

# Defining the Modern Concept of Self-Revelation: Toward a Synthesis of Barth and Pannenberg

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Some years ago Paul Althaus had spoken of the inflation of the idea of revelation.<sup>1</sup> He called attention to the new trend in neo-orthodox theology to redefine revelation in an all-inclusive manner so that it became a synonymous term for theology.

This can be seen especially in Barth's *Church Dogmatics* in which redemption, reconciliation, resurrection, etc., are all categorized under the one concept of revelation. The point of this redefinition was to restrict its meaning to the idea of God's *self*-disclosure. That is, revelation is not a matter of propositions or objective events; it is exclusively the selfhood of God as he discloses Himself. Hence historical events and the words of the Bible are not the revelation of God. Rather, the revelation of God is *God Himself*.

While revelation is defined as rational and objective and even contained in propositions, its truthfulness was considered by Barth (and the neo-orthodox movement in general) to be established solely in faith. This means for Barth that all attempts to give a rational foundation for belief are blasphemous. Only God can prove God! Regardless of the negative results of critical history, theology is thus supposedly totally exempt from its implications. For God Himself cannot be analyzed by the critical pen of thoughtful scholars. Hence with this new definition of revelation (as a direct revelation of God's very self) the believer need not fear the consequences of higher biblical criticism.

This new definition implies that the scholar is perfectly free to say that the events of the Bible may be historically false, while as a believer he can affirm the events of the Bible are theologically true. In this respect, only the believer can affirm that the events of the Bible really happened. Indeed Barth affirmed the central events of the Bible as historically factual. But the basis of this affirmation was solely fiducial.

This concept of revelation in modern times as "*self*-revelation" (i.e., what is revealed is God's personhood) finds its most immediate source in German idealism. This source is found especially in the Hegelian metaphysical concept of Spirit (*Geist*) which reveals itself to itself through human self-consciousness (i.e., Spirit comes to the full awareness of its essence through the human spirit). In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel calls this fully-developed consciousness of spirit, the Absolute Idea or the Notion.<sup>2</sup>

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This connection between Hegel's concept of Spirit and the neo-orthodox view of revelation can be seen in Barth's qualified appreciation for the Hegelian Philipp Marheineke's concept of self-revelation. Marheineke writes:

In the human spirit God is manifest to Himself not through it but through Himself, and in that way is manifest to the human spirit also. The latter, as reason, is annulled in Him. The hardest thing science requires in all its devotees is that pure Substance itself should show itself as subject, man with his spirit to be subject to the divine spirit and be patient under it. His true knowledge of the absolute is itself an absolute knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

In thus defining revelation as *self-revelation*, it can be understood why Barth has restricted the use of this word exclusively to the person of Jesus Christ.<sup>4</sup> If revelation means "*self-revelation*," i.e., what God reveals is nothing else than Himself, then Barth properly draws the logical deduction that only in one event can God be revealed, namely, in the Christ event. If God should be revealed elsewhere, then it would be obvious that God had not really revealed Himself in Jesus. The idea of several revelations would show a logical inconsistency. Thus, Barth concludes that revelation as the self-revelation of God occurred objectively only in Jesus Christ. When one thus speaks of revelations, he is not employing the use of this word in Barth's strict sense.<sup>5</sup>

For Barth, the subject of revelation and the object of revelation are one essence, i.e., subject and object are identical. Barth has emphasized the unity of God with Jesus, for if God is revealed in Jesus, then Jesus must be God. Barth asks: "But who can reveal God but God Himself?" Thus, he argues that if Jesus reveals God, then "he must himself be God."<sup>6</sup> In this way, Barth says that the revealer, the means of revelation, and what is revealed are the same. He writes:

*God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself. If we wish really to regard the revelation from the side of its subject, God, then above all we must understand that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation, identical also with its effect.*<sup>7</sup>

Here it can be seen that Barth's idea of *self-revelation* is somewhat of a theological parallel to Hegel's metaphysical concept of the Notion, i.e., the fully-developed awareness of the Idea in the human consciousness. Revelation for Barth is known only through the Holy Spirit and cannot be comprehended on the basis of man's intellectual achievement. Insofar as God unveils Himself through the human spirit, He is "His own double in His Revelation."<sup>8</sup>

Pannenberg, however, has pointed out that if Barth speaks of a veiling of revelation so that the form of revelation is both a manifestation and a veiling,<sup>9</sup> then the unity of form and essence is endangered because this implies that there are as many manifestations as veiled forms. But if revelation means *self-revelation*, then

the form is itself the revelation. Pannenberg writes: "Only if the form of revelation reveals God and—rightly understood—does not veil him, only then is Barth's thesis of the unity of revelation tenable."<sup>10</sup>

The significant factor to be considered in any definition of revelation is whether or not it can be exegetically supported from Scripture. To be sure, there is no systematic use of the word, "revelation," in the Bible. Neither is there any "concept" of revelation in the Bible,<sup>11</sup> just as there is no concept of history, ethics, ecclesiology, eschatology, etc. Rather, the Scriptures *talk* history and revelation, but do not *talk about* them, e.g., John's gospel says "the Word became flesh" (which is *talking* history), but it does not theoretically reflect on this event in the sense of a philosophical abstraction (which would be to *talk about* history). However, when a concept of revelation is used for purposes of systematic theology, it must appeal to Scripture for its support. This is to say, if revelation as *self-revelation* is to be theologically valid, then it must be shown exegetically to be in accord with the "given" of the biblical witness. This is not intended to be an arbitrary judgment, but rather is an acknowledgement that the Scriptures are the only records we have which "report" those events that specifically concern the Christian believer.

In what follows, the motif to be defended is that revelation indirectly reveals who God is in His essence. In addition to Barth's statement that "God's Word is God Himself in His Revelation,"<sup>12</sup> it will be argued here that revelation is the communication of content which is to be differentiated from God's essential presence. For example, in the Bible, the phrase, "the Word of God," is equated with the apostolic kerygma, thus indicating that revelation as the Word of God is linked to tradition (1 Thess. 2:13; 1 Peter 1:25; Romans 10:8). Also, the appearances of Jahweh in the earliest Israelite traditions are not the unveiling of the essence of God, but the imparting of certain information and thus may be called manifestations of God, but not *self-revelation*. For example, in Exodus 3, God appears to Moses to inform him that he is to lead His people out of Egyptian bondage, and thus only indirectly reveals Himself to Moses.

To be sure, Barth emphasizes the verbal character of the Word of God. However, since "God's Word is God's Son," it is impossible to control and systematize the Word of God in the sense in which high orthodoxy sought to do, for it viewed the Holy Scriptures as "a fixed total of revealed propositions to be systematized like the sections of a *corpus* of laws."<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, Barth states that God makes Himself known "in propositions by means of language, and human language at that, to the effect that from time to time such and such a word, spoken by the prophets and apostles and proclaimed in the Church, becomes *His Word*."<sup>14</sup> Barth thus differentiates between the form and the content. The content is the Word of God, i.e., God Himself. The form is the language of the Bible. The form becomes the content in an indirect identity when God so chooses to unveil Himself through the form.<sup>15</sup> Thus *Paulus dixit* and *Deus dixit* are indirectly united in the moment of revelation. The fact that the words of the Bible and the Word of God form an indirect (and not a direct) identity is to point out that the identity is an assumed identity, which is brought about by the choice of God and thus is not

an intrinsic identity.<sup>16</sup>

Barth, in this respect, likewise points out that “in the Acts and Epistles the preaching of the apostles is often regarded as equivalent to the Word of God itself.”<sup>17</sup> For example, Barth shows this to be true of Paul, who writes: “Christ is speaking in me” (II Cor. 13:3). However, Barth does not allow the Word of God to be historical, except in the objective reality of Jesus Christ, because revelation always means *self*-revelation, i.e., the revealer and what is revealed are identical. Thus, the propositional truth of Holy Scripture is not revelation, but only attests revelation and becomes revelation when God in His freedom so chooses it to be revelation. If one should equate the words of the Bible as being inherently the Word of God (as the post-Reformation Orthodoxy did), then this would be to reduce the Living God to a dead book.<sup>18</sup>

If the biblical propositions contained in language are the words of man, which though can become the Word of God through God’s initiative, is there any necessity for ascertaining their authenticity and historical reliability? Further, if Jesus Christ is the objective reality of revelation, does this not necessitate the use of the historical-critical method for ascertaining who he really was? Barth’s answer is a decisive NO. Rather, God reveals Himself whenever He so chooses and in no way is it a determination of man’s initiative. One might ask, why put such heavy emphasis upon the Bible as a necessary medium through which God reveals Himself? Could He not reveal Himself through some other form than the Scriptures? Barth makes it unmistakably clear that Scripture is linked to the Word of God: “Preaching and the sacrament of the Church do indeed need the basis and authority and authenticity of the original Word of God in Scripture to be the Word of God.”<sup>19</sup> The theological uniqueness of Holy Scripture rests in the fact that the prophets and the apostles were witnessess of the one revelation which took place in Jesus Christ, who is the objective fact of revelation, i.e., He is very God and very Man.<sup>20</sup> The prophets witnessed to Jesus Christ in “expectation,” while the apostles witnessed in “recollection.”<sup>21</sup>

Because of their unique position in relation to Jesus Christ, their witness is essential. Thus, Scripture in its witness to the original revelation in Jesus Christ is the Word of God when God so chooses it to become His Word. Barth illustrates this unity of form (Scripture) and content (revelation) in connection with the Incarnation of Jesus as both God and man.<sup>22</sup> Even as in the Incarnation, God in His free act chose to reveal Himself in Jesus Christ, so God chooses to reveal Himself in Holy Scripture. In revealing Himself in Jesus, Jesus himself was identical with God. This unity of Jesus with God is an assumed identity, i.e., the man Jesus was not inherently God, but God willed and created this unity, thus effecting an indirect identity. Likewise, the Holy Scriptures become the revelation of God when God so creates and wills the indirect identity between the Scriptures and God. To be sure, there are inherent differences between the incarnate Word and the Word of God in Holy Scripture. That Jesus became the Word of God in his humanity needs no repetition or confirmation, for he is the eternal presence of God.

On the other hand, the Scriptures as the witness to the revelation of God in

Jesus are signs through which Jesus is revealed to man on earth. Thus, these signs must always become the Word of God to us. This means that the Church stands in constant need of the ministry of the Holy Spirit to effect the Word of God through the Bible.<sup>23</sup>

Barth further draws the distinction between a “verbal inspiration” and “verbal inspiredness.” By the former he suggests that God verbally spoke through the prophets and apostles by means of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. By verbal inspiredness, Barth suggests that this is the attempt to freeze the Word of God in the words of the Bible, thus bringing God under the control of man by reducing Him to the level of a mere book.<sup>24</sup> To be sure, the words of the Bible contain proposition, but these propositions are not revelation, though they can become revelation when God so chooses. Because of this dialectical relationship between the Word of God and Holy Scripture, Barth frequently refers to the Scriptures as the Word of God.<sup>25</sup>

However, if one should merely equate the words of the Bible with the Word of God, i.e., if the words of the Bible in themselves are defined as revelation, then this is to speak of verbal inspiredness. Barth does not see the Reformers saying anything materially different from what he says in this regard: “For them (especially Calvin) the literally inspired Bible was not at all a revealed book of oracles, but a witness to revelation, to be interpreted from the standpoint of and with a view to its theme, and in conformity with that theme.<sup>26</sup> The shift from the perspective of “inspiration” to “inspiredness” occurred in high orthodoxy about 1700.<sup>27</sup> Barth writes:

This new understanding of biblical inspiration meant simply that the statement that the Bible is the Word of God was now transformed . . . from a statement about the free grace of God into a statement about the nature of the Bible as exposed to human inquiry brought under human control. The Bible as the Word of God surreptitiously became a part of natural knowledge of God, i.e., of that knowledge of God which man can have without the free grace of God, by his own power, and with direct insight and assurance.<sup>28</sup>

The result of the freezing up of the Word of God into the words of the Bible in effect reduced saving faith to *fides historica*. Barth writes:

The Bible was now grounded upon itself apart from the mystery of Christ and the Holy Ghost. It became a “paper Pope,” and unlike the living Pope in Rome it was wholly given up into the hands of its interpreters. It was no longer a free and spiritual force, but an instrument of human power.<sup>29</sup>

This reduction of the Word of God to the words of the Bible was followed by the Enlightenment, which treated the Bible solely as a historical book, thus following high orthodoxy.<sup>30</sup>

Barth points out that the aim of the post-Reformation interpretation of Holy Scripture in affirming its inerrancy and infallibility even to the minutest details was an attempt to set forth the Bible as “a codex of axioms which can be seen as such with the same formal dignity as those of philosophy and mathematics.”<sup>31</sup>

However, if high orthodoxy attempted to guarantee the Bible to be the Word of God by means of its rigid doctrine of “inspiredness,” Barth on the other hand completely eliminates the necessity of any natural proof of the Word of God in Holy Scripture. To be sure, Barth has only one intention—to let the Bible speak on its own terms. Only in this way can the Word of God be found in Holy Scripture. But in no sense can one “find” the Word of God in Scripture.

This rejection of any natural proof for revelation necessarily follows from Barth’s concept of *self*-revelation. If revelation is the direct self-disclosure of God, then obviously it is in no way dependent upon man. Revelation is totally a matter of faith. It is a miracle.<sup>32</sup> It cannot be proved, only believed.<sup>33</sup> For this reason, Barth is willing to concede that the Bible as the words of man is fallible, errant, and even contradictory. He says the Bible can also be read historically for it is “human speech uttered by specific men at specific times in a specific situation, in a specific language and with a specific intention.”<sup>34</sup>

However, for Barth historical investigation into the Bible in no way can damage the concept of God’s *self*-revelation through the Bible. Revelation in no way is dependent upon the results of historical research. Bultmann has raised against Barth the question concerning what his “principle of selection” is insofar as he seeks to interpret the Bible for modern man. Bultmann asks:

The purpose of my existential interpretation of myth is precisely to inquire into the possibility of a valid meaning for the mythical picture of the world, and in this I am trying to proceed methodically, while in the case of Barth I can perceive only arbitrary assertions. What, then, is his principle of selection.<sup>35</sup>

Bultmann’s question misses the mark altogether insofar as Barth’s doctrine of Holy Scripture is concerned. Barth makes it quite clear that the proof of Holy Scripture lies in God’s self-authentication of it. That the Canon is Holy Scripture is the result of the Church confirming and establishing that which was already formed and given. The Church did not arbitrarily compose the Canon, but the Canon was formed because it imposed itself upon the Church.<sup>36</sup> Likewise today, Scripture as the Word of God needs no external authority for its support. This means the believer is “absolved from differentiating the Word of God in the Bible from other contents, infallible portions and expressions from the erroneous ones, the infallible from the fallible, and from imagining that by means of such discoveries we can create for ourselves encounters with the genuine Word of God in the Bible.”<sup>37</sup> This clearly means that the believer is not concerned with any “principle of selection.” The question of the Bible as the Word of God is not a historical but a theological question. This is to say, it is exclusively a question whether or not God so chooses to reveal Himself through the biblical “form.”

However, if Barth asserts that revelation became historical in Jesus Christ and if the apostles are given a unique position in the Church because they were "eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses" of God's revelation in time,<sup>38</sup> then must it not follow that man's faith can stand the test of critical rationality and historical examination? This is to say, if in fact this revelation did occur in time and space and was witnessed by certain men, must not the biblical texts then be treated as historical "sources" as well as kerygma?

Paul Althaus shows that while in Kähler's time it was necessary "to emphasize the fact that the gospels are not *primarily* sources, but testimonies of faith, today the emphasis must be placed elsewhere; the gospels are *also* narratives and sources." Althaus thus points out that the historical question of the gospel is not only "theologically legitimate," but "by the character of the gospels, the New Testament itself invites us to such historical reflexion."<sup>39</sup>

To be sure, Barth's emphasis upon the priority of faith over critical rationality is well taken, i.e., faith is a way of knowing as well as trust. But what faith believes should not have to be sheltered from critical investigation. Paul, in defending the resurrection kerygma before King Agrippa, appeals to the possibility of its public investigation. Paul says: "This was not done in a corner" (Acts 26:26). Paul further makes it clear that the Word of God does not consist of gnostic secrets, but is open to all who can see, and if the gospel is veiled, it is because "the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers" (II Cor. 4:2-4).

Without intending to surrender the freedom of God or to make faith the work of man, it will be argued here that Jesus Christ is not the only objective reality of revelation, nor is revelation only a *direct* self-revelation of God. To be sure, this presupposes a revised concept of *self*-revelation. It has already been suggested that the motif to be defined here is the concept of an *indirect* self-revelation of God. In order to pursue this motif, it has been necessary to follow Barth's theology of a direct self-revelation of God, for it is he who has defined so cogently what is meant by *self*-revelation.

This proposal for an indirect self-revelation of God in history is consciously dependent upon certain presuppositions of Wolfhart Pannenberg, for it is he who has sought purposively to restore a proper balance between reason and faith, revelation and history, in contemporary theology.

Crucial to this revised concept of revelation is thus the terminological distinction between direct and indirect self-revelation. Pannenberg clarifies this distinction in connection with the difference between direct and indirect communication. Direct communication means an exact identity between the content to be communicated and what is actually communicated.<sup>40</sup> Thus, in Barth's terminology, there is no difference between the Word of God and God Himself, for what is revealed is the revealer—thus a direct self-revelation of God. An indirect communication means that what is communicated is not identical with what was intended to be communicated. Pannenberg writes:

Direct communication transmits content without a break from the sender to the receiver. In indirect communication, the path is broken:

the content first reveals its actual meaning by being considered from another perspective. Indirect communication is on a higher level: it always has direct communication as its basis, but takes this into a new perspective.<sup>41</sup>

It is insignificant whether or not such an indirect or direct communication is received immediately or mediated by a messenger. For example, the various Protestant Orthodox theories of inspiration presupposed *direct* communication which was immediately given to the prophets and apostles, but this direct communication was passed on to us as a mediated revelation. This is to say, the direct communication which *immediately* was given to the prophets and apostles through inspiration is revelation for us today because of their words as the Word of God. Such a view of direct communication, however, was formulated before revelation came to be re-defined as self-revelation. Pannenberg does not at all associate his view of revelation with any of the theories of inspiration. Rather, revelation for him is comparable to indirect communication rather than a supernaturally-inspired direct communication. At any rate, for the purposes of clarifying the difference between direct and indirect communication, Pannenberg shows that a direct communication can be received directly, i.e., without a third party being involved. Or, it can be received indirectly by means of a third-party messenger. The same can be said of an indirect communication. What is significant, however, is not the *act* of communicating, but the *content* that is actually received in the act of communicating. Does this content reflect directly or only indirectly what was intended in the communication?

Thus, direct communication would have God himself—without mediation—as its content, analogous to divine epiphanies in the sense of a complete self-revelation, and communication of the divine name would be a direct revelation if it involved a direct disclosure of the being of God himself.<sup>42</sup>

Likewise, the Law would be a direct self-revelation if its content was identical with the will of God, for the will of God (in a comprehensive sense) is the essence of God.<sup>43</sup> The Word of God would be a direct self-revelation if its content was identical with God, whether in Barth's sense of God's self-presentation through the medium of the Bible or in high orthodoxy's rigid doctrine of "inspiredness" in which the written Word was substituted for Christ, the Living Word.<sup>44</sup> However, Pannenberg contends both in regard to the giving of the Law and in regard to the dogmatic concept of the Word of God that what is involved is an indirect (and not a direct) self-revelation. Likewise, the giving of Jahweh's name to Moses is not intended in the first place to be a *self*-disclosure of God.<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, "indirect communication is distinguished by not having God as the content in any direct manner."<sup>46</sup> Though God is the originator of the revelatory events and thus intends to disclose Himself, nevertheless, his essence is only known indirectly, i.e., by reflecting on the event which he originated.



One of the many christological models critically analyzed in John McIntyre's book, *The Shape of Christology*, is the "revelation model."<sup>47</sup> What he proposes as an adequate concept of revelation closely corresponds to what Pannenberg means by an indirect self-revelation. Professor McIntyre points out that the paradigm of revelation in the Old Testament is triadic, i.e., the revealer (represented by *A*), what is revealed (represented by *B*), and the recipient of the revelation (represented by *C*) constitute the three-term relation of the revelation model. The three terms in the concept of revelation are thus related in this way *A* reveals *B* to *C*. For example, in the exodus event, the drying up of the Red Sea is the revealer, *A*; what is revealed is God, *B*; and the recipient of the revelation, *C*, is Moses.<sup>48</sup>

The three terms of this basic revelation model (*A* reveals *B* to *C*) are further qualified. *A* is qualified by *x*, so the *A* (i.e., any empirical event, object, or situation) which reveals God, *B*, is not revelatory in itself, but requires a supernatural frame of reference, *x*. Thus, *A(x)* represents an occurrence in the space-time spectrum which possesses at the same time an ontological difference from everything else that naturally occurs, i.e., this occurrence is a supernatural event; otherwise, it would not be revelatory.<sup>49</sup>

*B* is qualified by *y*, so that *B* (God who is revealed) is not the pure essence of God, but is some aspect of his essence, *y*. Thus *A(x)* reveals *B(y)*. For example, the drying up of the Red Sea as an act of God, *A(x)*, reveals God's saving activity, *B(y)*, but not God's pure essence, *A(E)*. The second term of this model, *A(y)*, is precisely what is meant by an indirect self-revelation. What is revealed is not God's essence, but some aspect of his being which indirectly reveals his essence.<sup>50</sup>

The third term, *C*, is qualified by the Holy Spirit. The recipient, *C*, is not a passive agent in the revelation event. He is active either in rejecting or accepting the revelation. However, the recipient cannot truly understand the revelation event apart from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Thus, *A(x)* reveals *B(y)* to *C* (Holy Spirit).<sup>51</sup>

Pannenberg would dispute the validity of this third term, *C* (Holy Spirit). Instead, his third term would be *C* (Historical Reason), i.e., what is revealed is open to anyone who properly exercises his powers of reason. This is to say, the Holy Spirit is not needed in order to ascertain the proper interpretation of revelatory events. Rather, events speak their own language, "the language of facts."<sup>52</sup> In this respect, if Barth onesidedly stresses the *sola scriptura* principle, Pannenberg onesidedly neglects it.

In the New Testament, McIntyre shows that the Old Testament model, *A(x)* reveals *B(y)* to *C* (Holy Spirit) undergoes a further modification. *A* represents Jesus of Nazareth as he appeared to his contemporaries as any other man would have. The *x* represents the transcendent reality of *A*, which means that *A* can only be properly seen from the perspective of faith. *B(y)* is altered to become *B(A)*, for what is revealed is not some aspect of God's essence, but his essence itself. Thus, *B(A)* refers to "God in Jesus Christ." The second form of the revelation model is thus: *A(x)* reveals *B(A)* to *C* (Holy Spirit).

Since *A(x)* is not just any event, but God as he is in Christ, then *A(x)* becomes *B(A)*. And since what *B(A)* reveals is not some attribute of God's being, but God's

being per se—which is given the term,  $B(E)$ —then the second form of the revelation model is altered to a third form:  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(E)$  to  $C$  (Holy Spirit). That is, the God-man reveals God as he is essentially in himself to believers through the illumination of the Holy Spirit.<sup>53</sup>

According to the third form of the revelation model,  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(E)$  to  $C$  (Holy Spirit), the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is *absolutely* unique. That is, while there may be many instances of the Old Testament revelation model,  $A(x)$  reveals  $B(x)$  to  $C$  (Holy Spirit), there can logically be only *one* instance of the New Testament model,  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(E)$  to  $C$  (Holy Spirit).<sup>54</sup>

But even in this third form of the revelation model, it is not a matter of a complete direct self-revelation. Professor McIntyre does not speak in these terms of a direct self-revelation. However, as he points out, what we do have in Jesus Christ is a revelation of God's self regardless how incomplete it may now be. He writes:

On the one hand, we want to do justice to the claim made by theologians who use this model that in Jesus God reveals not just one of his attributes, or some aspect of his nature or even his whole purpose for mankind, but his very self; ...At the same time, on the other hand, it is obvious that in Jesus the naked glory of God's majesty is not beheld, and that we have to do, in the first instance, with the Word *made flesh*, God in Christ Jesus, God as a man among men.<sup>55</sup>

F. Gerald Downing has given an extensive critical analysis of the biblical terms for revelation in which he concludes that the word "revelation" very often refers to the future appearance of Jesus Christ.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, McIntyre has indicated that only in the end-time will God's *self-revelation* be complete.<sup>57</sup> McIntyre further speaks of the incarnation as "the anticipation of the end," i.e., the eschaton.<sup>58</sup> This suggests that what is given in the Christ event as God's *self-revelation* is the pre-actualization of the end at which time God's *self* will be fully revealed.<sup>59</sup>

In a way not altogether unlike McIntyre's "revelation model," Pannenberg contends that "there are as many revelations as there are divine acts and occurrences in nature and history,"<sup>60</sup> i. e.,  $A(x)$  reveals  $B(x)$  to  $C$  (Historical Reason). Admittedly, this eliminates the idea of a direct self-revelation except in a qualified sense so far as the Christ event is concerned.

What Pannenberg is asserting, in contrast to a *direct* self-revelation, is the idea of an *indirect* self-revelation of God which becomes a direct self-revelation only as the totality of reality is known, namely, at the end of history. However, this direct self-revelation has already been partially unveiled in Jesus Christ—thus Pannenberg's concept of the New Testament revelation model becomes:  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(\text{some } E)$  to  $C$  (Historical Reason). Only in the eschaton can it be said that  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(\text{all } E)$ .

Pannenberg seeks to expound this fundamental idea of the New Testament (i.e., that God's indirect self-revelation has progressively unfolded in the world but will be consummated in a complete direct self-revelation only at the end-time) in terms

of universal history. Pannenberg acknowledges that this idea of a universal history goes back to German idealism, especially to Hegel, even as Barth's idea of self-revelation has its roots there. For Pannenberg, this recognition does not invalidate its use in systematic theology.<sup>61</sup> Rather, what is significant is whether or not the idea of universal history can articulate properly the idea of God's self-revelation. What follows is intended only to point out that the idea of an indirect self-revelation of God in terms of a universal history can be exegetically supported in Scripture.

First, it can be said that knowledge of God is derived on the basis of His historical activity which includes both word and event. This can be seen in the Exodus event. Before the Exodus, Jahweh tells Moses what He is going to do so that after the event the people will look upon it as the confirmation of the prophetic word. "And Israel saw the great work which the Lord did against the Egyptians, and the people feared the Lord; and they believed in the Lord and in his servant Moses" (Exodus 14:31). In Elijah's contest with the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, it was God's action in consuming Elijah's sacrifice with fire that proved His divinity. "And when all the people saw it, they fell on their faces; and they said, 'The Lord, he is God; the Lord, he is God'" (I Kings 18:39). Jethro (Exodus 18:11) and Naaman (II Kings 5:15) likewise both acknowledged the sovereignty and deity of Jahweh on the basis of what they saw and experienced.<sup>62</sup>

The basis for Israel's belief in the divinity of God is thus found in the testimony of their history. They have not arrived at this fundamental conviction through philosophical speculation, but rather, it is derived from their experience of history. Yehezkel Kaufmann points this out succinctly.

The religion of the Bible is not set forth philosophically. It is urged on Israel on the basis of history; the basic attributes of Israel's God are historical. The first of the Ten Commandments grounds *YHWH's* claim to be recognized as sole God on the fact that he brought Israel out of the land of Egypt. Israel believed in *YHWH* and Moses after the miracle of the Red Sea (Exod. 14:31). Israel will have lasting faith in *YHWH* and Moses because of the Sinaitic theophany (19:9). "Knowledge of God" derives from historical experience: "To you it was shown that you might know that *YHWH* is God, there is none else beside him" (Deut. 4:35). The Exodus, the theophany at Sinai, the miraculous conquest of Canaan are repeatedly put forth as proofs that "*YHWH* is God, there is none else" (e.g., Josh. 23; 24; Judg. 2:1-2, 7; 10:11 ff.; I Sam. 12:6 ff.; I Kings 8:16, 53). It is the basis of prophetic arguments as well (Amos 2:9 ff.; Hos. 13:4; Mic. 6:1 ff.; Ezek. 16; 20; and elsewhere). The eschatological events that will proclaim the glory of *YHWH* to all men are also portrayed in images drawn from the legends of the Exodus.<sup>63</sup>

Likewise in the New Testament the decisive factor of revelation is its historical character. For example, the mere claims of Jesus to authority in themselves did not verify his unity with God. Rather, the function of the miracle stories was to

demonstrate this unity. Ulrich Wilkens points this out:

The answer of Jesus to the direct question: "Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?" receives the direct reply: "The blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have the good news preached to them." All of this was expected in the course of events on the judgment day and was also taken as a sign of salvation in the new age. If these miracles were done by Jesus, then they point to Jesus as "the one who is to come." This is the rationale for the answer of Jesus: "Blessed is he who takes no offense at me." Thus, these miracles are understood as the rule of God which is imminent in the company of his person, and they are therefore to be taken seriously.<sup>64</sup>

What is being argued here is that revelation is not a direct self-revelation, but is indirect in the sense that God is known on the basis of his historical activity, which means that the God who reveals Himself is not to be directly identified with what is actually revealed. To be sure, the purpose of God's revelation is to make Himself known, but in so doing He actually communicates a content other than His pure presence. It is by reflecting on this "other content" that indirectly reveals who God is. What is to be further contended is that this indirect self-revelation of God was progressively expanded in the course of historical development until it reached its proleptic culmination in the Christ event. By "proleptic" is meant the self-revelation of God has reached its climax in the course of historical process and will not be overtaken by any other event until the eschaton at which time the *direct* self-revelation of God will occur. In other words, "prolepsis" means the provisional fulfillment of what is to be expected in the future.

Thus, revelation, as Pannenberg describes it, is related to a "chain of tradition, which runs from the Old Testament through the apocalyptic literature and on to the proclamation of Jesus found in the first community and in Paul."<sup>65</sup> Finally, it is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead that is the self-vindication of the God of Israel to be the God of all men, for Jesus' substantial unity with God and his claim to divine authority can be seen to be true from the perspective of the resurrection event.

This example upon the continuity of historical events reaching back into the earliest beginnings of Israel's history stands in conscious opposition to the so-called "new quest" for the historical Jesus which constructs its Christology on the pre-Easter Jesus and his claim to authority. Jesus' claim to divine authority can only rightly be understood both in the light of Israel's historical development and the divine confirmation of Jesus' unity with God by his resurrection. Paul succinctly points out this continuous chain of tradition in which the revelation of God reaches its climax in Jesus of Nazareth. In this respect, he speaks of (1) the historical continuity between Israel and Jesus, (2) his resurrection as confirmation of his deity, and (3) the universal goal of history in bringing salvation to all nations.

Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God which he promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures, the gospel concerning his Son, who was descended from David according to the flesh and designated Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by his resurrection from the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord, through whom we have received grace and apostleship to bring about obedience to the faith for the sake of his name among all the nations, including yourselves who are called to belong to Jesus Christ (Romans 1:1-6).

Thus, it is not just single historical occurrences that completely reveal the essence of God, but rather, it is a complex of events which points to the revelation of God, culminating in Jesus Christ. "But when the time had fully come (*οτε δε ηλθεν το πληρωμα του χρονου*), God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as son" (Galations 4:4-5).

This understanding of revelation as being the result of a complex of events is clearly expressed by the Deuteronomist: "And because he loved your fathers and chose their descendants after them, and brought you out of Egypt with his own presence, by his great power, driving out before you nations greater and mightier than yourselves, to bring you in, to give you their land for an inheritance, as at this day; *know therefore this day*, and lay it to your heart, *that the Lord is God in heaven above and on the earth beneath; there is no other*" (Deuteronomy 4:37-39). That God's plan for his people had been revealed to their "fathers," and the fact that they now were to live in the promised land constituted for them the revelation of God: "know therefore this day . . . that the Lord is God." Thus, the purpose of history was to make Jahweh known to the people of Israel.<sup>66</sup>

It can be said that the self-vindication of the deity of Jahweh was considered to be complete after the occupation of the promised land.<sup>67</sup> But the events of the fall of Judah and the exile brought about a revision in Israel's understanding of revelation. Revelation was now moved to a future expectation. While the exile itself came as the result of disobedience on the part of Israel, as the prophets proclaimed, the present tribulation was only transitory, for in the end of their distress would come the salvation of Jahweh. Edmond Jacob shows that the apocalyptic expectation of the prophets is a new understanding of revelation in connection with the exodus and conquest. "The Exodus theme with its accent on deliverance had a new flowering when the events of the exile were considered as the final point of Yahweh's judgments."<sup>68</sup> This is especially seen in Ezekiel and Isaiah who take up the theme of the Exodus and the occupation of the promised land. Jacob writes:

By emphasizing the wilderness theme and by introducing into it the idea of punishment, they reconcile judgment with the promise: Jahweh will once more lead Israel into the wilderness of the peoples and will perform a judgment there (Ex. 20-35), for, through the dangers that it presented,

the wilderness was a place of temptation rather than an idyllic setting. Ezekiel sees his own role in the light of that of Moses: as a sentinel with the duty of warning the people, he will proclaim the coming of a new shepherd, a new David, who will take up on a vaster scale the work of Joshua. The people will be restored: just as in former times they had crossed the Red Sea and the Jordan, which in each case had been a passage through death—think of the lasting association of the sea with chaos—they will again pass from death to life (Ez. 36-37) and the Temple rebuilt in the centre of the country will be the guarantee of the dependability of this promise. So Ezekiel proclaims nothing which is not to be found already in the ancient *credo*, so convinced is he that the faithlessness of the people does not cancel the faithfulness of God.<sup>69</sup>

Isaiah also speaks of the future deliverance of Israel as being a new Exodus which then will be followed with a new Covenant (Isaiah 54).<sup>70</sup>

What the prophetic expectation thus conceives as decisive is the future revelation of God. It will be the inauguration of a new aeon which will also reveal the meaning of the present. History thus progresses toward this end according to the plan of God. Jacob shows that, though the belief that God is the initiator of events is not uniquely a biblical teaching, the idea “that God binds himself to historical events to make them the vehicle of the manifestation of his purpose” is a characteristic feature of revelation. Jacob writes:

While the powers of the gods of the nations cease at the frontiers of their territory, Yahweh directs universal history, and a declaration like that of Amos that Yahweh directs not only the destinies of Israel, but also that of the Philistines and of the Ethiopians, provides a good illustration of the specific power of Israel's God, all of whose potentialities were developed by the prophets. Yahweh is not only a powerful God but a wise sovereign who leaves no place either for dualism or for chance: all is initiated and willed by him (Amos 3:6; Is. 47:7; Lam 3:37), which does not mean that history is only the unfolding of a plan fixed in advance, for Yahweh holds the destinies of men in his hands, not in the way of a marionette operator, but by leaving them with the freedom of decision; and so history always appears to be a drama in which the two protagonists, God and men, call one another, flee from one another and finally become reconciled.<sup>71</sup>

The ultimate purpose of God's historical activity is to make himself known to all peoples (Isaiah 43:9-10), to all “flesh” (Isaiah 49:26). “I gird you [Israel]...that men may know...that there is none beside me” (Isaiah 45:5-6). “And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together” (Isaiah 40:5).<sup>72</sup>

What is thus especially emphasized in the prophetic expectation is the extending of *Heilsgeschichte* into universal history. Thus, it is at the end of the present aeon that the essence of God shall be revealed, for then he shall come to inaugurate his

kingship on earth so that it can be said that "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea" (Isaiah 11:9; Hab. 2:14).

It is this eschatological inauguration of the Kingdom of God on earth which can be said to be identical with the full knowledge of God. Pannenberg writes:

Placing the manifestation of God at the end of history means that the biblical God has, so to speak, his own history. That is, the historical event of revelation cannot be thought of in an outward way as revealing the essence of God. It is not so much the course of history as it is the end of history that is at one with the essence of God. But insofar as the end presupposes the course of history, because it is the perfection of it, then also the course of history belongs in essence to the revelation of God, for history receives its unity from its goal. Although the essence of God is from everlasting to everlasting the same, it does have a history in time. Thus it is that Jahweh first becomes the God of all mankind in the course of the history that he has brought to be.<sup>73</sup>

The significance of the resurrection of Jesus can be seen in the fact that the eschatological expectation of God's coming Kingdom on earth has already been pre-actualized in Jesus of Nazareth. This indicates that neither "the realized eschatology" of Dodd nor "the consistent eschatology" of Albert Schweitzer can be seen to be the exclusive interpretation of Jesus' eschatological preaching. Rather, eschatology includes an "already" and "not-yet."<sup>74</sup> In the kerygma of Jesus is proclaimed the "already" of the Kingdom of God. The central proclamation of Jesus' kerygma was the imminent Kingdom of God: "But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well" (Matthew 6:33). Thus, the eschatological message of God's imminent reign formed the encompassing thrust of Jesus' preaching. Whatever attitude his hearers took toward his message and his claim to divine authority would ultimately determine their destiny. But, this "already" of the Kingdom of God stands in tension with the "not yet" aspect. The apocalyptic expectation had pointed to the earthly rule of the Kingdom of God, but such a political development did not happen. For this reason, Pannenberg points out that "without the resurrection of Jesus, his message would have turned out to be a fanatical audacity."<sup>75</sup> It was, in fact, because of his resurrection that Jesus' message concerning the expectation of the near end was vindicated, for this end was proleptically fulfilled in his own person. In this way it can be seen that the "not yet" of the Kingdom of God still remains to be fulfilled in the eschaton, when "the kingdom of the world has become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever" (Revelation 11:15).

We shall now summarize what has been said or implied concerning the relationship between revelation and history. (1) The concept of revelation is here defined as the self-disclosure of God, i.e., man's knowledge of God has its origin in God's disclosure of Himself. (2) Revelation as history is an indirect disclosure of God, i.e., the content of revelation in history does not directly coincide with the

essence of God. This means that the Revealer and what is revealed do not have an exact correspondence. Rather, the content of revelation tells us something *about* God, and only indirectly *who* God is. (3) There are as many revelations of God as there are divine events. (4) *Heilsgeschichte* takes on a universal character, for all history is seen to be moving toward the eschaton at which time the full direct revelation of God shall be visible. (5) Insofar as Jesus' substantial unity with God can be seen on the basis of Jesus' claim to divine authority and his resurrection from the dead, he is the pre-actualization of the eschatological future. Thus, those who respond to his message and abandon their own self-sufficiency in favor of his lordship have a share in the coming Kingdom of God in the present. (6) Insofar as the eschaton has been anticipated in Jesus' person, i.e., insofar as Jesus is God, he possesses absolute significance for all mankind. This means no further revelation can overtake the Christ event so long as history is moving toward the eschaton. This suggests that all history is to be judged in the light of the Christ event. (7) It is the end of history that can be said to be one with the essence of God, i.e., God will be fully known in a direct self-disclosure in the eschaton. This points out that the course of history constitutes an indirect self-revelation, while the end of history is a direct self-revelation.

Despite the further developments in theology since the rise of the neo-orthodoxy of Barth and the existentialism of Bultmann (who also agreed with the concept of revelation as meaning exclusively self-disclosure), it is still generally assumed that theology is not concerned with intellectual insight that involves ontological objectivity. With this redefinition of the traditional concept of revelation in terms of self-revelation, this supposedly permits the theologian to maintain the purity of faith (*fiducia*), while the scholar can engage in a historical-critical analysis of the Bible without the factual results of one's study having any harmful and negative effect on faith. However, this splitting up of historical consciousness into a critical detection of facts on the one hand and existential-theological meaningfulness on the other hand is fatal because it reduces belief to a mere subjectivism that undermines the integrity of Christian conviction.

To put aside the question concerning the truthfulness of faith's basis in history opens up one to Feuerbach's criticism that theology is merely anthropology. This means faith will "deteriorate into the 'work' of an illusory redemption of oneself," as Pannenberg puts it. He pointedly writes: "The believer who thinks that he can give the answer to the trial of gnawing doubt through the act of faith itself is already on the road to such a self-deceptive works-righteousness."<sup>76</sup>

This modern redefinition of revelation as self-revelation rightly points out that the ultimate intent of God is to make Himself known in personal and intimate fellowship. In this respect, theology is history, for revelation-history is the engagement of persons in a drama that God has with His people. This history is both event and interpretation. The attempt, on the other hand, to withdraw from the full dimension of historical truth into a ghetto of existential meaningfulness is illusory. For the meaningfulness of God's self-revelation is linked inseparably to the question of whether or not God has successfully communicated something about Himself in the events of history that He has initiated with his people.



One final comment. To speak of this self-revelation of God as indirect calls attention to the incompleteness and openness of the history which is to be finalized in the eschaton; it specifically does not mean that one cannot have a direct experience with God. John Cobb has criticized Pannenberg for allegedly drawing "attention away from the question of God's immediate dealings with individuals."<sup>77</sup> Pannenberg replies: "Far be it from me to contest the immediacy of contingent divine activity in individuals."<sup>78</sup> Indeed Pannenberg's point is that personal commitment and experience is an essential ingredient of historical knowledge. On the other hand, Pannenberg rightly assumes that one can have an authentic experience with Christ despite the scholarly inadequacy of one's understanding. He writes:

He who believes in Jesus has salvation in Jesus whom he trusts, without regard to the question how it stands with his historical and theological knowledge of Jesus. The presupposition is, of course, that fellowship with Jesus really mediates and assures salvation. The research and knowledge of theology, or at least of the theoretical disciplines of theology, deal with the truth of this presupposition of faith. Such knowledge is thus not a condition for participating in salvation, but rather it assures faith about its basis. It thereby enables faith to resist the gnawing doubt that it has no basis beyond itself and that it merely satisfies a subjective need through fictions, and thus is only accomplishing self-redemption through self-deception.<sup>79</sup>

To speak of self-revelation as indirect is thus not an agnosticism. It is not a denial of real knowledge of God's essence. Indeed the historical events of God's self-revelation as witnessed to in the Scriptures provide the factual basis for a theological understanding of the nature of God's selfhood. Furthermore, the believer has genuine fellowship and intimacy with Jesus, and this fellowship is personal and immediate. Indeed this fellowship with Jesus, instead of being a rational hindrance to an objective knowledge of God's revelation in history, actually enhances one's true understanding. For all true knowing involves the knower as an active participant. The Kantian ideal of detachment and neutrality on the part of the knower is indeed a highly questionable presupposition, as Michael Polanyi has cogently shown in *Personal Knowledge*. Thus to speak of God's self-revelation as indirect is not to suggest that a knowledge of God is merely inferential. Rather, it is to say that God's selfhood is mediated through the history He has with His people. This means that "now we see through a mirror dimly, but then [in the eschaton] face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood" (I Cor. 13:12).

Our understanding of the nature of God is based on the reality that God has successfully communicated something about Himself in the story that he has with his people. If this concept of an indirect self-revelation of God is valid, then theology cannot ignore the factual question of whether or not the events of biblical history are reliable and true.

The implications of this assumption are enormous for the varied forms of contemporary theological concerns and expressions. For if God's self-revelation has really occurred, theology has a normative and authoritative basis by which to evaluate the claims of all human institutions and theoretical systems. Yet many recent theological trends indicate that the task of the theologian is not to bring our cultural and social issues before the normative authority of God's revelation in Scripture, but rather to readjust our interpretation of the Bible in the light of our cultural concerns. In this respect, our cultural situation becomes the "text" and the Bible is the "context" with the consequence that the Bible is given a secondary status.

Pannenberg in particular rightly insists that our contemporary experience and cultural situation are to be factored into our understanding of the revelation of God in history as recorded in the Scriptures, yet he insists upon the normative truth of Jesus' claim to be the eternal Son of God incarnate. Recent theologies which seek to bypass the normativity of God's historical revelation are succumbing to a subjectivism and pluralism which undermine the basis of genuine faith. As Pannenberg has put it, the revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth is open to anyone who has eyes to see.<sup>80</sup> To ignore the absolute uniqueness of Jesus for our contemporary situations and to restrict the revelation of God to merely an existentialist encounter is to abandon the primary task of theology. Barth of course insisted upon the propositional task of interpreting the revelation of God mediated through Scripture, but his and Bultmann's concept of revelation as encounter opens the door to a downplaying of the normative significance of biblical data, despite Barth's intention to the contrary.

Both Barth and Pannenberg insist that God has really spoken in a decisively intellectual and personal manner. Barth defines this revelation primarily in terms of the Bible becoming the Word of God in the moment of faith, whereas Pannenberg defines revelation as history. While this paper has not tried to assess in detail the strengths and weaknesses of both positions, it seems that Pannenberg's proposal for understanding revelation (theology) as history is apologetically a more defensible position if it can be modified to include Barth's emphasis upon the *sola scriptura* principle. In this respect, McIntyre's revelation model of  $B(A)$  reveals  $B(E)$  to  $C$  (Holy Spirit) gives us this synthesis. For revelation includes both encounter with the presence of God in Christ and the objective events and words which mediate to us this knowledge. Ultimately this revelation will be realized in the eschaton when God's glory (naked presence) will be revealed.

#### Notes

1. Paul Althaus, "Die Inflation des Begriffs der Offenbarung in der gegenwertigen Theologie," *Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie*, 18 (1941): 134-135.
2. *Science of Logic*, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (London: George Allen

and Unwin, Ltd., 1929), II, 466-467; I, 60-62.

3. *Grundlehren der Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, 1827, Paragraph 115, cited by Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I, 1, 280. Cf. Pannenberg, *Revelation as History*, trans. David Granskou (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 5.

4. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1963), I, 2, 489.

5. Pannenberg, *Revelation as History*, p. 6.

6. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I, 1, 465.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 340.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

9. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 189ff, 369.

10. *Revelation as History*, p. 8.

11. Cf. John McIntyre, *The Christian Doctrine of History* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), p. 2. F. Gerald Downing, *Has Christianity a Revelation?* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1964) pp. 238-239.

12. *Church Dogmatics*, I, 1, 339.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Church Dogmatics*, I, 2, 499.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 491.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 522.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 501.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 487ff.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 499ff.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 513.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 518.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 473-537.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 521.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 522.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 522-523.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 525.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 525.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 502.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 484.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

35. *Essays: Philosophical and Theological*, trans. James C. G. Greig (London: SCM Press, 1955), p.261.

36. *Church Dogmatics*, I, 2, 473.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 531.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 505.
39. Paul Althaus, *The So-Called Kerygma and the Historical Jesus*, trans. David Cairns (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p.25. The necessary change of emphasis today from “kerygma” to the “historical” is illustrated in Althaus’ title, *The So-Called Kerygma and the Historical Jesus*, in contrast to Kähler’s *The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ*.
40. *Revelation as History*, p. 14.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Church Dogmatics*, I, 2, 522-523.
45. *Revelation as History*, pp. 9-10.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
47. John McIntyre, *The Shape of Christology* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1966), pp. 145-171.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 147f.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.
52. *Revelation as History*, p. 137.
53. *The Shape of Christology*, pp. 150-152.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151
56. Downing has sought to provide an exegetical and lexical demonstration that “the documents of the ‘New Testament’ do not, by and large, give a very large place to ‘revelation’ in any sense as a metaphor, concept or category to express their understanding of the purpose of Jesus or of God ‘in’ Jesus” (*Has Christianity A Revelation?*, p. 126). Particularly Downing points out the concept of revelation as an unveiling of the selfhood of God to man in an “I-Thou” confrontation is not a biblical idea (*ibid.*, pp. 197-199). On the other hand, he points out that “revelation” means the revelation of Christ in glory. He writes: “The Corinthians are waiting for the ‘revealing’ (*αποκαλύψις*) of our Lord, Jesus Christ (I Cor. 1:7). The Thessalonians will receive rest ‘at the revealing (same word) of the Lord Jesus from heaven’ (II Thess. 1:7). The Colossians will be manifested in glory, when Christ is manifested (*φανερωθη*) (Col. 3:4). This is the same event as Paul earlier wrote about to Rome: ‘The glory that shall be revealed,’ and ‘the earnest expectation of the creation’ that ‘waits for the revealing of the sons of God’ (*αποκαλυφθησονται, αποκαλυψιν*) (Rom. 8:18 ff.). *This is ‘revelation’ in its technical sense in the New Testament.* It is a future hope; other elements of the end-time may make their presence felt now; but ‘revealing’ refers to those aspects of the end that are still very much in the future.” (pp. 75-76).
57. *The Shape of Christology*, p. 164.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.
59. John Baillie likewise points out that the revelation in Jesus Christ is a partial pre-actualization of the revelation which is to be completed at the end-time. He writes:

"Indeed as time went on, this word apocalypse, which is the most general word for revelation in New Testament Greek, tended to be used exclusively for that which still waits to be revealed. Yet the point needs clearly to be made that this is not an independent or extra revelation, over and above that which is given in the Gospel history itself. The revelation of what is still to be is contained in the revelation of what has already been, and is nothing else than an elicitation of its inherent promise. Our assurance of the full inheritance derives from the earnest of it which we have already received. Or, in another metaphor, our assurance of the final harvest rests on our having already reaped the first fruits of it in the resurrection of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit"[*The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 57].

60. *Revelation as History*, p. 16.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
62. Rolf Rendtorff, "The Concept of Revelation in Ancient Israel," *Revelation as History*, p. 42.
63. Kaufmann, *The Religion of Israel*, trans. and abridged by Mosche Greenberg (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 132.
64. U. Wilkens, "The Understanding of Revelation within the History of Primitive Christianity," *Revelation as History*, p. 77.
65. *Revelation as History*, p. 131.
66. Edmond Jacob, *Theology of the Old Testament*, trans. Arthur W. Heathcote and Philip T. Allcock (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), p. 190.
67. Pannenberg, *Revelation as History*, p. 132.
68. Jacob, p. 192.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.
72. Rolf Rendtorff, *Revelation as History*, pp. 45-46.
73. *Revelation as History*, pp. 133-134.  
(pp. 75-76).
74. Cf. Cullmann, *Salvation as History*, trans. Sidney G. Sowers (London: SCM Press, 1967), p. 202.
75. *Theology as History*, p. 116.
76. *Theology as History*, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 270.
77. Cobb, "Past, Present, and Future," *Theology as History*, p. 209.
78. *Theology as History*, p. 238.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
80. *Revelation as History*, p. 135.

