and of reasons, just happen to coincide in the relevant in­
stances, as in effect the "Occasionalists" of the seventeenth century did,
seems no more satisfactory; would not the amount of coincidence needed be
quite incredible? And if reason is a mere "epiphenomenon" of underlying
causal determinism, it is difficult to see how it can be really operative in the
world in the way that it must be if our speech and thought, and therefore our
science, are ever to be reasonable. One seems to be left with some form of
mental-physical interaction; with the physical events which underlie our men­
tal life being sufficiently undetermined by their physical preconditions for us
to act and think as we do really because we have good reason to do so. But
this is precisely what Lewis is arguing. The nonrational causes which predis­
pose us to act irrationally, it may reasonably be suggested, do so precisely
because they render it difficult or even impossible for us really to act for
reasons, by more or less totally determining the situation causally. It is not
so much religious superstition, as the real difficulties attendant on the alter­
native possibilities, which have driven such thinkers as Sir Karl Popper to
champion a form of mind-brain interactionism.

In arguing that the total causal determination of something does not entail that
it cannot be assessed from other points of view, Beversluis takes Beethoven's
quartets as an example. That Beethoven was driven by a psychological compulsion
to produce them, which made him indifferent to such prudential considerations as
that of his health, does not mean that they cannot be evaluated for their qualities
as great music, as he says. But this consideration does not appear to me to be
really relevant to Lewis's argument, and that for two reasons. First, the claim that
Beethoven was driven to compose by psychological compulsion does not imply
that every note of every piece that he wrote was determined to be exactly as it
was by such compulsion. Second, to value some human production as an aes­
thetic object does not seem, at first sight at least, so imperatively to demand that its producer should have acted for reasons in executing it just as it is, as to value it as liable to be expressive of the truth about some aspect of the world.

It may certainly be conceded to Miss Anscombe and to Beversluis that Lewis should, in the original version of his argument in *Miracles*, have distinguished the irrational from the nonrational. It may also be admitted that it would have been better for Lewis, if he had been writing for professional philosophers, to have gone further into the ingenious ways in which those who believe in the compatibility of total causal determination with rational belief and action have got round the difficulties in their position pointed out by himself and by others. But none of these concessions imply that Lewis's argument, especially as revised in the light of Miss Anscombe's objections, does not have considerable force.

However, as I have said, I think that the nerve of Lewis's argument at this point is not the independence of rational processes from causality, but rather the fact that the world is amenable to rational explanation at all. It is claimed by Beversluis that this commits Lewis to the view, once widely maintained by philosophers but now as widely rejected by them, that we are directly aware only of sense-experience, and cannot acquire knowledge of an independently-existing world of material things and other persons except by a process of inference. But it is absurd, he objects, to deny that we actually see objects and people; or to maintain that a child has to infer the existence of his parents and his toys from sense-experiences which are private to him through some complicated mental process. Now I think that the notorious philosophical issue of the existence of sense-data is not directly relevant to the point which Lewis was making, which is that reason is inextricably involved in our apprehension of the world. Even granted that we do directly see and feel the tables and chairs in our vicinity, what we can properly be said to know (that Great Britain has a female Monarch and a male Prime Minister, that Holland is to the south of Norway), goes far beyond our experience. Here rational inference of some kind, whether we are conscious of exercising it or not, does seem necessarily involved.

It is true that Lewis does explicitly maintain the view that material objects and other persons are not the direct objects of sensation, and thus are to be known only by a kind of inference. But even this view is by no means as indefensible as Beversluis would have his readers suppose. Certainly it can on first consideration of the matter seem strange to suppose that we ordinarily "infer" from our sensations to things and people; but this is just because the "inference," if this is the word, is usually automatic. Unless we are specially on our guard, as for example in a psychology laboratory or under the influence of drugs, we directly and spontaneously assume that when we have sensations as though of a tomato
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seen five feet before our eyes, or as though of an oboe playing a melody ten yards from our ears, there really is a tomato or an oboe placed at that distance from us. The point of linguistic analysis made by Beversluis is correct as far as it goes; we are usually said to see actual soldiers, and not khaki-colored sense-data in our visual field from which we infer the presence of soldiers. But this is not to provide any solution to the ancient philosophical difficulty of how, on the basis of our experience, we can come to know about a world which exists prior to and independently of our experience. All that Beversluis really establishes is that when we are said to see a tree, it is usually implied not only that we enjoy visual experiences as though of a tree, but that a tree is really present where it seems to us to be. Our usual vocabulary of sensation and perception, that is to say, presupposes the reality of the external world; but this does not of itself amount to a good argument for the reality of that world.

Beversluis puts it to his readers that Lewis's conception of reason as a kind of cosmic principle is old-fashioned; in modern times, as he says, a humbler and more work-a-day role has been assigned to it. But one may reasonably ask whether the moderns whom Beversluis commends have really been correct to dismiss the sense of wonder that the universe is amenable to rational investigation in the kind of way that it apparently is, and must be accepted as being if we are to take seriously science, or indeed even the most mundane kinds of inquiry about what is so. As Beversluis sees it, Lewis makes a mystery out of what is really very simple and straightforward, the application of deductive and inductive methods to the acquisition of knowledge of the universe. Now Beversluis not seldom charges Lewis with a certain disingenuousness; one wonders at this juncture whether a similar charge might not plausibly be levelled at him himself. For every professional philosopher knows that the nature and the justification of "induction," or at least of the kind of "induction" which, when complemented by "deduction," tends to yield the truth about the world, is something of puzzle. To say that, apart from deduction, only induction is needed, for getting to know the truth about things on the basis of observation, is little more than to admit that we cannot get at the truth by deduction and observation alone, and to lump together the other methods we need, whatever they are, under the label "induction."

What is called "induction by simple enumeration" takes the following form: we have observed a large number of ravens that are black, and have never observed a raven which is not black; so we infer that all ravens are black. This sort of argument, for all that we cannot do without it or something like it if we are to gain knowledge of the world, is itself, as has been well-known to philosophers since Hume, extraordinarily difficult to justify; and in any case is quite inadequate as a model to apply to the manner in which the discoveries of scientists or historians are supposed to be related to the evidence which supports them. In refusing, for reasons such as these, to call the
methods by which such discoveries are made "inductive" at all, and in denying the validity of "induction," Lewis is thus on firm ground.

It is notorious that a whole host of attempts have been made to get round the difficulties which Hume raised about "induction," and that none of them have commanded general acceptance. Some have appealed to its practical success, which seems question-begging; the problem is its vindication as a method of securing truth, and not its practical utility. Others have based it upon a metaphysical principle to the effect that nature is basically uniform, which in turn is "known perhaps, if at all, by faith alone." Popper and his followers have cut the knot by conceding that Hume has demonstrated the invalidity of induction, but insisting that science properly speaking does not use "inductive" methods. Lewis's claim, which Beversluis' arguments do nothing to refute, is to the effect that a universe which is amenable to the rational methods of inquiry exemplified in science, whether one calls them "inductive" or not, is satisfactorily to be explained only as itself due to rational agency.

While we are on the topic of induction, it is worth mentioning the well-known logical fallacy attributed by Beversluis to Lewis, that of "affirming the consequent." It is to be noted that most "inductive" arguments in the broad sense, for all that, as I have said, we cannot do without them if we are to find out anything about the world, may seem at first glance to commit this fallacy. One could take as an example any claim made in science or history, in relation to the evidence available in experience which is supposed to support it. It is, as would be agreed on all hands, grossly superstitious to suppose that I could strictly speaking deduce such a claim from such evidence (the loose sense in which expertise in "deduction" is ascribable to Sherlock Holmes or Mr. Spock is of course quite a different matter). On the other hand, if, following a procedure which is surely essentially constitutive of science, I deduce the occurrence of an observable state of affairs or an experimental result from my theory, and things turn out accordingly, it looks at first sight as though I can only claim that my theory is confirmed at the cost of committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. "If A (my theory) then B (the observation). B; therefore A"—this appears to be the form of my argument; and that is precisely what it is to commit the fallacy. This is the point made by Hume and his followers, and expressed by Lewis (and by Popper) in terms of a denial that "induction" is a valid form of argument.

What then is to be made of "induction" in the broad sense, the kind of argument other than deduction which we cannot do without in our reasonings about the world? To cut a very long story short, one has to envisage a range of possible explanations for any phenomenon, and deduce the observable consequences of each. That possibility may be provisionally accepted as liable to be true which is not falsified by the relevant observations. To return yet again to the traditional and well-worn example of the ravens—after observing a number
of black ravens, and none which are of any other colour, we reach by a flash of insight the hypothesis that all ravens are black; and this hypothesis is corroborated by all subsequent observations, in the sense that while any particular raven might have turned out to be of another colour, none of them have in fact done so. One may conveniently refer to this kind of "inductive"-and-deductive argument as argument to the best explanation. What Lewis's claim amounts to, is that a universe which is knowable by such a use of reason is itself best explained as due to rational agency. To envisage Lewis's theistic arguments in this way is not only charitable but also plausible; it is always perilously easy, for reasons which I have explained, for controversialists to represent this kind of argument as involving an elementary logical fallacy.

Before concluding, I would like to deal with two subsidiary points, that of the so-called "argument from desire" to God, and that to the divinity of Christ. As to the first matter, Lewis argues, to put it shortly, that we have desires which cannot be fulfilled by any earthly object or situation, such as could therefore be met only by something supernatural. Since "nature does nothing in vain," this supernatural something must exist. I am inclined to agree with Beversluis in giving very little weight to the principle that "nature does nothing in vain." One might mean by it that the fact that some or most people have desires of the kind referred to by Lewis, if indeed they do have them, is liable to have some explanation from the point of view of evolutionary biology; and I see no reason in principle why some such explanation should not be forthcoming. I think it can be said that the existence of a desire such as can only be satisfied by enjoyment of God consorts well with the view that, as Augustine says, such a being has made us for itself; but the desire, taken by itself, is only very weak evidence for God. With Beversluis' other main objection to this claim of Lewis's, however, I have much less sympathy. Beversluis drives a wedge between the God of the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament on the one side, and the object of Platonic and romantic longing on the other; he says that the one has nothing to do with the other, though admitting that many people have thought that it had. The God of the bible, he insists, demands repentance from human beings; not just a determined pursuit of what we already really desire anyway in our heart of hearts. The experience Lewis claims to have undergone himself, of intense reluctance at the moment of conversion, is itself incompatible, says Beversluis, with his identification of God with the real object of our deepest desires. "Either God is the ultimate object of desire or he is not. If he is, then it makes no sense to talk about shrinking from him the moment he is found." Beversluis says that Lewis has the bad controversial habit of presenting his readers with false dilemmas; yet the first sentence of that quotation might be thought to provide an instance of this. What he says seems to underestimate the complexity of human interests and motivations. Does Beversluis...
really think that it is impossible both to want an aching tooth to be extracted, and to shrink from the touch of the dentist? Is there no such state as that of being a compulsive drinker, and longing intensely but impotently to kick the habit? If God is really that to which our deepest desires are fundamentally oriented, one would have thought that to counteract the pull of the sum of more superficial desires would require repentance enough.

The conviction that Platonism is in many respects closely allied to Christianity, for all its opposition to the tenets of classical Protestantism, has so much prevailed, among the enemies as well as the friends of Christianity, that it cannot easily be dismissed. Nietzsche’s contemptuous gibe against Christianity, that it was vulgarized Platonism, may have been an exaggeration, but it was surely not an entirely baseless or pointless one. Hans Urs von Balthasar, moreover, has written at great length of the manner in which expression of the divine beauty has been a crucial factor in the work of many or most of the important Christian theologians. If the idea of God as ultimate satisfaction of human longing were alleged all the same to be unscriptural, one might allude to several references in the Psalms to God’s beauty or desirableness; or for that matter to St. Paul’s remark that “our troubles are light and short-lived, and their outcome an eternal glory which outweighs them far.” I conclude, in favor of Lewis and against Beversluis, that the idea that we fulfill our deepest desires only in God is not merely compatible with Christian belief, but probably a rather central component of it. However, I would add that the mere existence in us of such desires, and the impossibility of satisfying them with any earthly object, is not particularly strong evidence for the existence of God, especially when taken in isolation.

I have mentioned that Beversluis often attributes to Lewis the fault of presenting his readers with false dilemmas. The prime example of this, on his account, is Lewis’s claim that Jesus cannot both have falsely believed that he himself was of divine status, and been a great moral teacher. Beversluis argues that the two questions, of who a human being believes herself to be, and whether or not she is a great moral teacher, have no bearing on one another. I must say that I find this opinion very strange, for all the vehemence of Beversluis’ denunciation of Lewis for holding the contradictory view. It is to be admitted, it is true, that there are some false beliefs which a person could hold about herself, and still be a great moral teacher; for example, that she was some child’s aunt, or had just inherited a small legacy, when in fact she was not or had not. It may also be conceded, perhaps, that there is no formal incompatibility which can be demonstrated here; but that is about as far as one could plausibly go. Beversluis suggests, with a show of making whatever concessions to Lewis he can, that there might be some kind of incompatibility, if the supposed great moral teacher was deliberately lying to the effect that he was divine. No such hypothesis is necessary; the case would be just as strong, if not more so, if
he merely suffered from that greatest of all conceivable delusions of grandeur, that of falsely believing that he was God.

One may well, of course, argue that Jesus did not in fact, either explicitly or implicitly, claim divine status for himself; but this would shift the argument to a different ground. Yet even if Jesus was deluded to the relatively minor extent of falsely believing that he was the Messiah, the promised deliverer awaited by his people for hundreds of years, this would surely count rather considerably against his being a great moral teacher. To be such a teacher may be supposed to demand a knowledge of human motivations, including one’s own, which is the very opposite of such literally lunatic self-conceit. I conclude that Lewis’s argument is a strong one at this point, if one admits his premises; granted that Jesus believed himself to be of divine status, and granted that this belief was false, then it would be very odd, to say the least, to regard him as a great moral teacher.

What are we to conclude on Lewis’s arguments to God from desire, from morality, and from reason? I think it is fair to say that, if an intelligent ground of the universe exists which has intentions for human beings, one might expect it to reveal its will to us through moral conscience; and if it wishes us to come to enjoyment of it, one might have expected it to have implanted in us a desire which cannot be satisfied in any other way. But I am inclined to accept Beversluis’ view, that there is nothing in a thorough-going naturalism which would prevent it from accounting for the existence of these phenomena. On the matter of morality, Lewis’s arguments, in spite of Beversluis’ objections, do seem to me to show that “subjectivist” views of morality are in a sense unsatisfactory. But the sense in which they are unsatisfactory needs careful scrutiny; Lewis’s arguments tend to show, as it seems to me, not so much that “subjectivist” views of morality are false, as that we cannot both maintain them with full consistency, and apply them to our lives in the way that we must if we are to be fully moral persons. (Perhaps the fact that morality is entirely “subjective” is one of those things that nice people do not know, unless they are inconsistent as well). Lewis’s view that the amenability of the universe to reason shows that there is something of a rational nature which underlies it seems to me essentially correct; given this, there is indeed ground for maintaining that our limitless desire is not in vain, and that our moral conscience is rightly to be interpreted as reflecting the will which undergirds the universe.

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NOTES

1. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1985. All references will be to this book unless otherwise assigned.

3. 40, 41.

4. 40.

5. 41, 45. Cf. 73: “Merely is a word of which Lewis was inordinately fond.” It may be remarked that Lewis himself was aware of certain dangers in the use of the word; see *The Four Loves* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), 10.


7. 53.

8. 52.


12. 65-68.

13. 69.

14. 73.

15. 74.

16. 61.

17. 60; cf. *Miracles*, 25.

18. 58.

19. Cf. 77: “All we have to grant is that the truth of the statements contained in an argument are inductively inferred from experience and that on the basis of them we can deductively infer other statements.”


22. 51.

23. 17. As Beversluis says, “For all we know, perhaps some desires are in vain” (19).

24. 22.

25. Beversluis cites St. Augustine in this connection (9).

26. 21.

27. 43.


29. Psalm 42, 1-2; Psalm 50, 2; Psalm 27, 4.

30. 2 Corinthians 4, 17.

31. 38.

32. 55.